Sudan University for Science and Technology (SUST)
College of Post Graduate
Center for Studies and Culture of Peace (CSCP)

**Topic: PhD Research**

Title: conflict Transformation in the Horn of Africa Region

A study on local mechanisms and its role in building sustainable peace and Developing a Socio - cultural module bases on Africa Indigenous Knowledge System

(With a focus on Somalia)

By: Ahmednur Mohamed Abdi

**Supervisor: Professor.Dr. Abuelgasim Gour Hamid**
Preface

This research is based primarily on qualitative field research carried out in the Horn of Africa with a focus on Somalia and particularly the northern part known as Somaliland, the research was conducted between 2012 to 2016, under the auspices of Sudan University for Science and Technology (SUST), College of Post Graduate, Center for Studies and Culture of Peace (CSCP). The researcher is grateful to the university, the center and to the supervisor, as well as to the members of Guurti, other elders, and regional experts who have contributed their views, knowledge and ideas to this research.

During the 5 years of this research the researcher managed to spend time with different stake holders including representatives from IGAD, high officials from the AU, representatives of government leaders in the region including government officials from Somalia, Ethiopia and Djibouti, but more importantly have also engaged with Guurti members and elders in the region. The researcher also managed to visit all the countries in the Horn of Africa region but also specific regions in Somalia such as North (Somali Land) and south central Somalia.

Starting the research with a little knowledge in 2012 have made the researcher travel to countries in the continent that may have been successful in managing their peace and security such as Tanzania which is one of the practically peaceful countries in East Africa, the objective of that visit was not only to feel arrested to the continuing conflict and instability situation in the Horn of Africa but find a country that is not far but fully enjoying stable environment and within the continent. In the inception phase of this research it become clearer that a lot of information and knowledge is with people and that many knowledge persons in the community especially Guurti members are at their retirement ages hence the research come on its right time.

Finally, interacting with many clan men and women, but also with some young generations have provided a lot of insight to the researcher and provided clarity towards the direction of the research. Those interactions with different clans, communities and persons but also the direct engagement with groups involving in the research have also enlightened opportunities of future regional integrations and possibility of communities to reach to each other, something that this research will not study at this particular time.
Acknowledgements

I would like to sincerely thank all those who made this research possible, including the Director for CSCP, it is director of higher studies, the director of UPEACE, the department of trainings, and all my colleagues and friends who have helped in one way or another. Special thanks go to all those who gave their precious time to participate in the related discussions and those who have been interviewed on the various aspects of this research and their role in the collection and compilation of information but also those who have warmly welcomed me in their offices and places in the Horn and East Africa region. I would like to thank the government of Sudan through the Sudan University for Science and Technology for their continued support and honoring me this scholarship to conduct this study’ which has made the presentation of this research and its conclusion possible.

To My Father and Mother, You Mean the World to Me, I also wish to thank my family members who were more than generous to send me books, and tolerate that I use their time for the research. I also thank my supervisor and friends for offering their expertise and precious time.

I would like to acknowledge and thank all in the Center for Studies and Culture of Peace for helping me and allowing me to conduct my research and for providing assistances requested, thanks to Professor Hajj Abba, and Dr. Jamal, I also thank professor Samual head of U-PEACE Africa branch and members of UPEACE in Addis-Ababa for their support and allowing me to use their library. Finally, I would like to thank Mr. Mohamoud Ahmed, a senior officer at UNICEF-Somali Land, Suldan Korfe, Haji Abu sitte, and members of the Guurti in Somali Land for the endless support to this research.

Especial thanks goes to Professor Abulgasim Gore not only as a supervisor for this research but also as a mentor and teacher of who with his excitement and willingness to provide feedback made me complete this research, I have enjoyed the experience to work with him in this study.

Thank you all.
Dedication

I dedicate my dissertation work to my father (Allah Yarhamuhu) who have passed away during this research period, and to my family and many friends.

A special feeling of gratitude to both my loving parents, Sh. Mohamed Abdi and Sahlan Hassan whose words of encouragement and push for tenacity ring in my ears. My brother Ali-Haydar who because of his care and support to parents enabled me to do this research and my sister Ruqia who is the one that takes care of my mother and sacrificed a lot for our parents.

I also dedicate this dissertation to my many friends who have supported me throughout the process. I will always appreciate all they have done.

I dedicate this research and give special thanks to my families and my best friends for being there for me throughout the entire doctorate program. All of you have been my best cheerleaders.

This Research is especially dedicated to my mother who have been my constant source of inspiration. She has given me the drive and discipline to tackle any task with enthusiasm and determination. Without her love and support this research would not have been made possible.
Abstract

The very unstable situation and recurring conflicts in the Horn of Africa raises questions pertaining to the future of this region but also concerning the historical traditions of conflict resolution and transformation.

The Horn of Africa (HoA) region especially Somalia has long been exposed to deteriorating situations of instability and recurring conflicts. This failing country and its stressed communities is facing a latest risk of disappearing from the map of the free countries in the world not because of a climate change but because of insecurity and common violence in most of the parts of it is districts and areas.

Historically the region was rich with traditional systems of conflict resolution and transformation however post colonization government systems have over ruled the traditions’ yet could not protect violence’s and conflict as the same system failed in Somalia, it is in this regard that peace and conflict studies are not only important for knowledge research but for advising on future stability in the country and saving lives and livelihoods of many citizens in Somalia and in the Horn of Africa region of which this research is contributing to.

The purposes of this study is:

- To discover the contribution and consideration of the indigenous knowledge systems and local cultures in the process of peace building in the region with specific focus on Somalia.
- Identify ways of strengthening the current existing local systems for peace making and peace building
- Develop a proposed outline to improve and empower effective indigenous cultures and methods that may contribute in transforming conflicts.

This research draws upon mostly primary sources including memories of elders, knowledge of expertise, published books and letters, as well as view of key educated and individual leaders but also includes Little Reviews. While the research informs about strengths and weaknesses of local mechanisms of conflict transformation (i.e Cultural Heritage) it presents a model of indigenous knowledge system that has developed itself with a bottom up approach, and has led people in the Northern area of Somalia (Somali Land) to a positive peace and sustainable cohesion among themselves, it studied the history of conflicts and wars in the region, touches it is implications, reviewed both local and international actors and presents the Guurti model as a practical local self-governing solution for people living in the same region whom are clan based and or interrelated in their community structures.
List of Abbreviations and acronyms:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SUST</td>
<td>Sudan University for Science and Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCP</td>
<td>Center for Studies and Culture of Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Inter Governmental Authority for Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali Land</td>
<td>Norther regions of Somalia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUURTI</td>
<td>House of Elders in Somali Land-North Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPEACE</td>
<td>University of Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HoA</td>
<td>Horn of Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLM/A</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Mission in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>United Nations and African Mission in Darfur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XEER DHAQAMEED</td>
<td>Traditional way of Solving conflicts and problems</td>
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<tr>
<td>OGADEEN</td>
<td>The current Somali region of Ethiopia.</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RREAD</td>
<td>Regional Resilience Enhancement against Drought</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLI</td>
<td>Pastoralist Livelihoods Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELMT</td>
<td>Livelihoods in Mandera Triangle</td>
</tr>
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<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office</td>
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<td>CPMR</td>
<td>Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU:</td>
<td>Organization for African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSZ:</td>
<td>Temporary Security Zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMEE:</td>
<td>The United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea</td>
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<tr>
<td>STFG:</td>
<td>Somali Transitional Federal Government</td>
</tr>
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<td>ICU:</td>
<td>Islamic Court Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR:</td>
<td>United Nations High Commission for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONLF:</td>
<td>Ogaden National Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC:</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACLED:</td>
<td>Armed Conflict Location and Event Data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPOS:</td>
<td>UN’s Political Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IKS:</td>
<td>Indigenous Knowledge System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CR &amp; T:</td>
<td>Conflict resolutions and transformation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XEER:</td>
<td>Customary law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERGO:</td>
<td>Customary envoy/Delegate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAAQIL/UGAAS/GARAAD</td>
<td>Titles and meanings of a different traditional leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODAY:</td>
<td>An elder men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLAAD:</td>
<td>Conflict that is may reach to a level of instability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NABAD:</td>
<td>Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHIR GUDOON:</td>
<td>Chair of a Meeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP:</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNM:</td>
<td>Somali National Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOSOM:</td>
<td>United Nations office for Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSADO:</td>
<td>Red Sea Afar Democratic Organisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Table of Content:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Content:</th>
<th>Page number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Abstract: English</strong></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Abstract: Arabic</strong></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Abbreviations and acronyms,</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER ONE:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INTRODUCTORY</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This chapter will be the introductory section that will present the research problem, research questions, objectives, importance, methodology, premises, hypothesis, significance, scope, limitations, and challenges.</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1. Background:</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2. Statement of the Problem:</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3. Research Objective:</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4. Methodology:</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5. Hypothesis:</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6. Significance of the Study:</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.7. Scope of the Study:</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.8. Limitation of the Study:</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.9. Ethical Considerations</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER TWO:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>THEORETICAL FRAME WORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW</strong></td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This chapter will review previous studies and present overviews of the past studies, as well as a summarized preview of readings, with the focus on specific books and papers of peace and conflict theories and studies, especially those that links international studies to Africa and to Horn of Africa.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Conceptual Framework and the Concept of Conflict</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>Defining Intra-State and Interstate Conflicts in the Horn of Africa Region</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>Causes of Conflicts in the Horn of Africa</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>Theoretical framework of the sources of conflicts</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>Review of Related literature</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CHAPTER THREE**

**DELINEATION OF VARIABLES**

This chapter examines the concept of conflict transformation within the Peace building, outlines the history of peace and conflict studies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>Peace and Conflict Studies: A Brief History</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>Galtung and the Conflict Triangle and the Horn of Africa conflict</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>The Cost of War in the Horn of Africa</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>Peace-making, Peacebuilding and Peace keeping:</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.1</td>
<td>Peace building</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.2</td>
<td>Criticisms on Peace and conflict concepts explained above</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.3</td>
<td>Responses to criticisms</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CHAPTER FOUR**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION IN PEACE AND CONFLICT PROCESSES IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

This chapter presents an in-depth study about stakeholders in Peace and conflict processes in the Horn of Africa region (regional and local actors). It will also study element that affects peace process, and it discusses regional peace institutions and examines the role of international actors in the region, including the IGAD, AU and the UN.

4.1 The Researcher and a Stakeholder
4.2 Patterns of War and Peace in the Horn (2005-2010)
4.3 The conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia.
4.3.1 Cessation of hostilities
4.3.2 Continued tensions
4.4. Cluster of conflicts centered on Somalia
4.1 The War in Somalia
4.1.1. Incidents timeline of the three-year war
4.2 The Conflict over the Somali region of Ethiopia (Known as Ogaden)
4.3 Borders and People
4.4 International reactions and involvement in conflicts of the Horn
4.5 The Role of the IGAD/AU

CHAPTER FIVE:
HISTORIC ROLE OF THE TRADITIONAL LEADERSHIP SYSTEMS and INTERLINKS BETWEEN LOCAL MECHANISMS AND GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES

5.1. Former and current functionality of local mechanisms, and it is integration to modernized systems of peace processes
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.2. The role of the traditional administrations and local mechanisms in the Horn of Africa (Somali communities)</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3. The Guurti mechanism under study</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4. Guurti as a model for peace keeping, peacemaking and peace building</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5. Voices from the Guurti</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER SIX: RESULTS AND FINDINGS</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1. Preliminary results and findings of Guurti as Model for sustainable peace</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2. Enlightening the major practices and cultures of the Guurti model</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3. Elements of learnings from the Guurti that can be expanded to other regions</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4. Proposal to strengthen the Guurti Model.</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5. Steps that will enable practitioners to further study and implement the outcome of this research.</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.6. Brief Recommendations and conclusions</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANNEXSESS</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

The greatest challenge that the human race has ever faced is peace maintenance. Some argue that much of the conflict in the world can be attributed to the existence of an oppressive social system of power that reinforces differences between groups and allows one group to have power or privilege over another group. Others argue that, conflict usually occurs primarily as a result of a clash of interests in the relationship between parties, groups or states, either because they pursuing opposing or incompatible goals. Although the term war is sometimes used as a synonym for conflict, it is more usual to restrict the meaning of war to violent conflict, involving armed forces. But like war, conflict is and has been throughout history a normal way of conducting disputes between political groups within human society. As Gurr puts argues, conflict is an inevitable outcome of human diversity and a world without conflict is not desirable, because it would mean a world without diversity. Africa is a diverse continent – diverse in ethnic, religious and socio-
cultural terms (Gurr, 1991). According to Williams (2011) the main causes of a conflict could be briefly specified as follows:

- Individual differences: In society, men are not alike in their nature, attitudes, ideal, interest and aspirations. Due to this difference, they fail to accommodate themselves which may lead to conflict among them.

