



SUDAN UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
COLLEGE OF GRADUATE STUDIES



**TEACHING PHILOSOPHY OF THE GOOD LIFE WITH REFLECTIONS
IN VIEWS OF AL-GHAZALI AND MACINTYRE ON VIRTUE AND
ESSENCE FOR NIGERIA**

تدريس فلسفة الحياة الجيدة مع تأملات في آراء الغزالي
وماكينتير عن الفضيلة والجوهر في نيجيريا

A Ph.D. THESIS

SUBMITTED TO COLLEGE OF GRADUATE STUDIES THROUGH THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATIONAL SCIENCES,
COLLEGE OF EDUCATION

IN FULFILMENT FOR THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE AWARD OF Ph.D. IN
EDUCATION (*PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION*)

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OCTOBER, 2019

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1. BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

The Federal Republic of Nigeria in its National Policy on Education (NPE) proclaimed that: the overall philosophy of Nigeria is to live in unity and harmony as one indivisible, indissoluble democratic and sovereign nation founded on the principles of freedom, equality and justice, while Nigeria's philosophy of education is based on the development of the individual into a sound and effective citizen as well as the full integration of the individual into the community.¹ However, this is what one of the concerned citizens of Nigeria had to say about the status quo of the nation:

In Nigeria, corruption has been deeply entrenched in our national ethics, politics, civil society, public and private sectors of business and commerce. The religious, educational, moral spheres and the whole economic machinery of our society, stink and ooze with the stench of corruption. Every level of the Nigerian society has been deeply permeated by a pervasive and debilitating culture of corruption so much that it has been rightly remarked that, corruption has been institutionalized in Nigeria.²

This has become a source of serious concern not only in Nigeria but in Africa and the world over, where our social institutions are not functioning effectively as a result of corruption, indiscipline and moral decadence. This has in effect negatively affected the socio-economic, political and educational institutions of the country. Akinpelu, one of the eminent philosophers in

¹ Federal Republic of Nigeria (2013). *National Policy on Education*.

² Chimakonam, O. J., 2015. Corruption in Nigeria: Ethical and Biblical Considerations, Accessed December 2, 2015, http://www.academia.edu/997581/CORRUPTION_IN_NIGERIA_ETHICAL_AND_BIBLICAL_CONSIDERATIONS.

Nigeria stated that; “*the Nigerian education system is in dire trouble. This is the only statement that one can make in Nigeria without much controversy*”.¹

Nigeria is still classed as one of the 20 poorest countries in terms of some selected social and economic indicators according to World Bank.² This shows that the country is seriously suffering from mismanagement of its tapped resources.

In this research attempts would be made to revisit the various theories and conceptions of the concepts of ‘virtue’ and ‘essence’, from pure reason and theology passing comments on Al-Ghazali and MacIntyre’s excogitations on these concepts. It is also the intent of this research to identify the educational implications of these theories and concepts. Further, good life may from philosophical points of view, mean, different things in different parts of the world. Although this entirely depends on what we mean by the phrase ‘the good life’ and what we ought to do in attaining the good life – the ‘end’ and the ‘means’ of teleological³ perspective. Therefore, Africa in general and Nigeria in particular, should serve as our guiding compass in navigating through the ocean of the ethical meanings of the good life here.

But, what does it really mean to claim to have attained the status of the good life? And what philosophies can we derive from the good life? Can the virtuous man claim to have attained the good life? But then, who is the

¹ Akinpelu, J. A., 2005. *Themes in Philosophy of Education for Teachers*. Ibadan: Tafak Publications. p. vii.

² Sekwat, A., n.d. *Economic Development Experience in Nigeria*, accessed 24/05/2016 from https://books.google.com/books?id=cxxJkKYAzioC&pg=PA571&lpg=PA571&dq=Nigeria's+Development+index+since+1960&source=bl&ots=wOpOs-AJjB&sig=D8mwhkZ8JaBZwyj_HswUdVNtFXM&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiMpqPi6vLMAhXDB8AKHTu9D64Q6AEIStAH#v=onepage&q=Nigeria's%20Development%20index%20since%201960&f=false

³ Teleologism in Orhungur, M. M., 2013. *Understanding the Philosophy of Education*. Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited, p. 124.

virtuous man? Is the 'stoic sage' capable of claiming to have attained the good life? And ultimately, what is the purpose of our lives?

Having had a focus on the subject matter, the problem here is, if we argue that it is a good thing to achieve the cardinal objective of the good life, then, how can we teach this philosophy of the good life? If virtue as a concept or construct is considered as a sine qua non in attaining the good life, the fundamental question is; can virtue be taught? This is a very serious argument that has been lingering over the ages since from the green years of philosophy where Socrates with Protagoras, Laches, Meno, Euthypro etc. had some serious debates in the Platonic dialogues,¹ and recently, Ryle² coming up with his own line of argument on the teachability of virtue.

1.2. Statement of the Problem

Every form of research in education, science, social sciences and applied arts must be geared and engineered towards solving a particular identified problem. This is in fact, the major argument of the famous problem solving method of John Dewey.³ This research is not in any way intending to be found wanting in this area. The main problem identified is with the definition and conception of the good life and what we ought to do in achieving and teaching philosophy of the good life particularly in Nigeria, Africa and the world over.

The question; what is the purpose of life? And how can we achieve the good life effectively and consistently is the major concern of this research. Some

¹ the Protagoras in Elwany, M. comp., 2008. *The Complete Works of Plato*, B. Jowett trans., p. 545

² Ryle, G., 1972/2010. Can Virtue Be Taught? In R. F. Dearden, P. H. Hirst and R. S. Peters eds., *Education and the Development of Reason*. London and New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul and Taylor & Francis e-Library, pp. 323 – 332.

³ Akinpelu, J. A., 1981. *An Introduction to Philosophy of Education*. London: Macmillan. P. 146.

might argue that pure reason is enough to make people behave in a morally upright manner, but this research argues to the contrary, and is of the view that a more cogent supplement must be added in order to address the issue of *akrasia* (i.e. weakness of the will) in the moral agents. It is however, hoped that a retreat on the concepts of ‘*virtue and essence*’, from reflections on Al-Ghazali¹ of Persia and MacIntyre² of Scotland using religion and pure reason respectively, could go a long way in addressing the problem at hand. We shall make some practical illustrations of the problem from the following facts.

Transparency International, a Berlin-based global NGO that focuses on reducing graft ran a survey in 28 countries in sub-Saharan Africa in 2014 and 2016 to attempt to measure the level of corruption.³ According to the survey, 22% of Africans who had contact with public services admit to having paid a bribe in the past year. In Liberia the figure was 69%. In Kenya and Nigeria, two of the most important African economies, it was 37% and 43% respectively.⁴ "Corruption creates and increases poverty and exclusion. While corrupt individuals with political power enjoy a lavish life, millions of Africans are deprived of their basic needs like food, health, education, housing, access to clean water and sanitation."⁵

Again, this problem of corruption is coupled with low human development index in African countries.⁶ In Nigeria, the case of mismanagement of public

¹ *Ihya Ulum al-Deen* (Revival of the Religious Sciences)

² *After Virtue* (2007), *Whose Justice, Which Rationality?* (1988) and *dependent Rational Animals* (1999) are the major works which this research will be reviewing in the course of this work.

³ <http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21679473-gloomy-news-transparency-international-scale-corruption-africa> .

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/12/24/africa/africa-corruption-transparency-international/>

⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_African_countries_by_Human_Development_Index

treasury and the general disregard for lives and properties of people has been the order of the day. Jide Ajani¹ would prefer to call this a curse! The past democratic administrations are accused of sucking the public treasury dry by the social media and the even incumbent public administration in Nigeria. Besides, the issue of the Nigerian Factor² has also been a disturbing one further confounding the problem, when Nigerians are said to do exactly the opposite of the right way of doing things. By the way they carelessly use the term has made it necessary for this research to clarify these concepts identified in order to make it green in our minds the actual meanings and importance of being virtuous and our purpose of existence.

However, the elected All Progressives Congress (APC) government has promised to put Nigeria back on track into a new hope. It immediately launched the anti-graft war on corruption³ which is faced with so many criticisms of not tackling the culprits as expected especially, those under the umbrella of the All Progressives Congress (APC). Yet, some people of the People's Democratic Party (PDP) are themselves eulogizing the efforts of the president on anti-corruption.⁴ The question is; since the time of his coming to power, has Nigeria really changed for the better?

Let us now look at some of the sources/causes of this problem in order to attempt having a search light that would lead the way. Take an instance of

¹ Ajani, J., 2013. Nigeria's Public Accounts: The Curse of Mismanagement of Funds, Vanguard Newspaper. Accessed December 2, 2015, <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/05/nigerias-public-accounts-the-curse-of-mismanagement-of-funds/>.

² Okogbule, N. S., n.d. *The Nigerian Factor and the Criminal Justice System*, <http://nigerianlawguru.com/articles/?P=articles&T=criminal%20law%20and%20procedure&L=criminal>

³ Wikipedia contributors, "Buhari's anti-corruption war," *Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia*. Accessed May 25, 2016, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Buhari%27s_anti-corruption_war&oldid=718490486.

⁴ Onyebuchi, E., 2016. *PDP Chieftain Scores Buhari's Anti-graft War High*. April. Thisday Newspaper online, accessed May 25, 2015. <http://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2016/04/24/pdp-chieftain-scores-buharis-anti-graft-war-high/>

the emphasis on paper qualification/good certificates and the falling standard of education in Nigeria; one could observe that all sorts of atrocities are being committed to ensure that the expected paper qualifications are acquired by any means necessary. This leads to desperation and serious examination misconducts in the National examination.¹ Again, Jibril in Omemu² argued that: “*Examination malpractice is the product of a society that nurtures cheats and mediocres and turn them into celebrities.... It is a reflection of the moral decadence of our country*”. A whole lot of other social factors were also highlighted by Omemu³ like admission requirements, occupational strikes which lead to rushing of the syllabus by teachers, desperation to make it to the top at all costs, the employment of unqualified teachers by the politicians, the general value system of the country where the value system in Nigeria is the acquisition of wealth; so much so that money has become the most important factor for status symbol. Most Nigerians believe that money is everything and so there is a rat race to acquire it. This has shown that the sources of these malpractices are more acute at the secondary schools and tertiary institutions.

It is against this background that this research deemed it necessary to identify with philosophy of the good life and the strategies that could be used in teaching the philosophy reflecting on the excogitations of Imam Al-Ghazzali and Alasdair MacIntyre. For, if the situation is not arrested in good

¹ Adegoke, B., 2010. *A survey of Examination: Malpractice Among Secondary School Students - Causes, effects and solutions*, Munich, GRIN Verlag, Accessed July 29, 2016, <http://www.grin.com/en/e-book/178869/a-survey-of-examination-malpractice-among-secondary-school-students>

² Omemu, F., 2015. Causes of Examination Malpractice in Nigeria Schools, *British Journal of Education*, Vol.3, No.7, pp.34-41, July 2015. Accessed July 29, 2016, <http://www.eajournals.org/wp-content/uploads/Causes-of-Examination-Malpractice-in-Nigeria-Schools.pdf>

³ Ibid,

time, Nigeria and many African countries are bound to be in a serious quagmire of indiscipline, mismanagement of public treasury, immorality and lack of focus and determination in life, and of course, a bleak future for the younger generation.

1.3. Aims of the Study

The study in line with the theme of virtues and philosophy of the good life aims at achievement of the following:

- 1) Clarifications on the essence of living and existence
- 2) Clarification of the concept of philosophy of the good life by subjecting it to philosophical analysis.
- 3) Identification of the virtues in Islamic and Western Philosophies of education and to explore their relevance and prospects in the production of morally upright individuals in Nigerian education, and ultimately, attainment of status of the good life.
- 4) Examination of the effective strategies for the teachability of virtue.

1.4. Research Questions

The research intends to seek for answers and clarifications to the following questions and issues:

- 1) What is the purpose of life?
- 2) What is the good life and how can we attain the good life?
- 3) Can virtue be taught?
- 4) Is there any relationship between Al-Ghazali's Islamic Philosophy and MacIntyre's Western Philosophy on the issues of virtue and essence? And to what extent can they affect the African child?

1.5. Assumptions

The study in relation to theme of the good life assumes the following:

- 1) That every society has certain values which are most desirable and worthwhile and therefore, should be transferred to the next generation.
- 2) That this transfer of values be done through both formal and informal means as a way of making it a lifelong affair in the production of autonomous moral agents.
- 3) That the means of transfer of these worthwhile values be done through morally acceptable method.
- 4) That when these values are well integrated into the citizen, he is said to have attained the status of leading a good life in his society.
- 5) That man by his nature is a gregarious being seeking to live with others and ready to value their customs and traditions.
- 6) That man is also a religious being; he either worships a deity or worships his desires, either way, whatever his society deems fit should govern his public conduct.

1.6. Significance of the Study

The study is expected to be of relevance in the two major areas viz: Theoretical and applied significance.

Theoretical Significance: The research is expected to be of relevance in increasing understanding by clarification and harmonisation of literature on concepts, issues, ideas and theories on the problems of indiscipline, corruption and moral decadence. The theories are on virtue ethics and

essence of living, and philosophy of the good life from the works of Al-Ghazali and MacIntyre.

Applied Significance: The application significance of the research is also identified as follows:

- 1) Provision of effective strategies in teaching and learning experiences on morality
- 2) Overall socio-economic development and progress through the production of morally upright citizens.

It is also going to be relevant to the following categories of individuals:

- 1) Policy makers.
- 2) Professionals in the field of mainstream philosophy and philosophy of education.
- 3) Teachers and student-teachers seeking to undertake further research in the area concerned.
- 4) The general public.

1.7. Operational Definitions of Terminologies

It is customary to explain briefly some key concepts of any academic research endeavour in order to avoid ambiguity and misperception of the presented arguments and ideas. Therefore, the following terminologies would have meanings in this research thus:

- 1) **Virtue:** Virtues are all the expected, desired and approved good qualities of an individual in a society. It is a character expected to be nurtured into an individual in order to make him learn to choose the right course of action in times of tribulations and temptations.

- 2) **Essence:** The Essence in philosophical schools of thought being '*ideas*' is not the type this research is considering, rather essence in the actual sense of the word, '*purpose*', '*reason*' (of existence).
- 3) **Corruption:** This means dishonesty for personal gain.¹ The unlawful use of power in obtaining personal advantage over others or one's country.
- 4) **The Good Life:** That state of living in which one is self-actualised and also respected as a virtuous/honourable person in his/her society.
- 5) **Aretaic Ethics:** The word '*aretaic*' is derived from the Greek term for excellence, *arete*². And *aretaic* ethics is distinguished with the ethics of Aristotle in his *Nicomachean Ethics*.
- 6) **Deontic Ethics:** The term 'deontic' is derived from the Greek *deon*, often translated as 'duty'. Such judgements as 'one should always speak the truth', 'one ought to keep one's promises' and 'stealing is morally wrong' are typical deontic constructions. Deontic ethics is however, represented as ethics of Immanuel Kant.
- 7) **Indiscipline:** This connotes lawlessness and the lack of control on the part of the citizenry of a particular nation.
- 8) **Stoic Sage:** Is a person who has attained excellent intellectual and moral character and the only one who is free from anguish and the ultimate destruction that they believe would come to all souls through the conflagration.³
- 9) **Social Institutions:** These are the basic social systems that make up an ideal society, they include; The Family institution, Economic institution,

¹ Microsoft Encarta, "Corruption", 2009 DVD version. 1993-2008 Microsoft Corporation.

² Carr, D. & Steutel, J., eds., 1999. *Virtue Ethics and Moral Education*. London: Routledge. p. 8.

³Saulawa, M. A., 2014. Philosophy of Stoicism and Islamic Moral Education: Some Socio-Ethical Considerations. *Nigerian Journal of Educational Philosophy*. October, 25(1), pp. 60 – 67. p. 62.

Political institution, Religious institution, Legal institution and Educational institution.¹

- 10) **Philosophy:** Philosophy in its modern analytic brand “*is the art of making critical clarifications and reading between the lines in order to illuminate or cast light into the darkness of ignorance so as to come up with rational answers to the questions of reality, knowledge and values*”.²
- 11) **Philosophy of Education:** In this research we shall express philosophy of education as the reflective and systematic utilization of knowledge of the subject matter of philosophy, its methods, tools and techniques in overseeing the modus operandi of the theories and practices of education. It attempts clarification and critique of the concepts, issues and problems that are germane to education such as learning, teaching, indoctrination, conditioning, education, discipline, equal educational opportunities, standard and quality of education, etc.³
- 12) **Logical Fallacy:** this is a state of exhibiting faulty reasoning, and therefore, having a disconnection between premises and their conclusions, premises being the explanations/facts given to support a claim (the conclusion).
- 13) **Teaching:** This technically means, when someone of more experience and higher degree of knowledge is seeking to foster or transfer some dispositions/worthwhile values/information to someone of lesser experience/knowledge (in the subject matter concerned) using an

¹ (Babarinde & Bankole, 2011)

² Saulawa, M. A., n.d. *A Treatise on the Philosophy of Education: A Handbook for Tertiary Institution Students and Practitioners in the Field of Philosophy and Philosophy of Education*. An unpublished handbook written in the Department of Education, Bayero University, Kano, 2016. p. 9.

³ Ibid. p. 9.

acceptable method of instruction. It could be formal, informal or non-formal.

- 14) **The Hidden Curriculum:** This is sometimes called the unseen curriculum. The hidden curriculum is a program of activities that are not vividly spelt out in the school syllabus. They are not directly being taught formally in the classroom, but are still part of the core values that mold character of the students. They support the accomplishment of objectives of the core curriculum. It is that part that mold's the character of the students into what the society needs for the flourishing and success of its legacies.

1.8. Scope and Delimitation of the Research

As with all standard researches, there is the need to mark an area within which the research endeavour intends to cover and the delimitation of its design and universal coverage. Being a philosophical research however, it does not deal with statistical numbers of the population, its sample and statistical tools, but the specific area of interest as shown in the title is Nigeria with Africa being the general interest. The interest is on the norms, values, customs and costumes of the people of Africa as they correlate with philosophy of the good life in Africa and its transfer/enculturation from older generation to the young.

Again, the research being normative in nature gives us a bearing of having interest primarily in normative arguments and theories against metaphysical and epistemological theories, meaning – arguments on metaphysics on the spirits/ soul or the existence or otherwise of God will not receive detailed analysis as would normative issues pertaining the good life, so also

arguments on the possibilities of knowledge, its types, and so on will not be treated in detail here, except pedagogy and praxis of Western, Islamic and African systems of education and ideas. The limitations are superficially on the argument that these facts are not going to be searched using empirical/scientific research methods. However, this could be seen as a major weakness to the layman, but then, C. D. Broad posited that; “*speculative philosophy’s object is to take over the results of the various sciences, to add to them the results of the religious and ethical experiences of mankind and then to reflect upon the whole*”.¹ Again, P.H. Phoenix in Akinpelu² is reported to have argued that philosophy is a synoptic discipline in which all facts and information from diverse other disciplines are integrated and synthesised to give a comprehensive perspective. Could it then, be plausible, to argue that it is incapable of finding the truth/facts which the empirical researches do?

1.9. Summary of the Chapter

From the foregoing, this chapter attempted to pose the research problem by laying a background to the study and stating in categorical terms the problem at hand, where it was traced that examination malpractice is the root of all evils bedeviling Nigeria and so many other African nations, leading to corruption, indiscipline, moral decadence and failure of so many social institutions of the concerned nations. However, this itself, was traced to be an offshoot of putting much emphasis on paper qualification rather than what one can do with his/her talent in practical terms. This necessitated the idea of identifying with philosophy of the good life and how it could be

¹ Enoh, A. O. & Babarinde, K., eds., 2012. *A Guide to Philosophical Research in Education*. Ibadan: Stirling-Horden Publishers Ltd. p. 28.

² Akinpelu, J. A. *Essays in Philosophy and Education*, op. cit., p. 138.

taught. Having had a focus made the researcher to identify philosophers who have extensively devoted their time addressing the research theme, this informed the selection of Al-Ghazali and MacIntyre from the two bipolar philosophies of Islam and the West.

The research aimed at making philosophical clarifications and analyses of the concepts of the research theme with the hope of finding relevance to education in Africa and Nigeria in particular. The research assumes among other things that man is a gregarious and religious being who must live in a company of others guided by rules and regulations, and must also have a deity to worship or worship his/her desires. The research further divided its relevance from theoretical and applied perspectives, where the theories of virtue, essence and the good life were found to be benefitting the most. On the applied side, pedagogy of the good life, policy makers, teachers and student researchers as well as professionals in the mainstream philosophy and philosophy of education were identified to find the work of vital importance to their respective areas. The chapter was closed with a clarification of some terminologies that are sui generis to the research theme, and finally concluded with its area of coverage and limitations as a research. Now, the research will look into a review of the related philosophies and literature to provide a framework for the research in line with the theme of teaching philosophy of the good life, this will be done with first, reviewing philosophies of the selected philosophers of interest in this work.

CHAPTER TWO

REVIEW OF RELATED PHILOSOPHIES AND LITERATURE

2.1. Preface

In this chapter attempts were made in order to establish a synergy of ideas from different philosophers as well as the two selected philosophers (i.e. Al-Ghazali and MacIntyre) in order to come up with a coherent whole on conceptions of the good life, this would be achieved by taking various conceptions of the human good and the purpose of existence in virtue ethics. The good life is by extension, something of ultimate value which every sane moral agent would want to attain, although this entirely depends on the society from which one is viewing the concept. But then, the main concern of this research is on teaching philosophy of the good life, and by implication, when we talk about teaching, we are referring to one of the two most important concepts in education,¹ (the other being learning). Frankena² maintained in his conception of education that; “...to put the matter abstractly and generally with the help of variables, every activity of education can be represented by the following formula: in it X is fostering or seeking to foster in Y some disposition D by method M.”

Where; X here is referring to the society or teacher, while Y being the recipient of what is worthwhile³ (value) or disposition (D) as he puts it, using a morally acceptable method (M). This however, tempts one in raising the question of aims in education, as to what dispositions are most cherished and regarded as worthwhile that could lead one to attaining a

¹ Akinpelu, J. A., 1981. *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education*. London: Macmillan. P. 186.

² Doyle, J. F., ed., 2010. *Educational Judgements: Papers in the Philosophy of Education*. New York: Taylor and Francis e-Library. p. 15.

³ Peters, R. S., 1966. *Ethics and Education*, London: Routledge. p. 25.

good life. Koetting and Malisa quoted Wingo in this regard as having mentioned that;

All serious discussion of educational problems, no matter how specific, soon leads to consideration of educational aims, and becomes a conversation about the good life, the nature of man, and the varieties of experience. But these are the perennial themes of philosophical investigation. It might be a hard thing to expect educators to be philosophical, but can they be anything else?¹

Conceptualizations about “the good life”, (they added) the nature of human kind etc., are problematic as there are no final, all-inclusive, agreed-on positions on these concepts. To this end, this research would use the theoretical framework of the subject matter of philosophy on reality, knowledge and values, with more emphasis on the values, so as to identify which are necessary in attaining the good life when viewed from Virtue ethics and theological submissions on the purpose of life.

However, it is important not to forget that we need to give an account of the biographies of these two selected icons in order to understand the way they think and reason, and how they came up with their systems of thought or world views in general. This is not going to be delving into their inner personal lives, but the point is in order to come up with their philosophies as they are regarded as having much influence in the process of character

¹ Koetting, J. R. & Malisa, M., 2004/2008. Philosophy, Research and Education, in Jonassen, D. H., ed., *Handbook of Research on Educational Communications and Technology*. Second Edition. New Jersey and London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers/Taylor & Francis e-Library. p. 1013. Accessed October 21, 2016, <http://aect.org/edtech/37.pdf>.

building, the molding attitude, and the shaping behaviour of people who put into practice and guard that system of thought.¹

2.2. Ghazali: An Introduction

In this study, it should be noted that by presenting the philosophy of Ghazali we are by implication, presenting another version of Islamic philosophy, just as in the words of Abdullah that; “*In general we can confidently proclaim that Ghazali’s philosophy represents the ‘system of thought’ in Muslim societies.*”² Ghazali has influenced so many philosophers, theologians, sociologists and academic moralists with varied number of works. Among the most salient in his catalogue of influence include St. Thomas Aquinas, who was reported to have acknowledge his indebtedness to the works of the Arabian philosophers of middle Ages. Al-Ghazali has been referred to by some historians as the single most influential Muslim after the Islamic prophet Muhammad [Peace be Upon Him (PBHU)].³

We shall look briefly into the lives and works of these two philosophers, that is, Al-Ghazali and MacIntyre, with their general philosophical outlooks just enough for us to grasp the genesis of their ideas and how we can make some sense out of it, especially in the present work on virtue ethics.

2.2.1. Ghazali’s Life

Imam Ghazali was born in 450 A.H. (1058 A.D.) in the village Taberan in the district of Taus in Persia and his name is Abu Hamid Muhammad. Known as the ‘Proof of Islam’ (*hujjatu al-Islām*), the ‘Renewer of Religion’ (*mujaddid*)

¹ Abdullah, M. A., 1992. *The Idea of Universality of Ethical Norms in Ghazali and Immanuel Kant*, Turkiye Diyanet Vakfi: Ankara, p. 2.

² Abdullah, M. A., 1992, op. cit., p. 7.

³ Wikipedia contributors. Al-Ghazali. Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. June 3, 2016, 04:45 UTC. Accessed June 22, 2016, <https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Al-Ghazali&oldid=723458009>.

and the 'Ornament of Faith' (*Zayn al-Dīn*), he was at once jurist, Qur'ānic commentator, theologian, logician, philosophical critic of philosophy and Sufi. His life became proverbial and his works, written in both Arabic and Persian, have been read avidly for the past nine centuries throughout the Islamic world and continue to be studied widely by both Muslims themselves and Western scholars of Islam.¹

His father was not a famous person but his grandfather was one of the leading men of that age. His father died while he was young leaving him under the care of his mother and grandfather. Ghazzal is said to be the name of a village in the district of Taus in the province of Khorasan in Persia. According to *Maulana Shibli Nomani*, his ancestors had the business of weaving (Ghazzal) and therefore he retained his family title Ghazali (weaver).² At the time of the death of Ghazali's father, he entrusted the education of his two sons Muhammad and Ahmad to one of his trusted friends. The latter imparted to them primary education and then sent them to a private *Maktab* (school).

The boy within a short time committed the whole Quran to memory and after that began to learn Arabic. Then he joined *Nizamia Madrasa* at Nishapur which was a reputed seat of learning and a great educationist named *Imamul Haramain* was its principal. He had 400 students of whom three were most noted - Harrasi, Ahmad-b-Muhammad and Imam Ghazali. The latter became so much grieved at his death that he left Nishapur and

¹ Nasr, S. H. & Aminrazavi, M., eds., 2010. *An Anthology of Philosophy in Persia Vol. 3: Philosophical Theology in the Middle Ages*, London and New York: I.B Tauris & Co. Ltd. p. 82.

² Imam Al-Ghazali, Karim, M. F., trans.1993. *Ihya Ulumiddin (Revival of the Religious Sciences)* Vol. I, Karachi-Pakistan: Darul-Ishaat. p. 8.

went to Baghdad, the capital of the Caliphs. He was then a young man of 28 years of age.¹

At Baghdad, he was appointed principal of Nizamīyah *Madrasa* by *Nizamul Mulk* the chief vizier of the Turkish ruler Malek Shah. Being thus appointed at an early age to such a high post, his popularity as a great learned man spread far and wide and the rulers and the chieftains used to consult him in state affairs and theological matters.² This appointment was made in 484/1097 in Baghdad where he was to teach for four years. While bathing in worldly success and fame in the Abbasid capital, Ghazzālī fell into religious doubt as a result of reading works on philosophy which he had never studied with a master.

Being a person of extreme intellectual sincerity, he could not live in a state of hypocrisy. He therefore relinquished his position, bade farewell to his family and left everything behind in quest of certitude (*yaqīn*). For ten years from 488/1095 to 498/1105 he lived away from public view, wandering in areas stretching from Mecca to Jerusalem and Damascus. His life was spent in spiritual exercise, in meditation, invocation and prayer. Through Sufism, which he now began to practice earnestly, he regained certitude and the eye of his heart was opened to perceive directly the realities of the invisible world. Finally, he returned to his homeland, teaching for a year at the Nizāmiyyah of Nayshābūr and then retreating for the last six years of his life to his city of birth, Ṭūs, where he trained a number of his choicest students and wrote his final works. Although invited to return to Baghdad, he

¹ Ibid, p. 9.

² Ibid.

declined, preferring the quieter ambience of his native city. He died in 505/1111 in Tūs where his tomb can be seen to this day.¹

The life of Ghazzālī is itself a key to the understanding of his works and the reason for his vast influence. He became the foremost authority in the exoteric religious sciences only to fall into religious doubt before the challenge of Avicennian philosophy. He regained his certitude through the path of Sufism and became himself a major authority in the esoteric sciences. He therefore played a major role in the development of jurisprudence and theology on the one hand and Sufism on the other. Moreover, he exercised the most far-reaching effect upon the trajectory that later Islamic philosophy was to follow in Persia.² To these works we shall now turn.

2.2.2. Ghazali's Works and Philosophy

Imam Ghazali is said to have lived for 55 years, and he started writing at about the age of 20, just as we have noted he was already in a very high rank of consultancy and leadership of school at the age of 28 in Nayshabur, he is said to have written over 400 hundred books³ mostly written in the 10 to 11 years he spent while travelling and reflection on his status in the spiritual sphere. He wrote in areas of philosophy, logic, theology, Islamic jurisprudence, mysticism/Sufism, morality, leadership, and Qur'anic (*Tafsir*) commentary. However, we are not going to discuss/mention all these works in this study, we are only going to concern ourselves with those that are related to the subject matter of our discourse here.

¹ Nasr, S. H. & Aminrazavi, M., 2010. op. cit., pp. 84 - 85.

² Ibid,

³ Imam Al-Ghazali, Karim, M. F., trans.1993. *Ihya Ulumiddin (Revival of the Religious Sciences)* Vol. I, Karachi-Pakistan: Darul-Ishaat. p. 10.

Being noted as the *mujaddid* (reviver of Islamic theology) of his time, no less should be expected from the erudite scholar. Ghazali wrote one of the most controversial and influential books on philosophy called *Maqasidul Falasifah* (the aims of the philosophers)¹ and *Tahafut al-falasifah* (The Incoherence of the Philosophers), the latter of which was what made him to be considered as the chief executioner² of Western philosophy in the East while the former being a background to the destruction of philosophy in the East.

The *Maqasidul Falasifah* is practically an Arabic translation of Ibn Sina's Persian work *Dānishnāmāyi 'Alā'ī* (The Book of Science dedicated to 'Alā' al-Dawlah). This work of Ghazali is so lucidly written that it became a favourite source for the learning of Islamic philosophy in the Islamic world and also in the West where its Latin translation became popular and where its author, the Latin *Algazel*, came to be considered a philosopher like Ibn Sīnā and not an opponent of Peripatetic philosophy.

This work was, however, merely a preparation for Ghazali's major criticism of Peripatetic philosophy in general and Ibn Sīnā in particular which he carried out in his *Tahāfut al-falāsifah* (The Incoherence of the Philosophers) to which Ibn Rushd was to respond in his *Tahāfut al-tahāfut* (The Incoherence of the Incoherence). While Ibn Rushd's response did not elicit many sympathizers among Muslims, the work of Ghazali played a major role in curtailing the power of rationalism and indirectly prepared the ground for

¹ This book summarized Ibn Sina's philosophical views, especially the peripatetic views from the teachings of Aristotle.

² Sherif, M. A. op. cit., p.1.

the spread of the teachings of the school of illumination (ishrāq) associated with Suhrawardī.¹

Again, on ethics the first significant work written by Al-Ghazali was *Mizan al-Amal* (Criterion of Action) which was a sequel to *Miyar al-Ilm* (Standard of Knowledge) just like that of *Maqasid* and *Tahafut* mentioned above. However, Ghazali's most important work on ethics as noted by M. Amin² is his Magnum Opus, *Ihya Ulum al-Din* (The Revival of the Religious Sciences), especially Volumes III and IV. These two works on ethics (i.e. *Mizan* and *Ihya*) also follow the usual style of Ghazali in the traditions mentioned above. Meaning - the *Mizan* was a summary of the *Ihya*, where in *Ihya* he was explicitly being detailed in most of his discussions of whatever matter he intends to discuss. We shall give more attention to the latter because virtue ethics is our area of interest, although we shall still not fail to find some relevant references to consult in the *Mizan*.

