CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW AND PREVIOUS STUDIED

Part One: Theoretical Background

2.0 Introduction

This introductory paragraph displays the relevant literature review on power struggle discourse that is depicted by other world media during different periods. This chapter is called chapter two which is divided into two parts; the first part is called, theoretical background and the second part is called previous studies.

2.1 What Is Critical Discourse Analysis?

Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is a type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context. With such dissident research, critical discourse analysts take explicit position, and thus want to understand, expose, and ultimately resist social inequality.

Agger& Rasmussen (1992b; 1996) states that some of the tenets of CDA can already be found in the critical theory of the Frankfurt School before the Second World War. Its current focus on language and discourse was initiated with the "critical linguistics" that emerged mostly in the UK and Australia at the end of the 1970s.
CDA is not so much a direction, school, or specialization next to the many other "approaches" in discourse studies. Rather, it aims to offer a different "mode" or "perspective" of theorizing, analysis, and application throughout the whole field. We may find a more or less critical perspective in such diverse areas as pragmatics, conversation analysis, narrative analysis, rhetoric, stylistics, sociolinguistics, ethnography, or media analysis, among others.

Crucial for critical discourse analysts is the explicit awareness of their role in society. Continuing a tradition that rejects the possibility of a "value-free" science, they argue that science, and especially scholarly discourse, are inherently part of and influenced by social structure, and produced in social interaction. Instead of denying or ignoring such a relation between scholarship and society, they plead that such relations be studied and accounted for in their own right, and that scholarly practices be based on such insights. Theory formation, description, and explanation, also in discourse analysis, are socio-politically "situated," whether we like it or not. Reflection on the role of scholars in society and the polity thus becomes an inherent part of the discourse analytical enterprise. This may mean, among other things that discourse analysts conduct research in solidarity and cooperation with dominated groups. Critical research on discourse needs to satisfy a number of requirements in order to effectively realize its aims:

a. As is often the case for more marginal research traditions, CDA research has to be "better" than other research in order to be accepted.

b. It focuses primarily on, social problems and political issues, rather than on current paradigms and fashions.
c. Empirically adequate critical analysis of social problems is usually multidisciplinary.

d. Rather than merely describe discourse structures, it tries to explain them in terms of properties of social interaction and especially social structure.

e. More specifically, CDA focuses on the ways discourse structures enact, confirm, legitimate, reproduce, or challenge relations of power and dominance in society.

Fairclough and Wodak (1997: 271-80) summarizes the main tenets of CDA as follows:

a. CDA addresses social problems.
b. Power relations are discursive.
c. Discourse constitutes society and culture.
d. Discourse does ideological work.
e. Discourse is historical.
f. The link between text and society is mediated.
g. Discourse analysis is interpretative and explanatory.
h. Discourse is a form of social action.

2.2 The Notion of Discourse

Fairclough and Wodak, (1997) state that CDA sees ‘language as social practice’, and considers the ‘context of language use’ to be crucial. We
quote one definition which has become ‘very popular’ among CDA researchers.

CDA sees discourse – language use in speech and writing – as a form of ‘social practice’. Describing discourse as social practice implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s), which frame it: both in the sense that it helps to sustain and reproduce the social status quo, and in the sense that it contributes to transforming it. Since discourse is so socially consequential, it gives rise to important issues of power. Discursive practices may have major ideological effects – that is, they can help produce and reproduce unequal power relations between (for instance) social classes, women and men, and ethnic/cultural majorities and minorities through the ways in which they represent things and position people.

Fairclough and Wodak (1997: 258) states, "CDA understands discourses as relatively stable uses of language serving the organization and structuring of social life". Within this understanding, Wodak (2006a,b) states that the term ‘discourse’ is of course used very differently by different researchers and also in different academic cultures. In the German and Central European context, a distinction is made between ‘text’ and ‘discourse’, relating to the tradition in text linguistics as well as to rhetoric as stated by (Brünner and Graefen, 1994; VASS, 1992; Wodak and Koller, 2008 for summaries). In the English speaking world, ‘discourse’ is often used both for written and oral texts as said by (Gee, 2004; Schiffrin, 1994). Other researchers distinguish between different levels of abstractness: Lemke (1995) defined that ‘text’ as the concrete realization of abstract forms of knowledge (‘discourse’), thus adhering to
a more Foucauldian approach (Jäger in this volume). The discourse-historical approach elaborates and links to the socio-cognitive theory of Teun van Dijk (1998) and views ‘discourse’ as structured forms of knowledge and the memory of social practices, whereas ‘text’ refers to concrete oral utterances or written documents as stated by (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001). The discursive event is shaped by them, but it also shapes them. That is, discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned – it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships between people and groups of people.

2.3 The Power of Discourse and the Discourse of Power

The ways we think and talk about a subject influence and reflect the ways we act in relation to that subject. This is the basic premise of discourse theory as stated by (Foucault, 1972, 1980; Hall, 1997; Phillips & Hardy, 2002). In Western-liberal societies, our discourses of power are almost exclusively conflictual or adversarial. Power tends to be associated with competition at best, coercion or domination at worst. Given that the ways we think and talk about a subject influence the ways we act in relation to that subject, these adversarial discourses of power can be problematic because they obscure the mutualistic dimensions of power that have played a significant role in human history and that will need to play an even more significant role if we are to learn how to live together peacefully in an increasingly interdependent world.

To further advance this project, an alternative discourse of power needs to be more clearly articulated. It also needs to be more fully reconciled with the conflictual models of power that are necessary for critical social
analysis but insufficient as a normative framework for social practice. Toward this end, this paper briefly traces the contours of prevailing discourses of power by examining them in their most explicitly articulated form: academic discourses of power. After identifying the limitations of these existing discourses, the paper outlines an alternative vocabulary, along with a simple analytical schema, for thinking and talking about power in both its mutualistic and adversarial expressions. The paper concludes with an examination of how one alternative discourse community – the international Bahá’í community – is already constructing alternative models of social practice.

2.4 Ideology and Power

Horkheimer and Adorno (1969,1991) claim that the critical impetus of CDA and other ‘critical’ research programs is somewhat the legacy of Critique regularly aims at revealing structures of power and unmasking ideologies. Ideology is then not understood in a positivistic way, i.e. ideologies cannot be subjected to a process of falsification. Nor is it the Marxian type of ideology according to the economic base/superstructure dichotomy that is of interest for CDA.

Political scientists name four central characteristics of ideologies as such:

a. Power is more important than cognitions.
b. They are capable of guiding individuals’ evaluations.
c. They provide guidance through action.
d. They must be logically coherent. (Mullins, 1972).
Although the core definition of ideology as a coherent and relatively stable set of beliefs or values has remained the same in political science over time, the connotations associated with this concept have undergone many transformations. During the era of fascism, communism and the cold war, totalitarian ideology was confronted with democracy, the evil with the good. If we speak of the ‘ideology of the new capitalism’ as stated by (Van Dijk and Fairclough in), ideology once again has a ‘bad connotation. Obviously, Knight (2006:625) states, "it is not easy to capture ideology as a belief system and simultaneously to free the concept from negative connotations". It is, however, not that type of ideology on the surface of culture that interests CDA, it is rather the more hidden and latent type of everyday beliefs, which often appear disguised as conceptual metaphors and analogies, thus attracting linguists’ attention (Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, 1999) who claims that life is a journey, social organizations are plants, love is war, and so on. In daily discussion, certain ideas arise more commonly than others. Frequently, people with diverse backgrounds and interests may find themselves thinking alike in startling ways. Dominant ideologies appear as ‘neutral’, holding on to assumptions that stay largely unchallenged. Organizations that strive for power will try to influence the ideology of a society to become closer to what they want it to be. When most people in a society think alike about certain matters, or even forget that there are alternatives to the status quo, we arrive at the Gramscian concept of hegemony. With regard to this key concept of ideology, van Dijk (1998) states, "ideologies as the ‘worldviews’ that constitute ‘social cognition’."(Van Dijk, 1993b: 258) stated, "Schematically organized complexes of representations and attitudes with regard to certain aspects of the social world, e.g. the schema … whites have about blacks". Furthermore, it is the functioning of ideologies in everyday life that intrigues CDA researchers. More
Marxist view of ideologies and their conceiving as constructions of practices from particular perspectives as Fairclough,( 2003: 218) states

"Ideologies are representations of aspects of the world which contribute to establishing and maintaining relations of power, domination and exploitation. They may be enacted in ways of interaction (and therefore in genres) and inculcated in ways of being identities (and therefore styles). Analysis of texts...is an important aspect of ideological analysis and critique ..."

Power is another concept which is central for CDA, as it often analyses the language use of those in power, who are responsible for the existence of inequalities. Typically, CDA researchers are interested in the way discourse (re)produces social domination, that is, the power abuse of one group over others, and how dominated groups may discursively resist such abuse. Billig (2008) states that this raises the question of how CDA researchers understand power and what moral standards allow them to differentiate between power use and abuse – a question which has so far had to remain unanswered.

Almost no sociological or socio-psychological theory which does not provide a distinctive notion of power, with a Weberian definition as the lowest common denominator (Weber, 1980: 28) claims, "Power as the chance that an individual in a social relationship can achieve his or her own will even against the resistance of others".

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At least three different approaches to power can be distinguished:

a. Power as a result of specific resources of individual actors (e.g. French and Raven, 1959)

b. Power as a specific attribute of social exchange in each interaction (e.g. Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1962, 1975)

c. Power as a systemic and constitutive element/characteristic of society (e.g. from very different angles, Foucault, 1975 and Giddens, 1984).

Michel Foucault (1975) concentrates on ‘technologies of power’: "Discipline is a complex bundle of power technologies developed during the 18th and 19th centuries. Power is thus exercised with intention – but it is not individual intention. He focuses on what is accepted knowledge about how to exercise power. One way of doing this is by threatening with violence. However, he suggested how happy people will become if they buy specific consumer products an exercise of power is also; marketing provides us with a large body of knowledge of powerful techniques. Though he also combined the notions of power and domination in a Weberian tradition, he focuses primarily on structure. He recommended an analysis of power with a rather functionalist strategy, in his historical analysis in Surveilleret punier he said that he always asked and answered questions concerning the social functions and effects of different technologies of surveillance and punishment. How do things
work at the level of ongoing subjugation, at the level of those continuous and uninterrupted processes which subject our bodies, govern our gestures and dictate our behaviors?"

Within CDA, power is mostly perceived in the third way, not only because Foucault is one of the theoretical ‘godfathers’ of CDA, but also because the text in CDA is often regarded as a manifestation of social action which again is widely determined by social structure. Besides, CDA researchers very rarely work with interactional texts such as dialogues (Chilton, 2004; Lalouschek et al., 1990; Wodak, 2009 as exceptions). Consequently, it is not the individual resources and not the specifics of single-exchange situations that are crucial for CDA analyses, but the overall structural features in social fields or in overall society.

Power is central for understanding the dynamics and specifics of control (of action) in modern societies, but power remains mostly invisible.

Linguistic manifestations are under investigation in CDA. Fairclough (1989/1991) and Wodak,( 1989) state that this relation between social power and language is a permanent topic not only in CDA. An important perspective in CDA related to the notion of ‘power’ is that it is very rare that a text is the work of any one person. In texts, discursive differences are negotiated; they are governed by differences in power that is in part encoded in and determined by discourse and by genre. Therefore, texts are often sites of struggle in that they show traces of differing discourses and ideologies contending and struggling for dominance. Thus, the defining features of CDA are its concern with power as a central condition in social life, and its efforts to develop a theory of language that incorporates this as a major premise. Closely attended to are not only the
notion of struggles for power and control, but also the intersexuality and reconceptualization of competing discourses in various public spaces and genres as stated by (Iedema, 1997; Iedema and Wodak, 1999; Muntigl et al., 2000).

Power is about relations of difference, and particularly about the effects of differences in social structures. The constant unity of language and other social matters ensures that language is entwined in social power in a number of ways: language indexes and expresses power, and is involved where there is contention over and a challenge to power. Power does not necessarily derive from language, but language can be used to challenge power, to subvert it, to alter distributions of power in the short and the long term. Language provides a finely articulated vehicle for differences in power in hierarchical social structures.

Finally, CDA can be defined as being fundamentally interested in analyzing opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language. In other words, CDA aims to investigate critically social inequality as it is expressed, constituted, legitimized, and so on, by language use (or in discourse). Most critical discourse analysts would thus endorse Habermas (1967: 259) claims, "language is also a medium of domination and social force. It serves to legitimize relations of organized power. In so far as the legitimizations of power relations ... are not articulated...language is also ideological".
2.5 Power as Control

A central notion in most critical work on discourse is that of power, and more specifically the social power of groups or institutions. Summarizing a complex philosophical and social analysis, we will define social power in terms of control. Thus, groups have (more or less) power if they are able to (more or less) control the acts and minds of (members of) other groups. This ability presupposes a power base of privileged access to scarce social resources, such as force, money, status, fame, knowledge, information, "culture," or indeed various forms of public discourse and communication as stated by (Lukes 1986; Wrong 1979).

Different types of power may be distinguished according to the various resources employed to exercise such power: the coercive power of the military and of violent men will rather be based on force, the rich will have power because of their money, whereas the more or less persuasive power of parents, professors, or journalists may be based on knowledge, information, or authority. Note also that power is seldom absolute. Groups may more or less control other groups, or only control them in specific situations or social domains. Moreover, dominated groups may more or less resist, accept, condone, comply with, or legitimate such power, and even find it natural. Gramsci (1971) states that "The power of dominant groups may be integrated in laws, rules, norms, habits, and even a quite general consensus, and thus take the form of what he called "hegemony". Class domination, sexism, and racism are characteristic examples of such hegemony. Essed (1991) notes that power is not always exercised in obviously abusive acts of dominant group members, but may be enacted in the myriad of taken-for-granted actions of everyday life, as is typically the case in the many forms of everyday
sexism or racism  Similarly, not all members of a powerful group are always more powerful than all members of dominated groups: power is only defined here for groups as a whole.