- Cultural Difference: Culture is the way of life for a group. It differs from society to society. The culture of one group differs from the culture of the other group. These cultural differences among the group, sometimes cause tension and lead to conflict.

- Clashes of Interests: The clash of interests of different people makes conflict inevitable. The interests of the workers clash with those of employers lead to conflict among them.

- Social Change: Conflict also arises due to differences between rates of social change. The change in the moral norms of a society and man's hopes, aspirations and demands leads to conflict. The conflict between the old and new generations is owing to social changes too.

In spite of the above categorization, the background to conflict in Africa is presented as comprising three factors:

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• Overthrowing colonialism. For example, Somalia refused to accept externally prescribed borders. Colonialism in Sudan was succeeded by an inadequate political structure;

• The Cold War resulted in a system of client states where corrupt leaders were maintained in exchange for allegiance with one of the superpowers. This increased arms flows and military expenditure and training. The large armies created by this support were not demobilised as the Cold War came to an end, leaving behind a threat to domestic security; and

• New World Order: In the 1990s state authority weakened, internal conflicts increased and fragmentation led to warring splinter groups. Conflicts became regional as collapsed states threatened the security of their neighbours.

Conflict is undesirable. In its violent form, it claims the lives of many people, destroys property, and diverts human as well as financial resources away from development (Alexander Attilio, 2002).² The Horn region is one of the most conflict-ravaged areas on the African continent. It is a region well known in African politics of being a volatile, hostile and poor place due to numerous conflicts, wars, and colorizations. The populations of the region have endured many inter-state and intra-state armed conflicts. Although interconnected, the region’s conflicts occur at

several levels, including direct inter-state wars and armed conflicts; intra-state civil wars and conflicts; and inter-communal conflicts (Kidane M., 2011). The fact that the Horn of Africa is central to the politics of the USA, Europe and the Arab world has gained worldwide recognition due to the frequent incidents of war in the region. The solution for the conflicts in the area should be sought in the context of the history, political system, religious affiliations and economic relations of the Horn countries to the rest of the world. Recent changes in the political order of the world may have also changed the influence of the East on the Horn countries. This has been demonstrated in the direction western countries are taking on matters concerning the Horn countries especially after the end of the cold war. This, however, does not mean that the old ties between the Horn countries and the East has been broken. The tie between them has only been loosened and it can be tightened in times of emergency. This factor can intensify conflicts between neighbouring countries of the Horn (Shemelis Gizaw, 2003).

Violent conflict is more the norm than the exception in the Horn of Africa. Conflicts are waged at various levels: state, regional, and local. Conflict involves various actors: governments, nationalist groups, religious groups, and community or identity groups with significant backing from external forces. It is common for conflicts in

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the sub-region to promptly acquire a sub-regional dimension, thus transcending national borders by attracting kinsmen from across the border. The result is often a flow of refugees, who destabilize economic and trade relations between neighbouring states, and pose a security threat to the sub-region.

As it has been depicted by Meala; 2011, the literature available regarding the causes of conflict often showed how leading scholars influence the perception and, subsequently, shape policies. They attempt to explain factors leading to conflicts, such as Cliffe (1994), who perceived the African continent as wild and backward. Huntington (1993) explained conflicts due to the interaction of different cultures leading to clashes, radicalisation and fundamentalism. Moreover, Chabal and Daloz (1999) can be under the same umbrella by viewing Africa of the Post-Cold War as the ‘way it works’. These explanations of conflicts tend to generalise and stereotype conflicts as irrational. Henceforth, it is important to enhance the research by looking at the question of rationality.

Thus, Collier and Hoeffler (1998) explained this notion, which will be useful in the analytical explanation of the return to conflict. In other words, they see the rationale

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driven by economic grievances creating new types of war, as argued by Mary Kaldor’s ‘new wars’ (2006).

Although, this notion is broader than former scholars mentioned, it remains a narrow explanation of the causes of violence and conflict only from an economic perspective neglecting other factors i.e. political power, self-determination and external actors’ implications.

Additionally, conflicts due to geographical situation are increasingly significant in literature; indeed, Clare (2001) explained this phenomenon to be influenced by vital interests and contested resources zones. Territories and boundaries, especially in Africa, is matter of debate and thus, the literature on this subject is important to assess.

Salim (1999) on his hand classifies conflicts in Africa as follows: boundary and territorial conflicts, civil wars and internal conflicts having international repercussions, succession conflicts in territories decolonised, political and ideological conflicts, others including those related to transhumance and irredentism.

Similarly, Collier and Binswanger (1999) classify conflicts into (a) loot seekers and (b) justice-seekers, classification which is based more on value judgment rather than analytical criteria. Nevertheless, both Salim and Binswanger use what they consider to be the objectives of the rebel groups as criterion for classifying conflicts. Others,
classify conflicts on the bases of the actors involved in a conflict. Still others are concerned only with conflicts in which the state is a party to the conflict. In general, most writers tend to think of conflicts in Africa as being political conflicts such as wars between states, armed rebellion against states (ranging from small-scale low intensity conflicts to large-scale civil war), armed secessionist rebellion (also of various scales), and coup d’etat. Indeed, most African conflicts which are reported and which draw international attention, are those which fit the above description.

**Causes of Conflict in the Horn of Africa**

The horn of Africa is the home of different ethnicities, religions and cultures. However, the peoples of the region are interconnected in one or other ways. But the question here is why it is a conflicting zone than the rest of Africa?

The following major factors contributed much for the socio-economic unrest of the region. While some causes are purely internal and portray specific country dynamics, others have a significant regional and international dimension. Economic Causes /Competition over and mismanagement of economic resources.

**Significant Strategic Importance of the Region**

Many of the horn conflicts can be linked directly to contests for the control of resources such as the Red Sea, Indian Ocean, oil, agriculture and grazing lands and
water resources like River Nile. This rivalry can be stretched from local to international levels. The Red Sea and the Indian Ocean are the most important sea routes which are shared by at least four countries in the Horn of Africa (Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia and Sudan) are, at this time, getting back sizeable strategic importance in international maritime trade among the Middle Eastern, Asian countries and the Russians to open new markets in Africa.

Likewise, to be advantageous from an ample oil extraction and to flood their electronic products towards Africa, the Far East Asian countries and the rest of the world choose these water routes. To this end, interest conflicts will appear between opponent parties. There are also some nations which take this conflicting region as a potential area for their arm sale.

Surprisingly, beyond acting as arm sellers of the region, they are also usually protagonists of most of the violent incidences of the area. Even though the country is in political chaos and disturbances inside its political opponents, the South Sudan have unexploited oil resources which are considered to the nucleus of conflict with its counterpart i.e. the Northern Sudan.

Ethiopia nowadays, being the water tower of East and North Africa, is progressing by utilizing its water resources (start to construct The Great Renaissance Dam) nevertheless its international rivers like the so called Abay are the source of tension
and conflict among Egypt and Sudan which are historically the foremost users of the river.

Supposed to be its internal problems be resolved, Ethiopia has significant agricultural potential wherein the Arab Emirates and the Asian countries are investing more on the country. This could be the source of conflict between the countries peoples and the government as the people considers some investments like flower productions are degrading the land and make it impossible to reutilize it again.

Furthermore, though the government consider it as the source of foreign currency and employment but the peoples still assume as exploitation of the potential resources and modern land grabbing system without the at most benefit of the nation. Within or with that of the neighbouring country, it is usual to get a conflict of pastoralist over the use of natural resources such as water and grazing land for their cattle.

However, these peoples are also clashing over because of cultural practices of heroism, cross-border and local livestock raiding and a need of socio-cultural fairness. Depletion of pastoral grazing areas cause one of the bordering countries pastoral to migrate to the other which lead in to conflict between the newly arriving group and the main settles there.
And even due to the encroachment of the pasture land by agriculturalists, there are repeated incidences of conflicts of farmer-herders. Resource is everything be it in scarcity and unwise use of it can lead into extreme war and violent conflicts. The map of the conflict of the horn is further complicated and tensioned by factors like chronic poverty, unemployment (especially youth), unfair distribution of resources and extreme contestation over decentralized resources. These are the means for the stiff competition amongst the political elites even in a stable political environment for the purpose of rent seeking. This is, nowadays; a headache for almost all countries of the horn.

Historical Legacies such as colonization has played an important role in the conflicts in the HoA region. Just after the independence of the horn countries they started to search their country demarcations, however; the only option to have the line of demarcation for the newly formed states was accepting the colonizers set but which was not fully accepted by every countries of the region or it was invisible. To this end, neighboring countries got in to armed conflicts or wars. The 1961, 1964-67, 1977 – 1978 and 2006-2009 Ethio-Somalia war and the 1998–2000 Ethio-Eriteria war are some but major manifestations of this colonial-boarder settings. The colonial sentiments in the mindsets of the peoples of the region are also mentioned as one factor of conflict.
Having some unique conflict dynamics historically, the region’s conflict dynamics was quite distinct from the patterns found among its sub-Saharan and North African neighbors. The region’s states had a long history of supporting insurgents in neighboring states in order to weaken what they consider to be oppositional regimes. Moreover, all nations of the region had a felt need of enlarging their territory by grabbing from the neighboring country rather than by deliberate round table discussions. A few instances of this action has been reflected by Eritrea by supporting various Ethiopian insurgency groups against the Ethiopian government and the Ethiopian regime in turn react by supporting Eritrean opposition groups, such as the Eritrean Democratic Alliance and The Red Sea Afar Democratic Organisation (RSADO).

Dictatorial and Oppressive Regimes In the former times even today, it is common to find undemocratic and oppressive regimes which were or are supported and sustained by super nations for the sake of their interests across the region. The derge military junta of Ethiopia repeatedly supported by Russia and Cuba, The government of Idi Amin from Uganda and Siad Barre of Somalia are some but bold instances of oppressive ruling systems of the horn.

The Cold War During this period, internal conflicts of the HOA were both aggravated and contained by the super powers on both sides. The influence of the super powers was very strong and invisible state party. Countries of the horn were
boiled by supporting either of the blocks where in the ruling party and the opposition parties will have different alienations towards these two ideologies. To this end, the super powers will assist, especially militarily and armament for these groups. The military junta of Ethiopia (Derge) had strong attachment with the Soviet Union. And there was a large amount of flow of arms towards Ethiopia. On the other hand, TPLF (the rebellious group at that time) was highly supported by USA. Finally, due to the confrontations of these groups, there was mass destruction in the country.

**Social and Cultural Causes**

- Extreme Religious Politics as witnessed by Sudan and Somalia

The region is threatened by Islamic religion fundamentalists who may escort in to rivalry between Sunni and Shi’ae to the horn, the international community as well as the states of the region are also tensioned by these emerging radical religious groups.

- Ethnic Polarity as it is known by its multi-ethnic groups

Horn of Africa (HOA) is also a home of racial divergence groups. Some of them thought that they were excluded by the former governmental systems and they started to hatred other ethnicities which are assumed to have a strong tie with the previous systems.
In Ethiopia, though the reality is different, the Oromo and some other ethnic groups consider as Amhara peoples were the most beneficiaries of the then governments. This is one of the major factors that direct the intrastate conflicts in the country. The political elites of the country, in the present days, use this as a fertile ground for manipulation of ethnic and regional sentiments.