Finally, we can generally summarize the philosophy of Al-Ghazali into the following main branches of philosophy on reality, knowledge and values; first, his metaphysics is grounded on the Divinity of God as the creator of the Universe and that causality³ is a matter of the total Will of God culled from his argument in the *Tahafut al-Falasifah*.⁴ Secondly, in the area of Epistemology, He believes in God as the chief source of all knowledge, and that knowledge should serve as a light that will guide one to the ultimate knowledge of reality and God. Again, that knowledge must not be hoarded

¹ Nasr, S. H. & Aminrazavi, M. 2010, op. cit., p. 86.

² Abdullah, M. A. 1992. *The Idea of Universality of Ethical Norms in Ghazali and Kant*, op. cit., p. 15.

³ De Boer, T. J., 1963. *The History of Philosophy in Islam*, Jones, E. R. trans. Canada: General Publishing Company, pp. 159 – 163.

⁴ Kamali, S. A., trans., 1963. *Al-Ghazali's Tahafut Al-Falasifah* (Incoherence of the Philosophers), Lahore: Pakistan Philosophical Congress.

but disseminated accordingly by the learned people. This is also culled from his *Ihya Ulum al- Din* in Vol. 1 of the work.¹ Third and finally, his philosophy on values is also that of virtues and ethics from Qur'an and Sunnah (Prophetic traditions) and the sayings of the sages, this could be evident in the way he presented his *Ihya* where most of his arguments were backed up by these three elements.

Zuleyha Keskin², summarized the influence of Al-Ghazali on Islamic thought into the following points:

1. He defended Sunni Islam against the tenets of philosophy and sectarianism.
2. He contributed to the weakening of all philosophy which was in contradiction with Islam.
3. He introduced several principles of logic and philosophy into the disciplines of Islamic law and theology.
4. He reconciled Shari'a and Sufi mysticism (Islamic law and Islamic spirituality).
5. Today his works still form major parts of curriculums in Islamic studies around the world.

Now let us look into the life of the next philosopher of our thesis, in person of Alasdair MacIntyre on his life, works and philosophy

2.3. MacIntyre

As we have mentioned earlier in Ghazali's life and works that he represents another version of orthodox Islam, so also with MacIntyre, here, shall

¹ Ghazali's *Ihya Ulum Al-Din*, Op. cit., pp. 18 – 92.

² Zuleyha Keskin, Imam Al-Ghazali, zkeskin@isra.edu.au

represent the Western philosophy of pure reason. But this is not in any way portraying that MacIntyre is not a religious person, because we are going to come to understand that he himself was deeply influenced by St. Thomas Aquinas, this is because he later on came to be mixing his philosophy with what is now termed as Thomism. Although we may not need to go beyond his rational philosophy, where necessary, anything that could be of help in our explication of the virtues, essences and the good life found within his new faith will not however be ignored.

Albeit, MacIntyre has attracted so many academics and novelists, both philosophers and non-philosophers who deemed his work of immense importance in a modern society of nowadays where morality is seriously in decay in the name of liberalism and modernity. According to McMylor; *“MacIntyre is, in the very best sense of the word, a moralist: the limitations and the impoverished quality of life under contemporary liberalism are his real concern and he is consequently too important a writer to be left only to the philosophers”*.¹ This is an indicator that MacIntyre despite still being alive has had a great deal of influence on so many people because of the depth and richness of his ideas and works. It is however, high time that we answer the questions; who is Alasdair MacIntyre? Where is he actually from and what are his works? Finally what philosophy can we deduce from his general works and arguments? To this analysis, we shall now turn.

2.3.1. MacIntyre’s Life

Alasdair Chalmers MacIntyre is a Scottish philosopher primarily known for his contribution to moral and political philosophy but also known for his

¹ McMylor, P., 2005. *Alasdair MacIntyre: Critic of Modernity*. London: Taylor & Francis e-Library. p. vi.

work in history of philosophy and theology. He was born on 12th January 1929 in Glasgow, to Eneas and Greta (Chalmers) MacIntyre. He was educated at Queen Mary, University of London, and has a Master of Arts degree from the University of Manchester and from the University of Oxford. He began his teaching career in 1951 at Manchester University. He taught at the University of Leeds, the University of Essex and the University of Oxford in the United Kingdom, before moving to the US in around 1969. MacIntyre has been something of an intellectual nomad, having taught at many universities in the US, and a professor in most of these universities.¹

He has also been a visiting professor at Princeton University, and is a former president of the American Philosophical Association. In 2010, he was awarded the Aquinas Medal by the American Catholic Philosophical Association.² From 2000 he was the Rev. John A. O'Brien Senior Research Professor in the Department of Philosophy (emeritus since 2010) at the University of Notre Dame, Indiana USA. He is also Professor Emerit and Emeritus at Duke University. In April 2005 he was elected to the American Philosophical Society, and in July 2010 became Senior Research Fellow at London Metropolitan University's Centre for Contemporary Aristotelian Studies in Ethics and Politics.³

2.3.2. MacIntyre's Works

To begin with, is important to note that MacIntyre has written quite a number of articles in both national and international journals of repute and has also written some books which are basically on the history of ethics,

¹ Wikipedia Contributors. Alasdair MacIntyre. Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Accessed November 13, 2019, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Alasdair_MacIntyre&oldid=726278407.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

and more importantly his staunch commitment to the revival of virtue ethics in Western philosophy culled from the *Nicomachean Ethics* of Aristotle. This came about when he wrote his master piece the “*After Virtue*”, in this regard, Murphy remarked;

*The contribution to contemporary philosophy of Alasdair MacIntyre is incontestably enormous. His writings on ethics, political philosophy, the philosophy of religion, the philosophy of the social sciences, and the history of philosophy have established him as one of the philosophical giants of the last fifty years. His best-known book, After Virtue (1981), spurred the profound revival of virtue ethics.*¹

The major argument in this work is reported to be on how MacIntyre sought to change the course of the hitherto Enlightenment period philosophical dispositions on the non-conclusive nature of rational morality. He brought back the rejected element of teleology into the equation from Aristotle, which he believes is the most important aspect of rational morality if at all, a sound argument is to be sustained.² MacIntyre's thought is revolutionary as it articulates a politics of self-defense for local communities that aspire to protect their practices and sustain their way of life from corrosive effects of the capitalist economy.³ This last point is however; philosophically contestable in this modern world of globalization, where the states under the banner of United Nations (UN) are forced to comply with what is now referred to as ‘*the New World Order*’. Morality is no longer defined from a local community perspective, but seeking for a global/universal acceptance

¹ Murphy, M. C., ed., 2003. *Alasdair MacIntyre*. New York: Cambridge University Press. p. i.

² Wikipedia, op. cit., Alasdair MacIntyre.

³ Ibid.

whereby new attitudes and foreign cultures are to some extent being forced on the developing nations, who are in one way or another indebted to the developed nations, in a 'center and periphery' kind of relationship. Thus, the community autonomy clause/sovereignty may need to be redefined.

The next sequel to the *After Virtue* is '*Whose Justice? Which Rationality?*' published in (1988) in which MacIntyre continued the argument in a more detailed and advanced fashion due to criticisms and revisions of *After Virtue*, it is more of a caricature of the clash of civilizations and traditions in the modern society; although he said it was a more advanced version of *After Virtue* in which he answered some of the questions that he asked without caring to answer¹ in the previous work.² In addition, he sought to find a compromise between opposing/rival traditions. MacIntyre's account also defends three further theses: first, that all rational human inquiry is conducted whether knowingly or not from within a tradition; second, that the incommensurable conceptual schemes of rival traditions do not entail either relativism or perspectivism; third, that although the arguments of the book are themselves attempts at universally valid insights they are nevertheless given from within a particular tradition (that of Thomist Aristotelianism) and that this need not imply any philosophical inconsistency.³

The following work after '*Whose Justice?*' was '*Three Rival Versions of Moral Inquiry*' (1990), this is more of a continuation of '*Whose Justice?*' and a plea for the acceptance of Thomism as the most important moral inquiry, we shall

¹ This is typical of philosophical writings; philosophers tend to ask more questions than they care to answer. In fact, is even one of the hallmarks of philosophical writings; being dialectical and speculative.

² MacIntyre, A., 1988. *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* Notre Dame Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press. pp. ix - x.

³ Wikipedia, op. cit.. Alasdair MacIntyre.

not discuss it in details as the others here, for, it does not directly touch the topic of this research. Therefore, we shall move to the next most important work which is *'Dependent Rational Animals'* (1999) published almost ten years after the last publication, which shows that the author has become more mature and has discovered a whole lot of ideas through experience and intense reflection over a decade.

In this work, MacIntyre shifted his philosophical outlook to a whole new level from the issue of practices and quests within a tradition as in the case of *'After Virtue'*, he acknowledged being in error to have thought of morality without taking the anatomy and physiology of human nature (biology). He considered in detail the development of human beings from the stage of infancy up to that of old age.¹ Of course, literature has shown that humans are so far the most dependent of all animals in their life cycle. He is in effect, considered instrumental to the development of the virtues from this perspective in this research. Wikipedia Contributors in this regard quoted his central argument in the book as thus;

It is most often to others that we owe our survival, let alone our flourishing ... It will be a central thesis of this book that the virtues that we need, if we are to develop from our animal condition into that of independent rational agents, and the virtues that we need, if we are to confront and respond to vulnerability and dis-ability both in ourselves and in others, belong to one and the same set of virtues, the distinctive virtues of dependent rational animals.²

It is in this regard he highlighted the issue of the illusion of self-sufficiency whereby we think we've got it all without realizing that we actually need to

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid.

co-exist with animals and humans as well in order to reach our potentialities of becoming independent rational animals. Let us now look at the overall philosophy of MacIntyre in the following unit.

2.3.3. MacIntyre's Philosophy

It has been the standard in philosophical writings to always look at the world view of each philosopher in the event of studying his philosophical excogitations. In this regard, we shall look at the philosophical style adopted by this philosopher and his general world perspective. By this, we mean what he thinks about general reality, knowledge and values as well as his philosophical method of inquiry.

Being a Catholic of the *Thomist* division, we can simply claim that MacIntyre is a Christian believer, although he joined the faith after being acquainted with Aquinas' *Summa Theologiae*¹ and being convinced about the freedom given to philosophical reason in the Encyclical. We can attribute this to his argument on reality where Thomism is believed to have chosen wisdom as the most important intellectual virtue which both the philosophers and the scientists must possess in order to understand the workings of reality. For MacIntyre, humans are divided into two different categories, we have what he called the '*plain persons*' and the '*philosophers*'.² To him the plain persons are the ordinary people including scientists who do not go so deep into thinking/asking critical and fundamental questions about the realities of life, and the philosophers who are regarded as those who abhor the prosaic mentality, by not taking anything/issue for granted. However, he believes

¹ MacIntyre, A., 2006. *The Tasks of Philosophy: Selected Essays Vol. 1*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 185-187.

² Ibid.

that the latter category is marginalized in their practices of philosophizing; this he argued, that it is relegated to a subordinate position in the curriculum of most colleges and universities for those who like that sort of a thing.¹ Here in Africa, very few universities are even offering it as a course of its own, except its applied form – the philosophy of education being a prerequisite in universities and colleges of education. Even in that case you will find that the teachers taking it have little or no training in philosophy or philosophy of education. From the foregoing, we can deduce that MacIntyre’s metaphysical submissions on the nature of man, that is, some having philosophical minds while others being plain persons, that is, those who are not necessarily being prosaic mentality but not minding to look into every little detail about life experiences like the philosophers.

In Epistemology, MacIntyre seems to be more interested in the crises of epistemology where truth, intelligence and rationality vis-à-vis conclusions drawn upon the laid premises while making a knowledge claim. This happens as a result of the second order observers/critics of the account to be given by the claimant of knowledge. He/she is therefore, made to be sure that this is ‘*the best account so far*’² and that this could be changed as a result of new scientific discoveries or what he calls ‘*alternative interpretations*’. From the foregoing, it could be discerned that MacIntyre is interested in giving historical accounts which are uncolored by the historical agent’s preconceptions and prejudices. Stated differently, the historiographer must be objective in the documentation of historical accounts.

¹ Ibid. p. 180.

² Ibid, p. 6.

On the issue of the theory of values (axiology) MacIntyre is known to be more interested in morality and virtue ethics taken from the traditional perspective. He is shown to be a staunch critic of liberalism and modernity which he thinks has caused serious crises in moral relativism and universality. Wikipedia summarized his virtue ethics in the following;

MacIntyre is a key figure in the recent surge of interest in virtue ethics, which identifies the central question of morality as having to do with the habits and knowledge concerning how to live a good life. His approach seeks to demonstrate that good judgment emanates from good character. Being a good person is not about seeking to follow formal rules. In elaborating this approach, MacIntyre understands himself to be reworking the Aristotelian idea of an ethical teleology.¹

He brought back what he called a missing component in rational accounts of morality from the Aristotelian Ethics, that is, ‘teleology’ as shown in the comment above and also mixed it with St. Thomas philosophy, whereby a new philosophy sui generis to his name was formulated referred to as ‘Augustinian Thomist’² approach to moral philosophy.

Finally, on his method of philosophical inquiry, we can say that he is both analytic as well as prescriptive in his style. This is so because, he has shown in many of his writings that the reason behind the marginalization of academic philosophy³ is because of its too much reliance on cool analysis without any practical implications. This implies that he believes in making relevant applications of philosophical theories into real life situations, which

¹ Alasdair MacIntyre in Wikipedia op. cit.

² Ibid.

³ MacIntyre, A., 2006. *The Tasks of Philosophy: Selected Essays Vol.1. op. cit.*, p.181.

will eventually class him as a prescriptivist in style. Having given a brief account of these philosophers from their biographies to their philosophies, let us now go into the nitty-gritty of our discourse on related philosophies and literature on the concepts of virtue, the purpose of life and notion of the good life in relation to practice and transfer of same to the younger generation in Nigeria.

2.4. Origins of the Virtues

To think about the origin of the virtues is as good as thinking about the origin of man and societies in general. This is because virtues are measured with respect to human activities as they interact with one another. Because they are traits endogenous to human beings when measured from the angle of morality as against when measured from the angle of worthiness or quality of something. This, by implication is alluding to the social nature of morality as Carden¹ presented the case of Dewey and MacIntyre in his work, arguing that because human activity is learned from interaction with others around us, naturally the standards for right and wrong are inculcated by society (or, rather, societies, for instead of one amorphous mass of others there are various sizes and types of groups to which any one of us belongs).

However, for MacIntyre there are three stages to be considered in the logical development of the concept of virtue which are practice, narrative order of a single human life and an account of what constitutes a moral tradition. Each of which follows after the other but not necessarily in a vice versa form.² But before going further to argue on the development of the virtue he

¹ Carden, S. D., 2006. *Virtue Ethics: Dewey and MacIntyre*, London and New York: Continuum International Publishing Group. p. 57.

² MacIntyre, A., 2007. *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*. 3rd ed. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. p. 187.

however explicitly clarified what he meant by practice in this development of the virtue as follows:

*By a 'practice' I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended.*¹

He further gave examples of which activities are practices and which are not; like art, architecture, farming, games, science, politics and the maintenance of family life as practices that lead to the narration of a single human life within the context of a given moral tradition. The practitioner has to be engaged in the historical progression of the practice itself. It becomes clear that MacIntyre intends by a practice, not just a set of skills, but the historical transformation of goals.²

However, the notion of a single life confining the individual into a particular tradition has been contested following the more accommodating liberal and modern style of Dewey by Carden.³ The argument was based on the premise that MacIntyre was basing his argument on a particular practice while Dewey was expanding it to the whole of human experience.⁴

This argument will be discarded in this study, for; Carden might perhaps be unable to comprehend well the definition of MacIntyre on what a practice is

¹ Ibid. p. 187.

² Ibid, p. 59.

³ Carden, S. D., 2006. op. cit., p. 58.

⁴ Ibid, p. 60.

as shown above, this is because, if we look up again, we will discern that, the fact that MacIntyre mentioned “...in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity,...” the making mention of trying to achieve standards of excellence is showing that these standards are not set by a single individual but the society in general. And of course, we know that it is through inductive reasoning that we come up with final deductive conclusions.

Let us now look at the origin of these virtues from the perspective of Al-Ghazali in his excogitations. Ghazali’s ethics or moral theory, like most of classical ethical theories is an ethics of virtue. In his major ethical works like the *Criterion* and the *Revival*, Ghazali devotes a great deal of attention to the definition and analysis of virtues and vices, thus Ghazali’s theory of virtue becomes the key to understanding his ethics, Sherif¹ remarked.

For Ghazali virtue emanates from three sources; habituation, learning and divine generosity. Sherif sees the first two as being one and the same thing,² that learning and habituation is one and the same thing and was wondering why Ghazali should separate the two. However, in this research we shall rebuke his position, even though he still went ahead and gave us what Ghazali thinks about the separation of the two. For Ghazali habituation is a situation whereby the moral agent seeks to attain a particular virtue by practice without the supervision of any teacher or authority while learning on the other hand is under the auspices of a teacher/father who guides the agent towards the acquisition of a particular virtue. This position of Ghazali is more cogent. The third (divine generosity) on the other hand comes as a

¹Sherif, M. A., 1975. *Ghazali's Theory of Virtue*. Albany: State University of New York Press. p. 22 – 23.

² Ibid, p. 31.

result of divine intervention when God bestows upon His servants a particular virtue at birth like the case of Jesus, John the Baptist and other prophets and pious predecessors. And Ghazali argues that most perfect of these three virtues is the divine virtue.¹

This third virtue is said to have been given by Ghazali outside the Aristotelian tradition which is habituation through nature, and as such he brought this third one from the Qur'an and traditions of the Holy prophet of Islam. We can however at this point add to the missing puzzle by mentioning the verses from the Qur'an for buttressing the point. On the Issue of John the Baptist being given the virtue of wisdom and judgement with leadership while he was a child, see Qur'an 19:12.² And for Jesus, see Qur'an 3:46.³

Ghazali however, sees habit (*ādah*) as a decisive factor in the acquisition of virtue by the majority of mankind, maintaining that virtue is a habit, a good habit influenced by both reason and revelation.⁴ This he argued that this practitioner of virtue must find pleasure and content in so doing just as a similitude of the agents of vices find pleasure in their acts. A gambler in gambling as well as a swindler (fraudster) when he swindles or effeminate in his effeminacy find pleasure in their habits. This he reckoned that is not natural to the soul, what is natural to the soul is the practice of good virtues as they are nutritious to the soul as opposed to the harmful effects of vicious vices. In other words, to acquire virtue, man must practice good deeds so

¹ Ibid.

² <http://quran.com/19/12>

³ <http://quran.com/3/46>

⁴ Mizan- Al-amal (the Criterion of Action), p. 18. In Sherif, M. A., 1975. op. cit., p. 32.

that they become habits to him. And this practice must be in a continuous way.¹

By and large, from the foregoing we have seen that both MacIntyre and Ghazali are tracing the origin of the virtues back to the concepts of habits and 'practices'. While MacIntyre was referring to these practices based on standards of a particular tradition, Ghazali was being universal in his application and a bit more spiritual in a sense. Ghazali also had a second component alien to MacIntyre's, the divine generosity and this should not be underestimated, as there are living proofs of these virtues from which we gave some examples in this study.

2.4.1. Philosophical and Mystic Virtues

In this unit we shall discuss the virtues from both Al-Ghazali's and MacIntyre's views. Although they did not disagree on the major principal virtues as Al-Ghazali would call them. This is because he also has what he referred to as the mystic virtues which are all discussed under the umbrella of the principal virtues. It is with these principal virtues that we shall begin our discussion. According to Al-Ghazali the principal virtues are basically four with a slight division of the virtues into one being the chief organizer of the remaining three. The first three are practical wisdom, courage, and temperance, while the fourth and the coordinating virtue being that of justice.² It should however, be noted that Ghazali here is making mention of practical wisdom, not just any wisdom that is kept for the special consumption of the wisdom owner like a reservoir. The possessor of wisdom

¹ Ibid, p. 33.

² Amin, M. op. cit., p. 164 and Sherif, M. A. op. cit., pp. 38 – 39.

must be a practicing wise man just like the Socrates of Athens.¹ But, was Socrates really wise to have practiced wisdom to his bane? So also with courage and temperance, we should not only have knowledge of what these virtues are but should also be able to put them into practice, after all in our discussion of origin of the virtues we made mention of practice and habituation. A virtue is thus, not worth its name unless accompanied by constant, consistent and persistent practice leading to a willful habituation by the practitioner or moral agent.

These are the philosophical virtues from the point of view of Ghazali, before we discuss the mystic virtues, we shall first address the question; are Ghazali's philosophical virtues the same with those of MacIntyre? The straight answer to this question is yes. But the manner of approach is entirely different, while Ghazali was busy defending a religious inclination using the virtues; MacIntyre was there defending virtues from point of view of a tradition using particularity, arguing from the heroic society's point of view against the Emotivist's moral universality in modernity.² We shall discuss this in a separate unit presently. Let us then, return to the mystic virtues.

Although these mystical virtues may sound a bit more personal to Ghazali in his ascension to the Sufi order, it is however very important in our topic of this research on 'essence' or purpose of life to attempt some reasonable analysis on them here, even if we don't go into too much details but to have an understanding of how they can influence the 'affective domain' of our

¹ Nigel Warburton, *A little History of Philosophy*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2011), for the acclaimed wisdom of Socrates in Athens.

² Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, op. cit., p. 126 – 127.

students in schools. The mystic virtues are established by Ghazali on the basis of a careful and elaborate interpretation of the hidden meanings of the divine commandments. This interpretation can be mastered by the truly learned men (*'ulama'*) only. These are not jurists, theologians, or philosophers, but only the mystics (*sufiyyah*); and Ghazali identifies himself with the mystics.¹ The mysticism of Al-Ghazali is most pronounced in his book called "Deliverance from Error" (*Al-Munqidh min-al-Dhalaal*)².

These mystical virtues also called the qualities of salvation by Ghazali are what he referred to as the roadmap to ultimate happiness and contentment with life. In order to understand the mystical virtues, it is imperative to first grasp the basic argument upon which the principal virtues were based. The principal virtues as culled from Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* are derived from a relationship between passions and actions. The passions are; "desire, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, friendship, hatred, longing, jealousy, pity, and generally those states of consciousness which are accompanied by pleasure or pain".³

Although there is a difference of usage of the terms longing and jealousy between Sherif and that of Bartlett and Susan's⁴ version of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* here, they instead, used yearning and emulation as the remaining passions. However, Sherif's jealousy and longing are closer to what we can accept here, although yearning and longing is just one and the same thing, jealousy and emulation are not direct synonyms. Emulation is more of imitation of something that is already successful, while jealousy is

¹ Sherif, M. A., 1975. op. cit., p. 105.

² <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/1100ghazali-truth.html>

³ Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* in M. A. Sheriff. Op. cit., p. 110.

⁴ Bartlett, R. C. & Collins, S. D., trans., 2011. *Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*. London: The University of Chicago Press. p. 2, p. 5, 1105b pp. 20-25.

more of envy and covetousness which is more close to passion than emulation. So jealousy will be maintained here. By and large, these passions are said not to lead to any virtue or vice leading to praise or blame, except after been backed up by practice or action. Extreme jealousy when accompanied by action to the extent of exterminating the opposition will lead to an act of murder and this is a bad action leading to a vice.

In all, these passions are not so much stressed in Aristotle's account of the virtues, but Ghazali is said to have taken them to a whole new level in his account of the mystic virtues, and this is why they have taken a new terminology of their own.¹ He however, approached them with the intention of making the practitioner closer to God. He further argued that each of these mystical virtues is accompanied by three characteristics; knowledge, positive disposition and action.² These virtues in his view are; repentance, patience, gratitude, hope, fear, poverty, asceticism, divine unity, and trust, in this order, all lead to love; whereas yearning, intimacy, and satisfaction are the fruits (*thimar*) or the by-products of love.³ This means that in hierarchy repentance is the first stage of these virtues while love is the highest. Although, there is an argument on what they mean by 'states' and 'stations' between the Sufi authors of the mystic virtues, this shall not be of much concern in this work.

However, Ghazali maintained that when a character trait of the soul becomes permanent and persists, it is a station; if, on the other hand, it occurs sporadically, it is a state.⁴ We shall leave the analysis of these virtues

¹ Sherif, M. A., 1975. op. cit., p. 111.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid, p. 113.

⁴ Ibid,

to the chapter assigned for analysis and discussions. The point needing to be made is that, these virtues are leading a good life from a point of view of Ghazali in his notion of ultimate happiness by uplifting the soul towards winning the love/pleasure of God.

2.5. Good Conduct of Al-Ghazali: The Good Life?

In volume III of Al-Ghazali's *Ihya*, there is a whole chapter dedicated to the good conduct, temperance and benevolence. And this, by implication is showing how we should lead a good life with people around us not simply being religious in prayers and other religious injunctions. In other words, the social interactions of man and his fellow men are of utmost importance in living a good life. He has to behave in a kind hearted and understanding manner with his co-humans in general and also should be gentle with the animals on the other hand. That is, he must show reverence to God's creations.

Al-Ghazali started this chapter by making a reference to the character of the prophet of Islam Muhammad (Peace and Blessings of Allah be Upon Him) [PBUH], and that lessons should be taken from his life style and what he commanded the Muslim faithfuls to do in Islam. He quoted the prophet (PBUH) as having said that the best amongst you is he who has the best of manners.

Again he reported another Hadith, *the Prophet said: God preferred this religion for Him. There will be no good in your religion except good conduct and benevolence. Beware; adorn your religion with these two virtues.*¹

¹ Imam Al-Ghazali, Karim, M. F., trans., 1993. *Ihya Ulumiddin, Vol. III*. Karachi-Pakistan: Darul-Ishaat. p. 48.

This is an indicator that these two virtues are commanded to be practiced by each and every Muslim who wishes to be a true practicing believer. It should however, not be forgotten that we mentioned in the introductory part of this chapter on Al-Ghazali that his philosophical system and ideas are a true replica of the Islamic faith, and as such most of his arguments are based on the dictates of the religion. The rank of the believer with good conduct is said to be high in the next world against the opposite of which is bad conduct being at the bottom-most of hellfire. The man of good conduct will be among the nearest to the prophet in the hereafter in another hadith.¹

We shall conclude this unit by giving the story of the wise Luqman and his son which Ghazali narrated thus;

*The son of Luqman asked his father: O father, which fine qualities in his conduct are good? Luqman said: Religion, treatment, shame, good conduct and generosity. When these five qualities are united in a person, he becomes pure, God-fearing and friend of God and is freed from the devil.*²

This is another version of a virtuous man, the qualities of which are expected to be found in a Muslim believer. Ghazali also quoted another version of these virtues here from Hazrat Junaid as follows; “*Four virtues raise up a man to the highest rank though his divine service and learning are little - (1) patience, (2) modesty, (3) generosity and. (4) good conduct.*”³ It is at this juncture that Ghazali thought we should answer the question; what then is good conduct? We have been talking about virtue but have not explained what are the actual actions or attributes that make up a man of good

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid, p. 49.

³ Ibid,

conduct. One might ask further; is good conduct a synonym to the good life? Let us first attempt the first question; perhaps we could get some clarifications before making the comparism.

2.5.1. What is Al-Ghazali's Good Conduct?

In answering this question, Ghazali tried to trace the origin of man, where God created him from clay of earth and also put a soul in him from Himself. And in this, there is connection between man and earth and God on the other end. This is perhaps the reason, when a man dies his body is buried in the earth, while the soul returns to the Creator. Just as Allah mentioned in the Qur'an 20: 55 that; *"We Created you from the earth and will revert you back to it; and raise you up from it a second time"*. The soul is blessed with some qualities of good from the creator and it is also left with freewill to do either good or bad. This is where it assumes good or bad conduct. Therefore, human nature is rooted in the soul and actions come from it.¹ From this Ghazali came up with four things: first to do good or bad action, second to possess power to do either of these actions, third to have knowledge of both, and finally to become either of these actions, good or bad. Owing to man's attachment to either of these actions, conduct arises.² Although in these possible natures of man Ghazali argued that man must have these qualities proportionately in order to be said to have good conduct.

However, in this research we are going to argue against this assertion. Because Ghazali is claiming that you must have a quality of being bad as well as good, and also be able to act on them at the same time to be tagged

¹ Ibid, p. 50.

² Ibid.

as being a good man.¹ This is a logical error that must be checked. But, if he says that after having got all these qualities with the knowledge of same, man out of his own volition does act on the good side, he will be called a good man with good conduct, would have been a more plausible argument. This could perhaps be an error from the translator or simply from the author himself. The next argument was that knowledge is the key to good conduct. This is so because it avails one with the opportunity to discern and differentiate the good from bad/evil and vice versa. Ghazali quoted the famous verse of the Qur'an 2:269 where God says; *He gives wisdom to whomsoever He pleases, Whoever is given wisdom has been given abundant good.* This wisdom Ghazali argues gives man the ability to control his excesses and deficiencies, and therefore he came up with the four major qualities of good conduct as follows: knowledge, bravery, patience and power of adjustment or judgment. Other qualities are their branches.²

To cap it up, he mentions a hadith of Ibn Abbas where he was asked;

*What is honour? He said: God explained it in the Quran: The most honourable of you is he who is the most God-fearing among you - 49:13. He said: He who has got best good conduct among you is the possessor of best quality among you. He said: Every building has got a foundation. The foundation of Islam is good conduct.*³

This is where, we now bring back our question whether the good life is in any way the same thing with good conduct. Taking it from the last question raised to Hazrat Ibn Abbas, if honour is related to good conduct, then, the good life must be related to good conduct as well. Although the good life may

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid, p. 49.

take different connotations from different parts of the world, MacIntyre in views of Cornwell, would prefer a more universal notion of it. Let us now discuss his notion of the good life in a fresh unit.

2.6. Contemporary Philosophical Literature Reviewed

2.6.1. MacIntyre's Universal Notion of the Good life

In an online article written by John Cornwell¹ in *Prospect Magazine*, titled *MacIntyre on Money*, he started with the statement “Alasdair MacIntyre argues for a single, shared view of the good life”.² This as tempting as it may seem in our theme of discussion, cannot suffice to say that MacIntyre is wholly in argument of a single notion of the good life without a critical assessment of Cornwell's premises on the conclusion.

MacIntyre's key moral and political idea is that to be human is to be an Aristotelian goal-driven, social animal. Being good, according to Aristotle, consists in a creature (whether plant, animal, or human) acting according to its nature – its *telos*, or purpose. The *telos* for human beings is to generate a communal life with others; and the good society is composed of many independent, self-reliant groups,³ this, Cornwell maintained.

He mentioned MacIntyre's ‘*After Virtue*’ and how he started his argument on the origin of the virtues as we have mentioned in the earlier part of this chapter that; moral behaviour begins with the good practice of a profession, trade, or art: playing the violin, cutting hair, brick-laying, teaching philosophy etc. Through these everyday social practices, he maintains, people develop the appropriate virtues. In other words, the virtues necessary

¹ Cornwell, J., November, 2010. MacIntyre on Money, *Prospect Magazine*, Accessed July 13, 2016, <http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/features/alsadair-MacIntyre-on-money>.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

for human flourishing are not a result of the top-down application of abstract ethical principles, but the development of good character in everyday life and again, stressed that; “*The hard work of morality,*” MacIntyre insists, “*consists in the transformation of desires, so that we aim at the good and respect the precepts of the natural law.*”¹

Again, MacIntyre yearns for a single, shared view of the good life as opposed to modern pluralism’s assumption that there can be many competing views of how to live well.² However, Cornwell was not able to justify the assertion that MacIntyre believes in a universal shared view of the good life from his essay, he ended up showcasing how MacIntyre rejected the theory of utilitarianism alongside Bernard Williams³ and continued with MacIntyre’s lecture on money. At this point we can assess Cornwell’s argument as an unsound one, because his conclusion is not supported by his premises.