For our analysis of the relations between discourse and power, thus, we first find that access to specific forms of discourse, e.g. those of politics, the media, or science, is itself a power resource. Secondly, as suggested earlier, action is controlled by our minds. So, if we are able to influence people's minds, e.g. their knowledge or opinions, we indirectly may control some of their actions, as we know from persuasion and manipulation.

Closing the discourse power circle, finally, this means that those groups who control most influential discourse also have more chances to control the minds and actions of others.

Simplifying these very intricate relationships even further for this chapter, we can split up the issue of discursive power into two basic questions for CDA research:

a. How do (more) powerful groups control public discourse?

b. How does such discourse control mind and action of (less) powerful groups, and what are the social consequences of such control, such as social inequality?
2.5.1 Control of Public Discourse

We have seen that among many other resources that Van Dijk (1996) defines that the power base of a group or institution, access to or control over public discourse and communication is an important "symbolic" resource, as is the case for knowledge and information. Most people have active control only over every day talk with family members, friends, or colleagues, and passive control over, e.g. media usage. In many situations, ordinary people are more or less passive targets of text or talk, e.g. of their bosses or teachers, or of the authorities, such as police officers, judges, welfare bureaucrats, or tax inspectors, who may simply tell them what (not) to believe or what to do.

On the other hand, members of more powerful social groups and institutions, and especially their leaders (the elites), have more or less exclusive access to, and control over, one or more types of public discourse. Thus, professors control scholarly discourse, teachers educational discourse, journalist's media discourse, lawyers legal discourse, and politicians policy and other public political discourse. Those who have more control over more and more influential discourse (and more discourse properties) are by that definition also more powerful. In other words, we here propose a discursive definition (as well as a practical diagnostic) of one of the crucial constituents of social power.

These notions of discourse access and control are very general, and it is one of the tasks of CDA to spell out these forms of power. Thus, if discourse is defined in terms of complex communicative events, access and control may be defined both for the context and for the structures of text and talk themselves.
Duranti & Goodwin (1992) and Van Dijk (1998b) define Context as the mentally represented structure of those properties of the social situation that are relevant for the production or comprehension of discourse. It consists of such categories as the overall definition of the situation, setting (time, place), ongoing actions (including discourses and discourse genres), participants in various communicative, social, or institutional roles, as well as their mental representations: goals, knowledge, opinions, attitudes, and ideologies. Controlling context involves control over one or more of these categories, e.g. determining the definition of the communicative situation, deciding on time and place of the communicative event, or on which participants may or must be present, and in which roles, or what knowledge or opinions they should (not) have, and which social actions may or must be accomplished by discourse.

Also crucial in the enactment or exercise of group power is control not only over content, but over the structures of text and talk. Relating text and context, thus, we already saw that (members of) powerful groups may decide on the (possible) discourse genre(s) or speech acts of an occasion argument. Wodak (1984a, 1986) states that a teacher or judge may require a direct answer from a student or suspect, respectively, and not a personal story or an argument. More critically, we may examine how powerful speakers may abuse their power in such situations, e.g. Linell and Jonsson (1991) state that when police officers use force to get a confession from a suspect or Van Zoonen (1994) state that when male editors exclude women from writing economic news.

Similarly, genres typically have conventional schemas consisting of various categories. Van Zoonen (1994) states that access to some of these
may be prohibited or obligatory, e.g. some greetings in a conversation may only be used by speakers of a specific social group, rank, age, or gender.

Gans (1979) and Van Dijk (1988a, 1988b) state that vital for all discourse and communication is who controls the topics (semantic macrostructures) and topic change, as when editors decide what news topics will be covered, professors decide what topics will be dealt with in class, or (Palmer 1989; Fishman 1983; Leet-Pellegrini 1980; Lindegren-Lerman 1983) states that men control topics and topic change in conversations with women. Martin-Rojo (1994) states that although most discourse control is contextual or global, even local details of meaning, form, or style may be controlled, e.g. the details of an answer in class or court, or choice of lexical items or jargon in courtrooms, classrooms or newsrooms. Houston and Kramarae (1991) claims that in many situations, volume may be controlled and speakers ordered to "keep their voice down" or to "keep quiet," women may be "silenced" in many ways and Albert (1972) states that in some cultures one needs to "mumble" as a form of respect. Williams (1995) states that the public use of specific words may be banned as subversive in a dictatorship, and discursive challenges to culturally dominant groups (e.g. white, western males) by their multicultural opponents may be ridiculed in the media as "politically correct". Finally, action and interaction dimensions of discourse may be controlled by prescribing or proscribing specific speech acts, and by selectively distributing or interrupting turns as stated by (Diamond 1996). Ultimately, virtually all levels and structures of context, text, and talk can in principle be more or less controlled by powerful speakers, and such power may be abused at the expense of other participants. It should, however, be stressed that talk and text do not always and directly enact or
embody the overall power relations between groups: it is always the context that may interfere with, reinforce, or otherwise transform such relationships.

2.5.2 Mind Control

If controlling discourse is a first major form of power, controlling people's minds is the other fundamental way to reproduce dominance and hegemony.' Within a CDA framework, "mind control" involves even more than just acquiring beliefs about the world through discourse and communication. Suggested below are ways that power and dominance are involved in mind control.

First, Nesler et al. (1993) state that recipients tend to accept beliefs, knowledge, and opinions (unless they are inconsistent with their personal beliefs and experiences) through discourse from what they see as authoritative, trustworthy, or credible sources, such as scholars, experts, professionals, or reliable media. Second, Giroux (1981) states that in some situations participants are obliged to be recipients of discourse, e.g. in education and in many job situations. Lessons, learning materials, job instructions, and other discourse types in such cases may need to be attended to, interpreted, and learned as intended by institutional or organizational authors. Third, Downing (1984) states that in many situations there are no public discourses or media that may provide information from which alternative beliefs may be derived. Fourth and closely related to the previous points, Wodak (1987) states that recipients may not have the knowledge and beliefs needed to challenge the discourses or information they are exposed to.
Whereas these conditions of mind control are largely contextual (they say something about the participants of a communicative event), other conditions are discursive, that is, a function of the structures and strategies of text or talk itself. In other words, given a specific context, certain meanings and forms of discourse have more influence on people's minds than others, as the very notion of "persuasion" and a tradition of 2000 years of rhetoric may show.'

Once we have elementary insight into some of the structures of the mind, and what it means to control it, the crucial question is how discourse and its structures are able to exercise such control. As suggested above, such discursive influence may be due to context as well as to the structures of text and talk themselves.

Martin Rojo and van Dijk (1997) claim that contextually based control derives from the fact that people understand and represent not only text and talk, but also the whole communicative situation. Thus, CDA typically studies how context features (such as the properties of language users of powerful groups) influence the ways members of dominated groups define the communicative situation in "preferred context models." CDA also focuses on how discourse structures influence mental representations. At the global level of discourse, topics may influence what people see as the most important information of text or talk, and thus correspond to the top levels of their mental models. For example, Duin et al. (1988) and Van Dijk (1991) state that expressing such a topic in a headline in news may powerfully influence how an event is defined in terms of a "preferred" mental model (e.g. when crime committed by minorities is typically topicalized and headlined in the press. Similarly, argumentation may be persuasive because of the social opinions that are
"hidden" in its implicit premises and thus taken for granted by the recipients, e.g. immigration may thus be restricted if it is presupposed in a parliamentary debate that all refugees are "illegal" as stated by (Wodak and van Dijk 2000). Likewise, at the local level, in order to understand discourse meaning and coherence, people may need models featuring beliefs that remain implicit (presupposed) in discourse. Thus, a typical feature of manipulation is to communicate beliefs implicitly, that is, without actually asserting them, and with less chance that they will be challenged.

These few examples show how various types of discourse structure may influence the formation and change of mental models and social representations. If dominant groups, and especially their elites, largely control public discourse and its structures, they thus also have more control over the minds of the public at large. However, such control has its limits. The complexity of comprehension, and the formation and change of beliefs, are such that one cannot always predict which features of a specific text or talk will have which effects on the minds of specific recipients.

These brief remarks have provided us with a very general picture of how discourse is involved in dominance (power abuse) and in the production and reproduction of social inequality. It is the aim of CDA to examine these relationships in more detail.

2.6 Power as Domination

As a central concept within Western social theory, the academic study of power has been approached in many ways, yielding diverse and valuable
insights. For example, some theorists such as Wartenberg (1990) and (1997) have focused on the different forms that power takes, as well as the bases or resources that permit the exercise of some of them such as Hindess (1996) has explored the complex relationship between the quantitative distribution of power and the processes of social consent that legitimate various expressions of power; some have examined the changing ways that power circulates throughout societies, constructing social institutions as well as individual subjectivities, as it imposes order and discipline in historically specific ways Foucault (1980) and others have approached the subject of power from other theoretical perspectives. A review of such a rich and complex body of literature is, of course, beyond the scope of this article.

In the latter half of the twentieth century, theorists of power began to invoke what has become a widely-used distinction between two broad ways of thinking and talking about power. This distinction is made by contrasting the expression “power to” with the expression “power over” (e.g., Connolly, 1974; Coser, 1976; Dowding, 1996; Hartsock, 1974, 1983; Lukes, 1986; Macpherson, 1973; Pitkin, 1972). As Wartenberg (1990: 27) explains:

"The expressions power-to and power-over are a shorthand way of making a distinction between two fundamentally different ordinary-language locutions within which the term “power” occurs. Depending upon which locution one takes as the basis of one’s theory of power, one will arrive at a very different model of the role of power in the social world".

The predominant model of power in Western social theory, what I call the power as domination model, derives from the latter of these expressions. Although “power to” is the basis of models in the physical and natural
sciences, “power over” highlights issues of social conflict, control, and coercion, which have been the primary focus of Western social and political scientists. This power as domination paradigm traces back, either implicitly or explicitly, through the writings of diverse social and political theorists, from Machiavelli (1961) to Weber (1986) to Bourdieu (1994). It informed Hobbes’ (1968) notion of a “war of all against all” as well as Marx and Engels’ (1967) theory of historical materialism. Indeed, Giddens (1984: 256:7) points out, "this conflictual model of power underlies virtually all major traditions of Western social and political theory, from the left and the right".

The extent to which Western social and political theory has developed within the boundaries of this paradigm can best be seen in the American “community power debates” of the mid-twentieth century. Within these debates, prominent power theorists from various sides of the political spectrum, including Dahl, Bachrach and Baratz, and Lukes, all proposed different operational definitions of the term power. Yet all of these definitions fell squarely within the boundaries of the power as domination paradigm. In brief, Dahl (1969: 80) conceptualizes power in simple behavioral terms, explaining that “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do”. In response to this simple behavioral definition, Bachrach and Baratz (1970) argues that power over others can also be exercised in more subtle ways that involve “the mobilization of bias” within a social or political system in a manner that prevents some people or groups from advancing their own self-identified interests. As (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970:7) explain

"Power is also exercised when A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process to public consideration"
of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous to A. To the extent that A succeeds in doing this, B is prevented, for all practical purposes, from bringing to the fore any issues that in their resolution might be seriously detrimental to A’s set of preferences" 

Lukes (1974), in turn, insists that both of these conceptualizations are too simplistic. According to him, power over others can also be exercised by preventing them from identifying or recognizing their own interests. In other words, power can be exercised over others by cultivating what Marx and Engels (1967) referred to as false consciousness, or by exercising what Gramsci (1971) referred to as cultural hegemony. As Lukes (1974: 23) explains

"A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to do, but he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or determining his very wants. Indeed, is it not the supreme exercise of power to get another or others to have the desires you want them to have – that is, secure their compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires? "

Though Dahl, Bachrach and Baratz, and Lukes each advanced different operational definitions of the term power, all of these definitions were contained within the boundaries of the power as domination paradigm. To his credit, Lukes, along with a number of other power as domination theorists since him, have acknowledged the possibility that “power to” could serve as the basis for an alternative model of social power. However, this acknowledgment has typically been made in order to dismiss “power to” models as largely irrelevant to social and political theory. As Lukes (1974: 30) originally contends, "'power to' models have less conceptual value than 'power over' models for two reasons". First, he asserted that, these “revisionary persuasive redefinitions [i.e., “power to” definitions]... are out of line with the central meanings of “Power” as traditionally understood and with the concerns that have always centrally
preoccupied students of power. Second, he (1974: 31) asserts that when one focuses on “power to” concepts “the conflictual aspect of power, the fact that it is exercised over people, disappears altogether from view, and along with it there disappears the central interest of studying power relations in the first place”. In this vein, he argued that “power to” theories end up “concealing from view the central aspects of power which they define out of existence”. Ironically, by dismissing “power to” theories, he did the same thing in reverse.

Similar tendencies characterize the work of many other power theorists. For instance, Warten Berg (1990), after drawing the distinction between “power to” and “power over” quoted at the beginning, goes on to argue that a theory of power has, as a first priority, the articulation of the meaning of the concept of power-over because social theory employs this concept as a primary means of conceptualizing the nature of the fundamental inequalities in society, as he (1990: 5) asserts

“Power over”, is “the primary meaning of ‘power’”. And, like Lukes, he argued that a focus on “power to” relations merely “shifts the theorist’s gaze away from the set of phenomena that a theory of social power must comprehend, namely the illegitimate inequalities that exist in modern societies”.

Even Foucault, despite his radical re-thinking of the nature and function of power, was unable to escape the gravitational pull of the “power over” model in his own writing. Foucault (1980) understands power as a relational force that permeates the entire social body, connecting all social groups in a web of mutual influence. As a relational force, power constructs social organization and hierarchy by producing discourses and truths, by imposing discipline and order, and by shaping human desires and subjectivities. In this context, Foucault sees power as simultaneously
productive and repressive: a social body cannot function without it, despite its perennially oppressive manifestations. By recognizing the productive function of power, Foucault gives a nod to the “power to” theorists. However, in his actual analyses, Foucault situates himself squarely within the power-as-domination tradition, and his over-arching project is clearly one of resistance to such expressions of power. Furthermore, he explicitly calls for others to do the same: “We should direct our researches on the nature of power”, as (Foucault, 1980: 102) writes, “Towards domination and material operators of power”, and we should “base our analyses of power on the study of the techniques and tactics of domination”.