It has a spill-over effect of cultural detachment and the search for identity by developing a perception of they are not belongs to some social groups. Due to the legacy of colonialism, several ethnic groups like Somalia- Mogadishu with that of Ethiopian Somalia and Kenyan Somalia who claims homogeneity are today straddling across international boundaries between neighboring states. As far as identity (religion and ethnicity) conflict of the HOA concerns, the “We” and “Those”, “They” and “Us” and ours” and “Others” mentality deconstructed that had led to the loss of togetherness, empathy and sympathy among the peoples. This opened the way for political entrepreneurs and ethnic activists to fire the tensed groups to go to ethnic conflicts.

**Political Causes**

Power Struggle: Most of politicians of the region are not visionaries rather they struggle to seize state power seemingly for the purpose of rent seeking and in order to redress grievances that leads to the weakening of the state.
Poor Governance and Transparency Most of the countries of the HOA are known for their centralized states which contribute for the acceleration of instabilities which at the end directs to their fragmentation and failure. The ruling parties ignore power sharing and try to preach the people as they are democratic ones. HOA is thirsted of peaceful election. Most often the successors came in to power either by force or external support rather than by the full consent of the people. The political crises of the area are explained by civil wars, the restraining of civil liberties and the abuse of human rights.

1.2. Statement of the Problem

The Horn of Africa region is one of the most troubled regions in the world and most insecure with no sustainable peace in the horizon, and this does not mean that regional authorities and international actors are not addressing the issue of peace, instead peace forces continue to be deployed and many actors engage with peace efforts, therefore this research raises questions about the role of local mechanisms in building peace in the region, and ways of strengthening such systems; the following are the research questions.

- Are existing indigenous knowledge systems and local cultures considered in the peace building processes in the region?
How local mechanisms, efforts and initiatives in the Horn of Africa can be strengthened to promote sustainable solutions in tackling conflicts?

How traditional systems could be empowered to prevent conflicts turn in to violence?

From the research questions but also from the current situation of the Horn of Africa but even Africa, the fact remains that peace has been an elusive concept to many African countries plagued by civil war and conflict in the past decades. Such countries include the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mali, Sudan and South Sudan, among many others Somalia (Re- in the Horn) is one of the countries that have been categorized as failed state and witnessed a total collapse of the state, the Northern region of Somalia named recently the ‘Somali Land’ is one of the three regions that make up the pre-1991 Somali Republic of which this research will specifically study as it is one of the regions that has maintained relative peace in the last two decades without any outside support.

1.3. Research Objective

The overall aim of this research is:

To discover the contribution and consideration of the indigenous knowledge systems and local cultures in the process of peace building in the region with specific focus on Somalia.
• Identify ways of strengthening the current existing local systems for peace making and peace building

• Develop a proposed outline to improve and empower effective indigenous cultures and methods that may contribute in transforming conflicts.

To evidently achieve those above mentioned objectives the research will study the effect of the Guurti system in Somali Land, whereby a group of elders, and regional expertise will be engaged in formal and informal discussions to come up with analyzed answers for the questions of this research.

1.4. Methodology

The research adopted a qualitative, descriptive and analytical approach. Yin (1994) argues that the choice of a research strategy should be determined by the nature of the particular research question posed. The research questions in this study pointed to a qualitative approach. For example, questions on how local mechanisms such as the Guurti has been incorporated into the new governance dispensation as well as their contribution to peace and security consolidation in ‘Somaliland’ required a direct engagement with the Guurti members themselves, but also with regional experts that knows the history of such mechanisms. The researcher could not get this kind of information through the use of quantitative methods, it was also must to
involve think-tanks and decision makers and approach them from the qualitative side of the research so that all the dots scattered in the minds of many are linked. Although many surveyors and researchers implies the use of some form of questionnaire to be administered to a sample of respondents, the questionnaire is simply one instrument that can be employed in a research problem. As such, it can only contribute to the task at hand and will not be the only tool to be used, and the fact remains that now-a-days it may not be easy to secure actual and reliable information through questions and data gathered from many, but rather discussions and engagements that is deepened to people’s minds especially under such social researches.

The methodology undertaken in this research is therefore a qualitative one and it is chosen as the appropriate methodology for such a social but complicated research. Having said so some of the persons targeted by this research particularly those directly involved in the Guurti are interviewed, such hybrid research methodology approach shall therefore enable the researcher to secure most of the required information on this mechanism which is most probably unwritten, but also produce a comprehensive picture of the matter under study.

Considering that the issues of peace and conflicts in the horn of Africa are complex and that in most cases there is no single response that could be straight to black or white, the research will use more of the qualitative methodology to reach in to
conclusions on some of the issues arising from the interviews of the Guurti system, and the below are the steps that will be followed.

- A questionnaire was designed and distributed to about 10 participants from the Guurti systems to collect basic information about the mechanism.
- Results of those questioners will be combined and analyzed and minimum of key topics is developed’ then it is presented to two different groups for further discussion. (Elders from the region and regional experts), maximum of 10 as well-5 from each.
- The outcome of those group discussions compared with the information gathered from the Guurti members shall be presented as part of the findings of the research to respond to the research objectives.

Details of the analyzed information gathered from all the three groups will be presented in narratives and tables and will be documented in this research as part of the annexes of the research.

1.5. Hypothesis

A. The assumptions of this research is that the status quo⁹ in Somalia and generally in the Horn of Africa region is failing the people of Somalia and the

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⁹Status quo is the current never ending and chronic conflict which is clearly refuelled by interested actors of the war in Somalia.
Horn and that the majority of recent international policies pursued with regard to the region’s conflicts have not only failed, but have often been counter-productive.

B. This research will hence explicitly stimulate a renewed debate about the role of the people of the Horn of Africa themselves-the Somalis especially, their role as indigenous actors, mechanisms that worked in some places that should be replicated in other places so that those who may have participated in the creation of the conflict will themselves become workers in transforming conflicts into peace.

C. Effective local experiences of peace making and peace building is strengthened and tailored into an approach of peace culture which is then possible to be promoted among communities in the hall region. Locally owned actions are the most sustainable solutions for local conflicts and those participated in the creation of problems are then key participants for solving it.

D. International actors must learn and adopt community bottom up peace building initiatives rather than introducing top down resolutions, also successful examples of community based peace buildings is replicable elsewhere.
1.6. Significance of the Study

Researchers and practitioners have begun to discuss the role of local mechanisms in creating a sustainable peace. Attention has been paid to increasing importance of public participation within the broad field of planning for sustainability, but there has been little attention paid to assess on the impact of the already existing mechanisms and also developing lessons learned, challenges and practical protocols. For example, whilst participation is considered to be the foundation of most of the sustainable peace process, it is not necessarily linked to it is original traditions and indigenous experiences as well as local ways of conducting problem solving, it is rather assumed as process which governments and regional entities are using for a variety of methods to reach out to communities to improve public participation.

The researcher is aware that number of other researchers have studied similar or related topics including a general study on local ways of decision making call Xeer-dhaqameed which explains traditional ways of solving local problems, it is also true that some researchers have recently started to look in to ways of transforming the Guurti house in to a formal one, however the researcher is not aware of any research that have studied these mechanisms as a cultural and indigenous systems that contributes to peace building in the region, hence this research.

A change in the culture of involving local actors and mechanisms in the process of peace building means changing from only participation (led by the planning
authority and built around the assumption that their plan already represents a basis for consensus) to adopting what is working in the same local contexts and rather building on it.

This research will therefore bring new dimensions to the peace building process and will challenge the international community and international systems, it will indicate how local problems can only be sustainably addressed by local solutions and that peace does not necessary come with peace keeping missions but from within communities and traditional leaders and local systems.

Policy makers, regional and international organizations as well as politicians will benefit from this research, also those interested in further studies in the horn and Somalia will gain both information and ideas for their future studies.

1.7. Scope of the Study

This research is a study that will enable the researcher to qualify for PHD in the field of peace and conflict studies, and though it will touch some elements of the overall peace, peace culture and conflict dynamics of the Horn of Africa it will centrally focus on Somalia and it is peace and conflict situation. The scope of the research will particularly study the Somalis local mechanisms in building sustainable peace and transforming conflicts and for that it will give an emphasis to the Guurti system in Somali Land, these systems may go beyond borders within the region and or link
up with other practices in the region and thus the research will refer to the region, however the topic of the research is clearly about those mechanisms in the Somali communities. The research will mainly cover the period from 2005 to 2010.

1.8. Limitation of the Study

As any other project this research will have challenges and as such the actual challenges will be listed at the accomplishment of research, however some of the challenges that are expected to come against the research and or the researcher as well as participants includes the following:

- Communication and travel: as different persons and groups will participate in this research, it will be a challenge to easily communicate with all relevant actors of this research and some time it may not be possible to travel to some of the locations due to security and or access matters. To overcome to this challenge, the researcher will establish information focal points on most of the areas that participants or targeted groups are living in, therefore those focal points will follow up with persons that may not communicate and respond to e-mails, also the researcher will find different ways of organizing contacts such as skype, google, phone to get hold of persons and also may travel to some locations if required.
• Economic challenges: Organizing and facilitating practical research such as engaging with people organizing face to face meetings as well as gathering answers through questioners could be an expensive business and as such the researcher will mobilize some personal funding for such activities.

• Availability of experts and Think – tanks: Some of the persons that are proposed to participate in this research are officials and some are key community leaders therefore securing their time may not be easy and some may not actually actively participate, hence the researcher will make all the efforts to establish close contacts and exercise motivational approaches that may encourage them contribute such as raising interested questions etc.

1.9 Ethical Considerations
Like any other professional and academicals research the researcher is committed to ensure that sources of information are referred to and if classified information is kept as agreed with the source, but also respect identity related matters and describe sensitive information’s as appropriate. The researcher will comply international researching principles and will ensure that topics and finding are presented to the truth no matter things agree with the research direction or not. In brief all ethics and necessary protocols will be preserved.
CHAPTER TWO

Theoretical framework and Literature Review.

2.1. Conceptual Framework and the Concept of Conflict

In this section, definition of the concept of conflict will be provided. Through this definition an attempt will be made to understand why some conflicts are different from others. Although the focus will be on the inter-state dimension of conflicts, other level of conflict will also be highlighted & defined. According to Johan Burton (1990: 2), conflicts are “behaviors that have the potential of being destructive of persons, properties and systems”. For him, the issues that lead to conflict are not the ordinary ideas, theories, preferences and interests about which debates and negotiations are conducted as part of normal social life. 

The focuses are rather deeply rooted in human behavior. In other words, conflicts are expressed through the manner in which people react to differences and reflect their frustrations concerning each other’s behaviors. Burton further links conflict to power, and as such, for him a conflict would be, “a situation in which authorities or power is being exercised without the approval of those over whom it is being exercised” (Burton 1990: 126).

Burton (1989: 99) further contends that:
“Conflict may not be over material goods and symbols that cannot be shared, but over commonly held or universal goals such as identity, recognition, absence of control through effective participation, security and such basic needs that are a part of the human development process.”

What Burton seems to be emphasizing is that when people’s aspiration is frustrated in a given situation by others irrespective of whether they are close to them or not, whether they involve power or material interest, it becomes difficult to reconcile interests involved in such situations. On the other hand, James Lave (1989: 17) defined conflict as the:

“natural competition between two or more parties about scarce resources, power and prestige. Parties in conflict believe they have incompatible goals, and their aim is to neutralize, gain advantage over, injure or destroy another.”

For the above definitions, a conflict may be regarded as differences between and among individuals. These differences are further complicated by the nature of the conflict, mostly over goals, power values, motives, ideas, and resources. In the Africa context, conflict is often related to resources: power struggles, and in some cases the marginalization of the minority by the majority or vice versa, or political manipulation of the less developed groups by the sophisticated elite. In case of intra
conflicts, the outcome often tends to be a conflict between the central government and the regions.

The demands for equal participation in the government or recognition of groups interests by the ruling group are some of the causes of most conflict in Africa and these seem to fall within the framework of Burton and Lave’s definitions of conflict. Johan Galtung provides another definition of conflict. He states that “an action system is said to be in conflict if the system has two or more incompatible goal-states.” Galtung (1978: 434).