What one can see on MacIntyre’s account of universality of a conception of the good life is in his ‘*After Virtue*’ where he defended his work on the accusation of inescapable versions of relativity in his account of the virtues by Robert Wachbroit.⁴ In his attempt to counter argue this, he was able to show how two rival traditions can come to terms with one another on the dictates of reason and rationality about how they share some common practices of importance and the notion/conception of the human goods, and some characteristic features of the traditions in question. He concluded this in the following manner;

¹ Ibid, p. 4.

² Ibid, p. 2.

³ Ibid.

⁴ MacIntyre, A., 2007. *After Virtue*, op cit., p. 272.

It will thus sometimes at least be possible for adherents of each tradition to understand and to evaluate by their own standards—the characterizations of their positions advanced by their rivals. And nothing precludes their discovering that these characterizations reveal to them features of their own positions which had hitherto gone unnoticed or considerations which by their own standards they ought to have entertained, but had not. Indeed nothing precludes the discovery that the rival tradition offers cogent explanations of weaknesses, of inabilities to formulate or solve problems adequately, of a variety of incoherencies in one's own tradition for which the resources of one's own tradition had not been able to offer a convincing account.¹

One can understand here, that, MacIntyre is suggesting for a kind of a compromise between traditions in order to have a single uniform view of the human good. And that it is by this that we can guarantee human flourishing in our existence. By adapting to changes and also being ready to juxtapose our practices with those of our rivals from a different tradition. It should however, be mentioned that MacIntyre sees the *Aristotelian tradition*² as the best to have ever existed in the accounts of history. At this juncture, we can conclude that MacIntyre's conception of the universal notion of the good life is about striking a balance with other rival traditions and coming up with a common goal for the good of all.

2.6.2. Goldstein and Hegel's Idea of the Good Life

Different philosophers of the ancient period see these questions of the Good life from the philosophic Aristotelian virtues as we have argued in this chapter, while Hegel³ on the other hand, sees it from a different dimension from analysis of freedom and the philosophy of rights in a modern political community. It is imperative to introduce Hegel here so that we can comprehend his ideas more. Hegel is an early 19th century philosopher from

¹ Ibid, pp. 276 – 277.

² Ibid, p. 277.

³ Goldstein, J. D., 2006. *Hegel's Idea of the Good Life: From Virtue to Freedom, Early Writings and Mature Political Philosophy*, Canada: Springer. p. 122.

Germany whose full name is Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770 - 1831 C. E), he was born in Stuttgart, Germany, and led a rather normal and uneventful life as a youth, receiving his education until the age of 18 in his native city. He went on to the University of Tubingen and majored in theology graduating in 1793.¹ For a while, he was a lecturer at the University of Jena and then rector of a secondary school until 1816. He was a professor at the University of Heidelberg for two years and in 1818 became a professor of philosophy at the University of Berlin, remaining there until his death. Speaking of freedom and the free will, imagine asking a stranger to your land by telling him to “*feel at home*”.

This is a statement of assurance, of security and feeling of freedom which the stranger is made to feel. For, it is only when one is at home that one feels at ease, free, settled and secure, a feeling of having reached the last bus stop of your journey, this, is the cornerstone of Hegel’s idea of the good life. A feeling of belongingness to a particular set of people or society, this is in fact, what Hegel referred to as ‘*being at home in the world*’ as his version of the good life.²

Hegel continued his argument with finding the basis of the highest human good thus; *freedom as the activity of the free will; freedom as the ground of right or the good life*. “*We feel freedom to be the highest human value; we feel ourselves to be self-contained agents, creating out of, and acting on, our own will*”. Yet, he also identifies the ultimate ground of right in a way that falls

¹ Ozmon, H. A. & Craver, S. M., 2008. *Philosophical Foundations of Education*. 8th ed. New Jersey: Pearson, p. 16.

² Ibid, p. 117.

outside of our ordinary experience,¹ Goldstein added. The “basis of right is the *realm of spirit* in general”.²

However, Goldstein sees this as unintentional miseducation³ by Hegel to have thought of conceiving the nature of ‘free will’ as the ground for explaining the phenomenon of freedom. This notwithstanding, we shall still give a clarification of what he meant by the realm of spirit. Goldstein showed from Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right* that the ‘will’ and ‘thought’⁴ is the natural location of the human spirit. And that this ‘will’ has two particular moments, one of which is universalization and subjectivity or form itself, and the other being determination and objectivity or content, finally, that the free will is the conscious and concrete unity of its two moments.⁵ This appears to be having a self-consciousness that is capable of checking its own excesses and deficiencies through self-interrogation and introspection generally. Thus, the will appears to be the human capacity, its exercise, as freedom.⁶ The Education which Hegel intends to put to introspection, says Goldstein, is that my will is grounded in my absolute.⁷ Meaning that whatever that I ‘will’ is exclusively mine and not propelled by an external force or influence.

If this is what he sees as the good life, it is obvious that human beings by their nature are more inclined to be subjective than objective, their selfish-self is most of the time more powerfully engineered to praxis than their altruist-self, couldn’t this be a chaotic suggestion of some state of anarchy?

¹ Ibid, p. 123.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid, p. 124.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid, p. 125.

⁷ Ibid.

Again, to conceive of absolute freedom as I shall argue in this research is to think of mirage by a thirsty man in a desert as an oasis of water. Because, as a social and a gregarious being, as explained in the assumptions of the research, man must forego his freedom in order to respect the rights as well as freedom of others in his community.

However, we should not forget that this freedom is envisaged as being practiced in a modern political community as mentioned in the beginning part of this argument. In this community, there is expected to be a written document called the *Constitution* as having the sovereign authority over all the individuals of the community. It is expected to provide all the laws, rules and regulations upon which a just society shall flourish under the principles of justice, freedom, equality and the rule of law. This begs the question here as; where does Goldstein ground his so-called argument of Hegel's unintentional miseducation? His argument to me is more of a misunderstanding of Hegel's approach to the extrapolation of concept the good life, or a kind of background education/entry behaviour to the understanding of the parent concept (the good life/ultimate happiness). For, you need to differentiate from the first principles if you want your audience to be at par with what you intend to present before them.

Further, he argued that;

Yet, his attempted education to the very foundation of the good life—the nature of freedom—signals his failure as a Volkserzieher. This failure takes the form of an unintentional miseducation to freedom through a miseducation to the nature of

the free will. The conception of freedom as free will he wishes to instill is not the conception towards which his account educates.¹

From the above submission, it is clear that Goldstein is disputing the fact that Hegel is missing the road for having to delve into the nature of the freewill while explaining the concept of the good life. It is on this account that we debunk his argument, since Hegel was simply laying a foundation to his audience on actual nature of the human spirit and how the individual attains ultimate happiness from having the freedom by the ‘self’ to will from itself for itself. This was evident from Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right as* Goldstein continued to quote him;

Natural drives are replaced by the will and conflict is transformed into the rational system of the will’s determination... Freedom takes the shape of reflection upon these drives: representing them, estimating them, and comparing them with one another and them with the means they employ, their consequences etc., and with a sum total of satisfaction—i.e., with happiness.²

This clearly shows that Hegel has provided a sound conclusion to the premises he presented earlier, yet Goldstein was still unable to discern that from all that he has been presenting. We shall leave this portion and move to the next argument.

2.6.3. Herbert McCabe on Ethics, Education, Tradition and the Good Life

Before I start on this topic it is imperative again, to first identify who is Herbert and what has he got to say on the topic coined above? Herbert John Ignatius McCabe, OP (2 August 1926 – 28 June 2001) was an English-born

¹ Goldstein, J. D., 2006. *Hegel’s Idea of the Good Life*, op. cit., p. 124.

² Ibid, p. 126.

Irish Dominican priest, theologian and philosopher, who was born in Middlesbrough in the North Riding of Yorkshire. After studying chemistry and philosophy at Manchester University, he joined the Dominicans in 1949, where under Victor White he began his lifelong study of the works of Thomas Aquinas.

He spent many years teaching at Blackfriars, Oxford University, writing four books, *The New Creation*, a study of the Sacraments, in 1964; *Law, Love and Language*, on the centrality of language in ethics, in 1968; *The Teaching of the Catholic Church*, a short catechism, in 1986; *God Matters* in 1987; and *God Still Matters*, a collection of his articles, in 2002.¹ He combined a commitment to the thought of Aquinas and Wittgenstein with a socialist political stance, influenced by Marxism. The latter is evident, for example, in his article *The Class Struggle and Christian Love*. McCabe died at Oxford on 28 June 2001, and was buried at Wolvercote Cemetery on 5 July.²

This account has of course, not captured the current text on *The Good Life: Ethics and the Pursuit of Happiness* published in 2005 after his death which was compiled, edited and introduced by Brian Davies and published in New York by Continuum publishers. It is on this particular last text that my attention will be focused, for, it has got the stock of information needed particularly in philosophy of the good life and ethics in general. Again, the fact that the book was not wholly produced by McCabe due to his demise before its publication, where necessary, especially from the introduction, we shall identify and acknowledge the commentaries of Davies within the text. Again, we should mention that Herbert has acknowledged by himself that

¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Herbert_McCabe

² Ibid.

some of his ideas are borrowed partly from Alasdair MacIntyre¹ and a host of other contemporary philosophers like Philippa Foot, Gilbert Ryle etc. and therefore, he may be classed under one umbrella of the Thomist Aristotelians with MacIntyre.

On Ethics, Herbert sees the business of ethics from the point of 'praise and blame' on human behaviour where we end up judging some people as good while others as bad, and how change in time affects same. He sees the study of ethics² as a necessary tool in passing these judgements without having to repeat some mistakes over and over again. For he claims that, the study of ethics gives us the reasons, principles and patterns with which we judge our human practices.³ He picked a particular tradition to which he will be making his claims. And that tradition he alluded to Aristotelian tradition, understood through Aquinas.⁴ And in this tradition, "*it is thought proper to praise those actions and dispositions that lead to and are constitutive of that human satisfaction in which happiness consists.*"⁵ Where he elaborated that the notion of human satisfaction and happiness is a basic one though, not an obvious one. And that it must be immediately distinguished from utilitarianism where happiness to the greatest number of people should be praised. The difference he however claimed occurs as a result of the word 'constitutive'. For the Aristotelian, happiness is not just the result of praiseworthy action; it is constituted by virtuous action.⁶

¹ McCabe, OP. H., 2005. *The Good Life: Ethics and the Pursuit of Happiness*, Davies, B. ed. London: Continuum. p. 2.

² Ibid, p. 3.

³ Ibid, 4.

⁴ Ibid, p. 5.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid, p. 6.

Again, on education McCabe views education from the Aristotelian tradition in which it is viewed as the study of what made it possible to study ethics itself. It is the study of the virtues in theory and practice and hence, the educated man is regarded as he who has studied and internalized the virtues. It is this study that makes man to have what he termed ‘a moral understanding’¹ of what a praiseworthy generous act is, and how we come to terms in teaching people what is the good life in our homes, schools, churches, political groups, charitable organizations and even to some extent our universities.² This, he does by criticizing the liberal societies that see ethics from a point of view of not interfering with or influencing any body’s morals on the premise that; conventional wisdom will keep the peace between people with quite divergent views of the good life.³

McCabe sees the good life from a point of view of a phrase he coined ‘*a life that is becoming of a human being*’⁴, that is the life that is appropriate (non-poisonous) to a human being belonging to a particular tradition or customs in a society. He was however, not certain as to whether to accept the objectivity and relativity of moral truths and ethical judgments. This is however, doubting the universality of moral judgments because of the subjective connotations they could take with respect to different cultures and traditions.

2.6.4. The Good Life from African Perspective

Since this research is seeking to find the meanings of the good life from African point of view taking Nigeria as a case study, it however, means that

¹ Ibid, p. 9.

² Ibid, p. 10.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid, pp. 11 – 12.

we need to also have a glimpse of what the African society through its philosophers see as the good life. Having discussed the topic from the two selected giants (Ghazali and MacIntyre) from both Islamic and Western perspectives, it will be of paramount importance to explore it from the indigenous African point of view as well. Moral values are values that express ideas about the good life.¹ There is constant debate about which values constitute the good life. Aristotle introduced the idea in his *Nicomachean Ethics*, and there is continuous debate in philosophy and social science about which values are important, and about what exactly is meant by a certain value. We shall take this meaning from African perspective.

The African value system is based on a network of brotherhood, or egalitarian communal system, where by everyone is seen as his brother's keeper. This is where the famous *Ujamaa* of Julius Nyerere of Tanzania² comes to play; this *Ujamaa* as opposed to capitalism's individualism is a system which believes in collective responsibility³ and bond of brotherhood by African to any other African and thereby living as one giant extended family system.⁴ It is in other words known as African Socialism.

The idea here is that no one is left out to suffer alone in the communal system. Although one might argue this as an unpractical system due to population explosion and coupled with scarcity of resources and general rise in poverty. But, it was an agricultural system then, are we ready to go back

¹ Wiel Veugelers, Moral Values in Teacher Education (Draft Version), Being a Paper Presented at the 1st Symposium on *Moral and Democratic Education*, 24 - 27 August 2008, Florina, Greece. 1. Accessed 13/10/2016 from <http://www.eled.uowm.gr/sig13/fulltexts/Paper15.pdf>.

² Nyerere, J. K., 1968. *Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism*. London: Oxford University Press.

³ Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2013. op. cit., Section 1 (8d), p. 5.

⁴ Akinpelu, J. A., 1981. *An Introduction to Philosophy of Education*. London: Macmillan Publishers. p. 115.

to the farms? In this system, Nyerere¹ argued, the traditional African system made it such that everyone in the society is cared for, and no one who is willing to work is left unemployed as against the Capitalist system of production where one man acquires wealth of a thousand men and continues to live a life distant from his brethren by attempting to outdo them in whatever he does. It is of paramount importance then, to explain who a good person (i.e. the virtuous man) is in an ideal African society, as it is only from the good that one can expect a good life.

Taken from the African traditional point of view, the *ezigbo mmadu*, *omoluwabi*, *mutumen kirki*,² all signify the virtuous man from Igbo, Yoruba and Hausa tribes respectively. This virtuous man is believed to be one who is versed in the traditional practices in theory and practice, respects his people and culture, and is respected by the society, and very active in contribution to his community development. Ogunyemi maintained that “*the common factor in all of this is the civility (not necessarily passivity) that informs the construction of the good person in traditional Nigerian/African society and this resonates all through the people’s life as exemplified in the African indigenous education system*”.³ From his argument one can infer that the good life is viewed from one’s level of contribution to the societal development, which is why even in the current democratic and political dispensation, it could be claimed that, the best politician is one who is highly committed to his community’s development. Therefore, active participation in societal development is the key to leading a good life in

¹ Nyerere, J. K., 1968. op. cit., p. 3.

² Ogunyemi, A., 2014. *The Search for Good Citizens and the Curriculum as Compass: Inaugural Lecture*, Ago-Iwoye: Olabisi Onabanjo University Mass Communication Press. p. 5.

³ Ibid. p.5.

African perspective here. This argument is backed up by the National Policy on Education (NPE) of Nigeria Section 1(7d) where it stated;

*the national educational goals which derive from the philosophy, are therefore; the acquisition of appropriate skills and the development of mental, physical and social abilities and competencies as equipment for the individual to live in and contribute to the development of the society.*¹

This shows that the individual is expected to be competent in different life skills that should make him a self-reliant and participating member in his society. For this value to have been set as the expected life becoming of an individual, it then, necessarily follows that it is the life that is becoming of the person in his society whenever the system in that society is said to have achieved its purpose.

McCabe as we discussed in the last unit describes the good life as “*a life that is becoming of a human being*”. It is a value that is cherished in the society, this good life that is becoming is a cluster of different values and virtues approved by the society, to which we must identify before talking about the good life itself as a whole concept. The good life will not only consist of the moral virtues in a person, but also some values like functional education which would guarantee one a decent means of living and some economic independence, this would then guarantee an all-round good life for the individual. To this end we would recognize self-reliance as a virtue culled functional education as an aim. Again, this was mentioned in the philosophy and goals of education for Nigeria as stated;

¹ Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2013. op. cit., p. 5.

“In consequence, the quality of instruction at all levels has to be oriented toward inculcating the following values: ...Shared responsibility for the common good of society, and acquisition of competences necessary for self-reliance.”¹

It then, follows that, the good life in Africa is based on shared collective responsibility, respect for the societal norms and values by a functional member of the community. Not necessarily accumulating wealth for oneself and his immediate family. There must be that spirit of brotherhood and general sense of belongingness for all the members of the community. **2.6.5.**

Teaching Philosophy of the Good Life

If the good life as McCabe would describe it is *“a life that is becoming of a human being”* is seen as a network of values that are cherished in the society, then, it becomes incumbent on us to identify with necessity the possibility of passing these values to the next generation. This we are by implication, attempting to explore the strategies/methodologies of teaching the moral values in the society. One of the questions raised in this research is about the teachability of virtues, this section is going to explore from different angles on how we can achieve this goal from different sources.

When discussing the strategies for teaching or transferring values/virtues it should be remembered that the area of coverage must always go beyond the four walls of the school², as values are life-long traits that must start from home, shifted to the school/ classroom and back to the community. Values learned in school must be related, enriched and extended to the home and to the community. As such, the students’ valuing experiences inside the

¹ Ibid, Section 1 (8d - f)

² Saulawa, M. A., 2015. *Virtue, Character and Moral Dispositions from Indigenous African and Islamic Philosophies of Education for Nigeria Education*. Ibadan: Unpublished Masters Project in the Department of Teacher Education, University of Ibadan. p. 122.

classroom are continuously and consistently followed up outside the school through the provision of projects/activities that the students may do individually or in groups.¹ This was the submission of Asia and the Pacific Programme of Educational Innovation for Development (APEID) workshop and they provided a cluster of strategies that are at the disposal of the teacher and the community for facilitating the necessary virtues and values of the society in question.

It is however, important to mention before continuing that; values in Educational Psychology fall under the Affective domain of Bloom's² Taxonomy of educational objectives, with cognitive and psychomotor domains being the other two. The cognitive domain deals with recall and recognition of knowledge, and the psychomotor domain deals with objectives of education that are concerned with the manipulative and motor-skills of the students or simply the exploration and development of their talents. The Affective domain which is this research's area of concern includes objectives which describe changes in interest, attitudes, and values, and the development of appreciations and adequate adjustment.³ This is however, when taken from philosophical parlance, the domain of axiology. It is under axiology that we discuss the theory of values as well as ethics, aesthetics, altruism and religious values as its realms.⁴ It is then, now safe to continue with the exploration of the methodologies of teaching philosophy of the good

¹ Asia and the Pacific Programme of Educational Innovation for Development (APEID), 1993. *Strategies and Methods for Teaching Values in the Context of Science and Technology*, Bangkok: UNESCO Principal Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, Accessed October 14, 2016, http://www.unesco.org/education/pdf/325_96.pdf. p. 32.

² Bloom, B. S., ed., 1956. *Taxonomy of Educational Objectives: The Classification of Educational Goals*, Michigan & Canada: Longmans, Green & Co. Ltd. p. 7.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Thakur, A. S., 1982. *The Philosophical Foundations of Education*. New Delhi: National Publishing House, 1982), pp. 41 - 45.

life or values and virtues, because some of the sources of our strategies are enumerated and discussed from psychology of education point of view. The APEID workshop mentioned above itemized a number of strategies, ranging from in-school approaches to Out-of-School approaches.¹

2.6.5.1. In-School Strategies

Under the In-school Strategies, they identified *experiential* and *participatory* approaches where the students are put into structured learning experiences using simulated or direct quasi real life ethical issues, and are left to use their own reflective and introspective capacities in responding to the schema of value related issues before them. This also leaves them with the consequence of each of the responses they chose to offer. The wisdom behind this is that, the students are made to participate in the analysis of the value problem/issue and the decision making process in order to understand their feelings, thoughts and rational decision making capacities with the quality of judging for him/herself the rightness or otherwise of his/her choice.

There is also the *integrated approach* in which the both the cognitive and Affective domains are merged together in the classroom lesson with each having an effect on the student's learning experiences. This strategy is also called the ACES² strategy (Affective Cognitive Experiences for Self-integration) as it uses the inductive or discovery methodology of teaching. It goes through four phases of learning as follows; Activity -> Analysis -> Abstraction -> Application. It employs all the strategies in the experiential method, only that here the affective domain is not the only target as in the

¹ APEID, 1993. *Strategies and Methods for Teaching Values in the Context of Science and Technology*, op. cit., pp. 32 - 39.

² Ibid, p. 33.

experiential method but also the cognitive domain, thereby taking care of all the intellectual and value elements in the learning experience.

Other approaches mentioned in these in-school strategies include; value clarification, moral development, values analysis, and values inculcation strategies. Value clarification entails a practical navigation of the values with the students through cooperative learning, group dynamics, guided imagery or fantasy trips.¹ The students may be presented with practical ethical dilemmas to solve using logical moral reasoning with a schema of personal moral theories. Take for instance Mohanan's² Moral inquiry Course, where he demonstrated on the principle which says that '*Thou shall not kill*'. This is a value that is trying to introduce the students to the concept of sanctity of life, but then, it is the job of the facilitator/teacher to clarify to the students here; thou shall not kill what?

Human beings? Human being of my group (where my group refers to my family/my community/my religion/my country/my ...)? Animals of the mammalian class? All living organisms? Does this include microorganisms?

Afterwards, the students are presented with a variety of ethical dilemmas to be attempted by themselves. Consider the following set of dilemmas:

*Hippias kills cat to amuse himself*³

With the sort of questions raised above, a moral principle can be hypothesized in the following fashion;

Destroying the life of X is morally wrong, where X is

¹ Ibid, pp. 33 - 34.

² Mohanan, K. P., n.d. *Designing a course on Moral Inquiry*, Accessed October 13, 2016, <http://www.iiserpune.ac.in/~mohanan/inquiry/TeachingMoralInquiry.pdf>

³ Ibid.

- a. Any human being
- b. Any human being of by group
- c. Any animal of the mammalian class
- d. Any living organism

The students are then presented with the Hippias's situation to pass the judgement on their own. But remember, a whole lot of further clarifications may be required by the teacher on the '*what ifs*' that may arise. This is the point on values clarification.

Moral Development Strategies are premised on the theory that the values developed are based on the moral reasoning level or judgement of the person.¹ The strategy is used by allowing the students to study the pros and cons of an action and thereby pass judgement based on their personal feelings. This is how they can develop their own moral capacity by themselves. Values analysis on one hand is also another strategy in which the students are made familiar with the codes of conduct, values, beliefs and practices in their environment, also allowed to critically analyse and question these values in order to avoid indoctrination, the students are left to decide on each of the values they are presented with through detailed analysis of each, so that they can decide for themselves what to believe, what to accept, and what to do.² They can be presented with news materials, a local issue, speeches, a portrait or picture of an event/incident etc. individually or as a group.

The last category here is values inculcation, which employs the direct teaching method and is regarded as the usual style used in schools. It

¹ APEID, 1993. op. cit., p. 34.

² Mohanan, K. p. n.d. op. cit., p. 1.

involves using direct lectures on morality, stories of heroes, religious leaders, great philosophers, poets, display of materials etc. but this method is however, regarded as outdated and to some extent impotent when it comes to dealing with adolescents, who are not positively responsive to prodding, nagging and pure lecturing.¹

Other in-school potent strategies identified here include, face-to-face interactions with resource persons, questioning and answering, modeling or the silent approach through the teacher's non-verbal actions that are worth imitating also go a long way in affecting the world views of the students. Let us now look into the out-of-school strategies in brief.

2.6.5.2. Out-of-School Strategies

Although these may be beyond the purview of this research, since we as teachers do not have the privilege of implementing them, we shall still attempt mentioning them for the benefit of policy makers and stakeholders in the society. These methods are more or less like a follow-up technique of getting the students to apply in real life situation (not simulations) what they have learned in the school. It could however, be facilitated by their parents and the general stakeholders. APEID² however, called these action strategies due to the activity component in the strategies; they include, field trips, visiting the orphanage/less privileged areas, social action volunteer work, community reach-out with NGOs, media awareness education, peace campaigns, research and project works on moral concepts in the community like honesty of vendors on weighing scale in markets, projects on superstitious beliefs and scientific truths, environmental sanitation etc. One

¹ APEID, 1993. op, cit., p. 35.

² Ibid, p. 36.

can also think about visiting a court of justice for a clearer understanding of the code of conduct in his/her society.

2.7. Empirical Studies Reviewed

In this section we shall attempt reviewing empirical works conducted by others on the variables of discourse as follows:

2.7.1. The Good Life and the Quality of Life

Michalos, Ramsey, Eberts and Kahlke¹ conducted a research in 2012 titled “Good Health is not the same as a Good Life: Survey Results from Brandon, Manitoba”. The objective of the study was to obtain some baseline self-reported data on the health status and overall quality of life of a sample of residents of the city of Brandon Manitoba aged 18 years or older, and to measure the impact of a set of designated determinants, comparison standards and satisfaction with diverse domains of life on health and quality of life. Their sampling technique was simple random sampling technique visiting random houses and distributing 16 item questionnaires as their instruments for data collection. For data analyses they took overall life assessment and the dependent variables include Average Health, happiness, a single item measure of satisfaction with life as a single item measure of satisfaction with the overall quality of life, the Satisfaction Life Scale, Contentment with Life Assessment Scale and a Subjective Wellbeing Index using multiple regression for their data analyses. The major findings indicated that using stepwise multiple regression, they were able to explain as much as 75% of the variance in Subjective Wellbeing (SWB) scores and as little as 45% in happiness scores. Four clusters of health determinants

¹ Michalos, A. C., Ramsey, D., Ebert, D. & Kahlke, P. M., 2012. Good Health is not the same as a Good Life: Survey Results from Brandon. *Manitoba Social Indicators Research*, 107(2), pp. 201-234: Springer.

explained from 20% (Happiness) to 44% (Average Health) of the variance in the dependent variables. Adding comparison standards and domain satisfaction scores to the set of health determinants increased their total explanatory power by 2% points for Average Health (from 44 to 46%), but by 36% points for satisfaction with the overall quality of life (from 31 to 67%) and 35% points for Subjective Wellbeing (from 39 to 74%). In all, their claim was that satisfaction with one's health was never the strongest predictor of one's happiness in any of the samples the surveyed.

However, these findings are not very clear as to what the researchers were up to with regards to the good life, the regression analyses were only able to increase their explanatory power from a lower percentage to a higher percentage, they were not able to explain to us what the key determinants of the good life are in unambiguous terms, but happiness and subjective wellbeing were seeming to rank high in their findings. Further investigations showed that the major researcher in person of Michalos¹ has earlier published more lucid findings where he mentioned in his journal paper that *"I assume, with some evidence, that measures of happiness provide at least one important way to operationalize the variety of ideas referred to by the phrase 'quality of life'"*, and also mentioned in his later findings that he reviewed results of eleven surveys undertaken to explain happiness on the basis of the personal satisfaction respondents got from a dozen specific domains of their lives, e.g., satisfaction with their jobs, their living partners, their financial security and their health, and three surveys undertaken to explain happiness on the basis of respondents' health measured by such

¹ Michalos, A. C., 2004. Social Indicators Research and Health Related Quality of Life Research. Springer: *Social Indicators Research*, 69 (1), pp. 27-72.

things as SF-36, chronic illnesses and Body Mass Index scores. And finally, he also mentioned satisfaction with one's health on the basis of measured health status and on the basis of Multiple Discrepancies Theory (MDT).

2.7.2. Ideals of the Good Life

Cheryl Armon¹ conducted another longitudinal/cross sectional study titled "Ideals of the Good Life: A Longitudinal/Cross Sectional Study of Evaluative Reasoning in Children and Adults" from Harvard University. The Method she used was normative ethics and meta-ethics together with empirical structural developmental psychology of Piaget. The data collection instruments used were both questionnaires and observation since the research was incorporating both philosophical and psychological paradigms in one study. Some of her findings revealed that hedonism plays a good role in the good life from two philosophic orientations that is, Classical Hedonism (Egoistic) and Social Hedonism.²

Social and egoistic forms are separated in that social forms tend to emphasize happiness in terms of contentment and satisfaction while the egoistic forms emphasized sensory pleasure and happiness in terms of enjoyment, stimulation and the like. The major discussion centred on the human tendency to make choices that are going to give individual happiness. This lies in her argument that humans, in general, are basically pleasure-seeking; choosing one's own activity results in the most happiness or enjoyment [Issue: Good Life; Norm: Choice; Element: Happiness/Enjoyment] and she concludes that individual pleasure is the ultimate

¹ Armon, C. 1984. *s of the good life: A longitudinal/cross-sectional study of evaluative reasoning in children and adults*. Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Harvard Graduate School of Education, Cambridge, MA.

² *ibid*, p. 70.

human good.¹ In so doing she considered three major areas of the good life in terms of good life, good friendship, good work and good person. These areas she believed will revolve around the construction of ideals of the good life in children and adults.

2.7.3. Is there more to life than being happy?

In trying to find what is the purpose of life, and is happiness the ultimate end of living? Emily Esfahani Smith conducted a study after having written a book titled “The Power of Meaning: Crafting a life that matters”² in 2017 with the chief aim of finding more meanings to life than just happiness. As a sequel to this work seeing the wide acceptability and influence of her work she conducted an empirical study and delivered a talk called “There is more to life than Being Happy”³ on the main stage of TED by April 2017 in Vancouver BC where she mentioned that after conducting a study from which the data showed that chasing happiness can make people unhappy. This she reiterated was coupled with an increase in the suicide rate around the world with a 30-year high in America, even though the standard of living has objectively risen yet people continue to feel hopeless, depressed and alone. Then she began to research and found that what predicts this despair is not a lack of happiness, but lack of having meaning in life. She therefore, tried to differentiate between being happy and having meaning in life. That is, while happiness was defined by psychologists as a state of comfort and ease, by feeling good in the moment. Having meaning in life is deeper, she claims, as defined by Martin Seligman that meaning comes from belonging

¹ Ibid, p. 70.

² Smith, E. E., 2017. *The Power of Meaning: Crafting a life that matters*. Washington DC: Crown.

³ https://www.ted.com/talks/emily_esfahani_smith_there_is_more_to_life_than_being_happy/up/-next?language=en

to and serving something beyond yourself and from developing the best within you.

The studies she conducted showed that people who have meaning in life are more resilient, they do better in school and at work, and they even live longer than their counterparts who are chasing happiness in life. She spent five years interviewing hundreds of people, reading from psychology, neuroscience and philosophy, at the end of which she came up with four pillars of a meaningful life, that is, firstly, belonging; which comes from being in relationships where you are valued for who you are intrinsically and where you value others as well. These create bonds of love with family and friends. Secondly, purpose is the second pillar which she thinks is more of using your strength to serve others, as it gives people something worthwhile to do, and ultimately something to live for or some 'why' that drives you forward.

Thirdly, transcendence, which is a state of mind, she claims that these are those rare moments where you feel lifted above the hustle and bustle of daily life, where your sense of self fades away and you feel connected to a higher reality. This she believes depends on what you do as a hobby or as a career or job, such that it makes you feel in a zone where you lose sense of time and place. This is more or less like when you feel so contented with life and what you are doing, it makes you feel so fulfilled and happy with your status quo. Finally, storytelling, that is, the story you tell yourself about yourself. That is, taking a look back at your life and understanding how you became you. This fourth pillar she believes has the power of making you edit

and reshape your life by giving you hope and purpose to move on with life despite facing economic and existential challenges.

2.7.4. What Makes a Good Life?

Robert Waldinger in November 2015 delivered a talk in Brookline Massachusetts at TED talk stage where he revealed what he called the longest study of adult life that has ever been done in history, lasting for more than 75 years titled “What makes a good life: Longest Study on Happiness” called “*The Harvard Study of Adult Development*”. From this study they used a sample of 724 male teenagers from the 1930s (*as at 2015 he said about 60 of the 724 of their original men are still alive, still participating in the study mostly in their 90s, now studying more than 2000 children of these men*) where they have since then been watching their lives and interviewing them from time to time, all the way into their old age, asking them about their daily life experiences, home life, work, taking medical records from their doctors and what really keeps them happy and healthy, etc. He mentioned that a recent study conducted where young adults are asked about what their major goal in life is, over 80% of them stated that their major life goal is to get rich, and another 50% of those same young adults said that another major life goal is to become famous. The sample was picked from Boston and Harvard where two groups of teenagers were selected for the study.