Finally, it is worth noting that most social and political theorists do not even acknowledge “power to” concepts in their writings. In keeping with the conventional definition of power as domination, most authors simply assume that the two concepts are synonymous – as they also tend to be in popular discourses on social power. In this way, Western social and political theorists tend to highlight only one facet of a potentially complex and multifaceted concept. In the process, other expressions of social and political power tend to be ignored or obscured.

2.7 Power as Capacity

Though the power as domination model has prevailed within Western social and political theory, alternative traditions do exist. Giddens (1984: 15), for example, defined power as, “transformative capacity” or “the capacity to achieve outcomes”, a definition which is consistent with the “power to” locution introduced above. Though he frequently associates power with domination in his writings, he (1984:257) recognizes, “power
is not necessarily linked with conflict... and power is not inherently oppressive”. Indeed, there is power in cooperation among equals, and even when power is unequally distributed it can still be express in forms that are not oppressive – as in the empowering relationship that can exist between a nurturing parent and child. Efforts to reconceptualize power along these lines have been most fully developed among feminist theorists, as well as some peace researchers and systems theorists.

2.7.1 Dominant Ethnicity: From Background to Foreground

Today's nations are experiencing an unprecedented degree of pressure from the forces of globalization. In particular, the spread of human and collective rights discourse since the 1960s has mounted an increasing challenge to the model of ethno-national congruence. Nations, nearly all of which were formed on the basis of a dominant, 'core' ethnic group, are thus facing pressure to shift their self-definitions from 'ethnic' to 'civic' criteria. They are encouraged to look to their future rather than their past, to treasure their cultural diversity (past and present) rather than their homogeneity, to recognize the autonomy claims of minorities and to be open to foreign trade, foreign immigration, and foreign ('multi') cultural influences. In short, global narratives of liberal multiculturalism, embedded in both global and national institutions, are driving an ever-greater wedge between modern nations and their dominant ethnic groups.

Much has been written about ethnic minorities and their relationship to state structures and abstract 'host societies.' There is also a voluminous literature on nations and nationalism. Burgeoning studies in the fields of citizenship and migration add to the debate. Yet there has been virtually no consideration of the living, breathing ethnic communities which gave
birth to, but are by no means coterminous with, the nation-state. These dominant ethnics - no less than their minority counterparts - are engaged in a process of reviving, constructing and adapting their identities and political strategies to the evolving context of late modernity. Due to their indigenous legitimacy and emotive power, such groups are arguably more central to explaining cultural and political developments than either subaltern minorities or professional state élites. We must therefore make every effort to improve our understanding of dominant ethnicity. How are ethnic majorities like the French of France, Japanese of Japan, Hindus of India and Jews of Israel responding to the pressures of our global era? Are such groups in decline or are they successfully negotiating (or circumventing) the challenge of new global structures and values? These questions comprise one axis of our analysis.

The other concerns the place of politically dominant (or formerly dominant) minorities. As with ethnic majorities, evolving global norms pose a challenge to dominant minorities. In this instance, our post-colonial, post-communist era has generated renewed legitimacy for the idea of democratic self-determination. Notions of suzerainty and hegemonic control have been de-legitimated, and dominant minorities have been forced on the defensive. Rhodesians, Afrikaners, Baltic Russians and North Indian Muslims – all share a sense of loss, and face a crisis of ethnic legitimation. Even so, other dominant minorities, like the ethnic Fijians, Tutsis, Malawis or Gulf Arabs, appear as robust as ever. Once more, the focus of this paper will be to probe the response of dominant ethnic communities to the new 'stimuli' in their environment, to examine whether such groups are in decline, or are successfully negotiating the latest wrinkle of global modernization.
Since 1980, great strides have been made toward differentiating the concepts of state, nation, and ethnic group, and sketching the linkages between such phenomena. Smith (1971; 1986; 1991), Gellner (1983), Anderson (1983); Hobsbawm (1990), and Connor (1994) state that place the emphasis on the instruments of coercion, government and boundary demarcation within a territory. Ethnic groups refer to communities of (supposedly) shared ancestry, almost always accompanied by notions of an ancestral homeland and cultural boundary markers. Nations comprise an uneasy hybrid of elements from ethnics and the modern state: they are better integrated, more politically self-conscious and spatially demarcated than ethnics, but can employ a myth of political or ideological origins which is not specifically genealogical. In addition, nations do not always control their own political apparatus nor must they maintain a monopoly of organized violence over their territory, hence the possibility of 'stateless nations.' Smith (1986, et al) state that the connections between these entities are equally subtle, and are the subject of intense controversy between those of constructivist and historicist bent of those ethnics that successfully achieved nationhood, many such as (Scots, Tibetans) have failed to achieve modern statehood. Dominant ethnicity refers to the phenomenon whereby a particular ethnic group exercises dominance within a nation. Notice that the dominant ethnic need not dominate the state in which 'its' nation resides.

This of course flags up the variety of ways in which an ethnic group can be dominant: demographic, cultural, political, and economic. In pre-1960s Quebec, for instance, purelainesQuebecois dominated culturally and politically but not economically. Today, many ethnic minorities (i.e. Chinese, Indians, Lebanese and Whites in developing countries) control the local economy but are politically weak, hence, argued Sino-Phillipine.
Amy Chua (2003) states that their vulnerability to genocide in a world of economic liberalization and populist democratization. He said that in many colonial settings, settler ethnics like the Rhodesians, America-Liberians and Afrikaners have enjoyed political, but not cultural dominance. In the medieval Baltic and Czech lands, German-speakers dominated the high culture, economy and polity, but the folk culture of the peasant masses remained as a springboard for the development of future Latvian, Czech and Estonian dominant ethnicity. Demography is also illusory since certain culturally dominant ethnics, like the Iraqi Shiites (Wimmer's piece), Surinamese Creoles or Melanesian Fijians (see Premdas' work here), do not even comprise a plurality of the population.

2.7.2 The Two Sides of Dominant Ethnicity: Indigenousness and Power

This brings us to the two key ingredients of ethnic dominance: indigenousness and power. Richard Schermerhorn's concept of an 'elite minority' (1970) and Anthony Smith's articulation of the term 'core ethnic' (1986) are cardinal points of departure for this investigation. The tradition that follows from Schermerhorn stresses the political side of the equation, concentrating on the raw political power of ethnic groups (minority or majority) and their ranking within ethnic power systems. Donald Horowitz' work is in this tradition, and Ashley Doane's important sociology of 'dominant-group ethnicity' (1993; 1997) maintains that the focus on politico-economic hegemony as the meter of dominant ethnicity.

Yet what remained to be crafted in the 1980s was a conceptual framework for cultural dominance which related ethnic to nation. In fact, it was not until 1986 that the term 'core ethnic' was first used - by
Anthony Smith (1986: 138) who had refined the concept sufficiently to be able to provide a definition of 'dominant ethnic' within the pages of his National Identity. In this work, Smith emphasized that nations are built around 'ethnic cores' or 'dominant ethnics' which furnish the nation with its legitimating myths, symbols and conceptions of territory. 'Though most latter-day nations are, in fact, polytechnics,' as Anthony Smith (1991: 39) states

"Many have been formed in the first place around a dominant ethnic, which attracted other ethnics or ethnic fragments into the state to which it gave a name and cultural charter...since ethnics are by definition associated with a given territory...the presumed boundaries of the nation are largely determined by the myths and memories of the dominant ethnics, which include the foundation charter, the myth of the golden age and the associated territorial claims, or ethnic title-deeds."

Smith's argument would suggest that the critical element in dominant ethnicity is indigenousness, the idea that this is 'our' nation, and that 'we' deserve to be in control of its government and territory.

Politically, we are interested in the mechanisms by which dominant ethnics control their state or provincial governments. Is violence used, or is hegemony affected through majority ethnic party mobilization and/or control of key posts in the legislature, executive and judiciary? Why have some dominant ethnics yielded powers to subaltern groups while others appear to have strengthened their hand in recent decades? The precarious nature of dominant ethnic unity is also an important theme: Mancur Olson (1982), famously writing from a rational choice perspective, suggested that large groups tend to fragment and are less effective than smaller political actors. Yet certain dominant ethnics seem to be successful in their ecumenical strategy of mobilizing their members across lines of region, class, and even language or religion.
There is also the international environment to consider: global or supranational institutions can exert diplomatic and economic pressure (i.e. in Fiji or South Africa), while foreign governments can sustain short or long-distance influence over the dynamics of dominance (i.e. USA in Liberia, Syria in Lebanon). International norms, whether of self-determination, state sovereignty or individual rights, similarly intrude into our picture. The influence of norms of self-determination, for instance, has helped to hasten the collapse of empire in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, along with the European and Turkish ethnic elites who ran them. However, the application of international norms may be uneven, thus while European colonial elites are no longer in power in many developing countries, dominance by one ethnic group (or a coalition of groups, as in Jordan) appears to be a de facto norm that basks within the protective shell of state sovereignty.

2.7.3 Expansive and Restrictive Strategies

Just as dominant ethnicity may be expressed in either political or cultural terms, it can take on either expansive or restrictive form. Expansive dominant ethnic strategies seek to project dominance outward to new lands, and in so doing may be content to let dominant ethnic particularity lapse in favor of a broader national or imperial construct. Restrictive strategies focus on purifying the dominant ethnic core of external influences and often involve instruments like immigration restriction, deportation, endogamy and cultural refinement. Restrictive dominant ethincs will not, in contrast to their expansive cousins, trade their 'soul' for power, and are in principle prepared to accept the secession or federation of minority ethnics. Many situations involve both strategies: the winners of World War I (i.e. those that chose the correct side, like
Romania) were only too pleased to enlarge their territories and deal later with their newfound heterogeneity through the high-pressure assimilation tactics of the 'nationalizing state'. In response, Zimmer (2003) and Brubaker( 1996) state that irredentist 'homeland nationalisms' among losing nations like inter-war Hungary or Germany attempted to enlarge the ethnic homeland by annexing adjacent territory inhabited by co-ethnics in other states. Serbian ambitions to carve out a Greater Serbia through ethnic cleansing or Indonesia's policy of sending Japanese settlers to East Timor or West Irian suggest that other groups wish to have their cake and eat it too.

Usually, such strategies fail, thus Barth (1969) states that the frequent decision to opt for power over culture in expansive fashion. If dominant ethnicity remains expansive, the preferred method for maintaining its boundaries is through assimilation rather than exclusion. In such cases, dominant ethnicity remains 'hidden' and a broader nationalist or imperial appeal takes place, though this can ultimately lead to a decline of dominant ethnic consciousness or its disappearance altogether. Smith (1986) states that the British, Ottoman, Habsburg and Tsarist/Soviet empires often submerged the identity of the dominant ethnic in their quest for power and territory. Ethnic decline is especially likely in the case of empires which engaged in large-scale cultural borrowing or slave labor importation (i.e. Assyrians, Romans, Normans). It is perhaps indicative that many of the cases which experienced a decline of dominant ethnicity (i.e. U.S., Canada and arguably Britain) were or are expansive in nature.

With the collapse of empire, rump states like Hungary, Britain or Turkey were faced with crises of identity. They could either return to imperial scale (a 'greater' strategy that involves more power/territory but less
ethnic homogeneity) or turn inward toward a 'little' nationalism that stresses the dominant ethnic's cultural particularity. Bryant (2003) claims that Israel's choice between a more homogeneous pre-1967 states or an expanded occupied territory presents one form of this dilemma. The renewed focus on 'little' Englandism in Britain in the wake of de-colonization and devolution suggests that a different route is possible. The American and Anglo-Canadian examples, in which ethnic homogeneity was 'traded' for the increased politico-economic power which immigrants brought to the country, might be viewed as a 'third way' forward of de-colonization and devolution suggests that a different route is possible. He stated that the American and Anglo-Canadian examples, in which ethnic homogeneity was 'traded' for the increased politico-economic power which immigrants brought to the country, might be viewed as a 'third way' forward.

2.8 Types of Conflicts in Africa

Writers often discuss conflict in Africa without any attempt at describing or defining the term. AbdallaBujra(1999) African Conflicts 3 states that they often use terms such as civil war, violent conflict, civil strife, hostility, war, and political instability, interchangeably. I am not a definition hard-liner, but there is a need to clarify the concept or phenomenon one is writing about. A rule of thumb definition would be useful here in contrast to that of the Aide-Memoire. I use the term conflict in this paper to mean a violent and armed confrontation and struggle between groups, between the state and one or more groups, and between two or more states. In such confrontation and struggle some of those involved are injured and killed. Such a conflict can last anything from six months to over twenty years.
Given this broad working definition, we can proceed to discuss the different types of conflicts that are and have taken place in Africa. Conflicts can be categorized in various ways depending on the type of criteria one uses. For example Salim (1999) classifies conflicts in Africa as follows:

- **a.** Boundary and territorial conflicts,
- **b.** Civil wars and internal conflicts having international repercussions,
- **c.** Succession conflicts in territories decolonized,
- **d.** Political and ideological conflicts,
- **e.** Others including those related to transhumance and irredentism.

Similarly, Collier and Binswanger (1999) classify conflicts into (a) loot seekers and (b) justice-seekers, classification which is based more on value judgment rather than analytical criteria. Nevertheless, both Salim and Binswanger use what they consider to be the objectives of the rebel groups as criterion for classifying conflicts. Others, as I will do below, classify conflicts on the bases of the actors involved in a conflict. Still others are concerned only with conflicts in which the state is a party to the conflict.

In general, most writers tend to think of conflicts in Africa as being political conflicts such as wars between states, armed rebellion against states (ranging from small-scale low intensity conflicts to large-scale civil war), armed secessionist rebellion (also of various scales), and coup d'état. Indeed, most African conflicts which are reported and which draw international attention, are those which fit the above description.
There are, of course, other types of conflicts which in the past were not given much attention. These are urban violence – sometimes they take the form of ethnic conflict, sometimes religious conflict, and sometimes they are class-based – the poor of many ethnic groups attacking government properties and installations, or attacking shops and houses of the rich and middle classes as stated in 4 DPMF Occasional Paper, No. 4. Urban violence, however, tends to be intermittent rather than continuous. Urban violence is not a new phenomenon but has been taking place since the colonial period. While urban violence and conflicts last only for a few days, a specific incident or situation often triggers them. In the past such violence was focused against the colonial authorities for deplorable living conditions and colonial control system. However, recently urban violence has taken the form of reacting to poverty and to struggles between supporters of political parties – parties which are often ethnically based.