In this system, the distinction is made between action-systems consisting of individuals and collectivities and another distinction is made between inter-and intra-system conflicts. Individuals in this system represent human beings and collectivities represents nations. Galtung (1978: 434) define intra-system conflict as: “a conflict that can be found in the smallest subunits of the system down to the individual actors, whereas inter-system conflict splits the system in parts, each system standing for its own goal-state.”

On the other hand, Galtung (1978: 438) defines the conflict behavior approach as being “concerned with the behavior of the persons in this particular situation.” Morton Deaston (1991) present another definition of conflict. According to Deaston, “conflict is a pervasive aspect of existence that occurs at all levels of social life, the interpersonal inter group, inter-organizational and international” (Deatson 1991:
According to him, most conflicts are mixed motive conflicts, in which the parties have both cooperative and competitive interests. In other words, a conflict can be constructive as well as destructive (Deatson 1991: 27).

From this perspective conflict may be defined as a process that originates when one individual perceives that another party has frustrated, or is about frustrate, some goal or concern of his or hers. In general, five types of conflicts may be distinguished: intra-personal (with in the self), interpersonal (between individuals), intra group (with in group) inter-group, (between groups), and international (between states or nations) (Borisoff and Victor 1989: 1-2). On the other hand, Demis Sandole defines conflict as a dynamic phenomenon a Manifest Conflict Process (MCP), comprised of phase of initiation, escalation, controlled maintenance, abatement, and termination /resolution” (Sandole 1993: 6).

In this context, a conflict is a process that has to go through certain specific stages. Each stages may be independent from or related to the one before it or the one it follows. While the cause of some conflicts in Africa tend to be rooted in material or political interests, at later stages of their progresses, some motives or interests become more important than others do, such as the ethnic group’s survival or preservation of the group’s dignity and prestige. This is often the case particularly in the instance relating to intra and inter-group conflicts (Sandole 1993: 6).
Equally the crisis of the state, feeds into the conflicts and insecurities there. All these factors require more scientific and critical studies of the conflicts and their regional dynamics. This volume seeks to contribute to the provision of tools those scholars, policy makers and concerned actors need in their search of scientific and critical, context sensitive studies, relevant and well formulated policies and regional outlook, making concerted and rigorous efforts to find viable and durable solution to these extensive and intractable conflicts and insecurities. The intra-and interstate conflicts very easily spill across international boundaries triggering conflict between states, resulting in inter-state conflicts. In recent decades’ interstate conflicts have been steadily waning, while intra-state conflicts have increased (Goor et al. 1996, Fearon and Latin 2003; Smith 2004; Zeleza 2008).

2.2. Defining Intra-State and Interstate Conflicts in the Horn of Africa Region

- Defining Intra-State and Inter-State Conflicts Patterns:

Conflicts as a social phenomenon in the Horn of Africa are widely perceived to be part of daily life (Axt et al. 2006: 19). Its manifestation, however, varies contingent on a number of factors contestation, the actors involved, duration, and accessibility to conflict-sustaining technology and so on. Concerning the origin of conflicts two approaches are provided (Axt et al. 2006). The subjective and the objective. While the objective approach traces the origin of conflict in the HoA region to the socio-
political fabric and structure of the society, the subjective approach attributes the origin of conflicts to the perceived incompatibility of goals and difference (Deutsch 1991).

Underlying this understanding is that in order for conflict to exist, there should be position difference or interest opposition between groups over certain values (Axt et al. 2006: 6). Conflicts are broadly categorized into two groups, the violent and a none violent. More specifically, five types of conflicts are described latent conflict, manifest conflict and crisis, and sever crisis and war. The first two are assumed to be nonviolent, the others are classified as engaging in violence.

A further distinction is made between intra-state and interstate conflicts:

- ‘intra-state wars, fought between two or more state members of the inter-state system;
- civil wars, fought within the “microprobe” of a member state of the system by forces of the regime against an insurgent group “(Sarkees etal 2003: 58).

This definition rests on the political status of the combatants. If they are recognized member of the international state system, but is located within a recognized state, the conflict is defined as intra-state or civil. Concerning intra-state conflicts Sarkees etal. (2003: 59) note- Intra-state wars are now those between or among two or more groups within the internationally recognized territory of the state.
They include civil war (involving the state government and a none state actors) and intra-communal conflicts (involving two or more groups, none of which is the state government). For the last 50 years the Horn of Africa has suffered protracted chronic and complex intra and inter-state conflicts (Cliffe 2004: 151).

These conflicts fall into three categories: State and society: state-state; and society-society. While state-society conflicts relate to civil wars (communities with legitimate grievances challenge the state), state-state are conflicts between sovereign states. The third type of society-society, concerns communal strife (intra-communal and inter-communal, under the shadow of the state. What all types of conflict have in common is that the underpinning source is the state (Cliffe 2004: 151). A fragile state or state crisis in the Horn of Africa has become the source of conflict and insecurity.

2.3. Causes of Conflicts in the Horn of Africa

It is no exaggeration-to state that conflicts the world over are characterized by numerous causes. Further, they are embedded in the socio economic, politico-cultural, historical identity constructions and experiences of the societies, the societies’ relation with local, national, regional and international actors. This multiple context of causality shows that there is no single explanation to the conflicts in the Horn of Africa, as things seem complicated than assumed. Conflict causalities
are categorized into root, proximate and tertiary causes (Singer 1996). Some of the commonly alluded to causes are: territory, ideology, religion, language, ethnicity, self-determination, access to resources. Market, dominance, equality and revenge (Singer 1996).

In reference to interstate conflict, Pfetsch and Rohloff (2000) identify nine items, which historically constituted the cause of conflicts between states. These are territory (border), secession, de-colocalization, autonomy, system (ideology, national, power, regional predominance, international power and resources. None the less, there seems to be a broad consensus among scholars that the classical cause of conflict is territory (Axt et al. 2006: 12).

Relative Deprivative Theory (Gurr 1970) also attributes conflicts to a group’s expected or actual access to prosperity and power. Relative Depurative theory is closely connected to group entitlement theory (Hoyowitz, 1985), which attributes conflicts to ethnic identification (Smith 2004: 5) others theories that seek causes of conflicts include: poor economic condition theory, repressive political system theory and environmental degradation theory (Smith 2004: 7). Inequality and Marginalization theories locate the causes of conflict in social relation in which certain groups are subjected to grave injustices and chronic marginalization. People, therefore, engage in conflict not only because they see it is fair but because they see no alternative to alleviate their plight.
The drivers of conflicts are internal as much as they are external as they entail international, regional, national and local actors and networks which are at the sometime social, economic, political and military (Zeliza 2008: 15).

The causes of the conflicts in the Horn of Africa are: -

- Livelihood – Based resources (land, water, grazing, pasture).
- Culture (ethnicity, language, religion).
- Politics (power, inequality, domination, discrimination, marginalization, and alienation).
- External intervention (colonial, cold war, regional, the war on the territory and piracy).
- Life style (peasantry, sedentary, pastoral, nomadic, highland, lowland).
- Dysfunctional governance practices (absence of democracy, accountability, transparency; tyranny; dictatorship; sham and) or unrepresentative electoral practice; alienation, and marginalization of local indigenous institutions and practices, state legitimacy deficiency).
- Under development (lack of industrialization, investment; agricultural, pastoral and agro-pastoral economy; primary goods export, pre-capitalist economic dominance).

Combinations of some or all of these explain the conflicts that the Horn of Africa is experiencing. If we take, the Darfur conflict as an example, we can easily see that a

2.4. Theoretical framework of the sources of conflicts

The major objective of this sub-section is to look at some of the theories of the sources of conflicts which are relevant to the conflict pattern in the Horn of Africa countries. In the argument of this research; - The analysis and understanding of the pertinent theories of sources of conflict is, highly imperative so as to understanding and comprehended the prevailing conflict in the Horn of Africa.

Generally speaking, it is suggested that the following are major reasons as to why policy-makers, actors and analysts can benefit from insights of conflict theories. First there is a fundamental assumption that theory is not simply an abstraction. Nor does it exist in isolation from the policy realm. Theory building closely follows the course of world politics. It often reflects our desire not only to explain change and problems, but also to provide better solution to problems of world order.

The first, theory reflects the accumulated wisdom of a discipline by building on comparisons between actors, events and outcomes in many different parts of the
world. As such theory can help us to learn from experience of others, and overcome the parochialism that often characterized the policy maker’s mental universe. Second, theory provides us with alternative lenses for explaining events and responding to them. However, it doesn’t mean that theories furnish precise answers to all problems and questions. But they are indispensable instruments which help us to organize our thinking about them and formulate our reaction to events. Theories also help us anticipate; if not always predict exactly, the course of events in the world politics. In the section that follows, few major theoretical perspectives will be outlined and used as analytical framework to explain the conflict patterns in the Horn of Africa and below is a brief account of each theory. These theories are the social learning theories and relative deprivation theory. Although they do not exhaust the variety of theoretical framework in conflicts, this study would limit to these two theories, as they are similar in the conflict in the Horn of Africa.

- **Human Nature and Violence**

Violence is deeply entrenched in the human nature itself and the unconscious human urge is widely used as a factor to explain the relationship between the innate potential and drive for violence behavior (Jeong, 2000:65). Some even extend their
arguments for there to the point that violence behavior originates in our animals past (Jeong, 2000:65).

Among the proponents of this theory biologists and psychologists have used animal behavior or ethological studies to illustrate possible corollaries to human behavior (cunning harm. www.cain.ulst.ac.uk). However, this theory was discredited later on by various theorists and scientists and the conference which was conducted in 1986 in Seville, Spain laid the ground for the proliferation of new theories. John E. mack Seville statement of violence as follows: In the Seville statement the signatories, who include psychologists, neuroscientists, geneticists, anthropologists, and political scientists, declared that there was on the basis of biological nature, Rather they said, war is a result of socialization and conditioning a phenomena of human organization, planning and information processing that plays on emotional and motivational potentialities.

In short the Seville statement implies that we have real choices and that a new kind of responsibility in the conduct of human group is possible. According to the statement of the above conference, the root cause of human conflict are to be found within nurture (the environment non nature (genetic) and debate pirating to the relationship between the nature and conflict become far from over.
The Frustration-Aggression Theory

According to the frustration aggression hypothesis human beings as goal oriented organisms, naturally become aggressive when they are prevented from achieving what they desire (Jeong, 200:76). Deep rooted conflicts are caused by unmet or frustrated basic human needs – physical. Psychological and social (Fisher and et al, 200: 8). As natural blocked up energy seeks release, and aggressive action is directed to the sources of one’s frustration (Jeong, 200: 76). The fundamental tenets of his theory emanates from the proposition that all aggression whether interpersonal or international, have their root caused in the frustration of one or more actors goal achievement (Cunningham, 1998: www.cain.ulst.ac.uk).

This is to mean that conflict erupted due to the un-fulfillment of 20 personal or group objectives and the frustration that this breeds. Since the demand for basic human needs has always exceeded the supply, all human conflict can be traced to an actor’s failure to obtain what is needs. According to the proponents of this theory, the frustration. Aggression hypothesis rests on the basic stimulus response. Individuals resort to their existence.

In line with this Dollord et al (1993) argued that the occurrence of aggressive behavior always presupposes the existence of frustration and contra wise, that the existence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression. However, there is a common argument among the proponent of this theory that wide spread frustration
among the population can be manipulated by political leaders in direct hostilities toward minority groups within a society or foreign countries. Some may argue that Hitler’s effect on Jews and others ethnic minorities (in Europe) were used to divert the public attention away from bad economic condition in the early 1930s, (Jeong, 2000: 76). However, the extent to which such frustration generates aggression or lead to violent conflict is uncertain, Glossop (200: 76).

- **The social learning theory**

Social learning theory is based on the assumption that aggression in not inherently entrenched in the nature of human being. It is rather something which is adopted from the environment in which we live in. To cite Cunningham (1998: www.cain.ulst.ac.uk) aggression is not innate or instinctual but actually learned through the process of socialization and one enquires aggressive attributes by learning them at home, in school and by interaction with their environment in general. This proposition is the most important pillar of the Seville statement, proponents of this theory have tried to understand the relationship between the individual, its environment and how it is related to group aggression.