However, he posited that most important finding and lessons they were able to gather about human life from the study showed that the good life is not about wealth or fame or working harder and harder. The Clearest message, he added from this study is; Good relationships keep us happier and

healthier. And that there are three major lessons about relationships. The first is that social connections are really good for us, and that loneliness kills as it showed that people who are more socially connected to family, to friends, to community are happier, they are physically healthier and they live longer than people who are less well connected. This is because the experience of loneliness has turns out to be toxic, as these people's health status decline earlier in midlife, their brain functioning declines sooner, and they live shorter lives than people who are not lonely. Secondly, it is not just about the number of friends you have the matters, or whether or not you are in a committed relationship, but the quality of your close relationships that matters.

Therefore, living in a midst of conflict in relationships or marriages is not healthy for our lives, and that in order to live into a happy, healthy octogenarian your satisfaction in your relationships would determine that. The Findings equally showed that the people are most satisfied with their relationships at age 50 were the healthiest at age 80, and good close relationships seem to buffer us from the slings and arrows of getting old. Thirdly, good relationships don't just protect our bodies, they protect our brains as it turns out that being in a securely attached relationship to another person in your 80s is protective, that the people who are in relationships where they really feel they can count on the other person in times of need, those people's memories stay sharper longer, and the people in relationships where they feel they really can't count on the other one, those are people who experience early memory decline. In conclusion, he advised that people in this age should find a way of replacing screen time

with people time, or livening up a stale relationship by doing something new together, long walks or date nights, or reaching out to that family member who you haven't spoken to in years, because those all-too common family feuds take a terrible toll on the people who hold the grudges.

Therefore the good life is built with good relationships, he concluded. Reflecting on this research, it may surprise the reader to learn that the findings from this 75 years research have been enjoined by the Prophet of Islam 1442 years ago. This can be found in the book of Sunan Abi Dawoud, where Anas reported messenger of Allah (Peace be upon him) as saying: *"Anyone who is pleased that his sustenance should be expanded and his age extended should do kindness and keep ties with his near relatives"*, in another Hadith the prophet forbid the cutting of ties of kinship, as whoever does that is cutting the ties from his Lord.¹ Imam Ghazali one of the key figures in this research also maintained that *"friendship is the result of good conduct and enmity of bad conduct. Good conduct is the root of love for one another and bad conduct is the root of hatred, envy and enmity. The result of good conduct is praise worthy. The merits of good conduct in religion are not secret."*² This is just to remind us that friendship is a very sacred concept that whoever wants to live a happy, healthy and good life should not take for granted. After all, one of the major assumptions of this research is that *'man is a gregarious being'* and that no man is an island of his own. Therefore, to say that you want to live a lonely life is as good as reducing the number of days you have in this world.

¹ Basiony, M. D., 2016. The Importance of Family Ties. Hadith of the Day.com, September 20, <https://hadithoftheday.com/the-importance-of-family-ties/>

² Imam Al-Ghazali, Karim, M. F., trans., 1993. *Ihya Ulumiddin, Vol. II*. Karachi-Pakistan: Darul-Ishaat. p. 87.

2.8. Summary and Uniqueness of the Study

In this chapter, attempts have been made to give an account on the life, works and philosophies of Al-Ghazali and MacIntyre where each of the philosophers was found to be an ardent proponent of the concepts of virtue and essence of existence. While Ghazali's *Ihya Ulumideen* and *Mizan al-Amal* were distinctively about the virtues so did MacIntyre's *After Virtue* and *Whose Justice Which Rationality?* However, a common ground one can establish of the two here is that they all tend towards attainment of the good life from the respective traditions which they purport to defend. We have also discussed the origin of the virtues which was traced back to practices and habituations from both philosophers and made mention of the philosophical and mystical virtues. The mystical virtues were sui generis to Ghazali's excogitations as an account of a closer look given to the desires earlier mentioned by Aristotle but taken to a whole new level where states and stations were discussed on the levels of the human soul in its quest for redemption and closeness to the Creator.

The Conceptions of the Good life and good conduct have also been analysed from the two philosophers, while Ghazali was busy giving an account of the tenets of good living from Qur'an and Hadiths of the Holy prophet of Islam, MacIntyre was busy defending the universal notion of the human good from rival traditions of morality and the general conception of the good life. There was also a more radical submission of the concept from the philosophy of Hegel, who viewed the good life from an unconventional perspective of the Aristotelian virtues, it was discussed that his version of the highest good is to be found in freedom and the utilization of the free will in a modern political community.

Herbert McCabe's account on ethics, education, tradition and the general conception of the good life was explicated to some length. A view of the good life from African perspective where the African socialism was adopted from the works of Julius K. Nyerere of Tanzania on the need to contribute to societal development with the virtue of self-reliance and then the crux of the research on the teaching methodologies to be employed on transferring the concept of the good life were explored to some length.

Finally, the chapter was wrapped up by a review of some researches that were empirically conducted on the good life by Michalos and others, and on ideals of the good life by Cheryl Armon whereby their major findings were tending to look at the good life as a life that leads one to happiness. She particularly viewed measures of happiness as the major determinants of quality of life while Cheryl was looking at individual pleasure as the ultimate human good. Then, Emily Smith's TED talk titled "There is more to life than happiness" was reviewed, where she came up with four pillars of having a meaningful life viz. Belonging, purpose, transcendence and storytelling. Finally, Waldinger's longest research on human happiness was reviewed where he concluded that the good life is built with good relationships.

However, what makes this study unique is that it has combined almost all the ingredients that man needs to live a humanly good life. That is, from the quality of life perspective and even the spiritual perspective. This is because it has reviewed works from both reason and religion, which is MacIntyre and Ghazali, and also tried to combine the two to make a cohesive unit. MacIntyre has been argued to stand for Western Philosophy and Al-Ghazali Islamic and Eastern Philosophy.

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY AND PROCEDURE OF THE RESEARCH

3.1. Preface

The sui generis nature of philosophical research method has made it necessary to always have to clarify to the non-philosophers why the philosophers do not heed to the vaunted scientific method of quantitative research technique. This is perhaps due to the dearth of philosophers and philosophical inquiries in the 21st century and of course, the deliberate attempt by the people in authority/policy makers to undermine the critical thinking powers of the common population. After all, this did not only start in the 21st century; the problem is dated as far back as 300 years B.C when Socrates was silenced forever by the Athenian people. But really, was he silenced forever? To begin with, it is important I start here by what is meant by reflection which is a key concept in the activity component of this research. Stephen¹ in a PEHL 557 class note mentioned a difference between the philosophers and scientists as; philosophers reflect – scientists count.

To reflect is to cogitate, to ponder, to wonder, to consider and to think seriously, carefully and relatively calmly² about an idea, concept and conceptions, issues and problems to whatever field applied. Therefore, to reflect in philosophy of education is to cogitate about concepts and conceptions, issues and problems that affect education as a social institution. It follows however, that philosophers of education reflect in education using qualitative technique of research against the empirical

¹ Stephen, P. & Jefferies, C., n.d. *Philosophic Research in Physical Activity*, accessed July 27, 2016, http://www.cwu.edu/~jefferis/PEHL557_philos.html

² **'Reflect'** in Microsoft Encarta Dictionaries, 2009 Edition.

quantitative research of the scientists using statistical tools. The only difference here is that while the scientists use statistics as a tool the philosophers use logic as a tool, simple. Richard Pring also clarified this in his “False Dualism of Educational Research” thus; “*The 'quantitative' requires precise and clear definition of terms, the generation of law-like hypotheses to be empirically tested, the application of mathematical and quantifiable precision. The 'qualitative' rejects this*”.¹ All standard philosophical researches are qualitative in nature, and therefore, do not use quantitative statistics as tools for obtaining the validity of their findings, but rather use logic as a major tool in so doing.

Again, philosophical researches are more sophisticated than just the application of logic. The use of critical analysis with linguistic expertise and clarification of virtually everything that comes in the way of the philosopher while in the quest for achieving his aim in addressing a particular concept, idea, issue and problem is another way of doing research in the philosophic tradition. Philosophical researches generate hypotheses through speculation and valid inferences while empirical researches on the other hand test those hypotheses. This means the two are complementary. Further, in philosophy, the viability of hypothetical propositions is checked by appealing to reason and inferences coupled with practical/pragmatic experiences of life. However, one might argue that even in the empirical researches those hypotheses are generated before testing them, it should be noted that in philosophy fundamental problems of reality, knowledge and values in general are speculated and analyzed in a more detailed fashion using logical

¹ Pring, R., 2005. *Philosophy of Education: Aims, Theory, Common Sense and Research*. London and New York: Continuum. p. 229.

tools of argument and assessment. Again, the results in the sciences are collected by the philosophers, after, the religious element and cultural experiences of the society are added together for further reflection on the whole, the cycle continues.

Further, where statistical data are found relevant, such results from quantitative researches that may assist in justification of some arguments will be adequately utilised. In line with the submission above C. D. Broad was of the view that; “*speculative philosophy’s object is to take over the results of the various sciences, to add to them the results of the religious and ethical experiences of mankind and then to reflect upon the whole*”.¹ Again, P.H. Phoenix in Akinpelu² is reported to have argued that philosophy is a synoptic discipline in which all facts and information from diverse other disciplines are integrated and synthesised to give a comprehensive perspective.

The general methodology to be employed will be using the tools of philosophical analysis, speculation and prescription. Since the study is expected to come up with some suggestions and recommendations on the effective strategies to be utilised in teaching philosophy of the good life, prescription will not be taken so lightly here as the case may be with most purists in the analytic tradition. The use of focused group discussions with Nigerians and observation would be employed and this may necessitate some field works in Nigeria. The internet encyclopaedias and works of the

¹ Enoh, A. O. & Babarinde, K., eds., 2012. *A Guide to Philosophical Research in Education*. Ibadan: Stirling-Horden Publishers Ltd. p. 28.

² Akinpelu, J. A., 2005. *Essays in Philosophy and Education*, op. cit., p. 138.

selected philosophers would be used extensively here, but the review is going to be subjected to critical philosophical analysis.

Further, attempts shall be made in showcasing the different tools and techniques available to the philosophers in their quest for the validity and soundness of arguments in arriving at ultimate truths. Again, logical tools of assessment like fallacies of the false-cause i.e. *cum hoc ergo propter hoc* and *post hoc ergo propter hoc*, fallacies of relevance and weak induction, bivalence and the excluded middle, conceptual incoherence as well as argumentative tools like validity and soundness of arguments, formal and informal fallacies, self-contradiction and non-contradiction principles¹ etc. shall be adequately utilized here. However, it is imperative to begin with what is meant by philosophical research and also to show how it applies in the evaluation of and arrival at truths and facts. We shall discuss these in detail presently with examples in education as they relate to our study here.

Since the justification of educational judgements is regarded as one of the key areas of interest in philosophy of education as a discipline, in the event of adopting any of the above philosophical methods, the study will use the analytic style of Descartes² in the justification of our arguments. This method as he briefly stated, is as follows:

- The first was never to accept anything as true that I did not plainly know to be such; that is to say, carefully to avoid hasty judgment and prejudice; and to include nothing more in my judgments than what

¹ Baggini, J. & Fosl, P. S., 2010. *The Philosopher's Toolkit: A Compendium of Philosophical Concepts and Methods* 2nd ed. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

² Ariew, R. ed., 2000. *Rene Descartes: Philosophical Essays and Correspondence*. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. P. 54.

presented itself to my mind so clearly and so distinctly that I had no occasion to call it in doubt.

- The second, to divide each of the difficulties I would examine into as many parts as possible and as was required in order better to resolve them.
- The third, to conduct my thoughts in an orderly fashion, by commencing with those objects that are simplest and easiest to know, in order to ascend little by little, as by degrees, to the knowledge of the most composite things, and by supposing an order even among those things that do not naturally precede one another.
- And the last, everywhere to make enumerations so complete and reviews so general that I was assured of having omitted nothing.

This was in his '*Discourse on the method of Reasoning*'. This method by Descartes has captured so many areas of philosophical research in education, ranging from the principles of philosophical research in education like, curiosity, wonder, objectivity¹, coherence, logicity, open-mindedness², and the ability to generalise from our findings.

However, this method is not left without a criticism despite the nature, with which it presents itself. The phrase that '*what presented itself to my mind so clearly and distinctly*' to be accepted as true is disputed in that, the fact the I have known something to be true so clearly and distinctly doesn't mean it's

¹ Bamisaiye, A. O., 2012. Philosophical Research Methods in Education in Enoh, A. O. & Babarinde, K., 2012. *A Guide to Philosophical Research in Education*, op. cit., pp. 69 - 71.

² Saulawa, M. A., 2015. *Virtue, Character and Moral Dispositions from Indigenous African and Islamic Philosophies of Education for Nigeria*. Ibadan: University of Ibadan. p. 64.

actually true.¹ My judgement of something out of sincere conviction does not make it to be true, this is because take for instance a drug addict who whenever takes his hallucinogen or whatever he uses to get high, he sees himself flying, and this makes him to be so sure that whenever he wants to fly he'll take the drug, this doesn't make it any true that he is actually flying.

Again, consider a class of students where one has proven to be exceptionally above average in the examination results, and the teacher simply concludes that he is the best student in the class, unknowingly to the teacher that he always cheats without the knowledge of the teacher. This shows that simply because one has been so clearly and distinctly sure about a fact does not make it actually the last and perfect judgement about that fact.

By and large, this research method by Descartes in his meditations has served as one of the typical examples in philosophical researches. We shall now discuss some the tools of philosophical research in education from *The Philosopher's Toolkit* by Julian and Peter,² and Hurley's³ '*A Concise Introduction to Logic*'.

3.2. PHILOSOPHICAL TOOLS OF ARGUMENT

Before we start this section is important to bring to light, what this section intends to cover by appealing to the philosophic style adopted by 20th century analytic movement precursors, this style takes, as its most fundamental object, the art of making clarification in the use of language.

Here is what they posited;

¹ Circularity and the Cartesian Circle in Julian Baggini and Fosl, 2010 op. cit., pp. 84 – 85.

² This book though not widely quoted in the philosophical researches will be extensively used in this section to bring to light the logical tools used by philosophers in their works. The book is purely philosophical, but attempts shall be made in citing practical educational examples in the course of our explanations.

³ Hurley, P. J., 2012. *A Concise Introduction to Logic*. 11th ed. Wadsworth Cengage Learning: Boston.

*Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences. (The word “philosophy” must mean something which stands above or below, but not beside the natural sciences.) The object of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a theory but an activity. A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations.*¹

These are the words of Wittgenstein as Russell introduced his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. In what follows, however, a philosophical approach on clarifications and elucidations shall be demonstrated to best of my prowess.

To begin with, the soundness of arguments in their premises and conclusions is one of the core areas of interest in philosophy. By argument here, it is not meant the contest or conflict between two or more people about an idea, concept, issue or problem which might involve the use of hash words and even without appealing to reason. It is meant an inference from one or more starting points (truth claims called a ‘premise’ or ‘premises’) to an end point (a truth claim called a ‘conclusion’).² One might argue that even in the natural and social sciences we have explanations to whatever claims we make before concluding a result through tests and experiments. The only difference is that philosophy does not yield to the use of these statistical tools, rather appeals to reason and experience in a technically logical fashion as we shall see presently.

Philosophy, then, is not the only field of thought for which rationality is important. And not all that goes by the name of philosophy is argumentative. But it is certainly safe to say that one cannot even begin to

¹ Wittgenstein, L. 1921. , *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. Pears, D. F. & McGuinness, B. F., trans. London and New York: Routledge. p. xiii.

² Baggini and Fosl, 2010. op. cit., p. 2.

master the expanse of philosophical thought without learning how to use the tools of reason.¹ To these tools, we shall now turn.

3.2.1. Validity and Soundness

Unlike the regular quantitative method of research where we now begin to ascertain the validity of the selected statistical measuring instrument, here we are going to demonstrate how we can justify arguments (be they inductive or deductive) as valid and sound. Validity of an argument is measured based on the truthfulness of the premises as they are linked to a particular conclusion. A valid argument is sometimes called a valid deductive reasoning. Which means the form and structure of the argument are well constructed. Calling a deductive argument 'valid' affirms that the conclusion actually does follow from the premises in that way. Arguments that are presented as or taken to be successful deductive arguments but where the conclusion does not in fact definitely follow from the premises are called 'invalid' deductive arguments.²

Consider the following;

1. All the students from Bayero University do not cheat in exams
2. Husna is from Bayero University
3. Therefore, Husna Doesn't cheat in exams

This is a standard valid deductive argument in that, the conclusion was drawn from the premises, although the premises might not be absolutely true, but as far as validity of an argument in terms of its form and structure is concerned the argument is a valid one. This means that validity is value

¹ Ibid, p. 3.

² Ibid, p. 13.

neutral because the premises might be false. However, a valid argument may not be endorsed as a sound one if either its conclusion or premise is false. It follows, therefore, that a sound argument must be backed up by true premises and conclusion and must also be valid in terms of form and structure.

For a deductive argument to pass muster, it must be valid. But being valid is not sufficient to make it a sound argument. A sound argument must not only be valid; it must also have true premises, as well. It is, strictly speaking, only sound arguments whose conclusions we must accept.¹ Calling an argument sound is thus, the highest endorsement one can give it in philosophy. In the example given above therefore, we must be sure before saying that the students of Bayero do not cheat in exams by making sure that the examinations are conducted under strict conditions of vigilance by the invigilators who are of proven integrity and that the students are free of all foreign relevant materials, with a good spacing and class arrangement to avoid copying from their fellow students. If the premises then are true, we have a true conclusion coming from the argument, and then we must accept that Husna doesn't cheat in examinations. This then, is a valid and sound argument.

3.2.2. Fallacies and Inconsistencies

One of the hallmarks of philosophical researches is the identification of poor reasoning or faulty inference, and fallacy is nothing other than poor

¹ Ibid, p. 16.

reasoning¹, which implies that finding fallacies is a core area in philosophizing. It should however, be noted that just as we have attached validity with soundness of an argument, so also we shall relate fallacious arguments with invalid arguments, but not in the same magnitude and fashion. This is because while all invalid arguments are fallacious, not all fallacies involve invalid arguments. Invalid arguments are faulty because of flaws in their form or structure. Sometimes, however, reasoning goes awry for reasons not of form but of content.²

When an argument is faulty in form or structure it is called a formal fallacy, and on the other hand if it is faulty in content, it is called an informal fallacy.

3.4.1. Formal Fallacy

One of the famous examples given about formal types of fallacies is that of '*affirming the consequent*'³

1. If Ahmed graduated from college last year, he would be living a good life this year
2. Ahmed is now living a good life
3. Therefore, Ahmed has graduated from college.

From the look of the above argument, it is evident that the conclusion may not necessarily follow from the premises, and of course, this is not in any way saying that the premises are false. The only way it is possible that if Ahmed graduated from the college, he might get employed that same year and start working which will give him the opportunity to live his dream life

¹ Ibid, p. 23.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

or a good or decent life. But this is not also ruling out reasons other than graduation to make Ahmed live a good life, he could have gotten wealth from inheritance of his late relative within that year, or he simply got lucky and won a lottery to have fetched him enough money to live his dream life, he could also have gotten the money through stealing or any other means illegal. Hence the premises and conclusion might all be true, but the conclusion will not follow with necessity from the premises. The source of this fallacy's persuasive power lies in an ambiguity in ordinary language concerning the use of 'if'. The word 'if' is sometimes used to imply 'if and only if' ('iff' in philosophical jargon) but sometimes means simply 'if'. Despite their similarity, these two phrases have very different meanings.¹ It should however, be noted that all formal fallacies occur only in deductive arguments.²

3.4.2. Informal Fallacy

Informal fallacies as shown earlier are fallacies that can be detected by examining the content of the argument. It requires adequate knowledge of the subject matter of discussion before one can identify it. Take for instance, the following argument;

Philosophy is made up of abstract ideas
Abstract ideas have no use in practical situations
Therefore, philosophy is useless in a practical world.

From the argument above, one can clearly agree that philosophy does involve abstract ideas in its subject matter (i.e. metaphysics) and of course

¹ Ibid, p. 24.

² Hurley, P. J., 2012. *A Concise Introduction to Logic*. 11th ed. Wadsworth Cengage Learning: Boston. p. 120.

in a field where policy makers are faced with a difficult situation they would want to have practical solutions to their problems, and if philosophy in its purist analytical tone is considered here, one would agree with the conclusion that philosophy is useless. But the fact that analysis makes ideas, concepts, issues and problems clear makes it more promising to the policy makers in tackling their problems from epistemological and axiological perspectives. Therefore, the source of this fallacy lies in clinging to the conclusion that based on one part of philosophy which is metaphysics that philosophy is useless in a practical world.¹ Informal fallacy is easily overlooked if one is not grounded in the subject matter of discourse, and this makes it more difficult to spot. And this is where we turn to logical tools of assessment. It is a continuation of the informal fallacy but here, we are going to show how one can detect a fallacious statement in an argument of whatever sort. However, the examples would always try to depict a scenario of moral argument, as we are dealing with teaching philosophy of the good life.

3.3. LOGICAL TOOLS OF ASSESSMENT

This section, will start with a continuation of the informal fallacies as they are going to be explained in a more detailed account with a view to unveiling how we can use them to assess arguments, and to judge precisely what kind of fallacy an arguer is committing in the course of presenting faulty

¹ For more on the possibility of practical ideas and the use of philosophy of education, See Pragmatism and uses of philosophy of education in Seetharamu, A. S., 2004. *Philosophies of Education*. New Delhi: Ashish Publishing House.

arguments. The various informal fallacies accomplish their purpose in so many different ways that no single umbrella theory covers them all. Some fallacies work by getting the reader or listener to feel various emotions, such as fear, pity, or camaraderie, and then attaching a certain conclusion to those emotions. Others attempt to discredit an opposing argument by associating it with certain pejorative features of its author. And then there are those that appeal to various dispositions on the part of the reader or listener, such as superstition or mental laziness, to get him or her to accept a conclusion.¹

There are over twenty of these fallacies, but for the purpose of this research we shall discuss the ones that are likely to occur in the subject matter of our research, especially when dealing with ethical propositions that appeal to emotions/religion of the listener/reader. And by these we are implying to concentrate on informal fallacies of relevance and weak induction.

3.5.1. Fallacies of Relevance

A fallacy of relevance is a situation where by in the argument, the premises have no any logical connection with the conclusion. In an argument that commits a fallacy of relevance, on the other hand, the connection between premises and conclusion is emotional. To identify a fallacy of relevance, therefore, one must be able to distinguish genuine evidence from various forms of emotional appeal. The decision to discuss only this type of fallacy among the various fallacies available in based on the fact that this type of fallacy is mostly grounded with emotive inclinations and this is what makes

¹ Hurley, P. J., 2012. op. cit., p. 121.

it fit in ethical discourses of this nature. We shall briefly attempt some clarifications on the few selected.

3.5.2. Argumentum Ad Baculum – Appeal to Stick (Force)

This fallacy is detected when an arguer makes a statement or proposition for which he/she does not have the necessary facts or reason to back it, therefore resorting to force or threatening the listener/reader in believing or accepting the claim. That if the listener/reader does not accept the conclusion, something bad will happen to him/her. A kind of physical or psychological well-being¹ of the listener/reader is threatened upon noncompliance. This fallacy is mostly used by traditional teachers in schools who cannot prove a certain claim by threatening the students with some kind of punishment if they reject the teacher's argument, and it is one of the reasons that kill the inquisitive attitudes of students in schools, such that they become so docile and passive in the classroom. And in most cases, it is not because those claims lack proofs or reasons; it is simply because the teacher did not do a thorough research before coming to his/her classroom.

Consider the following example;

A teacher in the classroom:

Philosophy of education is a good course, every student of higher education must offer it, if you think it otherwise then consider yourself as a carry-over student.

Another example is when a parent is trying to make a child religious;

¹ Ibid.

Praying is the best thing for our salvation, you must pray every day, if not I will flog you and nobody is going to save you from my punishment.

From the examples given above, in the first, a teacher is making a claim, and he is trying to avoid a question of proof of the claim thereby, threatening the students of a carry-over. This is not because the course has no proofs of its existence and relevance, it is simply because the teacher cannot stand answering the question of why every student must offer it and he cannot prove the claim, he is hiding behind a threat of failure upon posing a challenge to the claim. Secondly, a parent who is trying to make a child prayerful and is threatening him of some pain, because he wants to avoid the question, why must we pray? In either way, this fallacy is detected when a threat is used as a means of acceptance rather than reason or fact.

3.5.3. *Argumentum Ad Misericordiam* – Appeal to Pity

This fallacy occurs when the arguer evokes sympathy from the listener/reader as a means of accepting his claim/argument instead of reason. It is used mostly in justifying a crime by excuses that would put the assessor/judge in a psychological pity of the arguer or criminal in question. Mostly used by students in examinations and by criminals in the court. Take for instance, the following example; a student caught cheating in an examination hall.

I lost my parents yesterday; I didn't have the time to read my books while accepting condolences, I can't afford to fail this course because with the death of my parents I can't pay for an extra session, this is why I copied from my friend.

Another example is for a thief caught stealing;

I stole this grain to feed my family, I have a two year old daughter who has not eaten since morning, and I fear that she might die if not fed, therefore I am not guilty.

From the two examples given above, the arguers are only trying to prove their innocence based on a story that evokes the sympathy of the judge, but this is not in any way proving that what they did was acceptable or morally right, they have not proven anything for their reason of engaging in what they were accused of. Consider for instance, the first example if the student were to argue that; *the lecturer did not come to the class even once, and the reading materials given to us were very difficult to fathom without a professional explanation.* And the second arguing that I was only passing by and saw this grain on the ground, I never took it from anyone's shop it was from the remnants in a dustbin. Either way the arguer is giving possible genuine reasons that are not evoking the pity of the assessor. One has to be careful in detecting this fallacy and sticking to objectivity in whatever judgment one is passing.

3.5.4. Argumentum Ad Populum – Appeal to People

This fallacy occurs when the arguer uses the preconceptions and predispositions of a crowd in order to make them accept a weak conclusion. The argument on ordinary circumstances wouldn't survive the dictates of reason and inference, but for the sake of the exploitation of that weak spot of the audience, the arguer goes scot free without being challenged.

It is also having a structure of luring someone into the psychological feeling of belongingness and the need to keep up with the crowd/vogue; that if you want to be accepted or included as a member/loved or esteemed then you should accept xyz as true.¹

Take for instance, a mother to her child;

If you want to be like Homer of Greece, then you must eat your cheese balls.

The fallacy is somewhat detected as a false-cause fallacy, for, there is no any connection between a child's being a great poet like Homer and his eating of cheese balls. The listener/reader is left with the feeling of insecurity for not being with the crowd and therefore, forced to accept the conclusion/statement irrespective of its weak argument.

3.5.5. Argumentum Ad Hominem – Argument against the Person

This fallacy occurs when two arguers are involved, such that the first arguer (A) advances with an argument for which arguer (B) responds to by attacking the personality of arguer (A) instead of the topic of discussion; Arguer (B) here is said to have committed a fallacy of Argument against the person. The argument against the person occurs in three forms: the *ad hominem* abusive, the *ad hominem* circumstantial, and the *tu quoque* (you too). In the ***ad hominem* abusive**, the second person responds to the first person's argument by verbally abusing the first person.²

Consider the following examples;

Example 1

¹ Ibid, p. 126.

² Ibid, p. 126.

Prof. Dauda called for decent dressing of the students in campus to avoid sexual harassment; do you know that he is secretly campaigning to convince the Senate to give him Chairman of disciplinary committee on dress code? Enough about Prof. Dauda, we must discard his argument.

This is a typical example of *Ad hominem circumstantial* the author in the argument is ignoring the substance of Prof Dauda's argument by trying to discredit him through some certain circumstances that affect him.

Example 2

Dr. Abdul argued that all lecturers must be warned about the danger of being alone with female students in their offices; do you know that just this morning three female students were seen living his office after staying there for almost two hours?

In this example *Ad hominem tu quoque* is committed by ignoring the substance of Dr. Abdu's argument, thereby resorting to allude that he is also doing what he is calling people not to do. This is not however in any way showing that Dr. Abdul's argument deserves some rapt attention in order to avoid teacher/student extra-academic relationships.

Example 3

Faisal argued that inadequate number of professional teachers is the root of all evils of exams malpractices in Nigeria. But Faisal is an arrogant, selfish and pompous man who doesn't respect anyone in his family. Obviously his arguments are not worth listening to.

Here Faisal is bringing a very important and sensitive issue on the menace of exams malpractices in Nigeria, yet the author went straight ahead to abuse his person and ignoring the substance of Faisal's proposition. This is the case when the author is charged with committing the *Ad hominem abusive* fallacy.

Other fallacies of relevance include; straw man, red herring, missing the point and accident fallacies. We shall briefly summarize these as a result of time and space and the fact that they are not directly relevant in the theme of this research. The **straw man** shows a case where the counter arguer of an argument creates a whole new scenario of close meaning with first arguer's proposition condemns the point raised and claim to have demolished the first arguer's point. **Red herring** fallacy is also similar to the straw man fallacy only that it takes an entirely different argument in order to take away the attention of the listener/reader from actual point of discussion; the counter arguer here is accused of committing the red herring fallacy. The fallacy of **accident** is committed when a general rule is applied to a specific case it was not intended to cover. Typically, the general rule is cited (either directly or implicitly) in the premises and then wrongly applied to the specific case mentioned in the conclusion.¹ **Missing the point** also known as *Ignoratio Elenchi* (ignorance of the proof) is a fallacy that instead of the ones we discussed so far that the premises are irrelevant to the conclusion, in this missing the point the premises are supporting an entirely different unintended conclusion. But then, the assessor has to be sure of bringing up the supported conclusion.

¹ Ibid, pp. 128 - 129.

3.3.1. Fallacies of Weak Induction

All the fallacies of relevance discussed above show that there is no logical connection of relevance between the premises and the conclusions; here in fallacies of weak induction, there exists the connection, only that the premises are so weak in supporting the conclusion. Only four of these would be discussed here as follows; Appeal to unqualified authority, hasty generalizations, false-cause, and Appeal to ignorance.

3.6.1. *Argumentum Ad Verecundiam* – Appeal to Unqualified Authority

This tool is sometimes more useful in the court of law, but is also used in the academia where the credibility/expertise of the cited authority or witness of an event is questionable. In any of the cases it occurs when a conclusion is made on the basis of weak premises. There are several reasons why an authority or witness might lack credibility. The person might lack the requisite expertise, might be biased or prejudiced, might have a motive to lie or disseminate “misinformation,” or might lack the requisite ability to perceive or recall.¹

Dr. Hisham (A medical doctor at general Hospital) argued that the test items for the course Philosophy of Education in the second semester examinations of his son are faulty; his son failed the course, therefore that paper should be cancelled.

Despite the fact that Dr. Hisham is a specialist in medical sciences, this does not make him a specialist on the construction of test items in the course of philosophy of education; he is neither a specialist in the area of philosophy of education nor is he a specialist in the area of tests and

¹ Hurley, P. J., 2012. *A Concise Introduction to Logic*, op. cit., p. 138.

measurements. This is a pure case of appeal to unqualified authority, and therefore, the conclusion cannot be accepted. Again, the fact that his son wrote the exam and failed, there is likelihood that he is making the argument on the fear that his son would repeat the year for the sake of that course.

3.6.2. Hasty Generalizations (Converse Accident)

This fallacy is called converse accident, because it is similar to that of fallacy of accident only that it reverses the phenomenon by making an inductive generalization based on a few insignificant portion of a population, or non-simple random technique in the selection of the population sample. The arguer is hereby said to have committed the fallacy of hasty generalization by making a conclusion out of premises that are not genuinely representative of the general population.

3.6.3. False Cause Fallacy

With this fallacy the philosophers challenge the supposition that something is said to have caused an effect using a particular experiment while in the actual sense of the case, the cause is entirely a different one. Also known as *non causa pro causa* (not the cause, for the cause) this fallacy is committed when what is taken to be the cause of something is not really the cause at all, and the mistake is based on something other than mere temporal succession.¹ Consider the following example;

Whenever Ofisa smokes marijuana, he later reads his books very well and passes his exams; therefore marijuana is a good substance for reading.

¹ Ibid, p. 143.

The fact that Ofisa smokes marijuana and later on reads his books doesn't make it a sufficient ground to conclude that marijuana is the cause of his success in academics. It could either be that he is simply a victim of classical conditioning, or an addict that can't stop or control himself without taking this substance, after which he goes on with his normal activities. Therefore, this argument is guilty of the *non causa pro causa* fallacy. There are two (though not limited to this number) major types of this fallacy;

a. ***Cum hoc Ergo Propter hoc* (with this, therefore, because of this)**

Also referred to as the *cum hoc* fallacy. It is in this form;

X occurs along with Y,

Therefore X causes Y.