In rural areas of many countries there are many conflicts which are ethnically based, mainly over grazing land and over cattle amongst pastoral people. Similarly, there are conflicts over cultivable land amongst peasant farmers within the same ethnic group and also between ethnic groups. Sometimes these inter-ethnic conflicts over land and cattle develop into rebellions and armed fighting between the ethnic groups and the state, when the latter sends in the military to stop the fighting or even to take side. For example, the Karamajong of Uganda and the Pokot of Kenya (on either side of the Kenya/Uganda border) have been fighting over grazing land and over cattle for more than three decades. Such conflicts amongst pastoralists are common and widespread in many countries. Similarly conflicts for fertile and cultivable land have been taking place amongst many ethnic groups in many countries. Most of these rural conflicts over land and cattle have been going on over a long period, with very little attention given to them. Even today most such
conflicts go unnoticed and unreported – unless large-scale killing and injuries takes place and the state intervenes militarily.

The distinction between the two categories of conflicts – political conflicts in which the state is involved in one way or another, and the less well known urban and rural conflicts in which generally the state is not a party, and which conflicts are not well reported2 – is useful. While most research publications and media reports cover the political conflicts, little research has been done to indicate the extent of the latter type of conflicts in African countries. AbdallaBujra (1999) African Conflicts5 states that at the beginning we pointed out that during the four decades of independence there have been roughly 80 violent changes of government. This fact is basically given to indicate the extent of conflicts in Africa. But it is important to point out that this is only one type of political conflict.

There are other political conflicts – mainly rebellions and civil wars which are well known. Yet we do not really know the extent of the urban and rural conflicts as described above. Indeed there may be more of these latter types of conflicts than the political conflicts. And if this is the case, the policy implication here is serious. While the states are more concerned with rebellions against them, the real arena and drama of conflicts in most African countries may be somewhere else. And the state’s normal reactions to these “other” conflicts are simply to send the police, paramilitary and the army to quell the conflicts. As we will point out below, different conflicts emerge under different political, social and economic conditions. Similarly, their causes may be different. And unless these issues are properly understood by the states, it will be difficult to manage and resolve these conflicts in the short term, let alone tackle their
long-term root causes. Lack of comprehension of their conflicts by African states has led to the present situation where there are no strategies, policies or mechanism for dealing with on-going conflicts in their countries. Still less are there any strategies for tackling the long-term causes and conditions of conflicts.

It may be useful at this point to give some examples of the various types of conflicts. Our criterion for classifying the different types will be the actors to the conflict. The two broad categories of African conflicts are inter-state conflicts and internal conflicts.

2.8.1 Inter-State Conflicts

These arose as a result of the colonial boundaries and although the OAU Charter declared the borders inviolable; nevertheless, almost all the interstate conflicts were caused by claims over borders. Some important features of African borders which were the bases for claims to change them, and claims which led to border conflicts, are:

a. Many borders were imprecise;

b. Some borders were straddled by a large ethnic group considered strategic by one side of the border;

c. Some borders passed through strategic terrain desired by countries on both sides of the border;

d. Some borders passed by areas rich with mineral resources all of which fell on one side of the border, thus excluding the other country.
2.8.2 Internal Conflicts

As indicated earlier, there are several types of internal conflicts and these are presently the majority of conflicts in Africa, especially since the end of the post-cold-war period. These conflicts can be divided into two broad categories: (i) those conflicts in which the state is a party to the conflict; these are therefore politically driven or instigated conflicts, and (ii) conflicts between groups within the country and which the state is not a party to. What follows is a brief description of conflicts in each of these two broad categories.

2.8.3 A Rebellion to Overthrow a Government

Rebellions, by groups outside the military establishment of a country and which aim to overthrow a government, are the most common type of political conflict in most African countries. These rebellions are generally initiated by urban elites who are dissatisfied with the way the government had treated them and their region or ethnic group. They mobilize a section of their regional or ethnic supporters; acquire arms clandestinely and often supported by a neighboring country and sometimes by an outside power as well. Initial grievances of the leadership of such a rebel group would vary from being blocked from achieving political power, under representation of their region/ethnic group in the government and administration, their region deliberately neglected from access to development funds, to blockage of their ethnic groups from the private sector, and allocation of their land to other ethnic groups (of the ruling ethnic group), etc. AbdallaBujra (1999) African Conflicts 7 claims that these grievances may be shared by other ethnic groups, in which case the rebel group forms alliances with others and the rebellion becomes more
widespread. The sustenance of such rebel movements is only possible if it is supported by a neighboring country from where it can have bases and arms supplies.

While in the past recruitment for these rebel groups was difficult and narrowed to one ethnic group, the situation has changed dramatically during the last two decades. Increase in population, the largest proportion being young people, and the deterioration of many African economies, especially the agricultural sector; have resulted in a large section of the youth being unemployed, landless and very poor. Hence, the youth become an important and accessible pool for recruitment at a very low cost to rebel movements. More importantly, the easy availability of small arms has enabled such rebel movements to turn into powerful and destructive forces capable of causing serious harm and destruction in rural areas. Since small arms do not need much training while their possession gives considerable power to those who possess them, rebel movements thus become very attractive to the youth, including those in their early teen. Ethnic division therefore is no longer important to recruitment and to the organization of rebellion across ethnic lines. In almost all the sub-regions there are various local languages which become lingua franca within the rebel movements. Conflicts between state and rebellions trying to overthrow them vary in intensity, scale, and duration depending on many factors. These factors also vary depending on the depth of the grievances, the political indoctrination of the supporters, the quality of the leadership, the strength and weakness of the state, the seriousness of support from neighboring states and the outside powers.
During the cold war, these types of rebellion were favorites of the super powers; and the more these powers were involved, the longer and bitter the conflict became. The conflicts in the Sudan and Angola are classic examples. However, since the end of the Cold War, the same two civil wars have continued for almost a decade, despite many outside attempts at resolving the two conflicts. Obviously, other factors have intervened to sustain these civil wars. In both cases, the rebels seem to have built a strong military force and some civilian support. In both cases, support from neighboring countries is crucial; in both cases, critical support from an outside power is also very important, especially in the case of the Sudan. In Angola, the control of the diamond mines is very important for the sustenance of UNITA and support from other African countries to break the arms embargo has been and is also crucial, as revealed recently by a UN Report. In the case of the Sudan, the prospect of recently operationalized oil wells in areas claimed by the SPLA is a new factor, which may sustain the rebel movement for a longer period as stated in DPMF Occasional Paper, No. 4. The complexity of these large-scale civil wars is obvious and unless both the grievances and the external support are seriously addressed, it will be difficult to resolve these conflicts which have now reached a kind of stalemate. There are other rebellions, for example in DRC, Burundi, etc., which have or are reaching the stalemate stage. Others such as those in Senegal, Namibia, Uganda, Congo Brazzaville, etc., have yet to reach the stalemate stage. What is of immediate importance therefore is to ensure that these rebellions do not escalate to the level and scale of those in the Sudan, Angola, DRC, Burundi, etc.

Finally, it is useful to point out that very few rebel movements have succeeded in overthrowing their governments. Many have been
suppressed by military force within a short time; others have negotiated their way to power sharing; yet others have lasted for a long time reaching a virtual stalemate, such as the SPLA and UNITA.

2.8.4 Secessionist Rebellion

While the rebellions which want to overthrow the government are driven by the possibility of gaining political power and the prospect of economic gains, the rebellions seeking secession are often driven by their perceived political, economic and cultural oppression. Such rebellions often go through a similar development process, but are usually defeated by military force. Both the African governments and the international community are generally not sympathetic to secessionist rebellions. Hence, very few secessionist movements have succeeded compared to those rebellions which aim at overthrowing their governments. The most spectacular secessionist war was that of Biafra in Nigeria that ended in catastrophic failure. The Eritrean war, on the other hand, succeeded for different reasons. Another example was Guinea Bissau, which separated peacefully from the Cape Verde. Despite the limited success of these secessionist rebellions, they have nevertheless caused considerable damage and destruction.

2.8.5 Coup D'état

Violent and undemocratic change of government by the military is one of the most common methods of achieving power. As mentioned earlier, there have been roughly 80 such violent changes of government in Sub-Saharan Africa during the last four decades. A coup d'état by the military of a country can be instigated and even carried out by outside forces such
as in AbdallaBujra(1999) African Conflicts 9 the Comoros. However, most coup d'états are carried out without external instigation or support. They are generally the expression of a struggle for power between contending groups amongst the elite. And when the military feels it has been left out of such struggle, it generally takes over power on behalf of itself or on behalf of an ethnic group or an alliance of such groups.

2.8.6 Cold-War Sustained Conflicts

During the 1970s and 1980s, the vicious competition between the superpowers in Africa was an important factor, if not in starting conflicts, certainly in sustaining them. The Americans and the Russians in particular, and less so openly the British and the French, competed for (a) “the hearts and minds” of the African elites and their followers; (b) political and diplomatic allies; (c) strategic allies; and (d) mineral resources. The rivalry and competition took various forms: supporting governments, overthrowing governments, supporting/opposing political parties, covert activities in support of or in opposition to governments, and supporting, if not initiating rebel movements. What needs to be emphasized here is that, at the time, the support or opposition of one super-power or another was a very powerful force in the political survival or demise of an African government. So powerful were these cold war interventions that they set in motion sociopolitical forces in some of the strategic countries, processes that led to serious internal conflicts which have outlasted the Cold War itself and continued until today. In the Congo of 1964, the Americans intervened to remove Lumumba and install Mobutu, an intervention which has set in motion serious and unforeseen consequences which are unfolding to this day. In Somalia, it led to the collapse of the state. In Angola, it has led to the long and tragic
civil war. Similarly in Mozambique (through the proxy of apartheid South Africa), it has led to another vicious civil war which has fortunately been temporarily resolved. In the Sudan, the civil war continues to evolve, taking different forms every few years. The continuation of these civil wars is, however, sufficient indication that the Cold War interventions were not the single determining factor which causes these civil wars. An internal division, colonial legacy, history of cultural oppression, intense rivalry and competition for political power, etc., a combination of these factors constitutes the root cause of these major conflicts. More significantly, because the fundamental causes of the conflicts have not been addressed or resolved, they have lasted longer, and the duration of these conflicts has given them “independent” internal dynamics that keeps them going as stated in 10 DPMF Occasional Paper, No. 4

2.8.7 Many-Sided Conflicts to Seize State Power

In countries where certain specific conditions prevail, several rebellions emerge independently, each of which is trying to capture the capital and take over power. In the process, each of these rebellions form temporary alliances which do not last more than a few months, and at the same time fight other groups in different fronts. Needless to say each of the rebel movements is supported by a different neighboring (or distant) country – financial support, supplies of arms, diplomatic support, giving refuge to the various levels of the leadership, etc. Furthermore, each patron of a rebel group has its own interest, mainly in terms of its potential influence in the future government if its group succeeds in getting to power.
The specific conditions for this type of conflict are the following elements:

a. A very weak government; the reason for the weakness of the government could be many and we need not go into them here;

b. A deterioration and deep malaise of the economy, widespread poverty and a large pool of unemployed, landless and aimless youth;

c. The state and its few institutions are the sole means of accumulating wealth;

d. The availability and control by the state of easily exploitable natural resources;

e. Deep divisions in a stratified society based on ethnicity, race, religion, and cultural and economic oppression of various groups by a ruling class/group.

These conditions enable various competing elite to mobilize their respective groups in order to gain power by seizing state power by force. Ease of recruitment of man/youth power, accessibility of small arms; support from outside make it very tempting and feasible to start a rebellion with the ambition of toppling the weak government. However, under these circumstances, if it is easy for one group to start a rebellion, it is equally easy for another to do the same. And when one rebellion starts, soon it is followed by others. And within a short period of time there are several rebellions in one country, fighting the small, weak beleaguered
government as well as fighting each other. Soon to the government itself is reduced to the status equivalent to that of the rebel groups and all pretensions to legitimacy disappear. Often the government collapses leaving behind a dangerous vacuum. This leads to an intensification of the conflict between the remaining rebel groups, until (i) through alliances, a powerful faction emerges and takes over power, (ii) without any alliance one faction defeats the others militarily, (iii) through negotiations sponsored by the OAU, a sub-regional organization, the UN, etc. The classic examples of this type of situation are Sierra Leone and Liberia. Congo Brazzaville and DRC are more complex examples of the same type of situations. It is necessary to add here that a ceasefire based on an agreement that one or an alliance of groups share power is basically a temporary solution. AbdallaBujra(1999) African Conflicts 11 states that he forces which fought in the civil war can easily be mobilized to “go back to the bush”. How long the peace lasts will depend on: (i) how militarily strong the new ruling group/s are and how weak the opposition groups are, (ii) how acceptable the post-conflict arrangements are to the groups which have accepted to give up fighting and join the “power-sharing” arrangements. The history of negotiated peace of African conflicts and the agreements made is basically a history of “broken agreements”.

There are several reasons for breaking such agreements. Firstly, agreements are not backed by any form of guarantee – particularly external guarantee. Secondly, many of the agreements are reached under heavy pressure from the mediators, both African and outsiders; thirdly, the agreements generally concern themselves with ceasefire arrangements and power sharing at the ministerial level; these agreements do not touch the root causes of the conflict. The Arusha Peace Accord for Rwanda was
an exception, but even that highly sophisticated Accord was eventually “broken”. Fourthly, the post-conflict arrangements are generally very vague and several groups involved in the conflict become immediate losers. Fifthly, civil society in all these situations is left out, both at the negotiation and implementation stages. Finally, resources to implement some of the immediate and needy social sector programs, including demobilization, which are generally promised by donors, do not materialize or at best only half is provided and this after long and time-wasting request procedures. The transition from a society in conflict to a post-conflict society is crucial. Yet, very little is known of how this should be done.