Socialization in conflict prone area like Horn Africa is believed to have a negative impact on psychological makeup of the people especially on teenagers and younger adults. Children, who growth – up watching their parents and neighbors being
hassled by the police, army or “other” community often become petrol bomb wield teens (1998: www.cain.ulst.ac.uk).

This is the peculiar characteristic of despotic and non-democratic government, where the arbitrary arrest and killing is a norm. It cats were raised from almost never kill rats when they grow up (Kuo, 1961, 43) and vice versa would be a relevant parable which could explain the condition in at most Horn states.

Odero (2002: 124) also claims that the influence of trauma on generation need to be regarded as a key to many conflicts. He further pushed his argument by saying that the children of parents traumatized by war are likely to become active players in the future violent conflicts (Odero, 2002: 124).

- **Relative Deprivation Theory**

The Relative Deprivation theory is closely associated with the frustration aggression theory in that this theory stress that sometimes people perceived creates the inter groups hostility rather the actual relative status of the two groups (Draman, 2003: 9). This theory assumes the deep rooted conflict is caused by unmet or frustrated basic human needs physical, psychological and social (Fisher et al, 2000; 8). Relative Deprivation emanates from the failure to fill the gap between ever rising expectation and the absence of progressive towards better human life. According to Jeong (2000: 69) it is the intolerable gab between expected reality of life condition serves as a pre- condition for wide spread invest. This is also defined as “as actor”
perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities (Jeong 2000: 69).

This is particularly true in most developing countries where an individual or collective sense of entitlement performance coupled with distribution of wealth has been one of the most important cause of the conflict in developing countries.

Jeong. (2000: 69) has tried to show the relationship between uneven distribution of wealth and conflict in the coupled with uneven distribution of wealth and power, tends to generate feelings of a growing gap between un materialized and perceptions about exiting economic, social and political conditions.

Such as assumptions and feelings which are effectively manipulated by political leaders in pursuit in their political agenda are the root causes of social invest in most of the Horn of Africa. Conflict and the demands for justice are also diametrically related. The quests for genuine justices are expressed in terms of demands for political right, demand for session and independence, demand for political participation, demand for economic right, and the demand for social, culture religions rights. (Kinfe, 1999: 15-17).

Hence, the demands for the above political and human rights are the major causes of conflict in countries of the Horn of Africa. The goals of work based on this theory are to assist conflicting parties to identify and share their unmet needs, generate
options for meeting those needs and to reach agreements that meet the basic human needs of all the sides (Fisher, 2000: 8).

- **Social Identity theory**

Common history, traditions, languages, beliefs and values are the basic and objective criteria that distinguish one group from another and are also maintained by shared culture transmitted over generation as explained by the primordial and elements of myths, memories, values and symbols are used to close ethnic group. (Jeong, 2000: 71).

This theory assumes that conflict is caused by feelings of threatened identity, often rooted in unresolved past loss and suffering (Fisher, 2000:8) Cannoningham (www.cain.vlst.ac.uk) is also of the view that identity boundaries between in groups and out- groups are established by a subjective group consciousness in order to simplify their respective external relations.

However, such wider self-awareness of their common history and destiny a weakened by social change such as modernization that often leads to competition with other communities (Jeong. 2000:71). Hence, identity can be used as instrument to purist individual and group interests. That is why ethnicity is becoming the source of conflict in most part of the world. Political parties vying for political power most of the time used ethnic affiliation as an instrument to mobilize popular support.
This argument is further strengthened by Jeong (2000: 72) that identity are manipulated to maintain the power of a dominate group and justify discrimination against others groups in education and employment. This is manifested by the assumed physical and intellectual superiority of one group of human being over another category of people of different which use biological trait as a basis of subjugation (Kinge, 199: 8-6).

However ethnic and religious differences are not in themselves cause of conflict and ethnic communities may remain passive and immobilized for long periods. The salience of group identity is awakened by social derived inequality in material well—being or political access. Racial or ethnic distinctions are deepened by the denial of political participation as well as lack of physical and economical security. Discriminatory treatment along with repressive state control generates group grievances. Political and material demands reflect their efforts to seek justice for members of their groups (Teong, 200: 72).

The goals of work based on the identity theory are build empathy and reconciliation between the parties through facilitated workshops and dialogue for conflicting parties to identify threats and fear they each feel and to build empathy, and jointly reach agreement that recognize the core identity needs of all parties (Fisher et al 200:8).
2.5. Review of Related literature

Understanding the ways in which violence might be erupted, prevented, managed and resolved or transformed made it the most important topic in the modern societies (Clements, www.cain.ulst.ac.uk). Therefore, many scholars in the field have identified various causes of conflict entrenched in the economic, political; social and cultural spiritual world. Most of them also involve more than one cause (Linda & et al 2005: 495). The following are the most important sources of conflict wither relevant to this study, inter alia:

Political System as a source of conflict Political systems adopted by government are considered as one of the major source of intra and interstate conflicts especially in countries ruled by autocratic and nondemocratic political systems or within systems that are in transition (Clements, www.cain.u/st.ac.uk).

Although adoption of autocratic and non-democratic political systems seems to be an internal domain of state, most of the time spilled over to neighboring countries and become source of conflicts. In reinforcing this argument, Clements (www.cai.ulst.ac.uk) further accentuated those interims of established democracies for example, only 12% were involved in civil war where as 45% of one 24 party dictatorship were involved in civil war and 30% of state with transitional or uncertain democracies were involved in civil war.
The lack of commitment of leaders to instill genuine democratic system is also one major cause of conflict in the post-cold war African context with regards to this Odunuga (2001: 48) has forwarded the following: While it is accepted that most of the leaders of modern Africa accepted the notion of democracy when bidding for leadership, they have not been able to establish a political environment that could have allowed for the development of a political culture that would be devoid of intolerance, distrust extremism, and violence.

This in a clear manifestation of the idea propelled by the American political philosophers, Hanna Arendt, who lived from 1906 – 1975 that “the most radical revolutionary will become conservation on the day after revolution”. Hence the quest for a democratic order is the cause of the inter & intra state conflict in the contemporary.

World order -in Africa in general and the Horn of Africa in particular. The internal challenges for any government today emanates from their subjects who are either dissatisfied with the performance of the incumbent government with regards to the internal cause of conflict participation of third annual African Governance Forum (AGF III) which was conducted from June 28-30/ 2001 in Bamako, Mali identified the major cause of internal conflict in Africa today as follows: -

“... the breakdown of governance resulting from the manipulations of ethnic religious, and others societal differences by power elites’ poor
governance practices such as a lack of accountability and transparency produce cultures of miss management, rent seeking and impunity. The protected efforts such as policies as systematic exclusion, socio economic marginalization, disregard for the rule of law and violation of human rights often trigger or exacerbate conflict. Failures in developing a share vision for a United Nations amid communal and other diversity or in augmenting and utilizing the social capital inherent in traditional institution and practices can also undermine national cohesion and lead to internal conflict and state collapse.”

(AGF, Final Report P.25).

A conflict over who controls the National Government has also international dimensions. The external dimensions emanate from neighboring countries who are not happy with the united Nation and other international organization which prohibited the interference of states in the internal affairs of any state, in practice often have strong interests in the governments of others states and use a variety of means of leverage to influence who holds power in those state (Goldstien, 2001: 2011).

As a result, today many states are in conflict due to interference in the internal affairs of others states. Such efforts may extend from a simple manipulation or influence on anther state’s elections at other times, a stare supports rebel
elements that seek to overthrow the second states constitutional order altogether (Goldstien, 2001: 211).

With regard to this, professor Adebayo Adedegi (2001: 3) has put a very typical example, which is worth mentioning: More often than not, it manifests itself more in a bilateral rather than a multilateral form. Examples are South Africa in Lesotho, Senegal in Guinea Bissau and although it is often ferociously denied Ethiopia, Uganda, and Eritrea individually, and surreptitiously jointly, in Southern Sudan. For this project to succeed, the US government poured considerable amount of resources interims of weapon, financial support and military training for the aforementioned country replacing the proxy wars of the cold war. However, the effort of the US government wasted in vain shortly without yielding the intended result due to the border conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

The involvement of a number of neighboring states mainly Uganda, Rwanda & Burundi, in the internal affairs of Democratic Republic of Cong (DRC is also a classical example of such type of conflicts.

- **Ethnicity as a source of conflict**

Chirot in [in Monney] (2005: 497) identified five level of ethnic conflicts, inter alia: multi ethnic societies without serious conflict (e.g. Switzerland),
multiethnic societies without controlled conflict (e.g. United States and Canada) societies with ethnic conflict that has been controlled (e.g. South Africa) societies with serious ethnic conflict leading of warfare (e.g. Sri Lanka) and societies with genocidal ethnic conflict including “ethnic cleansing” (e.g. Rwanda & Kosovo). However, the mere existence of several ethnic groups in any given societies cannot be the source of conflict by itself unless manipulated by the urban elites and politicians in pursuit of their respective interests.

However, it is the lack of satisfactory political arrangements, which accommodate the interests, and aspiration of most ethnic groups, it is not all (big and small alike) that made ethnic pluralism a major source of conflicts that have ruined social cohesion in many African countries (Odunuga 2001: 42). According to Goldstien (2001: 220): Thus it would be very safe to inter from the above propositions that it is the existence of such practices that in most of the cases.

Ethnic pluralism triggered and ignited ethnic hatred, which final led to deadly conflicts either to protect power and privilege or to challenge such power and privilege (Clements. ww.cain.ulst.ac.uk).

Hence ethnic conflicts have been one of the horrifying sources of conflict that human being witnessed in the aftermath of the cold war starting from the ex-
republics of the former USSR, Yugoslavia and Albania in eastern and central Europe to Rwanda and Burundi in central Africa and currently in western Sudan. If not managed amicably and meticulously, seeds of such conflicts and also being planted in the Ethiopian soil especially in the aftermath of the May 7, 2005 election.

- **The economic factors as a source of conflict**

The resource based conflict in Africa are of two broad categories namely these conflicts over scarce resources such as grazing land and water and those over abundant resources such as the mineral rich in the democratic republic of Congo (DRC) which attracted external interventions during the cold war period.

Conflict over economic resources and distribution of wealth within and among state is the most important source of international conflicts in Africa (Goldstein, 2001: 214). Odunga (2001: 46) stated the economic factors are a major cause of conflicts in Africa. The further pushed his argument that since politics and economics are interwined, it is inevitable that the distribution of wealth plays a major role in determining political stability in any society Odunga (2001: 46).

Aristotle many years ago also expressed the relationship between economy and violence stating that “poverty is the parent of crime and revolution” hence
poverty aggravate in Horn of Africa without any exceptions Odunuga (2001: 46). Although, currently there is a big debate about the relation between economic factors and peace, it is clear that most modern wars are concentrated in the poorest countries (Clements. www.cain.ulst.ac.uk).

Out of the entire countries classified as having low development by the 1997-2001 and only 2% of those countries classified as having high development experienced civil war in the same period (Clements, www.cain.ulst.ac.uk). To strength the above argument the World Bank in its report entitled “Breaking the conflict Trap – civil war and Development policy” enumerated that war causes poverty but poverty also increases the likelihood of civil war.

According the above report of the bank, countries with low economic performance are most likely to be exposed to dangerously could not be exception to this scenario. The current Ethio- Eritrean conflict, the crises in western Sudan and problem in Somalia are mainly attributed to economic situation of these countries. According to Odunuga (2001: 46)

One other common cause of conflict is conflict over scarce land, water and other natural resources in which competing groups go to great lengths to acquire for themselves are also very rampat. This is also the case in the Horn of Africa where scarce and strategic resources such as vital minerals and oil
(as in the case of the Sudan) and water (as in the case of the Nile basin countries are the source of intra and interstate conflict respectively.