The year Hafiz was introduced to this school; the students suddenly began to get excellent grades in their exams from that same year. Therefore, Hafiz is the cause of their high intelligence.

In this example, we can clearly see an example of this fallacy in that it sometimes is mostly used by superstitious beliefs as someone or something being a sign of good/bad luck. Just the fact that with the coming of Hafiz and things suddenly changed coincidentally does not mean that he is the cause of their high intelligence. A lot of factors could be the reason for that, perhaps the same year there was a re-training exercise for the teachers on new pedagogical skills of teaching, an increase in salaries with promises for the teachers to put in their best in teaching or just a new school policy change that could enhance the public welfare of the teachers etc.

b. ***Post hoc Ergo Propter hoc* (After this, therefore, because of this)**

Just as the *cum hoc* fallacy, it is also simply called the *post hoc* fallacy. The example of Ofisa above is an example of this fallacy, it maintains that despite effects precede their causes, but not everything that precedes an event causes that event. Shortly after the Monarch butterflies migrate south every year, for example, it gets colder and winter sets in. That doesn't mean the Monarchs' departure causes winter.¹ Therefore, care must be taken before accepting anything as the actual cause of an event or result. This will help teachers by judging with caution what it is that make their students behave/perform the way they do in the classroom/exams. Before closing these tools it would be of paramount importance to add bivalence and the excluded middle to the arsenal of the philosopher of education in presenting and assessing arguments, especially on values and the good life.

3.3.2. Bivalence and the Excluded Middle²

In this tool we shall extrapolate how philosophers argue for the middle course in the course of their arguments. The principle of excluded middle states that; for any statement P, P or not-P must be true. While that of the bivalence states that; every statement is true or false. The two almost say one and the same thing, only that one involves negation of a statement. Consider the following statement;

Abdul is courageous

¹ Baggini & Fosl, 2010. *The Philosopher's Toolkit*, op, cit., p. 99.

² Baggini & Fosl, 2010. op, cit., p. 77.

Taken from the above statement using these principles, the statement is true or false that is, either Abdul is courageous or not courageous (coward), there is no room for middle ground. And this is the point where we argue for the Aristotle's Mean¹, whereby as a result of temperance as a virtue, there is need for one to hit the middle ground between two extremes, neither too courageous nor too cowardly, in whatever it is that one is doing in life. These principles are brought here in order to check between excesses and deficiencies. Having discussed these logical tools at some length, it is now time we turn back to the general philosophical methods of doing the business of presenting philosophical works in education.

3.4. Philosophical Research Method in Education

With the logical tools discussed in this chapter, writing philosophically in education, would first, mean that the arguments presented must be valid and sound in all their ramifications (i.e. content, form or structure). It is at this point that we choose the philosophical research design for this research. But then, it is incumbent on us to explicate these methods before making the choice. There are different frameworks on which philosophy generally asks its questions, and these could be from the subject matter of philosophy itself in relation to education as an enterprise or from the basic functions of philosophy. Taken from the subject matter, we speak of raising questions about world views or the nature of man (metaphysics), the kind of knowledge (epistemology) worthwhile to be passed on to the next generation for the sake of survival and why it is more important (valuable) than others and what general customs and traditions should be upheld in preserving the heritage of mankind (axiology)?

¹ Bartlett & Collins, 2011. in *Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*, op. cit., p. 39. (1109a).

The second part is when we decide the course of doing philosophy from either of these functions; normative, descriptive and analytic functions.¹ Each of these functions comes with a variety of modes of philosophical activities. The modes as identified by Alhassan² are; Analytic, speculative and prescriptive modes of doing philosophy. The research shall take a hard look at each of these modes as they relate to our functions stated earlier.

3.4.1. Descriptive Function of Philosophy

Descriptive philosophical inquiries are mostly historical in nature. The researcher will be dealing with the evolution of philosophy and its dichotomies from the ancient to the modern era. The major schools of philosophy as well as their advocates as they refute one another in the presentation of their arguments about the nature of the universe, of man and his environment, the possibility of the knowledge of ultimate reality, and values he attach to things, practices and life are all studied under this descriptive function. Working comprehensively, he is trying to picture the general development of “philosophical thought”.³ Classical examples of this type of enquiry are those of Russell’s *“History of Western Philosophy”*⁴ and Radhakrishnan’s *“History of Philosophy: Eastern and Western”*.⁵ Each of these went to different lengths in exploring philosophical thought from different angles, while analyzing, clarifying and criticizing anything that comes their way in the process. This is in fact, what made it different from ordinary historical researches, because, you feel the presence and influence of the researcher vividly as he presents others’ arguments. Philosophy of

¹ Koetting & Malisa, 2004/2008. *Philosophy, Research and Education*. Op. cit. p. 1011.

² Alhassan, A. ed., 2006. *Philosophy of Education*. Lagos: National Open University of Nigeria. pp. 18 – 19.

³ Koetting & Malisa 2004/2008, op., cit., p. 1012.

⁴ Russell, B., 1957. *History of Western Philosophy*. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.

⁵ Radhakrishnan, S., ed., 1957. *History of Western Philosophy: Eastern and Western*. London: George Allen and Unwin

Education textbooks are also a good Example of this type of descriptive analysis, another classical example of this is that of J. A. Akinpelu's "An Introduction to Philosophy of Education", cited in different parts of this research. Therefore, this function of philosophy avails one with the opportunity to explore the historical development of philosophical thought while learning, in the process, the techniques of philosophical arguments and their presentation.

3.4.2. Normative Function of Philosophy

The normative method of philosophical inquiry is an umbrella term that deals with both speculative and prescriptive modes of doing philosophy. Unlike the descriptive mode which deals with *what is* and *what has been*¹, the normative method deals with *what ought to be*.²³ To engage in normative philosophical inquiry, one would be engaged with basically the questions of values and the standards of living a good life in the society, and of course, the possible course, which ought to be followed in attaining the good life. Normative philosophical inquiry explores and critiques philosophical positions, as well as making decisions as to the "rightness and wrongness" of those positions.⁴ In education however, Akinpelu quoted Quintilian with regards to this function that philosophy must also be: *...concerned with 'developing... a positive conception of what education ought to be in the light of as much information about man, society, and the universe as he can muster from all available areas of experience and knowledge*.⁵ This is the speculative

¹ Koetting, J. R. & Malisa, M., 2004/2008. Philosophy, Research and Education, in Jonassen, D. H., ed., *Handbook of Research on Educational Communications and Technology*. Second Edition. New Jersey and London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers/Taylor & Francis e-Library. p.1012.

² Ibid.

³ Akinpelu. 1981. *An Introduction to Philosophy of Education*, op. cit., p.9.

⁴ Koetting and Malisa 2004/2008, op. cit., p. 1013.

⁵ Akinpelu, op. cit., 9.

function, he concluded. But the prescriptive function also, surfaces when the researcher is involved with advocating some ends or objectives (values) that he believes to be desirable and justifying their desirability. He may also be involved in suggesting means for advocating these values.¹ This is the prescriptive function. And it is what the great educators (Plato, Quintilian, Rousseau, Locke, and Montessori) did as reported by Robert Rusk in his “*Doctrines of the Great Educators*”.² Others not mentioned in his collection like Comenius (The Great Didactic, and *Orbis Pictus*) and Dewey (Democracy and Education) were also mentioned by Saulawa³ in this regard.

3.4.3. Analytic Function of Philosophy

Analysis is often seen as the latest philosophic style in vogue, although it has been popular since from the time of Socrates and the Sophists. Analytic function is one of the major activities of philosophical and empirical researches in general. However, it took a turn to the analysis of language, praxis and words in usage from the time of Ludwig Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*.⁴ Clarification is the one simple unifying theme in analytic philosophy. The underlying assumption of the analysts is that most philosophical problems of the past were not problems concerning ultimate reality or truth, goodness, and beauty, but problems with confused language, warped or unclear meanings, and conceptual confusion. Genuine knowledge, most analysts claim, is the business of science, not philosophy. Thus, the true role of philosophy is critical clarification in this regard.

¹ Koetting and Malisa, 2004/2008 op., cit.

² Rusk, R. R., 1918. *The Doctrines of the Great Educators*. London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd.

³ Saulawa, M. A., 2014. Philosophy of Education for Educational Administrators: The Search for Meanings and Relevance. *Kano Journal of Educational Studies (KAJEST)*, 4(1).

⁴ Wittgenstein, L., 2007. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. Vienna: Gutenberg e-Books.

Several kinds of approaches can be taken within the general movement of analytic philosophy, and the movement itself has undergone a somewhat puzzling historical evolution. Basically, philosophical analysis has always taken place, just as Socrates was analysing when he investigated the meaning of justice. However, the modern movement of analytic philosophy has its more immediate roots in several recent philosophical developments.¹

To the analytics, philosophy is not about speculating what the best world or the best educational system would be, nor is it about prescribing the way that education ought to be conducted. Rather, philosophy plays mainly the role of a midwife: it helps in bringing ideas to birth in the way that midwives help in delivering babies. This it does by insisting that we formulate our ideas as precisely as possible and express them as clearly as we can, so that our listeners will have no difficulty in grasping the meaning of what we are saying. It is concerned with clear thinking and precise expression; and it may be applied to one's own ideas and statements or to the statements of other people. The intention is to avoid misunderstanding of the real issue in any problem. This is the general intention of the analytic philosophy.² From the overall functions and modes of doing philosophical researches above, we can conclude that the research design is normative as well as analytic in nature. This is because the concepts of virtue and the good life are ethical concepts that fall under axiology and normative philosophy as explained above. Now in what follows we shall consider writing philosophically in education from the next unit.

¹ Ozmon, H. A. & Craver, S. M., 2007. *Philosophical Foundations of Education* 8th ed. Virginia: Pearson Merry Prentice Hall. p. 254.

² Akinpelu, J. A., 1981. *An Introduction to Philosophy of Education*. London: Macmillan. p. 167.

3.5. Techniques of Philosophical Analysis in Education

In the course of analysing a concept, issues and problems in education, philosophers have given steps that one could employ in using the reductionist theory of analytic inquiries. Two of these shall be examined as follows:

The first technique developed by Babarinde¹, and a critique submitted by Saulawa² shall be considered. Babarinde however, proposed the following:

Step one: Isolate significant concepts for clarification. That is, concepts deserving attention as a result of their significance

Step two: Render these into propositions. That is, what the concepts or statements imply.

Step three: Clarify by investigating the relationship with other concepts by appealing to interpretation in use, rules of entailment, inference and logic.

Step four: State how the concepts should now be understood when encountered in certain discourses and writings.

Step five: Attempt a criticism of the concepts by raising possible counter objection and by providing adequate answer to such.³

¹ Kola Babarinde is one of the contemporary analytic philosophers of education, in The University of Ibadan, Nigeria. He has written widely on Philosophy of Education in books and journals and has trained quite a number of philosophers of education in the country. He Co-authored with Farayola, *Philosophical foundations of Education*, and one of his recent works in the area is the edited book he co-authored with Enoh, *A Guide to Philosophical research in Education*, A publication of Philosophers of Education Association of Nigeria (PEAN). He was the former Vice President of the Association, currently the Director, Centre for Excellence in Teaching and Learning, University of Ibadan, Nigeria.

² Saulawa, M. A., 2015. *Virtue, Character and Moral Dispositions from Indigenous African and Islamic Philosophies of Education for Nigeria Education*. Ibadan: Unpublished Masters Project in the Department of Teacher Education, University of Ibadan. pp. 78 – 80.

³ Babarinde, K., 2012. *Tyranny of Socio-Science Paradigm of Knowledge Over PRM: Issues and Possibilities for Philosophers of Education* in Enoh, O. & Babarinde. K., eds. *A Guide to Philosophical Research in Education*, op. cit., p. 121.

Saulawa, on the other hand maintained that on the account of the definition of philosophical analysis in education as the analysis of concepts, issues and fundamental problems in education, a definition given by Akinpelu¹, upon reflection on this account Mubarak maintained that the presentation is more or less biased on conceptual analysis alone and therefore, inadequate in handling sophisticated philosophical problems. An attempt was made on restating them in a different approach as follows;

Step 1: Identification: Start with identification and definition of key terms; that is, the concepts and issues or problems at hand.

Step 2: Hypothesis: Raising hypothetical questions in relation to the concept, problem or issue at hand.

Step 3: Usages and Relationship with other Concepts or Issues: That is, tracing the etymology of the concept or examining root cause of the problem and stating ways in which the concept or issue is commonly understood. Then, examine other concepts or issues that may in one way or another affect or influence the identity and definition of the concept or issue in question.

Step 4: Criticisms: Provide possible criticisms or attacks on the exposition given about the concept or issue in objective terms; a kind of an anti-thesis.

Step 5: Restatement: provide possible counter arguments or neutralisers of the objections in step 4 above, and state the new stance on the general argument; a kind of a synthesis.

¹ Akinpelu, 1981. op. cit., p. 171.

These steps have given quite a summary of our discourse in this chapter, and also affirm the dialectical method of philosophical investigations. Thus, this analytic method is more apparent in chapter four on the analyses of concepts, issues and problems of the research. However, the observation made at this level is on the steps stated by Mubarak particularly on step 3, the step is not adequately proposed, it could be restated thus; after tracing the etymology of the concept (or root cause of the problem), the contextually intended (and the possibly accidental) meaning of the concept should be clearly stated in order to avoid ambiguity and misperceptions. Again, all the arguments/propositions should be counterchecked against logical fallacies and inconsistencies in order to assure their validity and soundness. Therefore, these steps by me would be revised as follows:

Step 1: Identification of Terms: In this step select the relevant terms in need of philosophic rigor/attention in the selected topic of concern.

Step 2: Raise Hypothetical Questions: Raise hypothetical questions on the concepts and issues of concern. This sets the course for an intelligent discourse and the ultimate search for truth.

Step 3: Operationalize the Concept for the intended Discourse: After tracing the etymology of the concept (or root cause of the problem), the contextually intended (and the possibly accidental) meaning of the concept should be clearly stated in order to avoid ambiguity and misperceptions. Then, find all the relevant themes that have been attended to by philosophers in the topic of concern, and actively participate by reflecting on their findings and general discourse. Again, all the arguments/propositions

should be counterchecked against logical fallacies and inconsistencies in order to ensure their validity and soundness.

Step 4: Criticisms: Provide possible criticisms or attacks on the exposition given about the concept or issue in objective terms; also, provide a critique for the method used, a kind of an anti-thesis of step 3 above.

Step 5: Restatement: provide possible counter arguments or neutralisers of the objections in step 4 above, and state the new stance on the general argument; a kind of a synthesis of the arguments in general. Again, attempt establishing some criteria from which the concept, idea/issue or problem may be comprehensively construed.

From the techniques mentioned above, one may begin to wonder whether there is any particularly standard method which the philosophers are all adhering to. These steps given by Babarinde and Saulawa may not be suitable in all philosophical writings. However, one striking feature in all philosophical writings is that it must be logical, analytic, coherent, consistent, dialectical and of course, systematic. Therefore, the approaches given above all make use of these techniques.

From the foregoing, given the three major approaches above, one would begin to wonder; which of these is not evident in this research? The answer one might contemplate is, none. Because all the approaches from the functions explicated above are used interchangeably, ranging from the descriptive function, the analytic, as well as the normative (speculative and prescriptive) but as a matter of research design selection with respect to the theme of this study, I shall, conveniently claim that the research design is

normative in nature. Again, on the techniques mentioned by Babarinde and Saulawa, the final version submitted here, shall be the blueprint for this research. Therefore, we are going to employ the logical tools and techniques of philosophical analysis from this chapter using normative research design in presentation, harmonization and critique of the ideas and concepts we shall come to analyze in chapter four. But one striking nature of philosophical research method to be noted is that these tools are not only reserved for the chapter on analysis, rather they are utilized throughout the research endeavor.

3.6. Summary

In this chapter arguments for philosophical research methods in education as they complement with empirical researches of the quantitative paradigm in natural and social sciences were presented and discussed. After showcasing the sui generis nature of the philosophical research method, there was also a discourse on logical tools (as against the statistical tools of quantitative methods) where the tools of argument and validity were highlighted and discussed. It further discussed the logical philosophic tools of assessment and refutation, in this; fallacies of relevance, weak induction, and false cause were explicated in detailed account.

Philosophical research in education was discussed with modes of doing philosophy identified from the three functions of philosophy [descriptive, normative (prescriptive and speculative subsumed) and analytic functions]. Thereafter, the research design was selected as being normative in nature considering the theme of the research on the good life and education. It was however, maintained that both the analytic and descriptive flavors are also

apparently unavoidable and therefore, incorporated. The chapter was concluded with philosophical techniques of analysing concepts, issues and problems in education, to this analysis we shall now turn in chapter four.

CHAPTER FOUR

CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS, CRITIQUE AND DISCUSSIONS OF FINDINGS

4.1. Preface to Section One

As the name implies, this is not a chapter where we analyse data collected from the field as the case may be for quantitative/empirical researches. It is the point where we engage in rigorous philosophical analysis and critique of the concepts, issues and problems of the research theme. The concepts in need of analysis and clarification are; teaching, philosophy of..., the good life, virtue, and essence. This may perhaps, justify the reason why it is not called data analysis but conceptual analysis. However, although these concepts may seem to be the only ones itemized in the course of our intended analyses, it should however, be noted that, in philosophical analysis, analysis of one concept may lead to the analyses of a cluster of so many other related concepts and so on.

But, this analysis of sub-concepts must of course, be attempted towards a wider comprehension of the parent concept, else, we could be charged with committing one the fallacies of relevance in the logical parlance. But then, since we are dealing with normative concepts here, it is important we make some clarifications on the different types of definitions that are given on concepts; like descriptive definitions, stipulative definitions and programmatic or normative definitions of concepts.

By descriptive definition, Schofield¹ maintained that these are definitions that are familiar to us in the dictionaries. It is one that has been formulated in the past, has become standard, and accepted as explaining adequately what something is. A stipulative definition on the other hand, is a definition

¹ Schofield, H., 1972. *The Philosophy of Education: An Introduction*. London: George Allen & Unwin, p. 34.

which tries to map out how a concept should be understood in its context and usage. It could however, be later accepted as a descriptive definition depending on the level of acceptance it gains in its context and usage. Sometimes also, these stipulative definitions help in setting the course upon which a concept ought to be understood and defined. The other type of definition worthy of our attention here is the programmatic definition given by Scheffler in Enoh¹ which is said to be prescriptive in character, in that they are prescriptions of the right or best programs, whether as means or ends. These definitions establish an unbreakable nexus between means and ends of whatever endeavor one seeks to undertake.

In each of these three definitions we shall give example and a critique of what might happen if totally accepted as final. The descriptive definitions are said to be standardized and found in the dictionaries, although this has been argued otherwise, since a single word may have multiple meanings and usages in different contexts. This leaves the philosopher of education with the rigor of having to explain unequivocally which of the meanings he is actually referring to. This has been argued by Enoh² on the basis of the problem of circularity. Taking for instance, the concepts of 'curiosity and interest', he argued that each is defined in terms of the other, interest is defined as a quality that arouses concern or curiosity while curiosity is defined as being interested in something. A is defined in terms of B, and B in terms of A³. The structure of his argument on circularity is sound, because the conclusion is not only justified by the premises but also the

¹ Enoh, A. O., 2014. *Invitation to Philosophy of Education*, 2nd ed. Ibadan: Stirling Horden Publishers. p. 160.

² Ibid. p. 160.

³ Ibid, p. 159.

premises are justified by the conclusion.¹ However, the content on the other hand is weak in that, not all the time are these two concepts used as synonyms in the dictionaries to explain one another. He should have argued that when such happens, then we can charge the dictionaries with this logical error. But this is not always the case with dictionary meanings.

Secondly, the stipulative definitions lack universal applicability in the sense that they are usually given by authors in their own contextual situations and cannot always be generally accepted. Take for instance the stipulative definition of philosophy given by Russell in Schofield's work, "*That philosophy as I shall understand it... is a no man's land between theology and science.*"² This is how Russell understands philosophy, and this does not make any other definition unable to compete with Russell's, and or to even demolish it to some extent. That is why these definitions are said to be operational in character,³ just as we have them in research works, where when you define something and hold it as a constant, it continues undisputed only within the confines of your work, but the universality is entirely dependent on the level of the soundness of your argument on the definition of the concept.

Programmatic definitions especially when dealing with concepts that are educational, on the other hand, are also said to be normative in nature, in that; they set a standard on which those educational acts ought to be carried out. For instance the concept of education when normatively defined, gives the direction which education ought to take. The definition

¹ Baggini & Fosl, 2010. *The Philosopher's Toolkit*, op. cit., p. 84.

² Schofield, 1972. op. cit., p. 34.

³ Enoh, 2014. op. cit., p.160.

reflects a vision that goes beyond education itself, yet entails an educational program, ideal in character.¹ Example of this type of definition is the one given by Fafunwa on education as; “*the aggregate of all the process by which a child or young adult develops the abilities, attitudes and other forms of behaviours which are of positive value to the society in which he lives.*”² This has however, been criticized on the basis of non-universal applicability due to the plural nature of societies in terms of their norms and values, because; what is seen as a standard norm in one society may be seen otherwise in another and so on. Having discussed how the philosophers take definition of concepts from the three selected angles viz. descriptive, stipulative and programmatic respectively. We shall then, begin to analyze these concepts as promised in the beginning of this chapter.

The analysis here would be guided by the methodologies of philosophical analysis explicated by Babarinde and Saulawa in Chapter three of this research. The research shall begin with the concept of teaching.

4.2. The Concept of Teaching

This concept may seem to be straight forward in meaning and implication, yet being one of the central key concepts in education, there are so many dimensions from which the philosophers of education have viewed and argued it. We shall begin with other dimensions of the concept before narrowing it to the theme and context of this research. There are basically three dimensions from which this concept is viewed depending on the context of its application/appearance; as a profession/occupation,

¹ Babarinde, S. A. & Farayola, J. A. 2006. *Philosophical Foundations of Education*. Ibadan: Joytal Printing Press. p.65.

² Enoh, 2014. *Invitation to Philosophy of Education*, op. cit., p. 160.

enterprise and activity. However, we shall in this research show one more dimension – experience, often subtle, hidden and neglected, yet stands to be qualified as the concept of teaching, I shall attempt a justification of this claim presently.

First, teaching could be interpreted as a profession. A profession and/or occupation, the two however, both signify a means of living but are different in application as well. As an occupation Akinpelu¹ argued that it is simply what we do to earn a living. There are so many people from different professions trained as professionals in other fields of Arts and science, yet they find themselves teaching, not because it is what they want to do, but as the last resort for getting an employment/occupation. We can safely say that when one is from this category of teachers he is into teaching as an occupation but not as a profession because he is not a professionally trained teacher. Teaching as a profession on the other hand, demands that someone goes through a long period of training and education, into the rubrics of foundational courses of Education (philosophy, psychology, sociology,² curriculum etc.) and teaching methodologies for a specified period of time. It is after having passed all these requisite courses and requirements that one is called a professional teacher. This is a long argument, but as a matter of relevance, we need not to indulge into this area, provided that it is not the intent of the research theme.

Secondly, the other dimension is teaching as an enterprise. This version of the concept sees the whole of teaching as a process of educating, different

¹ Akinpelu, 1981. *An Introduction to Philosophy of Education*, op. cit., p.187.

² Bagudo, A. A., 2004. *Philosophical Analysis of Educational Concepts*. Ibadan: Sam Bookman Publishers. p. 20.

from that activity component of teaching in the ‘talking and chalking’¹ sense, as Akinpelu would refer to it. There are a lot of activities going on in the school or classroom in which we are not actually talking and chalking. Consider maintenance of discipline in the classroom, marking classwork, taking attendance, going round the class and seeing what the students have in their notes, shuffling of seats to have a good class atmosphere, and so many other non-verbal gestures which the teacher does in the classroom and he is not actually talking and chalking, yet, we infer that he is teaching. Again, when you ask a Headmaster or principal of a particular school what it is that he does in the school, he will reply to you that he is educating/teaching students, not because he enters into the classroom, rather because he helps in managing the whole teaching activity as a process. Now we shall view the concept of teaching as an activity.

Teaching as an activity is the third dimension and the most relevant to our theme here. We shall devote some amount of energy in bringing to light some details on the concept of teaching, which is the actual exercise going on in the classroom or school. This is where the different types of definitions mentioned in the introductory part of this chapter are going to be handy. Let us then, begin by what teaching is and what it ought to be. By this, we intend, looking at the descriptive definitions of teaching as well as the stipulative definitions if any, and the normative definitions in general. We shall start by picking some descriptive definitions from the dictionary as follows;

¹. Akinpelu, 1981, *An Introduction to Philosophy of Education*, op. cit., p. 187.

Since we are now taking the activity component of the word teaching, it means we are referring to the verb 'teach', it is however, important to trace the etymology of this word which is said to be from Middle English 'techen', from Old English *tæcan* ("to show, declare, demonstrate; teach, instruct, train; assign, prescribe, direct; warn; persuade"), also from Latin *dīcō* ("speak, say, tell") also from Ancient Greek *deiknumi*, ("show, point out, explain, teach").¹ The Dictionary here, defined the word simply as to impart skills or knowledge, to accustom gradually to some action or attitude; to change, alter or modify somebody or something, from one state of behaviour to another. When we examine some others from the work of Peter Jarvis² in Concise Oxford English Dictionary; we would find that for him, teaching itself has traditionally had a number of different meanings, as the *Concise Oxford English Dictionary* shows:

- To give systematic information to a person, (about a subject or skill).
- To practice this professionally.
- To enable a person to do something by instruction and training (to swim; to dance).
- To be an advocate for a moral principle (my parents taught me forgiveness).
- To communicate, instruct in a moral principle.
- To induce a person by example or punishment to do or not to do a thing (that will teach you to sit still; that will teach you not to laugh).

¹ 'teach' from Advanced English Dictionary, Based on WordNet by Princeton University, <http://wordnet.princeton.edu>.

² Jarvis, P. ed., 2006. *The Theory and Practice of Teaching: 2nd ed.* New York: Routledge & Taylor and Francis e-Library. p. 3.

- To make a person disinclined to do a thing (I will teach you to interfere).

It is obvious that these definitions have a lot in them to keep us busy. From the ones given, one can synthesize that to teach is; to pass a systematic information/ a doctrine/ a moral principle/skill or knowledge from a professional (or more learned in the area concerned) to an amateur (or less informed in the subject matter) with the intention to modify or improve the latter from a state of ignorance to enlightenment or mastery of the subject matter. Now let us unpack this. But first, we have to make it clear that the passing of whatever it is from one person to another is systematic – meaning that there is adherence to certain order and planning or taxonomy. In other words, the teaching is not haphazardly done and of course, by a professional.

This is exactly what the professional teachers ought to do in the classroom, because they don't just bump into the classroom with a pile of information stuffed in their head to start downloading to students. They have to carefully select the teaching method and technique to adopt for every particular lesson they want to teach. The content is also carefully selected from a scheme of work (syllabus) of the school which the teacher breaks down into smaller topics in his/her lesson plan to be translated on periodic basis until the subject matter is systematically broken down into consumable information and transferred to the students. Secondly, there has to be a deliberately conscious intention by the teacher to transfer this information/knowledge or skill to the learner.

However, these definitions may have captured a lot in the description of the act of teaching, but some normative elements are missing. Because in the event of the transfer of whatever it is, the learner's plight must also be considered, he also has to be willing to receive the knowledge and at the same time must be allowed to rationally judge and question the content of what is being presented for transfer to him/her. By implication, we mean indoctrination and conditioning, and all morally unacceptable methods must be avoided in order to make the undertaking a legitimate one. From this discourse, Akinpelu¹ summarized the whole teaching activity into a five criteria as follows;

- 1) A person who is consciously and deliberately doing the teaching (this is the professional/experienced teacher we discussed earlier)
- 2) Another person or oneself who is being taught [the less experienced learner in the subject matter concerned].
- 3) Some content or material, information, knowledge, [skill, a doctrine or principle] and so on, that is being imparted.
- 4) At least an intention on the part of the person doing the act that the recipient should learn, [and also the recipient should be willing to learn and not forced].²
- 5) The process of inducing the learning should be morally acceptable, and must be pedagogically sound.

These criteria somewhat describe a programmatic or normative definition of the activity called 'teaching'. Some modern moral philosophers like Carr,

¹ Akinpelu, 1981. *An Introduction to Philosophy of Education*, op. cit., p. 190.

² All the information added in the brackets are not from Akinpelu, but extracted from our analysis here in this chapter.

Dune and Hogan¹ have however, argued for teaching as a practice in the MacIntyrean sense. We mentioned this in Chapter two when MacIntyre define practice as;

*any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realised in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended.*²

They argued that these elements of MacIntyre's definition of practice can be used to conceptualize and understand teaching. Although, the author himself is reported to have rejected their claims in that what he said about morality can be applied to teaching.³ But, then, the question is, from what we have said so far, is there any link between MacIntyre's practice and the activity of teaching? This argument can wait to another time, because our focus here is on teaching philosophy of the good life and we have explicitly discussed what teaching is, and how it should be done in the morally acceptable manner as a matter of legitimacy.

But before we wrap up this section, there was a fourth dimension of teaching to be justified in this research. Experience has most of the time been neglected as a mode of teaching people how things are in reality. Yet,

¹ Winch, C. & Gingell, J., 2008. *Philosophy of Education: The Key Concepts*. 2nd ed. New York: Routledge & Taylor and Francis e-library. p.207.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid, p. 208.

we can all acknowledge the fact that we have been taught a lesson by the behaviour or actions of other humans or experience, without them necessarily consciously acting/behaving as such with the intention to teach us anything. Consider, a shop keeper who had trust that whenever he gives people some items that they would pay back the money as soon they receive their pay cheque, but came to realize that so many have not been returning the money as promised. This shopkeeper decides that since he has been taught a lesson by these people, he would cancel all forms of debts so as to stay in business. Now this experience was not taught to him by anybody, but through the actions/behaviour of some people. Again, consider a child who has never come in contact with fire before. All the time he sees it as a beautiful yellowish flame that is so catchy to the eye and always wishes he could reach out with his hand to touch such a beauty, upon having his very first contact realized that it produces a hurting pain that could destroy him, he simply decides that fire is not to be touched. Has he not been taught a lesson by experience here? Well, this is the last dimension of teaching we shall bring to the table in this regard. However, it does not fall into the criteria we set here, as there is no one doing the teaching deliberately, but nature itself.

4.3. What is Philosophy of...?

It is bane, at this point to start thinking of defining philosophy and philosophy of... in the grandeur fashion. Let me then, start by what I don't mean by philosophy of... here, by philosophy of..., it is not meant the love of wisdom as we customarily dissect the Greek noun *philosophia*. According to

Brickman as quoted by Akinpelu¹; *'philosophy of...'* implies an inquiry into the fundamental nature of the field in question; it is not a derivative or deduction from some other fields. Therefore, it appears that, if we say philosophy of law, we are implying undertaking an inquiry into the fundamental nature of normative and analytic jurisprudence. Or more precisely put a systematic and reflective study into the fundamental nature of jurisprudence.² Again, Akinpelu³ in a later occasion gave two interpretations from which the concept could be understood. First, it may mean principles, laws and logic behind the phenomenon to which it is applied. Thus, philosophy of science, he continued to argue, "...will include the nature of science and the law-like principles behind the discipline, the nature of its characteristic features, its peculiar methodology, its goals and objectives, and the basic truths and assumptions underlying its practice."⁴ The second activity he mentioned is analytic function of philosophy in the conceptual style of language analysis of the concepts that are germane to the discipline or phenomenon to which philosophy of... is applied. For example, we can examine the definition of philosophy of education as thus;

Philosophy of education is the reflective and systematic utilization of knowledge of the subject matter of philosophy, its methods, tools and techniques in overseeing the modus operandi of the theories and practices of education. It attempts clarification and critique of the concepts, issues and problems that are germane to education such as learning, teaching, indoctrination, conditioning, education, discipline, equal

¹ Akinpelu, 1981. *An Introduction to Philosophy of Education*, op. cit., p. 1.

² Saulawa, M. A., n.d. *A Treatise on the Philosophy of Education*, op. cit., p. 11.