2.8.8 Rural Conflicts Over Resources

Earlier, we have described briefly this type of conflict, which is possibly the most widespread. Yet little is known or is reported on these rural conflicts. These are conflicts over grazing land, over cattle, over water points and over cultivable land. These conflicts go back a long way, in some cases to the pre-colonial period. However, major changes have been introduced in the countries’ economies such as changes over land laws which often contradict customary laws, confiscation of large tracts of land for ranching and large-scale farming, and increase in population. Most important is the rise of rural inequalities – between rich and poor/landless farmers, between rich ranchers and poor cattle owners. These changes have led to a considerable competition for the scarce resources of land (cultivable and grazing, including water). Furthermore, environmental deterioration in land productivity and scarcity of water has contributed to the intensity of the competition. Amongst pastoral societies in particular, the system of grazing which involves movement of large
cattle herds to water points and in search of pasture, has created a serious problem. Private ownership of land has restricted these necessary movements of pastoralist and the impact has been serious and catastrophic on pastoralist societies as stated in 12 DPMF Occasional Paper, No. 4. A recent phenomenon has added the intensity and frequency of conflicts amongst cattle grazing people. In countries with serious rebel movements, these have often raided the pastoralists for cattle in order to sell them for arms or for food. The pastoralists in their turn had to acquire arms to defend themselves. Another phenomenon is the highly organized and extensive cattle stealing from one pastoralist group by another (often led by outsiders), with automatic weapons often being used. This is because cattle have acquired considerable value because of the great demand for meat in the urban areas and also for export purposes. This is particularly the case in the Horn of Africa and in East Africa. Examples of conflicts amongst pastoralists are many: among the Somalis, Oromos, Karamojong, Pokot, Masai, etc. Examples of large-scale conflicts over cultivable land (involving ethnic groups) are not, I suspect, as frequent as those among the pastoralists. Nevertheless, there are recent examples of well-reported conflicts in Kenya (Rift Valley), Nigeria (Ife and Modakeke Yoruba communities), the DRC (between the Hema and Lendu, in Ituri District) and in Ghana.

2.8.9 Urban Violence and Conflict

Urban violence is now becoming more common than in the past, as Africa’s rate of urbanization is the highest in the world. Population is increasing dramatically in urban centers, while the economies of most African countries have been deteriorating thus raising urban unemployment to a very high level. The youth (under 18 yrs) make up
more than half the population of African countries. The governments are no longer spending any money on the social sector – education, hospitals, housing and other urban social services – which have deteriorated dramatically during the last 15 years. These conditions in themselves are sufficient to provoke and sustain major and continuous violence in urban areas throughout Africa. It is a miracle that that level of violence has not been reached. AbdallaBujra (1999) African Conflicts 13 states that the urban centers, especially the capital, are where politics is conducted and where politicians concentrate. The capital is also where (i) a large number of the volatile university students generally concentrate, (ii) where the opposition political parties practice their opposition to the governments, (iii) where the media (both local and international) is ever present in stories, (iv) from where most of the advocacy NGOs and civil society groups operate and where most of the embassies monitor all aspects of a country’s activities. And it is in the urban centers that differences in wealth are exhibited and sharply contrasted. Given these conditions and the presence of many of the most politically sensitized actors, it is not surprising that politicians mobilize their supporters and organize political activism which often results in conflicts between these supporters who are mostly ethnically based. And these conflicts are not only one-time affairs but take place frequently and over a longer period of time. Cities whose conflicts are well reported are Nairobi, Harare, Lagos, Khartoum, etc.

In this Section, we have tried to describe the different types of African conflicts and to show the complexity of factors and forces which trigger and sustain these conflicts. In the next three Sections, we will discuss the different explanations given on the causes of conflict in Africa, the historical and political environment within which these conflicts occur,
and finally the strategy and policy implications in terms of preventing, managing and resolving conflicts.

2.9 Explaining the Causes of African Conflicts

We started our discussion of African conflicts by classifying the various types of conflicts. This is not an easy task because of the complex nature of the conflicts. We have also tried to indicate some of the social, economic and political conditions in which these conflicts take place. Accordingly, we will look briefly at the various explanations given by some writers and organizations on the causes of conflicts in Africa. It may be useful, however, to start with a general statement of caution. A recent major African Workshop on conflicts cautioned as Adedeji (1999: 364) states

"Africa is a vast and varied continent made up of countries with specific histories and geographical conditions as well as uneven levels of economic development. The causes of conflicts in Africa reflect the continent’s diversity and complexity. While some causes are purely internal and portray specific sub-regional dynamics, others have a significant international dimension. Not with standing these differences, African conflicts show a number of crosscutting themes and experiences".

This is a useful caution because, as we shall see below, there is a tendency by some writers to attribute a single deterministic cause to all African conflicts, past present and future! ! As in 14 DPMF Occasional Paper, No. 4

Adedeji (1999: 10) points out

"Understanding the origin of conflict means, therefore, developing a framework for comprehending (a) how the various causes of conflicts fit together and interact; (b) which among them are the dominant forces at a particular moment in time; and (c) what
policies and strategies should be crafted to address these causes in the short, medium and long term”.

In this Section, we will therefore look at the causes of the conflict and how they fit together while in the next Section we will look at the dominant forces in particular historical periods. In the last Section, we will briefly look at the policies and strategies for resolving conflicts.

We start with the explanation given by the Aide-Memoire. The Aide-Memoire (2000) is concerned with civil wars as per its definition and reports that the “core explanatory variables are economic”. It then describes the determinants of the risks of civil wars as follows:

a. Poorer countries have a considerably higher risk of civil war than rich countries;

b. If this is supposed to apply to Africa only, then it is not necessarily true mainly because most of the African countries are very poor by most standards; furthermore, civil wars are found in both poor and rich countries. The statement is too general.

c. Countries with abundant natural resources have a higher risk of civil wars; these are the rich countries in Africa and according to the earlier generalizations they are supposed to have a lower risk of civil war!

d. Countries where governments are dysfunctional have a higher risk of civil wars; Are there countries with dysfunctional governments which have had peace and development over a long period?

e. Fractionalized societies (ethnic and religious) have a lower risk of civil wars;

f. The argument that rebel movements find it harder to organize a rebellion and to be cohesive, are rather strange and goes against all
the evidence in Africa. Firstly, it took only the Ibos to start a major civil war in Nigeria – a highly fractionized society; and the Ibos were cohesive and well organized. Secondly, the civil wars in Uganda, the Sudan, Angola, DRC, Liberia, Abdalla Bujra (1999) African Conflicts 15 Sierra Leone was and are being carried out by rebel movements which are organized across ethnic lines.

Finally there is no need for polarization of society (ethnically or religiously) in order to have a civil war, if “political dysfunction and or development failures” are the condition prevailing in a country!

The attempt to find general determinants and conditions in order to explain the high or low risk of civil wars, and ultimately their causes, is commendable. But in the efforts to do so we should not lose sight of the facts that (a) there are many types of conflicts in Africa apart from the narrowly defined civil war in the Aide-Memoire, and (b) as the quotation starting this section of the paper clearly states, Africa is too large and varied a continent in terms of its geography and the historical and other specificities of the sub-region and countries and, therefore, generalized statements of explanations do not necessarily explain its many conflicts.

But this tendency is very strong amongst most writers who have tried to explain the causes of conflicts in Africa. Collier and Binswanger argue that (a) Africa has the highest level of ethnic diversity than any other continent, that African countries have small populations and therefore large numbers of ethnic groups, and that many African countries are distinct in having many multiple groups with strong identities; (b) because African countries have many ethnic groups with strong identities (loyalties), “it is hard to organize rebellion across ethnic division”, and
(c) that “many of Africa’s conflicts can be linked directly to contests for the control of resources such as diamonds, rubber and oil”.

The description of an African country (“nation”) is based on a static view of an idealized African tribe normally found in the traditional literature. The ethnic group of today is very different from that described by Collier and Binswanger. Even in the most ethnic conscious country such as Burundi, the reality is very different. Nevertheless, it is true that African countries are highly diversified ethnically. But the argument that ethnically diverse countries find it difficult to organize rebellion is not supported by reality. In the first place, rebellions do not have to be across ethnic boundaries. More importantly, many of the rebellions of the last two decades have been across ethnic boundaries. And the argument that many of Africa’s conflicts are caused by a contest for control of resources such as diamonds, rubber and oil again is not supported by reality. Such economic resources have sustained rather than caused some of the civil wars. And the absence of the resources in many other civil wars and other types of conflicts contradicts the “economistic” argument as stated in 16 DPMF Occasional Paper, No. 4

It is undeniable that intense elite political competition for control of the state is generally for purposes of using the state and its institutions for accumulation of wealth, i.e., rent seeking. But this is far from the deterministic argument that all African conflicts are caused by competition for control of economic resources. In any case argument based on economic determinism is not known and is generally attributed to Marxism. But even the Marxists have a more sophisticate level of argument when it comes to conflict: that the superstructure of any society is too sophisticated to be guided entirely by economic forces, particularly
when it comes to conflicts. On the other hand, admits that competition for economic resources is an important factor in conflict, but is not the only one.

Firstly, (Adedeji 1999: 10) argues, “competition for resources typically lies at the heart of conflict. This accounts for the intensity of the struggle for political power in many an African country”. This may explain the competition amongst the elite in a stable political environment. It does not follow, however, that competition for economic resources is the cause of all rebel movements. As we have pointed out earlier and will do so later, these rebel movements have much more complex causes than a mere need for economic resources.

Secondly, and at a slightly different level, Adedeji argued that universally, conflicts are the result of lack of security – a psychological fear of political uncertainty. He (1999: 10) states, “Throughout the world, conflicts are the consequences of the fear of the future, lived through the past”. It is the “collective fear of the future based on a history of social uncertainty, due to the failure of the state to arbitrate justly between or provide credible guarantee of protection for groups, resulting in emerging anarchy and social fractures”. Here, it seems that he is arguing that at a deeper level, conflicts are caused by fear of anarchy and political uncertainty more than simple competition for resources. But where there is political stability and the fear and uncertainty of anarchy is absent, it may be logical to draw a conclusion that competition for political power amongst the elite (and this need not result in an armed and organized conflict) is driven by competition for resources. But then how many African countries have this kind of solid long-term political stability?! Adedeji’s Workshop on Comprehending and Mastering Conflict in Africa
held in Mali (1998) set up a working group which concluded that the causes of conflict are multiple; they include political, economic, social and cultural causes as stated in AbdallaBujra(1999) African Conflicts 17.

Clearly both Adedeji and the impressive caliber of African participants in the Workshop do not subscribe to the deterministic “competition for resources” generalization as the sole cause of African conflicts. The recent UN Secretary-General’s Report on Africa (UN 1999: 3-5), discusses the cause of African conflicts. Briefly the Secretary-General’s views on the causes of conflicts, UN (1999: 3-5) are:

2.9.1 Historical Legacies:

(a) The colonial boundaries forced on the newly independent states a simultaneous task of state-building and nation-building. State-building led to heavy centralization of political and economic power and the suppression of pluralism. But the challenge of forging a genuine national identity from among disparate and often competing communities has remained;

(b) The character of the commercial relations instituted by colonialism also created long-term distortion in the political economy of Africa. The consequences of this pattern of production and exchange spilled over into the post-independence state. As political competition was not rooted in viable national economic systems, in many instances the prevailing structure of incentives favored capturing the institutional remnants of the colonial economy for factional advantage;
(c) Across Africa, undemocratic and oppressive regimes were supported and sustained by the competing superpowers in the name of their broad goals but, when the cold war ended, Africa was suddenly left to fend for itself.

2.9.2 Internal Factors:

The multi-ethnic character of most African states makes conflict even more likely, leading to an often violent politicization of ethnicity. External factors: In the competition for oil and other precious resources in Africa, interest external to Africa continue to play a large and sometimes decisive role, both in suppressing conflict and in sustaining it.

Economic motive: Very high on the list of those who profit from conflict in Africa are international arms merchants. Also high on the list, usually, are the protagonists themselves. Particular situations: In Central Africa, they include the competition for scarce land and water resources in densely populated areas.

   a. In African communities where oil is extracted, conflict has often arisen over local complaints that the community does not adequately reap the benefit of such resources, or suffers excessively from the degradation of the natural environment.

   b. In North Africa, the tension between strongly opposing visions of society and the state are serious sources of actual and potential conflict in some states as said in 18 DPMF Occasional Paper, No. 4
The Secretary-General’s Report summarizes very well the general causes of African political conflicts – conflicts in which the state is one party to the conflict. It does not deal with other conflicts in which the state itself is not a direct party. The OAU, like the UN, is much more concerned with preventing, managing and resolving conflicts. However, as an inter-governmental organization, it treads very carefully when it comes to the causes of conflicts in African countries, since different member states may have very different views of these causes. After all the OAU, like the UN, concerns itself with political conflicts and since member states are in general one party to such conflicts, the states have very strong views on the causes of conflicts in which they are involved. Hence, as far as I know, there is no official OAU position on the internal causes of political conflicts in African countries. Senior individual officials may probably agree with the UN list of causes enumerated above.

Other younger African researchers tend to give more attention to “political” causes rather than “economic” ones. In a recent special issue of CODESRIA’s journal Africa Development, several young researchers discuss specific case studies of conflicts from various countries in the different sub-regions of the continent. These researchers are clearly attracted by the argument that political forces are largely responsible for the many conflicts in the respective countries they discuss. They clearly describe the complexity of the processes which lead to conflict: poverty, youth unemployment, inequality in the distribution of development resources, ethnicity, and elite manipulation of grievances and use of sectarian ideologies for mobilization purposes, all these come to play. The political arena is wide and the struggle to seize state power ostensibly in order to redress grievances leads to the weakening of the state, its
eventual collapse and capture by one group or another sometimes with support from outside.

What follows are four of these case studies and the explanations of the causes of conflicts by the young researchers. Two case studies are from Nigeria and one each from Kenya and Congo Brazzaville. The Case of Political Conflicts in Nigeria (by William O. Idowu (1999) argues that the continuous conflicts in Nigeria are political in nature and they are the result of:

a. The absence of democracy;
b. The specific structure of the Nigerian federal system has encouraged local and ethnic loyalties and therefore failed to develop a national consciousness/unity or citizenship;
c. He stated that the control and monopoly of the Federal Government by the northern Hausa/Fulani and the consequent oppression of the other regions and ethnic groups in Nigeria.