With regard to water resource Tvedt (1992: 80) has expressed the situation in the Nile basin as follows:

…. imbalance between water contribution and water use will become increasingly contentious in the Blue Nile basin as a result of demographic economic and development factors which are more or less independent of the will of the leaders of the countries concerned. Skillful and practical state management in all the riparian states is required if open hostilities and water war are to avoided and negotiations and successful basin wide agreements achieved. Hence in the absence of such mechanisms and arrangement there might be a possibility of entering in to a basin wide conflict trap. The current Darfur crises is mainly attributed to a conflict over a grazing land between the black Africans and Arabs. The conflicts elsewhere in Africa for example neighboring countries are typical example worth mentioning.

- **Conflict over Territory**

There cannot be little doubt that territories have a profound impact of the needs that states feel the threat they perceived, the prospect they have and the relations they have with their neighboring countries. This is because the state value home territory with in an almost fanatical devotion and as a result border
dispute tend to be among the most intractable in International relation (Goldstein, 2001: 203).

The most common conflict that arise from territorial conflicts and or in secession interstate borders, territorial waters and airspace (Kinfe, 1998: 10) are a case in point. Un-demarcations leading to forceful territorial claims are also the major source of conflicts (Kinfe, 1998:10), Terrorism as well have become recently a source of conflict. The basic definition of Terrorism is a controversial since it has political motivation. One person’s freedom fighter is anthers terrorist (Goldstein, 2001: 236). However, it is not a new phenomenon in human experience and it has come as one of the most serious threats to international peace and security in the aftermath of the cold war era (Kinfe, 2005). Terrorism, according to above authors in the premeditated use or threatened use of violence by an individual or group to gain a political or social objective, to demoralize civilian population in order to use its discontent as leverage on national government or other parties to a conflict (Goldstien 2001: 236). Linda (2005: 498) also put it very succinctly, it may be used to publicize a cause, promote an ideology, achieve religious freedom, and attain the release of a political prisoner or rebel against a government. Terrorism however is characterized by the use of violence against civilians. With the expressed desire of causing terror or panic in the population are
distinguished from other form of violent conflicts, which targeted state apparatus and the military (Kinfe 2005). The tactics that these groups employ to secure recognitions of their social and political needs always rely on surprise, cunning and probing for vulnerability in the powerful (Clements www.cain.ulst.ac.uk).

It employed a Variety of tactics, including assassinations, sky jacking, suicide bombings, armed attacks, kidnapping and hostage taking threats, and various forms of bombing (Linda 2005: 498). Terrorism can also be international and local. The former type of terrorism involves international terrorist groups, which target foreign countries and their respective institutions, governments, or citizens (Linda 2005: 498).

The Bombings of the premises of the US Embassy in Kenya and Tanzania and the assassination attempt on the life of the Egyptian president in Addis Ababa are typical example or international terrorism attacks. Terrorism in the national political of countries is not clear whether it is source of conflict or a means of leverage to influence the incumbent government to yield to the demands of the groups engaged in such acts. Hence, the reluctance to engage with actors defined by one side as “terrorists or to address issues that motivate political violence threatens to increase intra state and global conflicts.
CHAPTER THREE
DELINEATION OF VARIABLES

In order to articulate a comprehensive understanding of the challenges of conflict resolution in the horn of Africa and the important role traditional mechanisms can play in bringing about sustainable long term peace it is important to examine the range of variables which have affected conflict resolution in the region within the context of the concept of peace and conflict studies and its history.

3.1. Peace and Conflict Studies: A Brief History

Peace and conflict studies is both a pedagogical activity, in which teachers transmit knowledge to students; and a research activity, in which researchers create new knowledge about the sources of conflict. Peace and conflict studies is a social science field that identifies and analyses violent and nonviolent behaviours as well as the structural mechanisms attending conflicts (including social conflicts) with a view towards understanding those processes which lead to a more desirable human condition.

A variation on this, peace studies (irenology), is an interdisciplinary effort aiming at the prevention, de-escalation, and solution of conflicts by peaceful means, thereby seeking 'victory' for all parties involved in the conflict. This is in contrast to war studies (polemology) which has as its aim on the efficient attainment of victory in
conflicts, primarily by violent means to the satisfaction of one or more, but not all, parties involved.

Disciplines involved may include political science, geography, economics, psychology, sociology, international relations, history, anthropology, religious studies, and gender studies, as well as a variety of others (Haries, 1989).

Peace and conflict studies entails understanding the concept of peace which is defined as political condition that ensures justice and social stability through formal and informal institutions, practices, and norms,(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/, 9th June 2013).

Academics and students in the world's oldest universities have long been motivated by an interest in peace. American student interest in what we today think of as peace studies first appeared in the form of campus clubs at U.S. colleges in the years immediately following the American Civil War. Similar movements appeared in Sweden in the last years of the 19th century, as elsewhere soon after. These were student-originated discussion groups, not formal courses included in college curricula.

The First World War was a turning point in Western attitudes to war. At the 1919 Peace of Paris where the leaders of France, Britain and the USA (led by Georges Clemenceau, David Lloyd George and Woodrow Wilson) met to decide the future of Europe, Wilson proposed his famous Fourteen Points for peacemaking.
These included breaking up European empires into nation states and the establishment of the League of Nations. These moves, intended to ensure a peaceful future, were the background to a number of developments in the emergence of Peace and Conflict Studies as an academic discipline but they also, as Keynes presciently pointed out, laid the seeds for future conflict, (John Maynard Keynes, 1920).

The founding of the first chair in International Relations (at Aberystwyth University, Wales), whose remit was partly to further the cause of peace, occurred in 1919. After World War II, the founding of the UN system provided a further stimulus for more rigorous approaches to peace and conflict studies to emerge.

Many university courses in schools of higher learning around the world began to develop which touched upon questions of peace (often in relation to war) during this period. The first undergraduate academic program in peace studies in the United States was not to develop until 1948, and then only at Manchester College in Indiana, a small liberal arts college, (Abrams, 2010-11-13).

It was not until the late 1960s in the US that students concerns about the Vietnam War forced ever more universities to offer courses about peace, whether in a designated peace studies course or as a course within a traditional major. Work by academics such as Johan Galtung and John Burton, and debates in fora such as the Journal of Peace Research in the 1960s reflected the growing interest and academic stature of the field,(johansen-wallensteensted, December 30, 2013).
Growth in the number of peace studies programmes around the world was to accelerate during the 1980s, as students became more concerned about the prospects of nuclear war. As the Cold War ended, peace and conflict studies courses shifted their focus from international conflict and towards complex issues related to political violence, human security, democratization, human rights, social justice, welfare, development, and producing sustainable forms of peace (Harris, et al., 1997-07).

A proliferation of international organizations, agencies and international NGOs, from the UN, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, European Union, and World Bank to International Crisis Group, International Alert, and others, began to draw on such research, (Hugh Miall, 2005).

Agendas relating to positive peace in European academic contexts were already widely debated in the 1960s, (J., 1971). By the mid-1990s peace studies curricula in the US had shifted "...from research and teaching about negative peace, and the cessation of violence, to positive peace, the conditions that eliminate the causes of violence. As a result, the topics had broadened enormously. By 1994, a review of course offerings in peace studies included topics such as: "north-south relations"; "development, debt, and global poverty"; "the environment, population growth, and resource scarcity"; and "feminist perspectives on peace, militarism, and political violence, (Harris, et al., 1997-07)."
There is now a general consensus on the importance of peace and conflict studies amongst scholars from a range of disciplines in and around the social sciences, as well as from many influential policymakers around the world. Peace and conflict studies today is widely researched and taught in a large and growing number of institutions and locations.

The number of universities offering peace and conflict studies courses is hard to estimate, mostly because courses may be taught out of different departments and have very different names. The International Peace Research Association website gives one of the most authoritative listings available.

A 2008 report in the *International Herald Tribune* mentions over 400 programmes of teaching and research in peace and conflict studies, noting in particular those at the United World Colleges, Peace Research Institute (Oslo), the American University, University of Bradford, the UN mandated Peace University UPEACE in Ciudad Colón/Costa Rica, George Mason, Lund, Michigan, Notre Dame, Queensland, Uppsala, Innsbruck/Austria, Universitat Jaume I in Castellón de la Plana (Spain), Virginia, and Wisconsin. The Rotary Foundation and the UN University (Tokyo) supports several international academic teaching and research programmes.

A 1995 survey found 136 U.S. colleges with peace studies programs: "Forty-six percent of these are in church related schools, another 32% are in large public
universities, 21% are in non-church related private colleges, and 1% are in community colleges. Fifty-five percent of the church related schools that have peace studies programs are Roman Catholic.

Other denominations with more than one college or university with a peace studies program are the Quakers, Mennonites, Church of the Brethren, and United Church of Christ. One hundred fifteen of these programs are at the undergraduate level and 21 at the graduate level. Fifteen of these colleges and universities had both undergraduate and graduate programs, (Harris, et al., 1997-07)

Other notable programmes can be found at the University of Manitoba (Canada), University of Hiroshima (Japan), University of Innsbruck (Austria), Universitat Jaume I in Castellón de la Plana (Spain), University of Sydney, University of Queensland (Brisbane), King's College (London), Sault College (Sault Ste. Marie), London Metropolitan, Sabanci (Istanbul), Marburg (Germany), Sciences Po (Paris), University of Amsterdam (The Netherlands), Otago (New Zealand), St Andrews, and York (UK).

Perhaps most importantly, such programmes and research agendas have now become common in institutions located in conflict, post-conflict, and developing countries and regions (e.g., National Peace Council (Sri Lanka), Centre for Human Rights, University of Sarajevo, Bosnia), Chulalongkorn University (Thailand), National University of Timor (Timor-Leste), University of Kabul (Afghanistan),
Makerere University, Mbarara University (Uganda), Tel Aviv University (Israel), Peace and security institute in Addis-Ababa, Peace and Development center at Bahri University at Khartoum and the Center for Studies and Culture of Peace (CSCP) at Sudan University for Science and Technology (SUST), etc.

As of today Peace and conflict studies are well established within the social sciences: it comprises many scholarly journals, college and university departments, peace research institutes, conferences, as well as outside recognition of the utility of peace and conflict studies as a method. Galtung's negative and positive peace framework is the most widely used today. Negative peace refers to the absence of direct violence. Positive peace refers to the absence of indirect and structural violence, and is the concept that most peace and conflict researchers adopt,(jacobsen, 2000).

With regard to the conceptions of peace, several models, or modes of peace have been suggested in which peace research might prosper.

- The first is that peace is a natural social condition, whereas war is not. The premise is simple for peace researchers: to present enough information so that a rational group of decision makers will seek to avoid war and conflict.
- Second, the view that violence is sinful or unskillful, and that non-violence is skillful or virtuous and should be cultivated. This view is held by a variety of religious traditions worldwide, including Islam, Peace churches within
Christianity; Jains, the Satyagraha tradition in Hinduism, Buddhism, and other portions of Indian religion and philosophy

- Third is pacifism: the view that peace is a prime force in human behavior.
- A further approach is that there are multiple modes of peace, (Wolfgang Dietrich, 2011).

There have been many offerings on these various forms of peace. Variations and additions have been developed more recently by scholars such as Raymond Aron, Edward Azar, John Burton, Martin Ceadal, Wolfgang Dietrich, Kevin Dooley, Johan Galtung, Michael Howard, Vivienne Jabri, Jean-Paul Lederach, Roger Mac Ginty, Hugh Miall, David Mitrany, Oliver Ramsbotham, Anatol Rapoport, Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, Oliver Richmond, S.P. Udayakumar, Tom Woodhouse, others mentioned above and many more. Democratic peace, liberal peace, sustainable peace, civil peace, trans-rational peace(s) and other concepts are regularly used in such work. Here below listed concepts are also some of the well-articulated concepts in the field of peace and conflict.

3.2. Galtung and the Conflict Triangle and the Horn of Africa conflict

Johan Galtung's conflict triangle works on the assumption that the best way to define peace in relation to the Horn of Africa is to define violence, its antithesis. It reflects
the normative aim of preventing, managing, limiting and overcoming violence, (Jacobsen, 2000).