³ Akinpelu, J. A., 2005. *Essays in Philosophy and Education*. Ibadan: Stirling-Horden Publishers. p. 226.

⁴ Ibid.

*educational opportunities, standard and quality of education, etc.*¹

From this definition we can see in the second part of it that, there is clarification and critique of the concepts that are germane to education. What if it is applied to the good life? One could simply make the deduction here that philosophy of the good life may mean, looking into the fundamental nature of the good life, its principles, normative laws and the logic behind them. The analysis and critique of all the salient principles and concepts that is germane to the good life. This however, begs the question, what then, is the good life?

4.4. What then, is the Good Life?

This concept, being the major value upon which we hope to place the highest worthwhileness, would be approached from several vantage points. Meaning, the analysis would be a very serious one as we shall come to see presently. To analyze the concept of the good life is to seek for rational answers to the question of the highest good. First, let us apply a reductionist technique of analysis here. The word is a compound word which carries a judgmental tone in it. We have 'good' and 'life'. Starting with the 'good', the opposite of which is bad or poor depending on the context, tells us that this is purely an ethical concept. Aristotle² is of the view that; *every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action as well as choice, is held to aim at some good. Hence people have nobly declared that the good is that at which all things aim.* Although he maintained that there is a certain difference among the ends. For instance, the end of philosophy is to clarify

¹ Saulawa, M. A., n.d. op. cit., p. 12.

² Bartlett & Collins 2011, *Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*, 1094a, (5).

issues, that of psychology to understand the workings of the mind and psyche, that of medicine, health, and so on.

These are goods that are not necessarily judgmental in the actual sense of the word we intend to clarify here. The good he is referring to is more of purposive in a kind. We are however, here on the contrary, choosing to view it from the perspective of the actions and choice he mentioned. Some actions and choices we make are approved or rejected, some classed moral or immoral, in short, good or bad in the societies we live. We are by implication, dwelling into the moral and non-moral category of value here, with particular reference to the moral value.

When we say good course, good school or good teacher, these are educational judgments and therefore, need to be justified based on either content, method, distribution or control. But these are educational judgements, in general life situations; we may need a bigger and more accommodating criterion. The means with which we achieve the ends must be morally justified. Consider when a child scores very high in his examinations and his teacher comments 'very good!' this is a sign of approval on the performance of the child, and by implication, a judgement. Again, take an instance of excellence of a professional teacher who teaches so well that students are talking about his skills in the hostel where one asks the question, "is there anyone better than Mr. Abdurrahman in teaching Philosophy?" the other one responds, "he is so good that I think not". This is indicating that the teaching method of Mr. Abdurrahman is good. We are trying to depict the judgmental tone of the word 'good' here.

From the two examples given above, if the child we scored very high in his examinations got those marks in a just and honest means, we infer that the marks are morally justified. While on the teacher's side if his method is through extreme discipline and corporal punishment or indoctrination, his method or means is going to be unacceptable despite the coerced understanding part of the students. We shall now look at 'life' as the second element of the compound word the 'good life'.

What is life? What does it mean to live a lifetime? How do we claim to exist? Is life forever or terminal? To begin this with the Cartesian dictum of '*cogito ergo sum*', meaning – '*I think, therefore, I exist*'. Rene Descartes¹ used this as his basis for existence. On the premise that he is a thinking being and for that he is occupying some space, and existing, in a material world. For if he does not exist, he wouldn't have continued to think the way he was. Let us quote him verbatim here to see what he had to say before giving our reservations;

And having noticed that there is nothing at all in this I think, therefore I am that assures me that I am speaking the truth, except that I see very clearly that, in order to think, it is necessary to exist, I judged that I could take as a general rule that the things we conceive very clearly and very distinctly are all true, but that there is merely some difficulty in properly discerning which are those that we distinctly conceive.²

¹ The 17th century French scientist and mathematician René Descartes was also one of the most influential thinkers in Western philosophy. Descartes stressed the importance of skepticism in thought and proposed the idea that existence had a dual nature: one physical, the other mental. The latter concept, known as Cartesian dualism, continues to engage philosophers today. This passage from *Discourse on Method* (first published in his *Philosophical Essays* in 1637) contains a summary of his thesis, which includes the celebrated phrase "I think, therefore I am."

² Ariew, R. ed., 2000. *Rene Descartes: Philosophical Essays and Correspondence*. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. p. 61.

From this argument, it follows that we are into existence (that is, living) by the very nature of our thinking capacity in Descartes' submission. But is it really by thought that we find the certitude of our living? How about the very experience of pain (both physical and mental) and happiness? I brought up these two in that we sometimes have thoughts while we are asleep and they feel so real that we think they are in fact real. Remember, sleeping is sometimes synonymous with death. But, experiencing pain from the physical and mental realms is a thing of absolute reality, and therefore should constitute the very foundation of our existence and of course, living. Granted that a dead person cannot think, how about the feeling of pain and happiness or otherwise on his circumstances? Are these not characteristics of a living being? For us not get carried away by this argument; the point we are however, attempting to clarify is on the question of life, the very proof of our existence.

From the foregoing, life is the experience we have as living beings which is generally characterized by pain and happiness. The next question is; is life terminal or has another dimension after this one? All the monotheistic religions are of the teachings that there is a life after this one, called the hereafter, could this be the object of religious morality in this world, and ultimately, the purpose of life? To address this question is to address one of the fundamental questions of this research and of course, a central concept to the research topic germane to this chapter called 'essence'. The researcher shall however reserve this as the last of the concepts to analyze at the end of this chapter, just for the sake of being systematic and, to continue with reflections on the good life.

Now to bring the parts into a whole, we have ‘the good life’ as a single compound concept. This is because we have argued that when we have this word as it were, ‘good’, is indicating some level of approved status of a choice or action from the Aristotelian sense, a life that is good however; is that which is generally approved as a standard way of living in a society. The question however, one would be tempted to ask further may be; is the good life a universal or a relative concept? If it is relative, it means that we need to strive to make it as universally acceptable as possible by establishing some criteria that could stand the sands of time for its general acceptability.

Further, speaking of the good life, could it be a situation where we have all our needs and desires fulfilled, or simply the Maslow’s concept of self-actualization? But then, what is Maslow’s self-actualization? We need to clarify here, as usual, taking the philosophic style of analysis, what is meant by Maslow’s hierarchy of needs,¹ when he explained the need for interpersonal relationships and friendship, as a necessary need and a means of happiness. Aristotle in his *Nicomachean Ethics* argued that the good life could only be attained when we attain the highest good, and to him the price and the end of virtue is happiness.² One could further ask; if someone has attained these virtues and decides to use them in a negative way, do we still say that he has reached status of the good life or happiness? Since if the intellectual virtues are acquired for example, take wisdom as one of the intellectual virtues, when a wise person uses his acquired skill to dupe a less wise or dull person into the acquisition of some benefit accrued to him/her, do we still declare this wise person as good?

¹ Power et al eds., 2008. *Moral Education: A Handbook, Vol. 1 A-L*. USA: Praeger Publishers. p. 234.

² Bartlett & Collins, 2011. Interpretive Essay, *Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics*, op. cit., p. 263.

Therefore, from our derived analysis here, the virtue from which Aristotle is arguing must be used in a morally accepted and rationally justified manner. Take courage and wisdom of Achilles and Odysseus of the *Iliad* of Homer¹ as an instance respectively. They have all been honored and respected for the possession of these virtues. The source of which proves that they were living a life that is approved by their societies through the exhibition of the highest good of Aristotle, that is, the virtues.

Again, Good life may mean a happy ending, which is, being happy by coming to live the rest of your life with your loved ones. Consider an instance of the characters of a TV series titled '*Once Upon a Time*'², all craving to attain from a different world. But the question is; are we in the real life all hoping to attain this happy ending? This notwithstanding, what is a happy ending? Does it mean having all our desires fulfilled? Could it be that moment when we take a God's eye view of our life and contemplate that we want nothing more from this point? Or living a life that is in conformity with the societal norms and values? R. S. Peters maintained in his paradox of freedom that; "*the acceptance of some forms of constraint by all is necessary for the avoidance of more grievous forms of constraint by some others*".³ But this is freedom we are talking about not happiness. The two are different, yet related. A free man is a happy man, but is a happy man always a free man? Russell would disagree with this when he posited that; "no man is wholly free, and no man is wholly a slave".⁴ This, as simple as it may seem, is not taken so lightly by the philosophers when it comes to analysis. This is

¹ Milch, R. J., 1962. *Cliffs Notes on Homer's The Iliad*, rev. ed. Nebraska: C. K. Hillegass. p. 28.

² Wikipedia Encyclopedia, <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OnceUponaTime> (TVseries)

³ Peters, R. S., 1973/2010. *Freedom and the Development of the Free Man* in James F. Doyle ed. *Educational Judgements: Papers in the Philosophy of Education*. New York and Canada. p. 87.

⁴ Egner, R. E. & Denonn, L. E., eds., 2009. *The Basic writings of Bertrand Russell*. London and New York: Routledge. p. 335.

because it tempts one to raise so many questions in the ocean of morality. But, freedom in its absolute sense is delusional, just as the parable of a thirsty man in a desert sighting a mirage and drifting swiftly towards it, when he comes close he realizes that it has gone farther than he initially perceived. But let us not get lost in this potion and return back to the nitty-gritty of our subject of discourse, how happy endings connect with the good life, to be taken from reason and theological grounds. Again, this same TV series (Once Upon a Time)¹ sees the happy ending as a situation whereby people find their soul mates and connect with them as their spouses. Similarly in Islam, the prophet (S.A.W) is reported to have said that; "this life is but a small enjoyment, and the best of its part is when one finds a good spouse".

The point here is that; the blessed prophet was in another occasion cautioning that a man should choose a good mother for his children, so also a woman should choose a good father for her children. This, by implication is, suggesting that marriage is beyond ordinary love, because character is more important than mere demonstration of love for the physical attributes of the spouse, or merely, an infatuation. For, to seek for happiness in mere beauty of a lady or handsomeness of a man is delusional, just as the parable of a thirsty man and a mirage cited above. The researcher shall conclude this analysis of the good life with establishing criteria from which the good life is to be discerned.

¹ [https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/OnceUponaTime\(TVseries\)](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/OnceUponaTime(TVseries))

4.4.1. Criteria for the Good life

By 'criteria' it is meant the kinds of considerations or reasons we give (and these will be diverse and depend on the circumstances) to explain, correct, challenge, and defend a particular application of the relevant concept.¹ For one to be said to have been living a good life, there must be certain conditions which must be met before we can judge that he/she is living a good life. These conditions are as follows:

- a) The life must be experienced by a sane human being
- b) The life must lead to true happiness (inner and outer)
- c) There must be contentment with the given status quo
- d) The means of living must be morally justifiable
- e) The life must be autonomous and free

We shall unpack these criteria presently. To begin with a sane human being, it is pertinent to mention that the moral agent be sane for, there is no rationality in insanity. It is only when we know exactly where we are and what we are doing that we can even claim to be experiencing a particular mode of life. This can be argued from Descartes' *cogito ergo sum*, because it is only when you are in your senses that you can think and act according to the dictates of reason. Consider for instance, a very rich man who had a sudden accident and bumped his head so bad that he cannot even answer his name. And before that accident he is classed as one of the people living the American Dream, can we now claim that he is living a good life? Thus, a good life must be experienced by a sane and rational individual. Therefore, there is no happiness in insanity that could lead to a good life.

¹ Tanney, J., 2009. *Rethinking Ryle: A Critical Discussion of The Concept of Mind*, in Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*. London and New York: Routledge and Taylor & Francis Group. p. xxii.

Secondly, the life is expected to lead to true happiness which is both external and internal. Sometimes people see 'having fun' momentarily as a form of happiness. But this thinking could be fallacious on the grounds of *cum hoc ergo propta hoc* fallacy – meaning - with this, therefore because of this. We have discussed this fallacy in chapter three of this research; therefore it will not be repeated here. The danger we are trying to avert here is having a thought that simply because we are seeing a sadist having fun by watching the sufferings of others that he is actually happy in the truest form of the word. He may be happy externally from what people can observe, but deeply inside him he is full of sorrow and torment of the innocent souls he has wronged.

Again, consider a cultist who makes blood money from the death of his loved ones – say his wife, child or mother as requested by his voodoo idol. He gets the wealth and is living large with all the luxuries of this world, yet his soul is tormented internally from the atrocities he personally committed on the innocent souls of his loved ones. Do we say that this person is living a good life? Or more precisely, is he actually happy from the truest form of the word? Therefore, in order to live a good life, the person must be happy from the truest form of the word. The problem however is, this cannot be measured scientifically, but how do we ensure this? We may not find answer to this, but the reality is we all are the best judges of ourselves; we may lie to others, but can never lie to ourselves. We know deeply if we are happy or otherwise. So, the moral agent is best left to judge himself in this regard.

Thirdly, there must be ultimate satisfaction with the given status quo of the moral agent. It must be a feeling, which makes one feel I want nothing more

from this point. I am just okay and happy with what I've got. This connotes that he/she covets nothing from his/her neighbor. This is not implying that he/she should not appreciate other beautiful things. For, this would make him something else out of the natural landscape. The point is he/she may not have the best of possessions but is not feeling so wretched and inferior to any other class of people. Instead of looking upward, he may look downward here; meaning he thinks of those who haven't got what he's got. He may feel very healthy in front of a multi-millionaire who is living on a life-support machine; he may equally feel rich in front of a vagabond who has nowhere to sleep and has nothing to eat. In this regard he/she is not only happy, but also thankful to God for the bounties bestowed upon him/her.

The Fourth criterion connotes that; for a moral agent to have a sensation of experiencing the good life, he/she must make sure that his/her source of income is a legitimate one. This is because, not only that this adds up to his/her happiness but also that no other person is hurt from his/her source of income. The legitimacy of his income provides a sense of security and safety assurance. It gives one some calm and confidence in whatever one is doing. Imagine a cocaine dealer with all the advantages of having the opportunity to own virtually anything he desires, yet the authorities are always on the hunt for making sure they bring him to justice. With that feeling of cat and mouse chase, there is no way for the moral agent to feel safe and happy. Again, if for instance, in the process of making his means of living others are hurt, directly or indirectly. They will always try to find a way of getting back at him. Consider for instance; an entrepreneur with a faulty or noisy machine in a domestic area where the ill-sound or smoke of that machine affects the welfare/well-being of the people in the residential

area, they will of course all wish for the total breakdown of that machine or in some advanced countries, they will sue that person to court, and this is likely going to cause a serious problem in his production and of course, means of living. This will definitely, temper with his happiness.

The final criterion demands that the moral agent be free and autonomous. For, freedom and autonomy are very crucial as some of the determinants of happiness. This criterion can be explained from the point of view of Hegel's idea of the good life in his *Philosophy of Right*¹ as argued in chapter two of this research. However, this does not mean that we are going to escape having to justify the argument at this point. This is because to be free and authentically autonomous is to be in some sense of happiness.² But, what freedom are we talking about here? Is it absolute freedom or institutional freedom? There are several others, but we shall limit our discussion to these two broad ones, because they shall suffice in the justification of our claim. By absolute freedom, it is meant total absence from constraints on the actions and thoughts of individuals. This entails the ability to do whatever one desires without the consideration of whether such action has a negative impact on the wellbeing of others. It is a total situation of lawlessness where there is no right or wrong. In short, morality is muted and freewill is absolute. This freedom was only in existence during the primitive periods of man, where jungle justice was order of the day. The strongest rules as well as survives. Now that we live in the 21st century, a lot has changed, with the advent of the League of Nations later called United Nations; we don't see such freedom even at the international level.

¹ Goldstein, J. D., *Hegel's Idea of the Good Life*, op. cit.

² Unit 4.3. in the last paragraph of this research.

The other type of freedom is the institutional freedom. So-called as it is derived from the doctrine of institutionalism, meaning – a belief in the merits of established customs and systems¹ or adherence to an established religion, or established codes of conduct². Institutional freedom could be argued from Kant’s definition of the concept, as he stated that “*freedom means independence from anything other than the moral law*”.³ I chose this to be institutional freedom because we are all bound by some codes of conduct as a matter of achieving a peaceful coexistence. For instance, there are certain freedoms expressed in most constitutions of state nations, organizations, groups, associations etc. in most sovereign nations, Nigeria for instance has some specified sections of its Constitution for the explication of fundamental human rights of the country’s citizens; e.g. freedom of speech, freedom of movement, freedom of association and the like. These are all forms of freedom given to the citizens of the state with some regulations attached, not absolute in their connotations. This type of freedom gives its possessor some level of tranquility and assurance of comfort. He/she feels the right not to be intimidated while within the confines of the constitutional law.

The second element of this criterion is autonomy, meaning the individual has the ability to make independent decisions that affects his life. This last criterion affirms a significant level of happiness on the moral agent just as Hegel would argue, ‘being free and feeling at home in the world.’ The next concept is the concept of virtue, having discussed its nature and origin in

¹ “**Institutionalism**”, Microsoft Encarta Dictionaries, DVD Version, 2008

² “**Institutionalism**”, Advanced English Dictionary, 2015. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

³ Schofield, H., 1972. *The Philosophy of Education: An Introduction*. London: George Allen & Unwin. p. 258.

chapter two from Ghazali and MacIntyre's views, the researcher shall then, give it a second hard look from linguistic analysis perspective.

4.5. The Concept of Virtue

This concept is yet another very difficult one to pin down with a single definition. Plato¹ depicted Socrates asking Meno what virtue is, but Meno continued to give him different types of virtue, but not virtue itself. Finding a common notion of virtue is a matter of particulars and universals. Consider for example, when I decide to tell a student that "black is colour", he would have asked; are there other colours? Because if I say black is colour it might sound like there are no others, and as such I would reply that 'it is a colour', for there is also white, red, blue, yellow and the like as colours. So it is with virtue, when I say that wisdom is virtue, the same question as above applies. For there is also justice, temperance, courage, magnanimity, piety, and the like all referred to as virtue. But, these are dealing with particulars, what about the universal meaning or a common notion of virtue? Could we say that virtue is a quality that gives its possessor the ability to stand out in moral issues? Or a disposition, the possession and exhibition of which makes one to be referred to as a good person?

Speaking of knowledge, Socrates² would contend that it is a virtue of its own, meaning that knowledge is virtue. Here, Aristotle, as quoted by Benjamin Jowett, accused Socrates and Plato of outstepping the truth—that they make a part of virtue into the whole.³ Yet Socrates argued in

¹ Cahn, S. M., 1997. *Classic and Contemporary Readings in the Philosophy of Education*. New York: McGraw-Hill. pp. 6 - 13.

² Elwany, M., comp., 2008. *The Complete Works of Plato*, B. Jowett trans. p. 521, Accessed 24/08/2014. <http://www.cakravartin.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2008/08/plato-complete-works.pdf>.

³ Ibid. p.529.

Meno¹ that if we say something is virtue it means we are inferring that, that thing is the whole of virtue itself, not a virtue, meaning – a part of virtue. Perhaps, the two could rather be charged with breaking the law of non-contradiction of thought and arguments, after all, they are humans, and therefore, bound to make mistakes. Let us then, get to the nitty-gritty of the concept.

Etymologically virtue is derived from a 12th century Old French *Vertu* also from Latin *virtus* to mean “manliness, worth, moral excellence”.² From this one can deduce that the concept implies three different things at a go. It means manliness or having the characteristics of an adult male. Or sense of worth of something. Consider for instance, the virtue of a gun is to shoot when required, a biro to write, a car to transport or for movement of people from one place to another. This part gives the concept a loose meaning by making it neutral in some sense. For instance, a gun could be used positively in the right hands, and misused by others to kill innocents or destroy properties on the other hand, making it evil; yet its virtue or sense of worth as a gun still stands. Again, to buttress this point further we can use the Meno dialogue as an instance. Meno attempted telling Socrates of the virtues of a man and a woman (especially the married ones) that the virtue of a man is to order a state and that of a woman is to order a household.³ From this, we can infer that he was viewing the virtues from duties of the citizens of a state, or their sense of worth and usefulness. So also it is with objects.

¹ Cahn, S. M., 1997. *Classic and Contemporary Readings in the Philosophy of Education*. New York: McGraw-Hill. p. 7.

² “**Virtue**”, Advanced English Dictionary, New Jersey: Princeton University, 2015.

³ Cahn, S. M., 1997. *Classic and Contemporary Readings in the Philosophy of Education*, op. cit., pp. 6 – 7.

The third dimension views virtue as moral excellence. This third; is the dimension we intend to imply for this study. Virtue is that disposition or character trait that makes one to stand out on moral trials and tribulations. We have seen in chapter two how Ghazali and MacIntyre mentioned the Aristotelian virtues of wisdom, justice, temperance, and courage as the four main philosophic virtues, with Ghazali adding some religious virtues to the equation like; repentance, patience, gratitude, hope, fear, poverty, asceticism, divine unity, and trust; in this order, all lead to love. Whereas yearning, intimacy, and satisfaction are the fruits (*thimar*) or the by-products of love which are called the mystical virtues, and which are expected to draw the virtuous close to *God*. His first move on this was shifting the concept from the Arabic *fadilah* i.e. virtue, as usually translated by the philosophers to *khuluq hasn* or *khuluq mamud*¹ i.e. good conduct. Therefore, virtue according to Al-Ghazali means good conduct.

We may at this point however, need to reflect on these mystical virtues, for there is a need for further clarification. The issues of fear and trust from this point, especially fear, are entirely contrary to the philosophic virtue of courage. Ghazali argued them from the point of relation with God that is, fear of God (*taqwa*) and having trust in God. It is expected that when God forbids callousness and oppression of the weak, man should fear the consequence of His wrath and do the right thing. This fear is expected to keep man in check, making him to behave in a good manner among his fellow men, and ultimately makes him happy, full of love and gratitude. And this draws us back to the good life criteria, proposed in this chapter. The

¹ Sharif, M. A. 1975 *Ghazali's Theory of Virtue*, op. cit., p.110.

research shall examine table of the philosophic virtues by Ghazali here as follows;

Table 4.5: Ghazali’s Classification of Philosophic Virtues¹

WISDOM	COURAGE	TEMPERANCE	JUSTICE
Discretion Excellence of discernment Penetration of thought Correctness of opinion Awareness of subtle actions and of the hidden evils of the soul	Magnificence	Modesty	-
	Intrepidity	Shame	-
	Greatness of soul	Remission	-
	Endurance	Patience	-
	Gentleness	Liberality	-
	Fortitude	Good calculation	-
	Suppression of anger	Contentment	-
	Correct evaluation of self	Abstinence	-
	Amiability	Cheerfulness	-
	Nobility	Joy	-
	Manliness	Tenderness of character	-
		Self-discipline	-
		Good appearance	-
		Tranquility	-
	Honest dealing	-	
	Righteous indignation	-	
	Wit	-	

The table above shows the classification of the philosophic virtues on the view of Al-Ghazali with some modification on their Islamic implications. Temperance here was taken beyond the Aristotelian Mean², which is, hitting the middle value between our excesses and deficiencies. The concept was treated on the practical training and purification of the human soul through

¹ Sherif, M. A., 1975. *Ghazali’s Theory of Virtue*, op. cit., p. 79.

² Saulawa, M. A., 2015. *Virtue, Character and Moral Dispositions from Indigenous African and Islamic Philosophies of Education for Nigeria*, Op. cit., pp. 97 – 100. For a more detailed treat of Aristotle’s Mean.

modesty, self-discipline, honest dealings, contentment, etc. which will lead to the attainment of ultimate happiness.¹ Since ultimate happiness lies in the hereafter, temperance here signifies minimum participation in worldly affairs.²

One thing remaining constant however is the concept of justice. Why is it left untended? Has it always been clear without the need for further clarification? The answer here is that Ghazali deliberately decided not to mention any other virtue under justice, for he sees it as the overall harmonizer of all the other three listed virtues, and that it is the only one that does not have two extremes as in the case of the first three virtues mentioned. Sharif on this account argued that Ghazali was in rebellion with the normal philosophic tradition where justice (especially in its social context) takes a central and high position.³ In all, there is a list of what he called the virtues of salvation in the *Revival of the Religious Sciences* as follows; *There are ten basic virtues of salvation - (1) Repentance, (2) Patience in dangers and difficulties (3) Gratefulness for gifts, (4) Fear, (5) Hope, (6) Renunciation of the world, (7) Sincerity, (8) Truthfulness, (9) Love for God and (10) Modesty*⁴. Some of these are enumerated in table 1 of the philosophic virtues. Let us then, consider the last concept of the research theme, that is, the concept of essence.

¹ Sharif, M. A., 1975. op. cit., p. 72.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid. p. 73.

⁴ Imam Al-Ghazali, 1993. *Ihya Ulum- Al-Deen (The Revival of the Religious Sciences)*, Vol. IV, op. cit., p. 376.

4.6. The Concept of Essence

This Concept as operationalized from the beginning of this research, intends not to mean the popular philosophical essence of Plato's theory of forms.¹ That is, ideas, from the argument of '*essence precedes existence*', to mean ideas must necessarily follow before the coming of man and everything else into existence. By essence here, it is meant the most essential or vital part of some idea or experience². For this study, we are dealing with the good life, therefore, what we intend to examine is about the most fundamental question of life; that is, what is the purpose of life? Or what is the end of living? But, let us first, argue that this belongs to the domain of teleology. That is, the study of the nature of ends, purposes and rationale behind the modus operandi of ideas, actions, practices and life itself. This may further be argued from the final cause of Aristotle.³ Although at this point his explanation was not in the essence form which we intend to argue. In a later chapter he argued for the final cause⁴ from the point of view of the soul and body. He argued that; *For Nature, like mind, always does whatever it does for the sake of something, which something is its end.*⁵ From this, we can continue to raise the intended questions of life.

What is purpose of our existence? Are we here to simply eat, sleep, procreate, repeat and die? Or are we actually here to fulfill a destiny? As fundamental as this question would sound, before we attempt it there are either of two things we must assume. First, we must assume that there is a higher power bigger and mightier than ourselves, for it is obvious that the

¹ Warburton, N., 2011. *A Little History of Philosophy*, op. cit., p. 5.

² "**Essence**", Advanced English Dictionary, 2015. New Jersey: Princeton University.

³ Aristotle, 2007. *The Complete Works*, Posterior Analytics Book II (11), G. R. G. Mure trans. North Terrace: eBooks @Adelaide. p. 217.

⁴ Aristotle, 2007. *The Complete Works On the Soul*, Book II (4), J. A. Smith (trans.), *ibid.*, p. 864.

⁵ *Ibid.*

universe did not bring itself into order without having a hand externally from itself. The logical law of cause and effect must come to play, for man himself did not create himself, we all found ourselves existing without signing any contract or negotiating about where we are going to stay in the world. It just happened, but, not by accident. There must be a super Being behind all these, or if you like, say a God who has a motive for the creation of all creations. In this line Bertrand Russell posited that; “*Unless you assume a God, the question of life’s purpose is meaningless.*”¹ Although Russell was an atheist, he set the course for a possible engagement of an intellectual discourse here. It follows therefore; that God alone reserves the prerogative to answer the question; what is the purpose of life?

The second possible assumption on answering this question is to engage in several wild guesses about the origin of the universe, through random chance, and the origin of species using science and artifacts, just like that of Darwin and the rest. But this will only be argued on conjectural statements of often weak induction. Again, since this research has from the beginning assumed that man by his nature is a religious being, arguing that he either worships a deity or worships his desires (i.e. *Abdullah* or *abdul-hawah*). We shall however, consider the first assumption of God’s purpose independently from our own wild guesses. Speaking of the purpose of life, we shall use the religious versions here from one of the monotheistic scriptures revealed by God. However, let us not get carried away here, that this analysis is only for the purpose of finding focus and direction for man, en route to living the good life, full of happiness.

¹ Warren, R., 2002. *The Purpose Driven Life*. Michigan: Zondervan. p. 17.

In the Holy Qur'an, God started laying a foundation for this question by saying; *...We have not created the heavens and earth, and all that lies between them for fun.* (Qur'an 21:16). This verse started setting the course towards answering the question before us. For, it implies a higher purpose. A statement showing that God is the architect of the universe and also plainly showing that He did so not for fun. Another verse stated it more categorically in the following manner; *I have not created mankind and the Jinns out of any other object but to worship Me.* (Q 51:56). Now that the purpose is plain, the questions one may ask further are what kind of worship or servitude is God referring to? Is it just the worship in synagogues, churches and mosques, or something more comprehensive than that? Let us take at least three of the renowned Muslim scholars on the meaning of the concept of worship (*al-Ibadah*) in Islam.

Shaykhul-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728H) maintained that; *"Worship (Al-Ibadah) is obedience to Allah by following that which He ordered upon the tongues of His Messengers."*¹ He in another point stated that: *"Worship (Al-Ibadah) is a comprehensive term covering everything that Allah loves and is pleased with - whether saying, or actions, outward and inward."*² This shows that one is constantly connected with the creator and heeding to all guidance and commandments from Him. Let us examine another scholar in the name of Ibn Al-Qayyim Al-Jauziyy (d. 751H) who on the other hand posited that;

Worship revolves around fifteen principles. Whosoever completes them has completed the stages of 'ubudiyah

¹Majmu'al Fatawa (10/149), <http://sunnahonline.com/library/purification-of-the-soul/624-meaning-of-worship-the>

² Ibid.

(servitude to Allah). The explanation of this is that 'ibadah is divided between the heart, the tongue, and the limbs. And that for each one of these three come five types of rulings, covering all actions: wajib (obligatory), mustahabb (recommended), haram (prohibited), makruh (disliked), and mubah (permissible).¹

From the above, Ibn Al-Qayyim expanded the scope by being more unequivocal against the earlier excogitation of Ibn Taymiyyah. He looks at worshipping Allah from the angle of actions and their consequences, which revolves around the entire life of the individual. Whatever he thinks, says and does, have implication on the relationship with his Lord. In addition to these two explanations, Ibn Kathir who is one of the renowned Qur'anic exegetes, gave a more comprehensive view of the verse on the worship of Allah as follows;

And 'ibadah is obedience to Allah by acting upon what He commands, and abandoning what He forbids; and this is the reality and essence of Islam. And the meaning of Islam is: istislam (submission and surrender) to Allah - the Most High - along with the utmost compliance, humility, and submissiveness to Him.²

After reasserting the previous explanations, Ibn Kathir went further to explain the meaning of Islam; which is the exhibition of total submissiveness and compliance to the will of God. This entails taking into cognizance and acceptance of the messages and lives of His prophets (E.g. Noah, Moses, David, Abraham, Jesus and Muhammad Peace be upon them

¹ Madarijus-Salihin (1/109), <http://sunnahonline.com/library/purification-of-the-soul/624-meaning-of-worship-the>

² Ibn Kathir, Tafsir Al-Qur'an Al'Adhim (7/402), accessed August 25, 2017, <http://sunnahonline.com/library/purification-of-the-soul/624-meaning-of-worship-the>

all) and how they conveyed His message. From this generation, the last of them, that is, Muhammad (Peace be Upon Him) serves as an epitome of exemplary leadership and guidance to the path of Allah's worship, taken from the angle Islam. This worship is expected to be rewarded by Him here in this life (world) and the next (hereafter), that is, the day of reckoning¹, when all will be called to answer for what they have done in this life. Let us bring a verse for buttressing this point as follows;

The day He will gather you together on the Day of Gathering, that is the day of Judgement. He who believed and did the right, will have his evil deeds expunged by God and admitted to gardens (paradise) with rivers flowing by and from beneath, to abide there perpetually. This will be the great achievement of success. (Qur'an 64: 9)

This verse shows that there is going to be consequences for all actions, as everyone shall be called upon to account for his/her conduct of this life. This should be enough, to address the question raised earlier, on the purpose of life. One may however, begin to wonder whether this has any bearing with the good life. The premise we can however, establish for this conclusion is derived from the following verse in the Qur'an; *It is He Who created Death and Life, that He may try (test) which of you is best in deed: He is the Almighty, oft forgiving. (Qur'an 67: 2)*. This verse stresses the need for good conduct, which was earlier argued by Al-Ghazali as a necessary condition to living a humanly good life. This is so because, it emphasized that this life is but a test, to see how well we are going to pass through the trials and temptations God has placed before us.² Again, this is guaranteed

¹ Qur'an 1:3, Q

² This may be approached from Ghazali's virtues of salvation mentioned earlier on the analysis of virtue.

by also giving us freewill to either follow His right path, by subscribing to the good or succumbing to our desires, which are often destructive and unproductive in nature.