As a result of the continuous struggle first to remove the military regime, which has been controlled by the Northerners, and secondly by bringing about a democratic system of governance, the conflicts will disappear as Idowu(1999: 53) states

"If one state is so powerful as to be able to vie in strength with many of them combined, it will insist on being the master of the joint deliberations. If they are two, they will be irresistible when they agree, but whenever they disagree, everything will be decided on a struggle for ascendancy between the two rivals. In the present-day, the “Northern elites” refusal to share power is the single most important reason why tribes have been resurgent and ethno national consciousness has come to override overall Nigerian Nationalism".
If conflict in Nigeria means the absence of democratic behavior and the absence of democratic behavior spells the absence of democratic governance, it follows therefore, that conflict in Nigeria is interwoven with the absence democratic governance. Owing to the absence of genuine citizenship, Nigeria has witnessed a series of baffling contradictions: a state of political conflict and instability, an irreconcilable struggle for power, reflected in antagonism and warfare, the politics of alienation, exclusion, and domination, accompanied by an incredible variety of micro-nationalism and pseudo-nationalism; and regrettably a forlorn search for the existence, establishment and sustenance of a well-rounded, vibrant system of democratic governance.

The Case of Ethnic Conflicts in Nigeria ToureKazah-Toure( 1999) states that the Southern Kaduna zone has occupied a volatile position in the twentieth century history of inter-group conflicts and tensions in Northern Nigeria. It has experienced complex conflicts, occasionally violent, mostly assuming ethnic form. Linked with these have been questions of social equality, citizenship, community rights and democracy. All this has taken place in a rural zone, which is a miniature of Nigeria, with about forty ethnic groups.

2.9.3 The Pre-Colonial Period

In the late nineteenth century, state formation in the Southern Kaduna zone was less developed than in the northern emirates. These cephalous societies experienced limited conflicts among themselves. These socio-political formations were generally non-expansionist. Inter20 DPMF Occasional Paper, No. 4 ethnic disputes and conflicts were based on the question of land, control of fishing and hunting areas, and the ownership of other resources. Armed clashes occasionally occurred, but on a small
scale. Inter-ethnic conflicts featured mainly in the relationship between the Southern Kaduna zone and the neighboring emirates, which were feudal, predominantly Hausa Muslim. The Hausa began to immigrate to the zone and established settlements as a result of the expansion of international trade.

Local people also emerged as agents of Hausa merchants. From the second half of the 19th century, there were a series of slave raids in the zone by agents of the northern feudal lords. These raids involved some of the House settlements in the zone as well as some of the indigenous people. The slave raids devastated, destabilized, and even depopulated some of the communities, with serious consequences. But stubborn resistance by the various polities to violent slave raids and to military and political aggression continued.

2.9.4 The Colonial Period

Then came British Colonialism that took control of the zone. Colonial military operations against the people went side by side with the establishment of administrative structures. The emirates aristocracy was imposed as overlords on the people in the zone and the Hausas or their agents became the chiefs. In matters of finance, recruitment of staff, and major decision-making, the chiefs and all others were subordinated to the Hausa-Fulani emirs. And they in turn derived their power from the British. Church schools became the dominant institutions for acquiring education, which favored the non-Muslim since education involved simultaneous conversion into Christianity. Eventually, this led to a major division in the zone between the Muslims and Christians and traditionalists. From 1910 onwards, there were a series of revolts mainly
directed at the administration dominated by the Hausa-Fulani. AbdallaBujra (1999) African Conflicts 21states that in the course of the decolonization process, political parties and organizations, which occupied more prominence among the non-Hausa ethnic group, focused more on reforms of the regional administration, integrating the elite within the system, the issue of ethnic discrimination and inequalities, rather than on the concern for national independence.

2.10 Electronic Government

Since the mid-1990s, the opening up of interpersonal electronic modes of communication including electronic mails (emails), Internet-based websites which facilitate electronic-commerce (e-commerce) transactions, digital mobile telephony with its short messaging service (SMS) and multimedia messaging service (MMS), and, more recently, the rise of electronic Government or ‘e-Government’ services – has enabled individuals in the developed world especially to experience what I would call ‘technologically-induced libertarianism’ by becoming more involved in political debates and public administration. With the ability to access wider information and the availability of space for a plurality of voices, (Gibson and Ward, 2000) state that technologies such as the Internet are seen as offering potential for bringing government closer to the people, making it more responsive and relevant. Or in the words of Chadwick (2001) claims that, with the Internet, governments around the world now have an “electronic face” where citizens can not only access government services but also engage in various governmental discourses.

It is obvious that one is becoming increasingly popularized and debated, that the early blue-sky vision of the Internet as a catalyst for the
‘perfection’ of democracy is somewhat premature, even mythical. In an era marked by the ubiquity of digital technology and computer-mediated communications – what Castells (2001) calls the “Internet galaxy”, drawing on Marshall McLuhan’s description of the diffusion of the printing press in the West as ‘Guttenberg Galaxy’, Shapiro (1999: 14:5) argues, "the Internet has become implicated in various political and regulatory struggles, much of which has already begun". Resnick (1998) makes a similar point when he argued that the ‘Cyberspace’ that the Internet occupies has been ‘normalized’, such that: Cyberspace has not become the locus of a new politics that spills out of the computer screen and revitalizes citizenship and democracy. If anything, ordinary politics in all its complexity and vitality has invaded and captures Cyberspace. He (1998: 48: 49) states

"The normalization of the Internet into ordinary politics and everyday life also means that utopian fantasies of citizen empowerment and freedom that once accompanied the advent of mass Internet access are being balanced and offset by dystopian fears of technocratic domination".

As a result, we should not be surprised to see governments and corporations trying to shape the code of the Internet to preserve their authority or profitability. But code is not everything. Even if we could lock in the democratic features of the Internet, the ultimate political impact of communication technologies must be judged on more than design. Shapiro (1999: 15) states, "We must also consider the way a technology is used and the social environment in which it is deployed".

Another way of analyzing the politics of the Internet is to look at how power struggles and relations have (always) been played out in the pre-Internet era. Such struggles are mostly about the maintenance of political
control and the winning of the hearts and minds of the citizen electorate, either directly or indirectly. Burchell (1996: 20) states, "Foucault calls this ‘governmentality’, where political struggle occurs at the “contact point” where technologies of power interact with technologies of the self to bring the governed individual into greater subjectification". Differently put, in order to triumph in the Internet era, governments need to be actively involved in shaping the design as well as the societal, cultural and regulatory environment in which the Internet and other new media technologies operate. In essence, it sets out to consider the ways in which new media technologies led by the Internet has been, and can be, used within the context of Singapore, widely acknowledged as one of the most technologically-advanced and networked societies in the world. With labels such as ‘police state’ and ‘nanny state’ constantly heaped on the city-state, it is well-known as a politically censorious and highly-regulated society. With toilet-flushing and anti-spitting rules, as well as widely derided laws banning the sale and distribution of chewing gum, it is not too difficult to understand why Singapore has come under frequent insults and criticisms by those hailing from liberal democratic traditions.

Indeed, Gomez, (2000) and Tremewan (1994) have been said much about how the Singapore polity resonates with a climate of fear, which gives rise to the prevalent practice of self-censorship against such a backdrop, it would be interesting to see how certain groups in Singapore attempt to employ the Internet to find their voice and seek their desired social, cultural and political ends. Equally, if not more, significant are the regulatory devices adopted by the highly pervasive People Action’s Party (PAP) government to respond to and set limits to these online ventures whilst concomitantly pursuing national technological cum economic development strategies. It concludes that the Internet in Singapore is a
highly contested space where the art of governmentality, in the forms of information controls and ‘automatic’ modes of regulation, is tried, tested, and subsequently perfected.

2.11 Auto-Regulation of Technology

The notion of auto-regulation is an appropriation of Foucault’s (1977) critique of the disciplinary power of Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon prison structure:

The major effect of the Panopticon is to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power. So to arrange things that the surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action; he (1977:201:2) states, "The perfection of power should tend to render its actual exercise unnecessary... It is an important mechanism, for it atomizes and disindividualizes power". Auto-regulation is predicated upon Foucault’s belief that power, understood here as the political management of the Singaporean populace, is perfected when it is ‘atomized’ and ‘disindividualized’. As he points out, the Panopticon architecture provides the “principle” of how to ‘atomize’ power, and therefore, discipline via a supreme control of one’s cultural thought and conduct.

Foucault then goes on to summarize Bentham’s principle by declaring that the exercise of power should be “visible and unverifiable” This suggests that surveillance via the policing of citizens – and indeed their Internet sojourns – must be conducted both ‘visibly’ (or directly) and ‘unverifiably’ (that is, indirectly and behind the scenes). In an extensive study on Bentham’s approach to liberal governmentality via “indirect
legislation”, Engelmann (2003: 379) points, "the central idea is to enlist the governed as supplementary governors of themselves and others”.

Indeed, Dean & Hindess, (1998: 11) and Gordon (1991: 3) states, "same rationale is propagated by Foucault in his governmentality discourse which relies on the shaping of the individuals’ conduct via the regulation of oneself". "More than just a surveillance and policing technology, the Panopticon is “above all a form of government” as (Foucault, 1994) cites in (Elden, 2003: 248), or in other words, (Foucault, 1978) defines that a function of Foucault’s governmentality is the ability to strike a delicate balance between being visible and unverifiable makes it possible to ‘govern at a distance’ (Miller and Rose, 1990: 76) claimed that the only course of ‘real’ actions needed by authorities are to issue regular compliance reminders and to fine-tune legislations and codes from time to time to ensure currency and relevance. Writing about Singapore’s politics of comfort and regulation, Cherian George (2000) states that Singapore’s tightly consolidated governmental power “central control” Although he does not make references to Foucault or Bentham, his description of the Singapore government’s ‘central control’ mentality mirrors the idea of the supervisory ‘central tower’ in the Panopticon, a conspicuously privileged position from which to exercise power and surveillance on citizens who are frequently construed and constructed as ‘inmates’ needing constant watch (Foucault, 1977: 202) states

"The notion of ‘auto-regulation’ embodies the key elements of the Panopticon in that one does not know when the ‘supervisor’, as the analogical extension of the authorities, is really watching. As a result, regulation appears to be carried out automatically and with machine-like precision".
As he puts it: the architectural apparatus should be a machine for creating and sustaining a power relation independent of the person who exercises it; in short, that the inmates should be caught up in a power situation of which they are themselves the bearers.

In a climate of auto-regulation, where regulation is carried out ‘automatically’, both directly and unverifiably or both overtly and subtly – at the same time, the regulatory powers-that-be are often further empowered to invoke existing laws, rules and codes and/or enact new ones to tighten its already tremendous grip on social, cultural, political and disciplinary powers. Lee and Birch (2000: 149) state

"if justifications of new or revised rules are required, broad statements emphasizing the importance of safeguarding ‘public interests’, such as the need to maintain public order, public security, public morality and national harmony, are readily issued and mobilized to silence critics and cripple opponents”.

It is no coincidence that these highly discursive political terms, contingent on the determinations of ministers and state officials, appear in most Singaporean laws that impact upon social and cultural policies. As such, Yao (1996: 73) states

"These critical terms do not necessarily conform to a ‘common’ understanding. They often have their own distinctive characteristics, euphemistically referred to by social anthropologist Yao Souchou as "special meanings”.

He tailored to suit whatever the political requirement of the day might be. This enhances the application of auto-regulation as it is essentially a potent combination of the ‘visible’ and the ‘unverifiable’: while the legal codes and terms are manifestly available for all to see, the meanings are
not inherently inscribed and are, therefore, ‘not verifiable’. As Thompson, (1997: 1) explains

"Meanings regulate and organize conduct and practices – they help to set the rules, norms and conventions by which social life is ordered and governed. They are, therefore, what those who wish to govern and regulate the conduct and idea of others seek to structure and shape”.

The deliberate employment of ambiguous and arbitrary terms that is often legally-binding yet interpretable only by state officials are but one of the key foundations of auto-regulation. It is further assisted by other visible mechanisms, including, inter alia: direct policing and surveillance of citizens, media reports that are mostly uncritical of government policies, and more recently, willingness to call for public feedback on certain policies (particularly those that carry less political risks). Despite recent moves towards embracing greater openness, indirect gate-keeping ‘activities’, including covert surveillances or indirect policing, are also employed at strategic instances to ensure that direct measures that are usually laborious and resource-intensive can be gradually phased out over time. In short, Foucault (1977: 138) argues, "these auto-regulatory strategies are calculated to attain policy compliance and political subservience, what he calls the shaping of disciplined and “docile bodies”.

2.12 Governance and ‘Soft Power’

The term ‘governance’ can be defined in a number of quite different and often ambiguous ways. Before proceeding further I should therefore offer my own definition. In the broadest terms ‘governance’ is a matter of coordinating and managing the collective actions of diverse actors. This
may take different forms in different contexts, each involving a particular distribution of power relations. For example, Fairclough (2007) states that hierarchical governance implies a greater centralization of control than hierarchical governance, where leadership and power are dispersed. Thus, we can distinguish governance in a ‘broad sense’1, meaning the modes and manner of governing (as opposed to the actual doing of it – ‘governing’), and governance in a ‘narrow sense’ of a particular model involving more flattened hierarchies, networks and self-organization.