- Direct (overt) violence, e.g., direct attack, massacre.
- Structural violence. Death by avoidable reasons such as malnutrition. Structural violence is indirect violence caused by an unjust structure and is not to be equated with an act of God.
- Cultural violence. Cultural violence occurs as a result of the cultural assumptions that blind one to direct or structural violence. For example, one may be indifferent toward the homeless, or even consider their expulsion or extermination a good thing.

Each corner of Galtung's triangle can relate to the other two. Ethnic cleansing can be an example of all three.

### 3.3. The Cost of War in the Horn of Africa

Cost of conflict is a tool which attempts to calculate the price of conflict to the human race. The idea is to examine this cost, not only in terms of the deaths and casualties and the economic costs borne by the people involved, but also the social, developmental, environmental and strategic costs of conflict. The approach considers direct costs of conflict, for instance human deaths, expenditure, destruction of land and physical infrastructure; as well as indirect costs that impact a society, for instance migration, humiliation, growth of extremism and lack of civil society.
Strategic Foresight Group, a think tank in India, has developed a Cost of Conflict Series for countries and regions involved in protracted conflicts. This tool is aimed at assessing past, present and future costs looking at a wide range of parameters (Futehallay, December 2007).

The normative aims of Peace Studies are conflict transformation and conflict resolution through mechanisms such as peacekeeping, peace building (e.g., tackling disparities in rights, institutions and the distribution of world wealth) and peacemaking (e.g., mediation and conflict resolution). Peace keeping falls under the sponsorship of negative peace, whereas efforts toward positive peace involves elements of peace building and peacemaking.

### 3.4. Peace-making, Peacebuilding and Peace keeping:

Peace-making refers to actions aimed at bringing two or more hostile parts to an agreement, through diplomatic negotiations and with their consent.

It is hard to define peace keeping, as like other conflict resolution instruments and it may mean different things for different users simply because operations of peace keeping can be very diversified so this description is one of the easy readable definitions, yet it is seems very focused on internationally mandated operations. A peace-keeping operation is performed for the maintenance of peace in states which the severity of the domestic situation could threaten peace and international security.
The principles governing peace-keeping missions are the consent of the parties, the non-use of force unless in self-defense and the impartiality. The missions are composed of soldiers and resources of various states, as the UN itself does not have its own army.

In the recent history (1948) Kashmir (Wille, 25. oktober 2012) and Palestine were the first places that international armed forces were used to observe cease-fires. Although not specifically mentioned in the UN Charter, the use of such forces as a buffer between warring parties pending troop withdrawals and negotiations—a practice known as peacekeeping—was formalized in 1956 during the Suez Crisis between Egypt, Israel, France, and the United Kingdom. Peacekeeping missions have taken many forms, though they have in common the fact that they are designed to be peaceful, that they involve military troops from several countries, and that the troops serve under the authority of the UN Security Council. In 1988 the UN Peacekeeping Forces were awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace (Aarvik, December 10 1988).

During the Cold War, so-called first-generation, or “classic,” peacekeeping was used in conflicts in the Middle East and Africa and in conflicts stemming from decolonization in Asia. Between 1948 and 1988 the UN undertook 13 peacekeeping missions involving generally lightly armed troops from neutral countries other than the permanent members of the Security Council—most often Canada, Sweden,
Norway, Finland, India, Ireland, and Italy. Troops in these missions, the so-called “Blue Helmets,” were allowed to use force only in self-defense. The missions were given and enjoyed the consent of the parties to the conflict and the support of the Security Council and the troop-contributing countries (Ralph R. Krueger, 2009).

With the end of the Cold War, the challenges of peacekeeping became more complex. In order to respond to situations in which internal order had broken down and the civilian population was suffering, “second-generation” peacekeeping was developed to achieve multiple political and social objectives. Unlike first-generation peacekeeping, second-generation peacekeeping often involves civilian experts and relief specialists as well as soldiers. Another difference between second-generation and first-generation peacekeeping is that soldiers in some second-generation missions are authorized to employ force for reasons other than self-defense. Because the goals of second-generation peacekeeping can be variable and difficult to define, however, much controversy has accompanied the use of troops in such missions.

In the 1990s, second-generation peacekeeping missions were undertaken in Cambodia (1991–93), the former Yugoslavia (1992–95), Somalia (1992–95), and elsewhere and included troops from the permanent members of the Security Council as well as from the developed and developing world (e.g., Australia, Pakistan, Ghana, Nigeria, Fiji, India). In the former Yugoslavia province of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Security Council created “safe areas” to protect the predominantly
Bosnian (Bosnian Muslim) population from Serbian attacks, and UN troops were authorized to defend the areas with force. In each of these cases, the UN reacted to threats to peace and security within states, sometimes taking sides in domestic disputes and thus jeopardizing its own neutrality. Between 1988 and 2000 more than 30 peacekeeping efforts were authorized, and at their peak in 1993 more than 80,000 peacekeeping troops representing 77 countries were deployed on missions throughout the world. In the first years of the 21st century, annual UN expenditures on peacekeeping operations exceeded $2 billion (Ralph R. Krueger, 2009).

In addition to traditional peacekeeping and preventive diplomacy, in the post-Cold War era the functions of UN forces were expanded considerably to include peacemaking and peace building. (Former UN secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali described these additional functions in his reports *An Agenda for Peace* [1992] and *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace* [1995]. For example, since 1990 UN forces have supervised elections in many parts of the world, including Nicaragua, Eritrea, and Cambodia; encouraged peace negotiations in El Salvador, Angola, and Western Sahara; and distributed food in Somalia. The presence of UN troops in Yugoslavia during the violent and protracted disintegration of that country renewed discussion about the role of UN troops in refugee resettlement. In 1992 the UN created the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), which provides administrative
and technical support for political and humanitarian missions and coordinates all mine-clearing activities conducted under UN auspices.

### 3.4.1 Peace building

Peace building is a term describing outside interventions that are designed to prevent the start or resumption of violent conflict within a nation by creating a sustainable peace. Peace building activities address the root causes or potential causes of violence, create a societal expectation for peaceful conflict resolution and stabilize society politically and socioeconomically. The exact definition varies depending on the actor, with some definitions specifying what activities fall within the scope of peace building or restricting peace building to post-conflict interventions. In 2007, the UN Secretary-General's Policy Committee defined peace building as follows: "Peace building involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Peace building strategies must be coherent and tailored to specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and therefore relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives(Kiran Filabta, 2011)."
Although many of peace building's aims overlap with those of peacemaking, peacekeeping and conflict resolution, it is a distinct idea. Peacemaking involves stopping an ongoing conflict, whereas peace building happens before a conflict starts or once it ends. Peace-keeping prevents the resumption of fighting following a conflict; it does not address the underlying causes of violence or work to create societal change, as peace building does. It also differs from peace building in that it only occurs after conflict ends, not before it begins. Conflict resolution does not include some components of peace building, such as state building and socioeconomic development. The tasks included in peace building vary depending on the situation and the agent of peace building.

Successful peace building activities create an environment supportive of self-sustaining, durable peace; reconcile opponents; prevent conflict from restarting; integrate civil society; create rule of law mechanisms; and address underlying structural and societal issues. Researchers and practitioners also increasingly find that peace building is most effective and durable when it relies upon local conceptions of peace and the underlying dynamics which foster or enable conflict (Coning, 2013).

Peace-building can therefore be described as the term used to post-conflict reconstruction, namely the long-term process that follows the formal peace process, that is, reconciliation building social relationships and institutions. In a broader
conception, peace-building can also mean a gradual change in attitude with regard to conflict prevention (John Le Carre, 2016).

As this research will study in chapter four peace processes have never been limited to the formal process of governments and UN but communities have practiced same actions for generations and still do, hence it must be noted that any definition that excludes the role of communities and local actors in any of the peace processes may be missing some of the points.

### 3.4.2 Criticisms on Peace and conflict concepts explained above

Though concepts presented above are internationally accepted and is used by the United Nation systems yet criticism and controversy should not be just neglected. A number of criticisms have been aimed at peace and conflict studies; and here some of the arguments and responses are presented as an example.

- Peace and Conflict concepts do not produce practical prescriptions for managing or resolving global conflicts because ideology always trumps objectivity and pragmatism.

- Are focused on putting a respectable face on Western self-loathing

- Are hypocritical because they "tacitly or openly support terrorism as a permissible strategy for the 'disempowered' to redress real or perceived grievances against the powerful" (i.e. ideological anti-Western concepts developed by social scientists such
as Johan Galtung which arguably add a sense of unjustified acceptability which is used in support of radicalism)

- Have curricula that are (according to human rights activist Caroline Cox and philosopher Roger Scruton) "intellectually incoherent, riddled with bias and unworthy of academic status" (Barbara Kay, 2009)

- Have faculty that are not fully competent in the disciplines (such as economics) whose ideas were invoked as solutions to problems of conflict;

- Have policies proposed to "eliminate the causes of violence" are uniformly leftist policies, and not necessarily policies which would find broad agreement among social scientists.

Barbara Kay, a columnist for the National Post, specifically criticized the views of the Norwegian professor Johan Galtung, who is considered to be a leader in modern peace researches. Kay wrote that Galtung has written on the "structural fascism" of "rich, Western, Christian" democracies, admires Fidel Castro, opposed resistance to the Soviet Invasion of Hungary in 1956, and has described Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Andrei Sakharov as "persecuted elite personages." Galtung has also praised Mao Zedong for "endlessly liberating" China. Galtung has also stated that the United States is a “killer country” that is guilty of “neo-fascist state terrorism” and has reportedly stated that the destruction of Washington, D. C., could be justified by
America's foreign policy. He has also compared the U.S. to Nazi Germany for bombing Kosovo during the 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. (Barbara Kay, 2009)

In the summer 2007 edition of City Journal, Bruce Bawer sharply criticized Peace Studies. He noted that many Peace Studies programs in American Universities are run by Marxist or far-left Professors. More broadly, he argued that Peace Studies are dominated by the belief that "America ... is the wellspring of the world's problems" and that while Professors of Peace Studies argue "that terrorist positions deserve respect at the negotiating table," they "seldom tolerate alternative views" and that "peace studies, as a rule, rejects questioning of its own guiding ideology." (Bruce Bawer, 2007)

Regarding his claim that Peace Studies supports violence in the pursuit of leftist ideology, Bawer cited a quote from Peace and Conflict Studies (Bruce Bawer, 2007), a widely used 2002 textbook written by Charles P. Webel and David P. Barash which praised Vladimir Lenin because he “maintained that only revolution—not reform—could undo capitalism’s tendency toward imperialism and thence to war" (Bruce Bawer, 2007).

David Horowitz has argued that Webel and Barash's book implicitly supports violence for socialist causes, noting that the book states "the case of Cuba indicates that violent revolutions can sometimes result in
generally improved living conditions for many people." Horowitz also argued that the book "treats the Soviet Union as a sponsor of peace movements, and the United States as the militaristic, imperialist power that peace movements try to keep in check" and that "the authors justify communist policies and actions while casting those of America and Western democracies in a negative light."