4.7. Summary of Section One

Thus far, we have in the first section of this chapter attempted to engage in some philosophical analyses of the concepts in this research's theme using the reductionist system of logical atomism. The concepts analyzed include teaching, philosophy of..., good life, virtue and essence. The fact that these analyses involved having to do with definitions of concepts from both linguistic, standardized and contextual dimensions, a brief introduction as a foundation was laid on the types of definitions involved in philosophical analysis; the types considered were descriptive definitions, stipulative definitions and programmatic or normative definitions of concepts.

Worth noting is from the analysis of the dimensions of teaching viz. as an enterprise, an occupation and activity with the adoption of Akinpelu's criteria for teaching as an activity and the introduction of often neglected the dimension of teaching from experience. The dimension was not however, applicable to the criteria propounded by Akinpelu, but still effective as a concept of teaching. After all, modern teaching techniques are more of considering child-centered methods of teaching as against the teacher-centered methods of teaching. In this regard, facilitation of experience becomes the watch word. On analysis of the good life, a reductionist style was employed by breaking the compound word 'good life', through analyzing the 'good' separately from 'life', after which an implication was derived based on the theme of the research.

Some pentad criteria were also established setting the conditions necessary for attaining the status of the good life. However, the common denominator for all the criteria of the philosophy behind the good life was happiness. This was later advanced on analysis of the concept of virtue culled from Ghazali's philosophic virtues and good conduct. The chapter was concluded with attempting answers to the fundamental question of the purpose of life. This was done by first, analyzing the concept of teleology so as to make us appreciate the idea of 'ends' and 'means' of life. It was then argued from the religious point of view that the purpose of life was to worship God by heeding to the commandments and following guidance from His messengers from Adam to Muhammad (peace and blessings of God be upon them all).

4.8. CRITIQUE, SYNTHESSES AND DISCUSSIONS OF FINDINGS

Being a sequel to the previous section of the chapter and a general review of the philosophical outlook of the research theme, we shall in this section provide criticisms, objections and counter objections with restatement of the general methodology applied in the analysis of the major concepts of the research theme. In other words, it affirms the dialectical method of philosophical inquiry, where thesis exists and objected by an anti-thesis, after which, a synthesis is arrived at; a kind of deconstruction and reconstruction of the ideas presented. We shall also make sure that all the research questions of this research are discussed here by harmonizing the findings in chapter two with analysis of the concepts in this chapter.

We have, in the first section of this chapter attempted to analyze philosophy of the good life alongside teaching with particular reference to the concept of virtue and essence. The analysis was undertaken using a reductionist

approach of logical atomism. Worth noting however, is that this logical atomism was developed by Bertrand Russell through his philosophy. Logical atomism believed that complex problems and ideas can be conceived of or broken up into its minute or atomic form and can be solved with clarity later.¹ Although, this is no different from the Cartesian method of analysis treated in Chapter Three's introduction of this research, we shall still, maintain this style as it is exactly what we applied in the first section of this chapter, and made plain in Chapter Three. In what follows, attempts shall be made at examining the problem of teaching philosophy of the good life as a whole, not using the reductionist style this time, since all the necessary concepts have been clarified, but treating the problem as a whole. Before then, however, let us first provide a critique on the method of reductionism as indicated in our technique of philosophical research in education in chapter three.

4.8.1. The Methods of Analysis

Criticisms have been directed towards philosophical researches since the popularization of the scientific method. The fact that reductionism is a child of concept analysis, this makes it to be vulnerable to attacks as the analyst's prejudices and subjective tendencies cannot be totally eliminated. Beckwith, Dickinson and Kendall² are of the view that the practice of concept analysis can be seen to be problematic as it is seen to be operating in territory where the subject of analysis, "the concept", may be disputed and the methods used to analyse are influenced by the skill, knowledge, culture and

¹ Seetharamu, A. S., 2004. *Philosophies of Education*. New Delhi: Ashish Publishing House. p. 96.

² Beckwith, S., Dickinson, A. & Kendall, S., 2008. The "Con" of Concept of Concept Analysis: A Discussion Paper which Explores and Critiques the Ontological Focus, Reliability and Antecedents of Concept Analysis Frameworks. *International Journal of Nursing Studies*: www.elsevier.com/ijns, June, p. 1833.

understanding of the analyst and the framework being used. Further, the fact that man is a product of his environment also confounds the problem, as there is no way you can detach him from his/her social milieu.

However, one must resort to, as a matter of necessity, grounded logical theories and practices that are full of objectivism in order to have a long standing argument about any concept one is intending to clarify. This is what informed this research in chapter three to explicate in unequivocal terms, the logical fallacies that argumentators engage in during the course of forwarding their arguments on a particular concept or issue. This is because the knowledge of these fallacies of weak induction can help not only in boosting the argumentative capacity of the analyst, but also the power of universalizing his/her argument based on logical grounds. Take for instance, the Kant's universalization criterion¹. Kant was able to universalize the categorical imperative on the grounds that people would love to be treated as ends in themselves and not means to an end, such that if they act in that accord, they would equally like to be treated in the same vein.

The statement that "Jiban is living a good life", is a proposition carrying a judgemental connotation that must be called to account on objective grounds. It entails that Jiban is living a life that has passed a score or some level of criteria, to be reckoned with. We shall clarify this from the subsequent units, especially on the good life matrix. But first, let us examine the teachability of virtue.

¹ Kant, I., 1997. *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. and ed. By Mary Gregor. New York: Cambridge University Press. p. 41.

4.8.2. Can Virtue be taught?

The teachability of virtue has been debated by several philosophers. We are not going to make a new analysis on this. Plato¹ from the classical era, and Ryle² from the contemporary times, have blown up the argument of teaching the virtues. The debate circles around the question; can virtue be taught? This is not however, implying fully, that virtue is synonymous with the good life, but, a part of it. When answering the question, on the problem of teaching virtue, arguments have been made as to the impossibility of the undertaking, on the premise that; we don't have specialists in the schools teaching virtue or morals as a subject of its own, just as we have teachers in mathematics, philosophy, psychology, economics and the like.

However, this is not implying that the process is automatic, that is to say that; a child will just learn the virtues from the street or from his elders or parents. Or is it the religious sciences that are allocated this task? But we see some religious fanatics killing in the name of religion, and doing a lot of unjustifiable immoral acts to those not in their creed or whatever ideology they purport advocate. This poses serious threat to leaving the task to the religions alone. Yet, this notwithstanding is not implying that these fanatics are actually following the orthodox teachings of their respective religions, so we cannot indict the orthodox religions for the crimes committed by their fanatic followers. However, Kantian deontological ethics professes to teach morals from the duty point of view, that is, when we do what we ought to do

¹ Plato's Protagoras and Meno Dialogues

² Ryle, G., 1972/2010. Can Virtue Be Taught? In R. F. Dearden, P. H. Hirst & R. S. Peters eds. *Education and the Development of Reason*. London and New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul and Taylor & Francis e-Library. pp. 323 - 332.

or are obliged to do. But is simply discharging our duties enough to make us virtuous or claim to be living the good life?

Some recent arguments about the teaching of the virtues or morality in general recommend the task during the green years of the child's moral development.¹ What is more challenging however, comes from Ryle's² argument; that virtue is not knowledge in the sense that you do not have ready-made answers/solutions to ethical problems/challenges just as you may have for knowledge in mathematics and other social sciences. This is because you don't forget to be kind or generous just the way you can forget the BODMAS formula for solving arithmetical problems. The experience is not possible to be classed under any of the two categories of knowledge, that is, knowledge how... and knowledge that..., in the sense that you either forget or become rusty of mathematical knowledge of formulae or how to solve quadratic equations, due to disuse, but you cannot claim to have forgotten how to be just, conscientious, or courageous as a result of disuse. On the contrary one can only be described as having lost touch with humanity or simply hard hearted or hardened.³ At this point Ryle⁴ thinks that Socrates erred to have conceived knowledge to be virtue that we should go about teaching.

But, I think, for Socrates to have claimed that knowledge is virtue⁵, he is not directly implying that the whole of virtue itself is knowledge, but a part of it,

¹ Carr, D. & Steutel, J., 1999/2005. The Virtue Approach to Moral Education: Pointers, Problems and Prospects in David Carr and Jan Steutel (eds.), *Virtue Ethics and Moral Education*. London and New York: Routledge and Taylor & Francis e-Library. p. 259.

² Ryle, G., 1972/2010. Can Virtue Be Taught? In R. F. Dearden, P. H. Hirst and R. S. Peters eds., *Education and the Development of Reason*, op. cit., p. 331.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid., p. 330.

⁵ Elwany, M. comp., 2008. *The Complete Works of Plato*, B. Jowett trans. Protagoras. p. 529.

just as Aristotle¹ was reported to have accused Plato and Socrates of outstepping the truth, by referring to a part as the whole. My reason for this defense lies in the Meno² dialogue where Socrates was cautioning Meno on making a mistake of referring to one of the virtues as the whole, for instance to say; justice is virtue, rather he should say justice is a virtue, because there other virtues like courage, temperance, wisdom etc. So to think of Socrates of easily making such mistake, then one may need to reevaluate one's fathoming of his arguments before jumping into conclusions. Thus, for him to say that knowledge is virtue does not mean that it is the entire concept of virtue that he is referring to. Rather if he had claimed that virtue is knowledge, then we can suppose that he is defining the concept as a whole. From the discussions of this unit, the question however, that we may ask again, is; can virtue be taught? Virtue may not be knowledge in the absolute sense of the word, but is a disposition that is not given by nature or genetically inheritable, which means it must be nurtured³ in the moral agent from the early stages of his/her life. Let us then, consider some of the possible strategies that could be synthesized in teaching or nurturing the virtues for living the good life.

4.8.3. Strategies for Teaching Philosophy of the Good Life

Virtue in the *aretaic* sense is not knowledge that can be stored or recalled whenever the need arises. What is undeniable however is that virtue is a disposition that is nurtured, not given by nature,⁴ that is, it neither grows

¹ Ibid.

² Cahn, S. M., 1997. *Classic and Contemporary Readings in the Philosophy of Education*, op. cit., pp. 6 – 7.

³ Saulawa, M. A. 2015. *Virtue, Character and Moral Dispositions from African Indigenous and Islamic Philosophies of Education for Nigeria*, op. cit., p. 88.

⁴ Saulawa, M. A. 2015. *Virtue, Character and Moral Dispositions from Islamic and Indigenous African Philosophies of Education for Nigeria*. Ibadan: Unpublished Masters Project in the Department of Teacher Education, University of Ibadan. p. 88.

spontaneously¹ in the individual nor is it inborn, but must be nursed and guided, either in a conditioned environment or in a company of the virtuous.

Consider for instance, if we want a child to learn a particular type of trade or hand craft, we take him to a specialist on the area concerned, he stays there with him for a specified period of time, learning and observing gradually whatever it is that he does that makes him who he is. He practices or imitates exactly what he sees the master doing, and one day he will eventually become like the master. From this, we can comfortably cite Socrates and Plato² as a typical example of master and disciple, one becoming an image of the other. The danger however, in using the above example is that, a trade is an art or skill we are referring to above, which is entirely a different case with virtue, say – political virtues like justice and reverence. To teach virtue by example for the sake of others to follow is also another area of controversy in philosophy. Some are of the view that acting in a virtuous manner for teaching sake reduces the value of the act, and thereby taking it out of the context of virtue, while others see no harm in so doing. At this point we can attempt suggesting Dewey's method of learning by doing. The students should be put in an environment such that their knowledge, sermons and training on the virtues could be put to test. In this condition, I think, they could be trained and allowed to self-evaluate themselves by failing again and again, until they are satisfied by their outcomes. In line with the above proposition, Ryle³ made it unequivocally clear as follows: *“What will help to make us self-controlled, fair-minded or*

¹ Elwany, M., 2008. *The Complete Works of Plato: Protagoras*, op. cit., pp.548 – 549.

² Warburton, N., 2011. *A Little History of Philosophy*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, pp. 1 – 8.

³ Ryle, G., 1972/2010. Can Virtue Be Taught? In R. F. Dearden, P. H. Hirst and R. S. Peters eds., *Education and the Development of Reason*, op. cit., p. 325.

hard-working are good examples set by others, and then ourselves practising and failing, and practising again, and failing again, but not quite so soon and so on.” He likes to compare this with the phenomenon of learning how to ride a bicycle. That is, how the process is such a kind of trying and failing again and again, after seeing and learning the basics from an expert.

This could perhaps, be one of the reasons why Socrates was citing an example to Protagoras that; people are likely to take away their wards from the company of the corrupt, to a company of the righteous. Because these people are already known to be virtuous and they don't have to pretend to be something they are not, all that is required of the child is to observe, appreciate and be self-persuaded to imitate. Although Socrates was pessimistic about the teachability of virtue,¹ on the premise that he had come across several virtuous men who were unable to make others or their friends or even strangers virtuous as themselves, Protagoras on the other hand was however, optimistic that even the Athenian people do teach virtue by approvals, reprimands and punishment of the evil doers.² This by implication means that we don't necessarily have to teach virtue in the classroom as a subject. This is because it is a practical part and parcel of our life experiences that can't wait to be taken to the classroom. You may however receive lectures and sermons on morals but you need to reflect and train yourself on how to apply them to your life experiences. From the foregoing, one may be tempted to ask whether virtue cannot be taught in the classroom. The argument is not implying that we cannot teach virtue in the classroom, it only purports that we cannot wait until a child goes to school,

¹ Warburton, N. 2011. *A Little History of Philosophy*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. p. 545.

² *Ibid.*, p. 549.

just as he/she gets to start learning his/her mother tongue right from home and the streets. The child only gets to learn some technical aspects of his/her language, which is semantics when he goes to school. So also in virtue ethics, ethical dilemmas and mastery of the general dichotomies of the virtues could be the case.

However, from the elementary level, through approval of some virtuous acts while in the company of elders or teachers, children get to understand that which is virtuous and that which is vice. In short, they are inculcated with standards of moral conduct by example, training, practice and self-training.¹ When they exhibit honest acts they are applauded and rewarded with special regards by their parents, teachers and community elders, depending on the milieu. On the other hand, they are cautioned, rebuked, reprimanded or frowned at, and in some extreme cases of defiance punished or sanctioned against malpractices such as examination misconduct, taking that which is not theirs without permission, disrespect for elders and peers, bullying and the like. They are however allowed to mix freely with others for the sake of fraternity and propagation of the spirit of caring for others.

4.8.4. Can friendship be instrumental in teaching philosophy of the good life?

Friendship and caring for others is a way of living a peaceful and meaningful life. When you make others happy by being kind to them, it bounces back into making you too happy, hence the need to teach children to care for others. For Aristotle², friendship is itself another virtue, or accompanied by virtue. This is because we only have a meaningful life when in the company

¹ Ryle, G., 1972/2010. Can Virtue Be Taught? In R. F. Dearden, P. H. Hirst and R. S. Peters eds., *Education and the Development of Reason*, op. cit., p. 325.

² Bartlett & Collins 2011, *Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*. Op. cit. p.163.

of others, to guide us, to support and encourage us, and vice versa. Friendship helps in defining us and giving us focus and a reason to live. We need friendship to fulfill our destinies. Aristotle would wonder how our prosperity can be preserved and guarded without friendship.¹ Friendship by implication is sometimes seen as a measure of might and power, for when people seek to unite themselves, into one indivisible and indissoluble entity, they tend to be untouchable and unstoppable. This is especially when we consider international politics; think about the United Nations (UN), the European Union (E.U), Warsaw Pact, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), The African Union (AU), the Arab League and the like. So also when on individual grounds, we become less vulnerable and secure, when we are in the company of others (say friends). And security is one of the pillars of happiness, we shall discuss this presently in the good life matrix.

Therefore, children should be taught the importance of companionship and allowed to mix freely with others for their sake and their future happiness. The challenge this approach could face is Kant's '*categorical imperative*' which purports that individuals should be treated as ends in themselves and not means to an end. For, if we seek to make friends with others for the sake of the happiness we hope to derive from the relationship, then this law could be violated. But, who would ever want to be a friend to a sadist or bully on categorical imperative terms? However, care should be taken, that, not all kids are friend worthy. This leaves us with the challenge of having to filter and evaluate the kinds of children our wards should mingle with. This is because, the influence of peers in the socialization process is very difficult to overcome, which means we should always be observant and vigilant

¹ Ibid.

about the friends our children keep. Again, do not be deceived that because your adult friend is good, into the thinking that his child is equally the same, we have argued from Socrates' point of view that so many virtuous people known to him have not been able to produce virtuous fellows. Some could be good but terrible in child upbringing and training. The question however is; where does this leave the school? This is where there are hundreds or tens of other children per se, where a child comes to mingle with different types of personalities. What role has the school got to play in putting these personalities in check?

The task is now left to the classroom teacher to see who has negative influence on whom, especially in the classroom sitting arrangement. The teacher can shuffle their seats to reduce the distraction one is causing for the other. Where a child is found to be notorious and seeming to be defying rules and regulations of the school, the teacher should ensure that he does not affect other children by following up to make sure that they are separated for good, even outside the classroom. S/he can liaise with parents of the potential victim. And for the ones with negative influence, that is, the delinquent children should not be left alone, because when left without supervision, they are the type that may drop out of school and become nuisance to the society, the teacher should equally liaise with their parents, to help bring to their notice how they should brace up in their upbringing style.

4.8.4.1. Al-Ghazali on Friendship and Brotherhood

Having discussed friendship from the tradition of Aristotle, which by implication, is the very tradition that McIntyre¹ propagates. It is now time that we look into Al-Ghazali's version of the concept, and to see how it could be instrumental in teaching philosophy of the good life. In the *Revival of the Religious Sciences*² Al-Ghazali devoted a whole chapter (i.e. chapter 5 of Vol. II) discussing about love, friendship and brotherhood. For him friendship is a result of good conduct just and as bad conduct breeds enmity and hatred.

Therefore, one must as a matter of necessity be of good character before one should expect others to want to be in one's company. He cited so many instances where the prophet (S.A.W) was enjoining the Muslims to be there for one another at all times, and highlighted the excellence of one who keeps ties with his fellow Muslim brothers and kinsmen. The Prophet said a believer loves and is loved. There is no good in one who does not love and is not loved. He reported the prophet³ (S.A.W) as praising brotherhood among Muslims by saying that; God gives a friend to one who is good. He intends, if he forgets he reminds him, they are just like two hands whenever they are together, helping and taking care of each other on whatever matters they find themselves. Among all the friendships, the most revered are those who love each other for the sake of God and not for worldly affairs. Ghazali cited a Hadith of the prophet relating that some servants of Allah will in the Day of reckoning be very close to Allah, because they meet each other

¹ Carden, S. D., 2006. *Virtue Ethics: Dewey and MacIntyre*. London and New York: Continuum International Publishing Group. p. 56. Carden here acknowledged the tendencies which Dewey and MacIntyre share as Aristotelian in nature.

² Imam Al-Ghazali, Karim, M. F., trans., 1993. *Ihya Ulumiddin (Revival of the Religious Sciences)* Vol. II Karachi-Pakistan: Darul-Ishaat. p. 85.

³ Ibid, p. 88.

remembering for the sake of Allah, they help each other for the sake of God¹, not expecting what the other will do for them.

In another version, Ghazali report Jesus Christ (A.S.) as saying to his companions that they should be dear to God by having enmity against the sinners and be near to God keeping away from them, and seek pleasure of God by displeasing them. So the companions asked; O the spirit of God, with whom shall we keep company? He replied: with such people who remind you of God when you see them, whose words increase your actions, and who arouse eagerness in your mind for the actions of the next world when you see them.² This by implication, is showing that keeping company with the righteous or pious servants of God is the friendship that will lead one to salvation. And for our line of discourse here, we shall add that keeping company with these people shall be able to help us in enriching our spiritual selves, what about teaching this virtue of friendship? How can we make our children to be among the virtuous servants of God?

From Al-Ghazali's argument here, we first, as a matter of necessity train our children on godliness by sending them to the right schools where they will be trained in the way of God and in a morally excellent manner. They have to be taught kindness and friendliness towards others, by learning to care, to share, and respect their friends and colleagues in school. This will inculcate good manners and general good conduct in their lives. Once these qualities are built in the child, he/she is likely going to be having friends in his/her later adult life, the consequent of which is a happy life. Therefore, from Ghazali's point of view, good conduct is the key to healthy friendship

¹ Ibid. p. 88.

² Ibid. p. 89.

and a happy life. The problem likely to arise however, is on the issue of the required school curriculum that would adequately support these ideals. Although morality in general does not fit adequately in the core curriculum, but rather, the hidden curriculum. The problem of the adaptation mostly is from the school management, they are sometimes in the name of secularity, made to remain silent on salient issues that have to do with moral upbringing of children, hiding under the guise of either federal character or 21st century democratic ideals. The question is; are we actually ready to sacrifice the future of our children in the name democratic ideals?

4.8.5. On the purpose of life (Research Question 1 [R.Q1])

This question, having been attempted in chapter four from the religious angle is probably having a pitfall by not appealing to human reason, and as such we shall look at the problem from a holistic perspective now. Therefore, the purpose of life could be broadly categorized into two; that is, personal purpose of life (PPL) and religious purpose of life (RPL). Having had a discussion about the RPL in chapter four, we shall however, now devote some attention on the PPL. Let us first, as a matter of necessity, clarify what is meant by the two terms proposed. By religious purpose of life, it is meant the general purpose of living, for which God assigned to all His creations. And we have in chapter four discussed that this purpose of life when taken from the dimension of worship exceeds the ordinary prayers/services that are carried out in the synagogues, churches or mosques. It is an all-inclusive affair of the individual's life, his relations with God and religious duties, his relations with fellow creations of God and people in general, are all under the worship of God, for God has commanded man to be kind

hearted and merciful to His creations, so that he may gain some benefit in so doing, here in this world and the next.

On the personal or individual purpose of life, the fact that man has been gifted with one of the most expensive gifts in life, that is freedom.¹ Freedom of choice, to either be thankful to God by doing good to His creations and fulfilling the religious duties, or by being ungrateful to Him by choosing the wrong path of harming oneself and other creations of God, and shunning away from all religious duties. Religious duties here, are talking about the five pillars of Islam, for instance (i.e. testimony of faith in the existence of one and only true God, observing the five daily prayers, giving of charity or zakat to the poor, fasting of the month of Ramadan, and performing Hajj or pilgrimage to Mecca for those who are able)² are the religious duties we are referring to here. This freedom has made man to be the master of his fate, and the captain of his soul.³ We are by implication, finding a route to existentialism vis-à-vis doctrine of Islamic freedom.

However, from the foregoing, personal purpose of life indicates the freewill of the individual to model his life and his future based on his choices. Because freedom of choice, must as a matter of fact be attached to bearing responsibility for the path chosen. It either pays off or backfires at its efficient cause. Therefore, to explain this phenomenon of freedom, let us look at the creation of man from conception to adulthood; each individual right from the day he/she is conceived in his/her mother's womb has

¹ Qur'an 76:2-3 for the creation of man and the freedom or freewill given to him by God.

² Saulawa, M. A. 2014. "Philosophy of Stoicism and Islamic Moral Education: Some Socio-ethical Considerations", *Nigerian Journal of Educational Philosophy*. October. 25(1). pp. 60 - 66.

³ Babarinde, K. & Saulawa, M. A., 2015. "Solarin's Philosophy of Functional Education, Self-Reliance and Sustainable Development for Nigeria", *Nigerian Journal of Educational Philosophy*. October. 26(2). pp. 97 - 105.

unique characteristics that he/she will exhibit, making the pregnant mother have some unprecedented pains and dispositions. She begins to like some things and detest others which she hitherto likes, her mood is perpetually altered (within the period in question) just as a result of what she carries, and each subsequent child she conceives will give her a unique experience independent of the previous children, up to the time the child comes to the world. He/she will be born with different character and destiny. This character will define what he/she is to become in the future, and therefore, fulfilling a particular destiny or purpose. This is where his/her personal purpose of life is derived, from his/her natural dispositions and made choices, and for this reason, his/her upbringing is very crucial in such determination. For instance, a cowardly raised child is likely to not engage in risk-taking ventures that have high reward and vice-versa, when a child is raised to be courageous; he/she is likely to be engaged in risk-taking businesses that are likely to pay off into making him/her successful in life. At this point, we can conclude that a courageously raised child is likely to be successful in life and vice-versa. Again, this shows that courage and determination must be instilled in our children at their green years, in order to help them achieve their personal purposes of life, and attain the ultimate status of the good life.

4.8.5.1. Analysis of Al-Ghazali and MacIntyre's Philosophies on the Concepts of Virtue and Essence

From the foregoing, it has been established that while Al-Ghazali represents the Islamic tradition on morality, MacIntyre on the other hand represents the Aristotelian tradition of the West. In this section, it should be recalled that one of the research questions **(R.Q4)** of this research is on seeking for a

synergy between these two philosophies, and to explore how they could be synthesized to benefit the African child.

To begin with Ghazali's philosophy, we have seen that he is more concerned with developing good conduct in the moral agent. This has been established from the way he views the best of virtues to be good conduct, culled from the Islamic prophetic traditions of Muhammad (S.A.W) in several chapters of his *Revival of the Religious Sciences*. In Chapter II¹ of the *Revival* Ghazali portrayed that good conduct is half of religious faith in Islam, and must be nurtured in our children in their early years, for, it is the beginning of a healthy soul and preparation for an everlasting life in the hereafter. He contrasted it with bad conduct, which is a disease and the root of all evils, liable to destroy the human soul. He mentioned that the Prophet of Islam is an embodiment of good conduct², and as such whoever wishes to have his child to be of virtuous character, should set Prophet Muhammad as a role model for the child and himself.

Further, Al-Ghazali mentioned a prophetic tradition of prophet Muhammad (S.A.W) on the virtues of good conduct, in which he said that; the one whom God has bestowed with good temperament and good appearance will not be punished in the hellfire.³ Therefore, good conduct is the foundation of a humanly good life, since it prepares one in establishing lasting and genuine friendships. It prepares man for a healthy living with his fellow men in the society.

¹ Imam Ghazali, 1993. *Ihya Ulum-Al-Din (Revival of the Religious Sciences)*, Vol. II, *op. cit.*, 47.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid, p. 48.

However, MacIntyre claims that his philosophy is both 'theistic' and 'as secular in its content as any other'.¹ Although his youth was spent in the protestant sect of Christianity, he later came to adopt Roman Catholic version of Thomism just enough to counter argue Nietzsche's popular dictum of "God is dead" from a reason-based perspective. His philosophy was for the most of time about seeking the truth via rational inquiry. He is equally fond of using the idea of a tradition from which arguments are rationally defended. To this effect, he chose Aristotelianism as not just the best form of a tradition, but the best yardstick to use in measuring what makes a particular theory the best one.² Knight was able to trace this fact by arguing that MacIntyre's metatheory posits a number of traditions in philosophical contention, his substantive theory paints a simpler picture from expressly Aristotelian perspective. In this picture the Aristotelian rationality of practices confronts a succession of rationalizations of the subordination of moral excellence to institutional effectiveness. He argued that this picture depicts the main thesis of MacIntyre's sense of tradition, the protagonists of this tradition see it teleologically as a practice of philosophical inquiry into and political pursuit of the true and the good, and views MacIntyre as being the most self-conscious of these protagonists challenging Nietzscheism and Capitalism.³

Younkins⁴ argues that Aristotle teaches that each man's life has a purpose and the function of one's life is to attain that purpose. He explains that the purpose of life is earthly happiness or flourishing that can be achieved via

¹ Knight, K. ed., 1998. *The MacIntyre Reader*. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press. p. 24.

² Ibid, p. 25.

³ Ibid, p.27.

⁴ Younkins, E. W., 2003. *Aristotle, Human Flourishing, and the Limited State*. Montreal, November 22, 2003) <http://www.quebecoislibre.org/031122-11.htm>. Accessed March 23, 2019.

reason and the acquisition of virtue. Again, the major argument started by Aristotle is that all human life consists of activity. And that human beings engage in these activities to arrive at some end. An end in itself or a subordinate end that is a means to another end. But the most complete end is better than the subordinate end. He then declares that the most complete end that all activity aims at is happiness.¹ However, this happiness is itself prone to interpretations, we have sustainable happiness and momentary happiness. How then, can we attain and teach this sustainable happiness is the major concern of this research work. Therefore, from the argument presented above, we can conveniently claim that MacIntyre's philosophy is Aristotelian in nature, and thus seeks for the rationalization of morality in its absolute form. These are very important in raising the African child through modern methods of teaching morality.

4.8.6. Major Findings of the Research

From the foregoing, having established some 5 point criteria in unit 4.4.1 from which we can measure the good life status of an individual, we shall in this section discuss how we can attain status of the good life with a six point matrix called the Good Life Matrix (GLM). Let us remember that, this is one of our research questions **(R.Q2)** that need attention. First, we must begin with a critique of the former 5 point criteria in this section. The discussion of the criteria in unit 4.4.1 was done with the intention of identifying the conditions necessary for happiness. There was no synchronization of the ideas into a single cohesive unit. Again, there was no synergy between the discussed points. The arguments were equally entirely secular, while this

¹ The Concept of Good life in the Philosophy of Aristotle at http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/116193/9/09_chapter%203.pdf. Accessed March 24,

research considers both religious arguments as well as those forwarded by reason (secular), with the chief aim of finding a compass that would guide the moral agent in navigating through life en route to happiness and the good life. Finally, happiness was itself a criterion out of the criteria mentioned; at this level we shall make it to be the overall denominator of the five-point criteria with the inclusion of friendship and piety as other very important variables or factors leading to happiness. These however, may constitute the major findings of this research. In what follows, we shall demonstrate the interrelatedness of these concepts/virtues and show how they can lead their possessor into happiness. We shall illustrate these new criteria from figure 4.8.6 below.



Figure 4.8.6.: The Good Life Matrix (GLM)

From the figure above; we can see that a life of happiness is a combination and the possession of some moral dispositions or character, relationships and some fundamental human rights. One other thing to discern from the

figure is that happiness begins with reason or rationality and ends with piety or godliness. These findings of the research coincide with the findings of Michalos, Ramsey, Ebert and Kahlke where they were able to rank happiness and subjective wellbeing as the major key determinants of the good life. Again, the findings of the GLM have also coincided with Michalos' empirical findings when he claimed to have reviewed results of eleven surveys undertaken to explain happiness on the basis of the personal satisfaction respondents got from a dozen specific domains of their lives, e.g., satisfaction with their jobs, their living partners, their financial security and their health.

However, the matrix we intend to create here is that all these criteria must be met before we can say that one is truly happy in the absolute sense of the word, because the possession of some with the exclusion of others would make the moral agent to be lacking in something. He/she may be momentarily happy but the happiness would not be sustainable. Therefore, to achieve a sustainable happiness, the matrix must be complete. We are not going to make a new analysis on the concepts here, since they have been introduced and treated in section one of the chapter.

Consider for instance; a salary earner who lacks rationality in his decision making process on how to manage his household. He is depicted as someone who works solely as a government employee without any external means of income. After collecting his monthly salary, he feels like making his family happy and therefore, goes on to take them to amusement parks and bought a lot of luxury items at the expense of food items that are a necessity. He and his family may be momentarily happy, but would soon

suffer the consequences of his irrational choice. Thus, rationality is needed to keep the good life matrix (GLM) intact in achieving sustainable happiness.

On friendship, imagine a very rich man who has no friends or even a wife (because marriage comes from friendship), would he actually be happy without anyone to share his riches and life successes with? Remember, this research is based on one of the assumptions that; man by his nature is a gregarious being. Meaning he is a social being that must live in a company of others to make his life complete and whole.

Therefore, friendship is a very important variable in helping us achieving sustainable happiness, because true and good friends make us feel part of a community or group, something bigger than ourselves, the absence of which would reduce the level of happiness of the individual in question. But who is a true and good friend? In so many relationships people tend to be our friends with the aim of achieving something through us. That is, they take us as a means to an end and not as ends ourselves. And as soon as they achieve their aim the friendship ceases to exist. A good friend is one who is ready to stand for his buddy (or partner) irrespective of whatever it is that he/she possesses for better or for worse. This is the major argument of Kant's '*Categorical imperative*'. On this he posited that; *For all rational beings stand under the law that each of them is to treat himself and all others never merely as means but always at the same time as ends in themselves.*¹ Kant was here attempting to introduce a universal law of relationships and actions. So much has since then been said about this law by different

¹ Kant, I., 1997. *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*. Gregor, M., trans and ed. New York: Cambridge University Press. p. 41.

philosophers of different times till this day. This very law has equally been treated in the Prophetic traditions of Islam and Bible.