Jessop (1999) argues that this specific style of governing has gained prominence in recent years in response to the increasing diversity and functional differentiation of the objects of governance, which are less amenable to simple top-down (bureaucratic) steering (Jessop, 1999). In the last quarter of the C20th, the decline of the post-war bureaucratic regime and its centrally regulated industrial economy gave way to the gradual emergence of a new ‘diagram’ of relation between government, expert and citizen. Rose (1999: 166) states

"C20th is characterized by technologies of self-governance, audit, and appraisal. A key figure in this new style of governing is the active citizen-consumer, empowered and responsibilised to make choices that further their own interests or those of the community within ‘socially sanctioned grammars of consumption’"

Importantly, this requires a shift in power relations: citizens must have greater agency over their own actions; the government less direct control. He (1999b: 142) states, "The social state gives way to the enabling state". For the sake of brevity, rather than theoretical cogency, I shall characterize this shift in the mode and style of governance in terms of a move from ‘government’ to ‘governance’. One question for empirical analysis is to probe the specifics of what these new power relations actually involve within and across institutions of government.
In an analytical critique of American foreign policy, Nye (2004) develops the concept of ‘soft power’ (or persuasive power) to characterize political power that aims to attract rather than coerce. It is offered as a more viable alternative to ‘hard power’ (for example, armed force) whose failing lies in the fact that it has to manage all the challenges to it, and possibly generate more in the process. The general idea of ‘soft’ power (under various names and theoretical guises) has similarly been used to capture trends in governance across many different organizational contexts (e.g. Courpasson, 2000; du Gay, 1996; Levay and Waks, 2009; Thrift, 1997). The concept is similar to Lukes’ (2005a) who states, "third dimension of power’, where power lies in shaping others’ beliefs and desires, and thereby securing compliance”. From the perspective of the subjects involved we might say this form of power aims to secure volition rather than merely obedience. For Lukes (2005b) claims that a key analytical question that follows is: exactly how is this achieved? One example comes from a study of technology policy. Graham (2001: 765) states, "The fundamental to the hortatory success of policy is its capacity to attract by creating ‘perceptions of value for…some imagined future place and time". In short, it creates utopian visions of the future that can be achieved through the recommended policy actions. From the perspective of soft power, these imagined policy futures thus carry their own ‘powers of attraction’. His analysis shows how such imaginaries2 are produced through the rhetorical mechanisms of factuality (thus allowing space for evidence-based rationality), futurity (textured through metaphors, modality and lexis), and desirability (through implicit and explicit evaluation). In whatever context it operates ‘soft power’ would appear to be more capable (than coercion) of absorbing potential opposition by instead offering choice, opportunity, possibility, and so forth. For this reason soft power rests to a greater degree on individual volition, which
in the context of policy-making would seem to be more intrinsically democratic. However, I will argue that some of the discursive forms this takes do not so much remove coercion as mask it in more subtle forms. Specifically I present a distinctive grammatical feature of New Labor discourse which I term ‘Managing Actions’. I argue that these have become an important discursive resource for governing, through a less direct form of agency, potentially manifold actions and actors ‘at a distance’. From the perspective of soft power I also show how they in fact assume, rather than secure volition.

I begin by presenting the methodological approach used in this study. I then discuss the grammatical and semantic features of Managing Actions, outlining the systemic-functional approach used to analyze them, based on their sociological significance and their diversity of surface form. Thus, following Van Leeuwen’s proposal (1999) claims, "A sociosemantic typology of Managing Actions as a first step towards a ‘grammar of management’.

2.12.1 Managing Actions as a Technique of ‘Soft Power’

We have seen that soft power operates through attraction and persuasion rather than coercion. It is manifest in the ‘responsibilising’ trend of managerialism, wherein centralized hierarchical control is relinquished (at least partially11) in favor of hierarchies of dispersed power and what Fairclough (2007) calls that responsible autonomy with the dispersal of power comes greater emphasis on individual responsibility and autonomy. However, as Davies (2003) observes that this is not a responsibility founded on trust, because this is eroded by the pervasive checks of audit, appraisal and accountability. In the context of schooling
in the UK, Dale (1989) claims that this encroachment on professional sovereignty ‘regulated autonomy’. Similarly, in Sweden Levay and Waks (2009) have been used the notion of ‘soft autonomy’ to describe moves by health care professionals to appropriate managerial controls (appraisal) in order to at least exert some influence over their form. In the context of the professions, therefore, trust has been replaced by a highly circumscribed form of autonomy in which required outcomes are clearly specified and monitoring mechanisms used to ensure they are met as stated by (Davies, 2003; Power, 1997; Schmelzer, 1993; Shore and Wright, 2000).

This new ‘soft’ mode of governance thus requires a two-fold move: the Government must step back from direct control over actions (while retaining the power to specify outcomes), allowing the responsible individual to step forward. In short, ‘enabling’ individuals has become a key feature of governance. I propose that Managing Actions are a salient textual mechanism for achieving this.

2.12.2 Managing Actions

a. Render government control apparently more indirect, and yet retain control by

b. Specifying outcomes (the managed action),

c. Presupposing Necessity, and in some cases

d. Assuming volition. Thus, Muntigl (2000a) states that Managing Actions are the textual manifestation of a new ‘enabling’ form of governance.
Their linguistic structure reveals how this creates a ‘managed autonomy’ rather than genuine freedoms. In terms of ‘soft power’, they assume, rather than secure, volition. The function of policy discourse is intrinsically hortatory - its purpose is to get people to do things. The same is true of Managing Actions. As discussed in the preceding section on Governance and Soft Power, Graham (2001; 2002) has shown that how policy discourse achieves this coercive function by texturing utopian visions of policy futures in highly abstract propositions, thereby implying the Necessity of the actions proposed to achieve those outcomes. In the case of Managing Actions the Necessity is presupposed. Moreover, in many cases evaluative meanings encoded in the semantics of the Managing Action strengthen its hortatory impetus. Following Lemke’s categories of evaluative meanings for propositions and proposals (1998) states that desirability is the most commonly evoked value. This is especially true of those actions I categories as ‘Facilitator’ types, in which the Managing Action is always pre-evaluated, thus making this a more hegemonic construction (e.g. enable, allow, help). This is coercion through attraction by assuming volition on the part of the managed actor.

The introduction of more ‘soft’ techniques of governance necessarily involves the renegotiation of power relations. Existing relations of power fundamentally intersect with the discursive enactment of soft governance and must be taken into account. In the example We will take powers to allow schools greater freedom to innovate, power relations are semantically encoded in the lexical forms allow and freedom. In other cases, they are assumed, as in examples representing the government’s expectations of others, where the successful instigation of others’ actions is vested in its institutional authority (e.g. we expect schools to introduce
this program as soon as possible). Thus, I would add two further comments to VanLeeuwen’s proposals for a ‘grammar of management’. Firstly, forms of managing vary along a cline of coercion (tendentially outlined below), and secondly, they intersect with the power relations that exist between the participants. It follows, moreover, that power relations can potentially be reproduced and transformed through differing degrees of coercion. For example, Dale, 1989; Trowler, 2003) states that in the data there is a tendency for more explicitly coercive forms of management, as encoded in the semantics of the verb (expect, require) to be textured with institutional actors whose power and influence we know to be in decline, namely Local Education Authorities. Conversely, (Blair, 2005; West and Pennell, 2002) state that actions which semantically encode greater freedom and/or less coercion (enable, allow, encourage) tend to be textured with schools, which accords with the principle of school autonomy in the creation of an educational market of ‘independent state schools’. One implication of this important role of social power relations is the contingency of success in management. That is, whether or not a managed action actually takes place depends on both the discursive construal of obligation and the power relations of the actors involved.

2.12.3 Typology of Managing Actions

I adopt a socio-semantic approach in classifying types of Managing Action, based on the represented power relations between the manager and managed actor, as well as the type of managing role represented. This is necessarily a matter of interpretation, drawing on native speaker intuition in order to classify the type of managing activity involved as well as the degree of coercion it involves. This classificatory judgment
was arrived at having examined each verb in context. These are set out in the order I would place them on a ‘cline of coercion’, starting with the most coercive. In all cases, it is suggested that the construction implies the government’s judgment about the ability or willingness of the managed actor to engage in the represented activity.

In turn, this implies a particular role for the government. I identified three main types of role which I label ‘Overseer’, ‘Leader’, and ‘Facilitator’ in order to capture subtle differences in the types of managerial activity being represented for the government in each case. There emerged from this, clear linkages with the literature on governance. In his analysis of state power under New Labor, Alexander (1997: 96) argues, "a crucial role for this managerial state is as the ‘enforcer of outcomes… making possible and monitoring the delivery of social services”. In terms of the shifting flows of power in the managerial state Newman (2001) states that this translates into three key roles. The ‘Overseer’ role is one that tightens control from the center, in order to guarantee particular goals. Then, in order to secure these goals, social roles must be formalized (often as partnerships) and responsibilities clearly assigned. This is the job of the ‘Leader’ - the classic middle manager role - delegating tasks in a collaborative project. In a partnership model of ‘joined up’ governance involving collective action across different sectors of government, Jessop (2003) states that both economic and social success are construed through the logic of competitive advantage through continual innovation and improvement. This requires flexibility, freedom, and continual negotiation of participation and membership. Such activities require the greatest freedoms for managed actors. Here, I characterize the government’s role as a ‘Facilitator’. Nevertheless, the representation of this role is strongly inflected with a parental gaze, concerned with
individual dispositions and capacities. In the next section I set out the rationale for the classification, explaining why certain examples whose surface form is similar to those I have classified as Managing Actions were not included in the typology. I then present the typology of Managing Actions followed by a description of the criteria used to group them together a) by type of managing role, and b) in order of coerciveness.

2.12.4 Classification of Managing Action

2.12.4.1 Overseer

Coercive Level of Managing Action

1. Ensure (that) [MA] Make sure (that) [MA]
Example: we will…ensure that Further Education colleges can play a full part with schools and LEAs (Cm 3681).

In these cases the manager (M) is in control of the managed actor’s (MA) behavior. In other words, they encode the meaning ‘without M, MA wouldn’t do it’. Completion of the activity is assumed semantically. In managerial terms, actions are instigated and their enactment monitored, thus construing an ‘overseer’ role for the government. I see this role as involving relatively tight central control by the government. Graham (2002) observes that in cases where a predication (representing desirable outcomes) follows a verb like ensure (for example investment in skills will ensure greater competitiveness in a knowledge economy), it elides the future orientation of the predicate, thereby construing it as the unquestionable result of the government’s actions, rather than a possible future effect. As a result, the state of affairs it represents takes on the appearance of inevitability. Applying Graham’s argument to the present
case of Managing Actions, we can say that the managed action is represented as if it were already accomplished, rather than being a possible future outcome, thereby reducing room for negotiation over the matter. Thus in these cases the independence of the managed actor is comparatively limited and the agency of the manager (the government) is rather more foregrounded. For this reason, it is ranked highest in terms of coerciveness. While still an indirect form of government control, this type of Managing Action semantically encodes less freedom for the manipulee. Within an interpretation of Managing Actions as a form of soft power, we might therefore say that, where the power of the managing actor is clearly greater than that of the managed actor, the coercive element is most apparent in ‘Overseer’ types.

2.12.4.2 [B] Leader

**Coercive Level of Managing Action**

- a. 1 Require [MA] to [A]
- b. 2 Expect [MA] to Look to [MA] to
- c. Want [MA] to Envisage that [MA] should
- d. 3 Urge [MA] to Encourage [MA] to
- e. 4 Ask [MA] to Invite [MA] to
- f. 5 Promote [+ nominalization meaning ‘the doing of X by MA’]

Examples: we will expect all LEAs to draw up an action plan (Cm 3681)
We encourage schools to work together in local ‘families’ to help share [Best practice] (Cm 5230)

Here the manager (M) has authority to instigate others’ actions, but the future orientation encoded semantically means there is no assumption of
their completion. This future orientation is particularly apparent in expect which can be either a command or a simple prediction. It therefore involves greater spatial and temporal distance between the manager and the managed than in the previous examples. In terms of power relations these types also encode the meaning ‘without M, MA wouldn’t do it’. The degree of coercion semantically encoded is actually comparable to that of Overseer actions, although this applies to the instigation, rather than completion, of the activity. The reason for the hortatory aspect of these examples lies partly in assumptions about the particular social (power) relations involved. In some cases it also lies in the possible blurring of epistemic and deontic meanings (modifying truth and obligation respectively). For example expect can be either a prediction or a command (compare I expect it will rain tomorrow and I expect you to tidy your room before bed). In some cases the distinction between the two may only be clear because of contextual factors like the power relations between the participants: I expect you will rethink your plans to climb Ben Nevis alone may be variously interpreted as a command, warning or prediction, depending on the relationship between the addressee and addressee.

The degree of coercion actually implied depends on pragmatic inferences about the likelihood of compliance, which in turn depend partly on socio-personal factors like power, status, authority, and obligation. Givon (1993: 13) observes, "That when it comes to assessing the degree of coercion expresses, what is at issue is not the agentivity of the manipulator, but the agentivity and independence of the manipulee". For our purposes, it is more helpful to express this in terms of the power relation between these two. The measure of this independence is the ability of the manipulee to mount resistance, which logically implies
that the greater this independence, the greater the coercive force required. In turn, this suggests that the degree of coercive force the government is represented as exerting over other social actors tells us about the government’s perception of the power relation that holds between them, as well as not only the manipulee’s capacity for resistance, but importantly, in a politically turbulent context - the likelihood of them resisting. Beyond this point I find it unhelpful to rank these actions along a coercive cline based on an account of modality, since it does not take into account other, contextual factors I consider to be important. For instance, unlike he (1993: 274) states

"I rank expect and want as being more coercive than ask and invite. I believe that when the speaker is a socially powerful actor like the government, addressing institutions like local education authorities and state schools over which it has considerable authority, its expectations and desires can be taken to be more coercive than its invitations".

Further, an account drawing purely on questions of modality misses other socially significant actions performed in the discourse representations. Consider the examples urge and encourage. In contrast with the other examples in this category, they also encode not only degrees of coercion, but also greater attention to dispositional factors like motivation, conveying the sense ‘without M, MA would lack the desire to do it’. When such forms are textured, for instance, with exhortations that young people engage in preparing themselves for the ‘uncertainties’ (i.e. insecurities) of a ‘flexible’ (i.e. under-regulated) labor market, their use is of potential ideological significance. It therefore demands attention to the role of such discourse patterns in shaping and naturalizing certain ‘preferred’ identities and roles; for example the active, responsible, lifelong learning citizen of the workfare era. In relation to the concept of
soft power Leader actions semantically encode a softer coercive force than Overseer types, introducing an evaluative dimension to the representation (of desirability, importance, attraction).