Furthermore, in the prophetic traditions, it came from a particular Hadith, where prophet Muhammad (S.A.W) was reported to have said; *“None of you is a true believer until he loves for his brother that which he loves for himself”*. This is also depicted in the Bible as do unto others what you would like them do unto you. Therefore, when a moral agent is considerate of these thoughts, he/she wouldn't want to be treated as a mere tool and is likely to act accordingly on his/her own accord or freewill. This is what Kant believes would create a universal law of morality that is created based on the freewill on the rational human beings. This argument is also in line with that of Cheryl Armon¹ as presented in chapter two. Again, these arguments are supported by our reviewed empirical researches from Emily Smith's findings where she came up with her 4 pillars of having meaning in life with belonging being the number one pillar of having meanings to life. The same thing applies with those of Waldinger's research in chapter 2.7.4 where they found that being in quality relationships makes people healthier and happier in the long run.

However, for avoidance of tautology, freedom, legitimate income and contentment shall not be used as examples here; rather, piety which is relatively a new concept in the matrix shall be treated. To begin with, what is piety and how does it correlate with happiness? On the eve of his indictment by Meletus and subsequent execution by the people of Athens, Socrates was so concerned about this concept. This was especially in the

¹ Armon, C. 1984. Ideals of the Good life, op. cit. p. 70.

Euthyphro dialogue, where he was bedazzled by Euthyphro's attempted prosecution of his father, whom later showed that he was only doing so for the sake of upholding the virtue of piety, of which he is known to be renowned in Athens. To this end, Socrates was so excited to get into a search for the meanings of piety with him, since he was accused of impiety and disrespect for the Greek gods by introducing others of his own.¹ Socrates was able to push Euthyphro into the conclusion that; "*that which is dear to the gods is pious and what is not is impious*".²

But, there was a confusion when the gods were reported to have been fighting one another, for example Zeus castrating his father for eating his children,³ which is unbecoming of the Divine, this was perhaps the reason why Socrates was not able to make good sense out of the Greek gods, and therefore thought of them as a thing of mockery. It was at this juncture that the '*Euthyphro Dilemma*' emanated when Socrates was reported to have been wondering what piety is actually? He asked a question that; is the pious being loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is being loved by the gods?⁴

The dialogue ended in a vicious cycle whereby Socrates was not actually satisfied of what the true nature of piety is. Because of the dilemma he put Euthyphro into the saying that the pious is pious because it is being loved by the gods and not pious because it being pious. That is, to say that piety or good acts cannot be determined by reason or by their quality of being good unless they are being loved by the gods. Socrates was trying to

¹Plato, 2002. *Plato: Five Dialogues: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Meno, Phaedo*, 2nd ed., revised by Cooper, J. M. ed., & Grube, G. M. A., trans. Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company Inc. p. 6 (5c-d).

² Ibid, p. 8.

³ Ibid, p. 6 (6a).

⁴ Ibid. p. 12, (Euthyphro, 10a)

establish a good ground for piety independent of the will of the gods. That is to say that one can be good without having to ascribe that act to the will of the gods. Another dilemma he put Euthyphro was on the benefit of service to the gods, that if we are to care for them, it means they are benefitting from our service.¹ Euthyphro was also able to escape this by rejecting Socrates' assertion, although not being able to justify that further.

Religious moral theories that promise everlasting happiness (in an afterlife) in exchange for compliance with the will of God similarly ground (motivate, justify) moral action in sensuous inclination², this was in the words of Uleman, when she was making a prelude to the moral philosophy of Kant. This is however, buttressing the point we have raised on the virtue of piety as it relates with pure reason, independent of religion. The danger however, in the GLM is on the claim that; the matrix must be complete before one could be said to obtain sustainable happiness. What about the atheist who does not believe in God, but is ready to follow moral theories on the basis of reason? The question we may ask further here is; can one who denies his source actually obtain happiness in a place where he does not belong?

Consider for instance, the concept of the '*marginal man*',³ that is, a man of two cultures and a citizen of neither. A man who is said to have denied his root or his ancestral home by claiming to be an indigene of an alien society, and that society not willing to accept an outcast or foreigner into its territory? Is he actually going to be happy in that state? Imagine also, a child who denied being a child of his biological father or mother, can he

¹ Ibid. p. 19 (Euthyphro 15a)

² Uleman, J. K., 2010. *An Introduction to Kant's Moral Philosophy*. New York: Cambridge University Press. p. 113.

³ Babarinde, K. & Bankole, A., 2011. *Society, Political Economy and Education*. Ibadan: Evan Brothers Nigeria Publishers Ltd. p. 52.

actually claim another in the biological sense? He is just like a bastard who is searching for his source of coming to this world. So also it is with the one who denies God as his true source and maker, he will continue to wander in search of other sources of his existence to no avail with false hope of living a meaningful life. This research is based on the assumption that man is religious being, who must cling to his God from one point or another in order to obtain happiness.

Now let us reflect on the proposition of Euthyphro about piety being that which is dear to the gods from a religious perspective, especially Islam, piety means obedience to the commandments of the Lord of the worlds. And this obedience encompasses both inner and outer commitments, that is, that which is between individuals (interpersonal) and the individual within himself (intrapersonal). For instance the command that forbids the consumption of alcohol or any substance that makes one go out of his sense is not an interpersonal issue. The individual may have developed a habit and urge for alcohol, but out of respect and recognition for the benefits of upholding the law of the Divine, he/she desist from its consumption, that is what we call piety. Therefore, piety in Arabic originates from the verb *taqwa*, which means forbearance, fear and abstinence. From Islamic point of view it means God consciousness, piousness, fear of Allah, love for Allah and self-restraint¹ or being conscious and cognizant of Allah, of truth, of the rational reality etc.²

Being kind and benevolent to others is also an act of piety. The Qur'an in this regard mentioned: *Behold, God enjoins justice and kindness, and*

¹ Taqwa in Wikipedia, <https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taqwa>

² Ibid.

*generosity towards (one's) fellow-men, and He forbids all that is shameful and He forbids all that runs counter to reason, as well and envy; and He admonishes you so that you may take heed.*¹ These are some of the major commandments of God in the Qur'an which has summarized the entire life of the individual in a short form. The place where piety came out is Quran (49:13) *'inna akramakum indallahi atqaakum'*² - Meaning *"the noblest of you in the sight of Allah is the one who is most deeply conscious of Him"*.

From the foregoing, piety when added to the GLM helps one in coordinating the rest the components, for, when one is pious he/she is likely to be contented with the life he/she is living as a destiny or gift from the Lord, and will not in any way seek for the accumulation of illegal wealth, the non-possession of which is likely to make one free from being harassed by the authorities or hooligans. Again, being pious as an act of obedience to the commandments of Allah has shown that one should be generous and kind to the people around him, and by virtue of this that person is likely to be a friend and brother to those whom he assists and they will be willing to stand for him at any time of his life, this breeds friendship. Piety also leads to rationality, take an instance given above about deceasing from the consumption of alcohol, whenever a person remains sober he/she is likely to remain rational and will not engage in some shameful acts that he/she would commit when drunk, the consequence of which could damage his/her public image for the rest of his/her life. Therefore, piety in this regard plays a coordinating role in the GLM, thereby, assuring sustainable happiness in the individual as the Qur'an says *"Who ever does righteousness, whether*

¹ <http://quran.com/16/90> or <http://www.islamawakened.com/quran/16/90/> for varied explanations of the verse from different scholars.

² <http://www.islamawakened.com/quran/49/13>

male or female, while he is a believer – we will surely cause him to live a good life, and we will surely give them their reward [in the hereafter] according to the best of what they used to do”¹.

4.8.6.1. Program of Guidance and Action for the GLM

One of the major functions of philosophy is serving as a guide to curriculum design and programs of action for the schools. We shall in this section attempt to define what programs should be implemented to enable the schools effectively execute the Good Life Matrix (GLM). The GLM program needs to be comprehensive and purpose driven. There is need to provide a blue-print that will either be embedded in the program of studies/learning, or the program of activities or program of guidance.² This is because the good life as argued in this research, is a constellation of virtuous concepts as shown in the GLM. These virtues are mostly taught or emphasized in the hidden curriculum.

However, it is important to clarify here, what is meant by the hidden curriculum. The hidden curriculum is a program of activities that are not vividly spelt out in the school syllabus and are not directly being taught formally in the classroom, but are still part of the core values that support the accomplishment of objectives of the core curriculum. It is that part that mold’s the character of the students into what the society needs for the flourishing and success of its legacies. The hidden curriculum could be a policy statement (such as a school motto, or visions and missions of the school etc.), or simply schools rules and regulations that guide the conduct of students as well as the teachers in their teacher-student relationships,

¹ <https://quran.com/16/97>.

² Dada, A., 1999. *The Teacher and the Curriculum*. Ibadan: Tejama General Enterprises. p. 91.

student-student relationships, or student-supporting staff relationship in a formal institution or school. The hidden curriculum generally represents the societal norms, values and best forms of practices in education that are morally, culturally and socially bound. However, we shall limit our discussion here with regard to conduct as it relates with the GLM from the points of views of Al-Ghazali and MacIntyre's Aristotelian tradition.

The fact that we are dealing with happiness as the ultimate denominator of the GLM means that we cannot avoid speaking of hedonistic tendencies of Epicureanism when it comes to pain and pleasure. This is because such virtues as honesty and piety bring ultimate happiness on their possessors against their corresponding vices when we cheat or become impious and mischievous, the end result is always pain and dissatisfaction with life.

Therefore, the students need to be made very much aware of the consequences of deviance in the lifelong educational process and how this can affect their overall happiness in life. It is not always about being obedient to school rules and regulations that should be emphasized as the ultimate prize of happiness, but the outcome of being morally upright through setting examples with successful alumni of the school and other role models in the society. The school head can also be used as an example especially when he/she rose through the ranks through hard work and dedication before being appointed as the school head, and any other relevant examples that could motivate the students into emulating them without threat from corporal punishment. Let us then, attempt suggesting some action plans for the implementation of the GLM in the schools' hidden curriculum.

4.8.6.2. Designing the Good Life Matrix Program

The following elements should be considered when designing the GLM program:

- 1) Setting short and long term goals and objectives at both the macro and micro levels (Some of these are already in the National Policy on Education document of Nigeria, and should therefore, be identified and stressed).
- 2) Selecting the appropriate content (learning/social experiences) to be involved in the hidden curriculum and also making it vividly clear to all within the four walls of the school that is; the teachers, non-academic staff and students.
- 3) The provision of appropriate social learning materials (such as bill boards, posters, video films etc.) and other objects that could be instrumental in executing the GLM program.
- 4) Although teachers are the first major implementers of the curriculum, implementation of the GLM should be carried out by all within the school not only the teachers, because inculcating good manners is a responsibility of all adults in the community that the child grows. Before embarking on the program all the teachers should be retrained on the strategies for teaching philosophy of the good life through either seminars, conferences or retreat programs.
- 5) Mechanism of evaluation for the success or otherwise of the program should be well spelt out and carried out periodically so that where necessary, grey areas identified could be addressed to ensure the success of the program.

4.8.6.3. What the School Authority can do

National Policy on Education of Nigeria as noted in the introductory part of this research has stated that the overall philosophy of Nigeria is to live in unity and harmony as one indivisible, indissoluble democratic and sovereign nation founded on the principles of freedom, equality and justice, while Nigeria's philosophy of education is based on the development of the individual into a sound and effective citizen as well as the full integration of the individual into the community.¹ The GLM is in line with this philosophy therefore, it is left for the curriculum developers in schools to design a program that would have an all-round impact on the lives of the pupils as they go through the four walls of formal schooling. This they can start by **first** employing teachers with the best of characters and moral acumen. This is because the teachers are the first exemplars that should represent the kind of models the society is hoping to produce through the formal education system. **Secondly**, subjects that emphasize moral education and social cohesion should be given undivided attention and well executed by professionally trained teachers in the area concerned.

Thirdly, a general seminar should be organized between the head teachers and teachers using professional resource persons and chatting the way out through best forms of educational practices, stating categorically why the GLM need to be emphasized for the good of all. **Fourthly**, during assemblies time should be given for stating the motto of the school as it relates with the GLM, just like how Tai Solarin of Nigeria was making the *'I am the master of*

¹ Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2013. *National Policy on Education*.

*my fate, and I am the captain of my soul*¹ in his famous Mayflower school.

Fifthly, bill boards and posters should be placed across strategic points in the school such as the school gate, in front of classes/lecture theatres, games fields, cafeteria or dining hall depicting the consequences of examination malpractices and the need to adhere to due process, quotations about rationality, the paradox of freedom, the need for healthy friendships and genuinely caring for others, the consequences of stealing and the need to avoid getting involved in any form, the need to accept what you have and appreciate it and finally the need to fear the all-seeing God in all we do at all times and in all circumstances should be well articulated. All these points should be linked with how the acquisition of these virtues and avoidance of the stated vices lead to happiness as argued in the GLM.

4.8.6.4. What the Classroom Teachers Can do

The classroom teachers being the final implementers of the curriculum have a lot to do in affecting the students' behaviors in the school as they teach. It does not matter what content or subject they are teaching, the approach used in teaching those subjects is where the GLM virtues can be injected. For example, a teacher teaching arms of government in Civic Education can influence his pupils by bring some interesting stories about past leaders as good examples of how we should expect our leaders to be in his introduction of the lesson. This is because, psychologically the most important thing to do in a lesson is to start it with something very interesting that would arouse the interest/readiness of the students to learn the intended topic. Further, even in mathematical sciences, the teacher can use honesty to

¹ Babarinde, K. & Saulawa, M. A., 2015. *Solarin's Philosophy of Functional Education, Self-Reliance and Sustainable Development for Nigeria*, op cit., p. 101.

teach the students when engaging in problem solving in the classroom, whoever is sincere and copied from no one should be encouraged even if that student did not get the correct answer. On the issue of friendship in the GLM, group activities/work should be emphasized so that when solving problems students get to learn how to lean on each other and become friends by actively contributing. All these are strategies that can be used in implementing the GLM through classroom teaching.

4.9. Summary of Section Two

The second section of chapter four presented the arguments and concepts of the whole research theme in a systematic manner, such that the concepts analysed in the previous chapters were put to test and a whole new matrix of the good life was arrived at from the five point criteria in section one of chapter four, and the questions raised in the introductory chapter also addressed, such as what is the purpose of life? What is the good life and how can we attain status of the good life? Can virtue be taught? And is there any relationship between Al-Ghazali's Islamic philosophy and MacIntyre's Western philosophy on the issues of virtue and essence? And to what extent can these philosophies affect the African child? In response to these questions, a whole lot of issues and problems were discussed in section two of this chapter.

To begin with the GLM, it turned out to be a conglomeration of virtuous concepts viz. rationality, friendship, freedom, legitimate income, contentment, and piety which were analysed to be circling around the concept of happiness. The argument is that these virtues are a sine qua non to living a humanly good life, and that a moral agent needs them to function

as a typical human being, capable of thinking things through, distinct from the lower animals. It is equally on this ground that the arguments of Al-Ghazali were forwarded on the premise of good conduct being a foundation of the good life, for, it creates an atmosphere of peaceful coexistence of men among other human fellows. Further, from MacIntyre's adoption of the Aristotelian Tradition as best yardstick for measuring the viability of rational inquiries, it showed that the philosophy is a pursuit of the truth and the good. This proves the relationship existing between Al-Ghazali's Islamic philosophy and MacIntyre's Western philosophy in pursuing the good life. Finally, a program of action for the policy makers, the curriculum developers and school authorities was suggested for the successful realization of the GLM in Nigeria and other African countries alike.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENNDATIONS

5.1. Preface

This chapter presents the summary of arguments and issues raised from the beginning of this work. The summary here, shall be an expansion of the summaries presented at the end of the preceding chapters. It is a brief summary of the whole work, but with a critique of each of the chapters presented. Subsequently, we shall proceed to present the practical feasibility of our research work, drawing implication from our proposal of teaching philosophy of the good life in Nigeria and evaluating its significance for the theory and practice of education in Nigeria. These implications are derived from the conceptual analysis and theoretical arguments that have been presented in the earlier chapters. In addition, the implications would be directed to certain aspects of education and some sectors of the society that have a stake in education. These include teacher education, curriculum planning, pedagogy, examination bodies, parents, schools and the communities for which the child/learner grows after leaving his home. It equally hopes to reach a conclusion on the viability of setting an educational aim of teaching philosophy of the good life, with a view to rectify the moral compass in Nigeria and Africa in general.

5.2. Summary of the Research

The first chapter centered on the establishment of the research thesis with problem identification and worthwhileness of the research endeavor. It was identified that examination malpractices from the grassroots is the major precursor to corruption, moral decadence and indiscipline in Africa. This

was argued on the premise that when a child is exposed to malpractices at tender age, he begins to think it as normal to cheat or bribe his way out to obtain high grades for better certificates. The emphasis on paper qualification, rather than practical knowledge and ability to deliver the expected services effectively, was established in the introductory chapter as the major precursor to examination malpractices. However, the chapter failed to trace the genesis to parental pressure of igniting children to become first in positioning of their classrooms as one of the major areas to address. This, they establish by claiming to buy some items which the children see somewhere either from supermarkets or from their friends, which they equally wish to possess. This is the first instance where desperation sets in, and desperation is the mother of all forms of malpractices.

In addition, based on the assumption that man is a gregarious as well as a religious being, having to live in society or a company of others, and with a disposition of worshipping a deity or his desires, it was established that the navigation through the theories of morality, with emphasis on the virtues and religious morality would go a long way in transferring philosophy of the good life in our societies. This informed the selection of Al-Ghazali and MacIntyre as the inspirational philosophers to review for the research.

The second Chapter being a review on related philosophies and literature started with biographies of the philosophers of interest (i.e. Al-Ghazali and MacIntyre) highlighting their life and works, from which their general philosophies were deduced. While Al-Ghazali was representing the Islamic tradition, MacIntyre was pro Aristotelian tradition. While Al-Ghazali's analyses virtues from the mystical point of view in His *Ihya-Uluum-Al-Deen*

(The Revival of the Religious Sciences) was presented alongside *Mizan al-Amal* (The Criterion of Action), MacIntyre's trace of the origin virtues and rival traditions was presented from his famous works of "After Virtue" and "Whose Justice? Which Rationality". Hegel, on the other hand, viewed the good life from an unconventional perspective of the Aristotelian virtues, it was discussed that his version of the highest good is to be found in freedom and the utilization of the free will in a modern political community. After taking, *Ujaama* of Julius Nyerere of Tanzania from the African perspective of the good life, there was a review about the modern strategies that could be synthesized in teaching philosophy of the good life to our schools and the communities in general.

Again, there was a suggestion based on the argument that teaching morality cannot be tied to the school alone, it is a cycle that starts at home, continues in school and extends to the community in general.




Figure 5.2. The cycle of teaching of Morality and philosophy of the good life.

It is on this ground, that the Asia and the Pacific Programme of Educational Innovation for Development (APEID) suggested in-school strategies and out-

of-school strategies, such that the students are occupied with various moral activities even after schools hours. This was proposed because they knew that morality and philosophy of the good life cannot be adequately treated in the school walls. It must be complemented with community experiences and also supported by the homes. The homes here are the first transmitters of societal values, as well as interpreters of the community's culture and norms. The in-school strategies centered on experiential and participatory learning whereby; value clarification, moral development, values analysis and values inculcation are employed through cooperative learning, guided imagery or fantasy trips.

However, the out-of-school approaches were demonstrated to be follow-up strategies of the in-school strategies, transferred to the real world of morality. They are called the action strategies by APEID due to the activity component in the strategies. They include: field trips, visiting the orphanage/less privileged areas, social action volunteer work, community reach-out with NGOs, media awareness education, peace campaigns, research and project works on moral concepts in the community like honesty of vendors on weighing scale in markets, projects on superstitious beliefs and scientific truths, environmental sanitation etc. It is hoped that when a student goes through these strategies he/she should be able to choose what kind of life he/she ought to live, to attain status of the good life. The question however, is that; are these strategies applicable to all levels of learners? There is a need to be specific about the curriculum content and activities, the age level characteristics of the learners, which the APEID has failed to indicate in the second chapter. Again, these strategies

are not usually found in the core curriculum, how do we ensure that they are part of the core curriculum?

The third chapter being methodology bound, was able to trace the tools of argument and assessment the philosophers employ. There was an attempt on showing how they apply them with respect to the theme of the research. This was done, because philosophical researches must always clarify to the general audience, what it is that they do to ensure some level of perspicuousness from the audience. The general methodology for the research involved using analysis, speculation and prescription, but the research design was normative in that, the good life and teaching are value laden concepts that are discussed in the theory of morality. Again, it was argued that descriptive philosophical inquiry deals with *what is* and *what has been*, while normative on the other hand, deals with *what ought to be*. That is, how ought we to live? What ought we to do to achieve the good life and how ought we to teach philosophy of the good life. The chapter was concluded with philosophical techniques of analysing concepts, issues and problems in education, where a deconstruction of the techniques by Saulawa and Babarinde was carried out and a new one proposed in this thesis, it is hoped that this new technique will suit many normative philosophical researches of its kind.

The fourth chapter was dedicated for conceptual analysis of the concepts and issues of the research theme, this was carried out employing the analytic tool of Descartes on analysis of concepts. Sometime times this method is referred to as the reductionist style. The method was augmented with the researcher developed technique of philosophical researches in

education. The major concepts analysed are the concepts of teaching, philosophy, philosophy of..., virtue, the good life and its criteria for identification, and finally, the concept of essence or rather the purpose of life were all philosophically analysed using the method of reductionism or logical atomism. Section two of the chapter was a started with a critique of the method employed in section one and a deconstruction of some of arguments raised in the previous chapters. It also made sure that all the research questions asked in the introductory chapter were attended to by treating some issues and problems in a systematic manner. The major findings of the chapter revealed that all the virtues discussed in section one criteria for the good life were supposed to lead the moral agent to a life of happiness. This led to development of the good life matrix (GLM) which is the most critical contribution of this research work that is, finding a blueprint en route to the good life. A program was designed for implementing the GLM into our hidden curriculum in schools.

5.3. Conclusion

To conclude is to decide by reasoning, or reach an agreement about a case, issue or problem. But, since we say by reasoning, it entails that we must heed to logical dictates. By implication, we must avoid fallacies of weak induction by making sure that the conclusion is well grounded by a preceding premise. In this case, the discussions we have presented so far are the premises that we need to conclude from. It is then, plausible to say that this research dwelled on seeking the road map en route to philosophy of the good life, and that it has been found out that Islamic and Western Philosophies are complementary in achieving status of the good life. Again, to live a good life means to live a life sustainable of happiness. This led to

establishing a conglomeration of factors that lead to happiness in a matrix called the Good Life Matrix (GLM), that is, possessing the qualities of being rational, being capable of establishing and sustaining friendships in a company of other fellow human beings. There must be freedom for the moral agent to be able to sustain those relationships, to act and move freely without restraint from external influence, are you free? Without the possession of some generally acceptable medium of exchange, that is money, the individual will find life very difficult, and thus happiness will be denied, therefore, he must have some reasonable amount of income to survive and to be happy, however, this income must be legitimately justifiable. Again, the individual must be contented with the little that he/she has, else there will be trouble of insatiability, and happiness denied. Finally, he must exercise the quality of piety that is from the Islamic perspective, of being good with or without the supervision of others, as this affirms the saying that it is always good to be good. Thus, in order to live a sustainable good life, the Good Life Matrix must be complete. The questions that would possibly follow then, are how do we teach or establish habits that would take us to these virtues in our societies? What agencies or sectors should ensure the establishment of these virtues?

5.4. Recommendations

For the purpose of practical significance of the study, the following recommendations are proposed. These are the implications that could be identified for different sectors of the society. For the good life is an all-round concept and as such it must touch all the social institutions of the society, that is, family institution, educational institution, religious institution, legal institution, political institution and economic institution. Therefore, our

implications will be drawn in this order. Let us then look at some general implications and recommendations for the research.

5.4.1. Implications for the Family Institution

The family being the smallest unit of organizations in a society and regarded as a microcosm of the larger society for discharging many vital functions of the society¹, such as preserving the human race through reproduction and preservation of societal norms, values and traditions. The saying that charity begins at home, can never be overemphasized, as every man is a product of his environment. Just as Protagoras would argue with Socrates that a child does not go to school to learn his mother's tongue, he just finds himself speaking it, so it is with virtue of the good life. Parents must be very careful and selective of the friends/associates that their children mingle with. They should memorize the GLM and make sure that in all their treatment of the child these virtues are the watch words. They can also do this by giving them stories that these virtues are embedded such as folklores etc. They should also live an exemplary life for the children to follow, since they are copy cats and are always trying to imitate what their parents are doing. Whenever, the children reach the age of morality, that is around 5 to 7, they should always try to rationalize the reason behind what they are teaching the children and by being caring and compassionate to the children so that whenever they are in a dilemma they can always make informed decisions as humans and not some sort of robots following the moral codes of their parents or community.

¹ Babarinde, K. & Bankole, A., 2011. *Society, Political Economy and Education*. Ibadan: Evan Brothers Nigeria Publishers Ltd. pp. 10 - 11.

5.4.2. Implications for Educational Institution

This is the widest of all the institutions in the society, because we are talking formal and non-formal education. However, our discourse will only concentrate on formal education, and under this we shall look at philosophical base of education in the society, curriculum, teacher education, pedagogy and examination bodies.

5.4.2.1. Philosophical Base of Education in the Society

The philosophy of a society's education is embedded in its culture, norms and values. In this regard, we are implying that the guiding principles for designing the curriculum should be well spelt out in line with the GLM, and this can be stated in form of goals and aims in education of the society. Take for instance, Nigeria in its National policy on Education (NPE) stated that its philosophy of education is "based on the development of the individual into a sound and effective citizen and the provision of equal educational opportunities for all citizens of the nation at the basic, secondary and tertiary levels both inside and outside the formal school system"¹. Therefore, for a citizen to be sound and effective he/she must possess the virtuous qualities of the GLM. Further, this should not only be confined within the four walls of the school, since the NPE has spelt it out that the aim is to go within and outside the formal school system. All outlets and media should be effectively utilized, for societal reorientation on living the good life and what the GLM entails.

¹ Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2013. Section 1(4).

5.4.2.2. Implications for the Curriculum

On the curriculum, having argued for the philosophical base of the nation, the call here is on the relegation of morality into the hidden curriculum, it should be well spelt out like any other content of the curriculum, even if it is not going to be taught in the classroom, codes of conduct should be issued and let there be a sense of discipline and moral consciousness in the school environment. Although the GLM has gone beyond just morality, since we are dealing with rationality therefore, philosophy courses should not be relegated to only colleges and departments of education and law, it should be made a general course up to postgraduate levels such that we can have more specialists in the area to train our teaming youth on the GLM, and to have focus and be productive/effective members/citizens of the society as the National Policy on Education demands.

5.4.2.3. Implications for Teacher Education and Pedagogy

To begin with teacher education, philosophy of education as a course, is suffering a serious dearth of specialists, and the GLM cannot be handled without the philosophers, there is need to train more hands and stop deceiving ourselves into the thinking that anybody who has offered philosophy at the undergraduate level and is now a graduate, can teach philosophy just like any other subject within the department. Philosophy due to its sui generis nature of research and inquiry must be handled by experts if at all we want our teaming students to demystify the course and love it to the postgraduate level, therefore universities should be serious about producing and employing more teachers in the area since the NPE and the National Universities Commission (NUC) of Nigeria have clearly demanded that it is a compulsory course in the universities and colleges of

education of the nation. Secondly, on pedagogy, the good life is a lifelong process that must be nurtured from cradle to the grave. Therefore, to say that we are going to leave it for the school is only delusional and temporary. The method however, as described must involve strategies that are both in school and out of school strategies. However, since we are talking within the confines of the formal education system, the methodology should be eclectic, in that it should incorporate multiple methods that are suitable to the target population. It should be child-centered as well as teacher centered or Socratic, such that the children/students are carried along in making moral decisions about life experiences.

5.4.2.4. Implications for Examination Bodies

This research is borne out of the realization that corruption starts from examination malpractices. Therefore, formal institutions (primary and secondary schools, tertiary institutions) and national examination bodies should try as much as possible to avoid all forms of examination misconduct, stringent policies should be made and executed without fear of whoever is caught in the act of malpractices. When such policies are seen being implemented, whoever is intending to cheat will think again. Because when this is done, the quality of education will surely improve and our students will be our pride of the nation, not what is now obtainable as they are called, illiterate graduates who are not employable into the labour market due to the poor quality of their education.

5.4.3. Implications for the Religious Institution

For this institution, it should be mentioned that religions are ardent promoters of morality, especially in Islam that this research is focusing on, a lot of Qur'anic verses and prophetic traditions of the prophet of Islam have indicated the need to live a decent life, a life of moderate living and good conduct as argued in the previous chapters by Al-Ghazali. Therefore, the GLM should be emphasized and where Islamic scholars have treated such topics, programs should be sponsored on televisions and radio stations to air the programs for everyone to benefit. Mosques and churches should encourage spirit of tolerance with other religions, just as both prophets Isah (A.S) and Muhammad (S.A.W) lived in peace with the Jewish believers of Moses (A.S.). The followers should be encouraged to spread love and tolerance of one another, the leaders should emphasize the fact that the two religions are all worshipping the same Almighty God that created the heavens and earth. Life can never be good where there is religious bigotries and violence.

5.4.4. Implications for Legal Institution

The specialists in this area should try to as much as possible continue to enlighten the general public on their rights as citizens of their respective countries, especially their fundamental human rights that are enshrined in the Constitution. Such as freedom of movement, freedom of speech, freedom of association, etc. because these are part of the crux of the GLM.

5.4.5. Implications for Political Institution

This is the institution that comprises the policy making bodies of the country. They should be made to understand that the welfare of their

citizens should be their number one priority, as democracy is beginning to take over African countries, it is only when you perform well and put the people first, that you can be re-elected again. The GLM teaches moderate living, they should know that living a moderate life is the key to their source of happiness as well, the more you think of accumulating from the public purse the more trouble and chaos you are inviting into your life. Could this be the reason why some politicians in African countries always go along with heavy security to avoid harassment from the common folks? Are they actually happy from the absolute sense of the word as argued in this research?

5.4.6. Implications for the Economic Institution

This implies the market mechanism, the bourgeois who are always trying to maximize profit or production of the surplus value at the expense of the common man. Just as Karl Marx has warned, they should know that they are only sitting on a timing bomb, the more you exploit the (proletariat) masses the less security you have and the more fear and lack of happiness. But when you are kind and treating the masses as not just means to an end, but as ends in themselves (to borrow from the Kantian Categorical Imperative), the more they tend to give you security and always be there for you at the time of need. It is therefore, a quid pro quo situation and people should be made to understand that through various sensitization programs. Employers of labour should treat their employees with respect and courtesy, that they cannot forget, and would always pray for and wish them the best in life. This can help the economic institution in breeding love and happiness between workers and their employers.

5.5. Suggestions for Further Studies

The GLM in this research talks more about morality and its counterparts, corruption, indiscipline and examination malpractices. Most of the discourse centered on the need to live a decent life, and not much is said about healthy living in terms of people's health. There is no happiness in a home where the bread winner is seriously sick and possibly on a dying bed, simply due to negligence of what he/she eats or where he/she works, perhaps in a hazardous and dangerous environment. This research has not gone into the health sector, due to its being purely educational in tone. Therefore, those in the area of health sciences should take over from where this research stops and build on in their respective areas of specialization. Again, empirical studies should be conducted on the GLM to prove its viability on guaranteeing a sustainable source of happiness into people's lives. Suggested topics for this may be;

- 1) "Investigation on eating habits of Africans and the Good Life: Implications for Curriculum Planners".
- 2) Is Happiness a product of the Good Life Matrix? An Examination of the Good life Matrix developed by Saulawa: Implications for Philosophy of Nigerian Education.
- 3) Can we solve the problem of corruption and Examination Malpractices from Reason and Religion? An examination of the Good Life Matrix Developed by Saulawa.

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