2.12.4.3 [C] Facilitator

Managing Action

Ability Support [MA] to/in doing Help [MA] to Facilitate [MA] to Let [MA] do Enable [MA] to Transform/Enhance the capacity of [MA] to Make it easier for [MA] to Allow [MA] to OpportunityFree[MA] to Give [MA] (greater/more)freedom(s) to Provide for [MA] to Provide/Increase/widen the opportunities for [MA] to Example: The government is concerned to enable the ethnic minority communities to play their full part in contributing to the education of ethnic minority pupils14 (Cm 9469)

Here the manager’s authority over MA is assumed, but completion of the action is not necessarily assumed. They encode the meaning ‘without M, MA couldn’t do it’, for want of either ability or permission. In managerial terms, we might characterize this as a facilitating role. Here, the coercion works through the assumption of volition and as such is a particularly hegemonic formulation. In sociological terms, the objects of facilitating interventions are structural (e.g.: provide opportunities) and dispositional, where the government attempts to address the capacities of managed actors (e.g.: help, support). This is similar to those Leader activities in which the government attempts to incite individuals to action through encouraging and urging. I have classified them separately however, because of the different assumptions they trigger about volition on the part of the managed actor. The surface form of Facilitator actions comes
closest to the ‘enabling’ force associated with the soft power of contemporary governance. The semantic realms they occupy are concerned with autonomy, freedom, space and flexibility. Here, the agency of the government seems the most indirect and the manipulee seemingly quite independent. However, as I have argued, it is not the case that the coercion is removed in these cases; simply that it is masked by the assumption of volition. While I find this ‘cline of coercion’ a useful tool in understanding the sorts of relations construed between the government and other social actions, this can only be a tendential framework. The exercise of power over others is never guaranteed, and is subject to multifarious social and psychological factors. While these contextual factors remain unknown variables, I can only base my interpretation on the degree of coercion I believe to be encoded in the semantics of the verb.

Before examining in more detail how Managing Actions are used in New Labor discourse it is worth observing a peculiarity of these linguistic forms. If we examine Managing Actions in relation to process type, an interesting pattern emerges in which processes become more materialized as their coerciveness declines. Thus, the most coercive ‘overseer’ role involves highly abstract semiotic actions (ensure, make sure). Those median range actions representing a ‘leader’ role are also semiotic, but less abstract. Within this category, moreover, there is movement towards the material realm as the coercion decreases, thus from mental processes (expect, require) to verbal processes (ask, urge). Finally, Rose (1999a: 15) states

"The ‘facilitator’ role involves mainly abstract material processes (help, support, enable). This suggests that, in the context of governing education, the contemporary exercise of power lies very
much in the realm of the psychological rather than the physical. This would accord with a governmentality understanding of advanced liberalism, which emphasizes the role of the semiotic and the interpersonal in political rule”.

Part Two: Previous Studies

According to Irena Urbanavičien (2004) handles Political Speeches in terms of Exertion of Power through Linguistic Means to examine two political speeches by Mr. Tony Blair and aims at demonstrating how a close analysis of linguistic features in the texts can contribute to the comprehension of power relations and ideological processes in discourse. Halliday (1975: 17), as cited in Malmkjaer (1991:161) states

"To bring to light the exertion of power, the analysis concentrates on such linguistic means as nominalization, the use of pronouns, and diverse lexical choices. These means have been chosen as primary tools for the analysis due to the fact that they are closely related to the three functions that language is said to perform, namely ideational, interpersonal, and textual".

The approach defined as critical linguistics is concerned with the analysis of how underlying ideologies mediated through discourse are embodied in linguistic expressions. The method of critical linguistics was particularly devised in response to such problems as a fixed, invisible ideology permeating language. As Fowler (1991:67) posits

"It is the main concern of critical linguists to study ‘the minute details of linguistic structure in the light of the social and historical situation of the text, to display to consciousness the patterns of belief and value which are encoded in the language – and which are below the threshold of notice for anyone who accepts the discourse as “natural” ’.”

From my own point of view, I think this paper is managed to treat the two political speeches successfully in terms of the methodology and tools
that have been used. It deserves to be used to explore the gist of this project.

Relatedly, Teun A. van Dijk (1993) handles Principles of critical discourse analysis. This paper discusses some principles of critical discourse analysis, such as the explicit sociopolitical stance of discourse analysts, and a focus on dominance relations by elite groups and institutions as they are being enacted, legitimated or otherwise reproduced by text and talk. One of the crucial elements of this analysis of the relations between power and discourse is the patterns of access to (public) discourse for different social groups. Theoretically it is shown that in order to be able to relate power and discourse in an explicit way, we need the cognitive interface of models. Knowledge, attitudes and ideologies and other social representations of the social mind, which also relate the individual and the social, and the micro- and the macro-levels of social structure. Finally, the argument is illustrated with an analysis of parliamentary debates about ethnic affairs.

This paper discusses some principles, aims and criteria of a critical discourse analysis (CDA). It tries to answer (critical) questions such as what is critical discourse analysis (anyway)?, How is it different from other types of discourse analysis? , What are its aims, special methods, and especially what is its theoretical foundation? Also, it acknowledges the need to examine, in rather practical terms. How one goes about doing a critical analysis of text and talk.

In general, the answers to such questions presuppose a study of the relations between discourse, power, dominance, social inequality and the position of the discourse analyst in such social relationships. Since this is
a complex, multidisciplinary and as yet underdeveloped domain of study, which one may call sociopolitical discourse analysis, only the most relevant dimensions of this domain can be addressed here. This study is expressive in its core concept. It deserves to be existed in this dignified project.

Accordingly, Zambezia (2000) tackles Democratic Discourse? Realizing Alternatives in Zimbabwean Political Discourse. This article discusses political discourse in Zimbabwe from a perspective of discourse analysis. It examines two speeches presented (in English) at a seminar on Structural Adjustment and Political Democracy and subsequently published. One speech was given on behalf of a government minister and the other was presented by the Secretary-General of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions. The speeches in their published form are examined in terms of their attempts to maintain or challenge hegemony in political discourse in Zimbabwe. The Minister's speech is described briefly as an exercise in rearticulating discursive hegemony at a critical point in Government policy formulation. The main focus of this article is an analysis of the linguistic strategies employed by the trade unionist to challenge that hegemony, by drawing the audience to consider alternative perceptions. His use of adversatives, negatives and questions is analyzed in detail. The article concludes that the trade unionist's discourse strategies are an effective means of introducing a democratic voice into Zimbabwean political discourse and of engaging an audience in 'collaborative denaturalization' of government discourse.

This article is concerned with issues of political discourse in Zimbabwe, particularly possible strategies for introducing increasingly democratic voices into political discussion. The article will examine two speeches on
Structural Adjustment and Political Democracy given in the early 1990s, one by a government minister and the other by a trade unionist. This article will concentrate on the latter, discussing means by which the trade unionist attempts to introduce alternative perceptions to those presented by the minister.

This article draws on material presented at a Linguistics Department seminar in 1995 at the University of Zimbabwe, and also on a paper presented at the International European Systemic Functional Workshop in Liverpool, UK, July 1998. This article is, however, a new discussion of the material. I am grateful to Professor M. Bourdillon for constructive comments on an earlier version of this article.

Political discourse has been widely studied, particularly within the areas of Pragmatics (e.g. Wilson, 1990; Ilie, 1994; 1998) and Critical Discourse Analysis (e.g. Fairclough, 1989; 1992; van Dijk, 1993). Typically, Pragmatics studies have sought to describe and explain strategies of political argumentation and, particularly, persuasion. Ilie's detailed pragmatic analysis of the speeches of the Romanian dictator, Ceausescu, demonstrates the linguistic strategies he used for totalitarian manipulation. Critical Discourse Analysis has tended to concentrate on the ways in which much political discourse is produced by, and in the interests of, powerful elites: the studies show the strategies by which the ideologies of the powerful are presented as 'natural'. Van Dijk, in an overview of Critical Discourse Analysis, as Van Dijk (1993: 250) states

"We pay more attention to 'top-down' relations of dominance than to bottom-up relations of resistance, compliance and acceptance. This does not mean that we see power and dominance merely as unilaterally 'imposed' on others. On the contrary, in many situations, and sometimes paradoxically, power and even power
abuse may seem 'jointly produced', e.g. when dominated groups are persuaded, by whatever means, that dominance is 'natural' or otherwise legitimate. Thus, although an analysis of strategies of resistance and challenge is crucial for our understanding of actual power and dominance relations in society, and although such an analysis needs to be included in a broader theory of power, counter-power and discourse, our critical approach prefers to focus on the elites and their discursive strategies for the maintenance of inequality".

Fairclough, however, prefers to adopt Gramsci's concept of 'hegemony' as a way of describing power relations, rather than 'dominance', as he (1992: 92) states

"Hegemony is leadership as much as domination across the economic, political, cultural and ideological domains of a society. Hegemony is the power over society as a whole of one of the fundamental economically-defined classes in alliance with other social forces, but it is never achieved more than partially, and temporarily, as an 'unstable equilibrium'. Hegemony is about constructing alliances, and integrating rather than simply dominating subordinate classes, through concessions or through ideological means, to win their consent. Hegemony is a focus of constant struggle around points of greatest instability between classes and blocs, to construct or sustain or fracture alliances and relations of domination/subordination, which takes economic, political and ideological forms. Hegemonic struggle takes place on a broad front, which includes the institutions of civil society (education, trade unions, family), with possible unevenness between different levels and domains".

Within the Zimbabwean context, despite significant differences from Western societies, an approach to political discourse that emphasizes the possibility of instability in hegemonic alliances seems more relevant than one emphasizing dominations. While the discourse of the political elite in Zimbabwe, in particular the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU [PF]) government, has many characteristics of the discourse of powerful elites elsewhere, the situation is complex. As Fairclough stresses, hegemony can be conceived as leadership: in Zimbabwe, the present political elite gained their positions after a successful war of liberation.
The government sees its power as validated not only in electoral terms, but also in terms of its leadership of the liberation struggle. In the immediate post-independence years, the legitimacy of this claim was rarely challenged, and the government was able to present itself as representing a national consensus, with homogeneous assumptions and aspirations, frequently expressed in terms of Marxist discourse as stated by (Love and Morrison, 1989).

In more recent years, this 'equilibrium' has become more 'unstable', as the promises of independence have not been fulfilled. There has been abundant evidence of corruption among the political elite and the pressures from international financial institutions to restructure the economy in ways vastly different from the earlier socialist rhetoric have become a major factor in policy formation.

The speeches which will be examined in this article were presented at a crucial point in this developing instability. The two speeches were keynote addresses at a seminar on Structural Adjustment and Political Democracy in the early 1990s, when the government was in the process of embarking, at the behest of the International Monetary Fund, on 'economic liberalization'. While ZANU (PF) can be seen as very much a monolithic party, with little distinction between party, government and state, the early 1990s saw a gradual separation of the organs of civil society, especially the trade unions, from the nationalist consensus and the start of the voicing of separate interest groups. These speeches represent the discourse of this separation, and therefore provide an interesting point at which to examine political discourse in Zimbabwe in terms of potential instability in the existing hegemony. This study is
comprehensive in terms of the holly issue "Democracy". It deserves to be existed in this great project.


The year 2004 marked South Africa's celebration of ten years of democracy as encapsulated by guaranteeing a better life for all. The gap between the rich and the poor as well as moral degradation challenges the euphoria of our young democracy. The South African government's commitment to non-racism, justice, democracy and non-sexism constitutes a center of values that challenges us all to live better lives. This social-democratic society is a secular expression of a Biblical social vision. Within the juxtaposition of Theo politics and secularism, this research explicates the challenges of liberal and secular laws as imposed on a fervently religious country.

Theo politics, as described as the continual interrelationship between government and church, is firmly cemented in South Africa. Nevertheless, how far would the secular, socialist-inclined government go in distancing itself from religious interference? How willing are churches to move away from a marginalized social agent to become are-energized moral watchdog? Consequently, South Africa's transformative democracy needs to rediscover its spiritual heritage, while churches and Christianity need to invigorate Theo politics to participate in and guarantee the realization of adjust democratic order.
This study therefore examines the level of interaction between church and state, specifically the Anglican Church and the Dutch Reformed Church. Furthermore, the degree of representation of church attendants and the electorate, as linked to transformation and their leaders in church and government respectively, are scrutinized.

In conclusion, it becomes apparent that Theo politics will continue to play a role in the secular South Africa. Church-state relationships will be united in their shared vision of a fair, just and socio-economically viable South Africa. This study tackled very important issue "Human Rights"
For this reason it deserves to be in this giant project.

Additionally, Baratz, L. & Reingold, R. (2010) tackles The Ideological Dilemma in Teaching Literature Moral Conflicts in a Diversified Society an Israeli Teacher Case Study. The current study examines the implications of literary teaching material in a national diversified society in which the governmental educational policy separates between two national educational systems, and controls both of these separate systems. We set out to examine whether, in such reality, teachers are willing to teach texts, not formally included in the curriculum, that are replete with values and politics. In addition, we examine if they are willing to teach, whether they would introduce their ideological beliefs even if the teaching unit is incompatible with their ideological worldview.

The teaching material comprises two poems about Jerusalem, one written by a Jewish poet and the other by an Israeli Palestinian poet. 26 Interviews were performed with teachers: 13 Jews and 13 Palestinians. Their sayings were categorized into the following voices: The essence of
the voice – a captured or liberated voice; Character of the voice – neutral or political; and Aim of the voice – socialization or individualization.

We did not find any differences in the voices among the Palestinian and the Jewish teachers. Categorically, the teachers attempted to silence any discussion that spilled over into political matters. The ideological dilemma made the teachers' voice as hidden voice.

Since, we do not believe that the governmental educational policy in Israel is going to become more democratic, we hope that our findings will encourage colleges of education in Israel and similar societies to encourage their students to develop liberated and political voices, and voices of individualization. This study handled the mechanism of two discourses in conflict "The Ideological Dilemma in Teaching Literature Moral Conflicts in a Diversified Society".

**Summary of the Chapter**

In this chapter the researcher has given a detailed picture about the theoretical background in terms of similar studied have been done in the same field; because the researcher can not start from very scratch but he should base his study on what have already done by others.