Horowitz also claimed that the authors discuss the Cuban Missile Crisis without mentioning its cause (i.e. the placement of the Soviet missiles in Cuba) and blame John F. Kennedy while praising Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev for "being willing to back down." Finally, Horowitz criticized the author's use of Marxist writers, such as Andre Gunder Frank and Frances Moore Lappe, as the sole basis on which to study "poverty and hunger as causes of human conflict."("One Man's Terrorist Is Another Man's Freedom Fighter" by David Horowitz, 2004)

Kay and Bawer also specifically criticized Professor Gordon Fellman, the Chairman of Brandeis University's Peace, Conflict, and Coexistence Studies Program, whom they claimed has justified Palestinian suicide-bombings against Israelis as "ways of inflicting revenge on an enemy that seems unable or unwilling to respond to rational plea for discussion and justice. (Gordon Fellman, 2002)

Katherine Kersten, who is a senior fellow at the Minneapolis-based conservative think tank Center of the American Experiment, believes that Peace Studies programs
are "dominated by people of a certain ideological bent, and are thus hard to take seriously." Robert Kennedy, a professor of Catholic studies and management at the University of St. Thomas, criticized his university's Peace Studies Program in an interview with Minneapolis Star Tribune in 2002, stating that the program employs several adjunct professors "whose academic qualifications are not as strong as we would ordinarily look for" and that "The combination of the ideological bite and the maybe less-than-full academic credentials of the faculty would probably raise some questions about how scholarly the program is.(Tom Ford and Bob von Sternberg, December 17, 2002)

3.4.3 Responses to criticisms
The views presented above have been strongly opposed by scholars who claim that these criticisms underestimate the development of detailed interdisciplinary, theoretical, methodological, and empirical research into the causes of violence and dynamics of peace that has occurred via academic and policy networks around the world.(Hugh Miall, 2005)

In reply to Barbara Kay's article, a group of Peace Studies experts in Canada responded that "Kay's...argument that the field of peace studies endorses terrorism is nonsense" and that dedicated peace theorists and researchers are distinguished by their commitment to reduce the use of violence whether committed by enemy nations, friendly governments or warlords of any stripe. They also argued that; Ms.
Kay attempts to portray advocates for peace as naive and idealistic, but the data shows that the large majority of armed conflicts in recent decades have been ended through negotiations, not military solutions. In the contemporary world, violence is less effective than diplomacy in ending armed conflict. Nothing is 100% effective to reduce tyranny and violence, but domestic and foreign strategy needs to be based on evidence, rather than assumptions and misconceptions from a bygone era. (Catherine Morris & Ben Hoffman, February 25 2009)

Most academics in the area argue that the accusations that peace studies approaches are not objective, and derived from mainly leftist or inexpert sources, are not practical, support violence rather than reject it, or have not led to policy developments, are clearly incorrect. They note that the development of UN and major donor policies (including the EU, US, and UK, as well as many others including those of Japan, Canada, Norway, etc.) towards and in conflict and post-conflict countries have been heavily influenced by such debates.

A range of key policy documents and responses have been developed by these governments in the last decade and more, and in UN (or related) documentation such as 'Agenda for Peace', 'Agenda for Development', 'Agenda for Democratization', the Millennium Development Goals, Responsibility to Protect, and the 'High Level Panel Report'. (Boutros Boutros Ghali, 1992) They have also been significant for the work of the World Bank, International Development Agencies, and a wide range of
Non-Governmental Organizations. (Paul Collier, 2003) It has been influential in the work of, among others, the UN, UNDP, UN Peace building Commission, UNHCR, World Bank, EU, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, for national donors including USAID, DFID, SIDA, NORAD, DANIDA, Japan Aid, GTZ, and international NGOs such as International Alert or International Crisis Group, as well as many local NGOs. Major databases have been generated by the work of scholars in these areas. (Paul F. Diehl Dataverse, 2007).

Finally, peace and conflict studies debates have generally confirmed, not undermined, a broad consensus (Northern and Southern) on the importance of human security, human rights, development, democracy, and a rule of law (though there is a vibrant debate ongoing about the contextual variations and applications of these frameworks, therefore it is with no doubt that peace and conflict studies are a living and knowledge oriented, dynamic and developing as human life moves on, hence studying it further and from many sides will contribute to the best interest of human beings in the world of today and probably the future.

While this research is not expected to explore details of the conceptual side of the peace and conflict study it will analyze local perspectives and concepts of conflict resolution and peace building to highlight the role of the indigenous knowledge in conflict transformation.
Chapter four here below will present the history of the Horn of Africa region, analyzing it is economic contents, politics, religion and borders so that the reader of this research will understand history of the region, strengths, and specifics, so that the current regional content of peace and conflict is linked to it is past, and then by studding both histories and backgrounds of the region as well as peace and conflict studies the research will move on to look in to local actors, its concepts and practices.
CHAPTER FOUR
Stakeholder Participation in Peace and Conflict Processes in the Horn of Africa

4.1 The Researcher and a Stakeholder

This chapter examines the various categories of stakeholders who have been involved in the peace and conflict processes in the Horn of Africa.

The researcher approached this chapter not only as a researcher but as a native person who has thrived through a lot of conflicts from early childhood stages across the Horn of Africa, and worked in conflicting zones for more than a decade. The researcher has learned that a conflict is indeed a likely element in people’s lives of this region but also believes that peace is possible, this belief is based on an experience of decades for the researcher whereby he has grown in the same conflict zone from 1972 up to date and have also worked in other regions of conflict such as Philippine, Searra-leone, Chad, and Sudan. It is worth noting that the peace and conflict study that this chapter is presenting will not address all related aspects but will deepen the topic of this research to a more regionalized approach before presenting the role of the communities and mechanisms in the grassroots level.

The following chapter of this research will therefore tailor concepts of peace and conflict through detailing patterns of war and conflict in the region and at the same time examine the affects of different elements to the peace and conflict status of the
region such as the political, economic and border issues, and assess which of these elements will be a priority for peace in the region.

Most of the experts in the region and others with a regional knowledge would agree that in recent decades the Horn of Africa was one of the most conflicted regions in the world, whereby it was estimated that the region has experienced over 200 armed conflicts since 1990 (Paul D. Williams, 2011).

By reviewing papers and articles about the horn of Africa situation and especially on Somalia it is clear that a conflict resolution and peace building lens would focus policymakers’ attention on an alternative agenda focused on issues of good governance, the rule of law, human security, and supporting local state-society complexes that work for their people rather than external interferences under the justification of terrorism, it is important to note that though this research is not concluding that an exclusive local actions are the only solutions for the Somalia conflicts it does emphasize the necessity to allow the Somalis take a lead in solving their own conflicts as international mechanisms is not succeeding with a solution.

Developing new, comprehensive and integrated approaches to building peace and resolving conflict should therefore include a real test and reflection of the conflict root causes which will then enable communities to address their own problems, Strategic priority for all actors (internal and external) concerned about the current trajectory of the region’s states and its peoples should be focused on rather
sustainable solution and not temporary interests of groups, such strategies has to come from the people of the region. To that end, this chapter should be read in conjunction with the global history and concepts of peace and conflict studies of chapter one in one side and the role of regional and local actors in making, keeping and building peace in chapter two and three.

4.2. Patterns of War and Peace in the Horn

The Horn of Africa remains one of the world’s most conflicted regions. This has contributed to some of the lowest development indicators on the planet and some of the highest levels of food insecurity and poverty. According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, since 1990, the Horn has suffered from 32 state based armed conflicts (the Horn here includes Sudan). 179 non-state armed conflicts, and 22 one-sided violence campaigns.

These state-based armed conflicts have resulted in approximately 231,510 battle related fatalities; the non-state armed conflicts have killed approximately 31,511 people; and roughly 25,264 have been massacred in the campaigns of one-sided violence. These figures do not include people killed in extrajudicial killings by the region’s governments and the many people who have died because of various traumas brought on by violence and displacement, chiefly disease, drought and malnutrition.
Although none of the Horn’s states have escaped all of these forms of political violence, the conflicts and fatalities have been dispersed highly unequally across the region. Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan have had roughly equal numbers of state based armed conflicts, but significantly more than the region’s other states.

Non-state armed conflicts in the Horn have been concentrated in Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan, with the latter two states experiencing over two-thirds of all related fatalities. Sudan and Somalia have witnessed, by far, the deadliest campaigns of one-sided violence over this period. These statistics from the Upsala conflict data reveal at least six general conclusions about recent patterns of political violence in the Horn.

First: The vast majority of armed conflicts have been of the “non-state” variety, that is, those fought between different non-state actors. In Somalia’s case, there were many years when no central government existed.

However, in the Horn’s other countries the existence of such conflicts highlights the fact that they usually occur in locations where central government structures have little reach and/or minimal influence on local dynamics, and where alternative governance structures are more prominent. With regard to conflict resolution and peace building, it means that advocates cannot focus their attention solely on the activities of governments or at the appropriate levels of diplomacy (so called track one level of diplomacy).
Second: The conflicts which produced the most fatalities were those between Ethiopia and Eritrea, (see the section below on Ethiopia and Eritrea war for more details) and the government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). Conflict resolution efforts were; therefore, supposed to prevent the recurrence of both these disputes, as well as other inter-state confrontations.

Thirdly: The third conclusion is that the majority of the region’s state-based armed conflicts have been intrastate, pitting governments against armed insurgents most of whom have articulated grievances about existing governance structures rather than making explicitly territorial/secessionist claims.

Fourth: Although few of these armed conflicts have been of the inter-state variety, the region’s states have a long history of “mutual destabilization” whereby governments support (overtly or covertly) insurgents in neighboring states in order to weaken what they consider to be oppositional regimes (discussed further in chapter 5).

Finally, the large number of armed conflicts highlights the rather obvious fact that the region’s institutional mechanisms for conflict prevention and early warning suffer from a range of serious conceptual and practical limitations. One of the main gaps in these regional mechanisms is it is lack of engagement with traditional actors and communities at grassroots whereby most of the conflict prevention and peace
building process is kept at levels of the country leaders with clear disengagement from those suffering in conflicts.

These deficiencies clearly need to be more analyzed and also overcome, but as this research is focused with few countries in the Horn (Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti and Eritrea) these following sections will discuss details on;

1. The conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia
2. Cluster of conflicts centered on Somalia
3. The Conflict in the Somali region of Ethiopia
4. Borders and People
5. Links between Governance and politics in the region.

4.3. The conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia.

The fact that most of Africa countries has suffered from artificial borders drawn by former imperial and colonial rulers, akin to what is usually attributed to Imperial Britain as the "divide and conquer" policy, but practiced by almost all power brokers throughout history, ancient and modern is simply the key trigger of the Eritrean – Ethiopian conflict. A combination of Italy drawing the maps in this region and later, Cold War support for dictators, has been part of the historical contributory factors, amongst others, that have lately led to what is known the Ethiopian – Eritrean war.
Ethiopia's Haile Selassie was supported for decades by the western powers and especially through the United States for geopolitical and Cold War reasons. The Soviet Union had supported Somalia in their claim that parts of Ethiopia and Kenya were part of Somalia, and these supports to Somalia and Ethiopia was directly and or indirectly involving the Eritrea case.

For the US's unrestricted use of a military base, Selassie was given "aid" (i.e. military aid).

This aid was used against Eritrean secessionists and Ethiopian guerillas in brutal wars. Italy, the former colonial ruler of Eritrea, left in 1952. Ethiopia annexed it in 1962. (Not too unlike the case between Indonesia and East Timor.) From 1962 about 30 years of war and conflict continued as Eritrea attempted to gain independence, joined by Ethiopian guerilla forces that were also fighting against the harsh dictatorship.

It is worth noting that the Ethiopian rebellions led by Malese Zanawi and the Eritrean fighters led by Afwerki were both fighting against the Derg regime of Mengistu Hailemeriomi with close relations that was mostly based on the shared clans and cultures as both leaders come originally from border areas of the two countries. It was because of this that Meles and his administration claimed they preferred a united but federal state that included the Eritrean state, since Meles' TPLF fought together with EPLF, Meles originally left the decision of independence to the Eritrean
citizens in the hope that the independence referendum would vote against secession, according to *Time* magazine's 1991 analysis.

However, after the EPLF secured their borders when Mengistu's regime fell, Isaias Afewerki became the leader of Eritrea, and some of the Meles administration, as well as opposition parties in Ethiopia were not excited over the decision to grant Eritrea its independence. Despite working together against the Derg regime, Meles and Afewerki's positive relationship turned sour after Meles succumbed to U.S. pressure to hold an election within a year, while Afewerki abandoned his original promise to create a transitional government in the early 1990s.

An internationally monitored referendum was conducted in May-April 1993, whereby 98.5% of the registered voters voted, and 99.8% of these voted for independence, however the borders between Ethiopia and Eritreia were not defined clearly. For a while, the two nations seemed to get on fairly well.

However, relations further deteriorated into war a couple of years after Eritrea introduced its own currency in 1997. War again resulted over what the BBC referred to as a minor border dispute in May 1998, and over differences on ethnicity and economic progress approaches. Millions of dollars were diverted from much needed development into military activities and weapons procurements.

Having said so, the major reason for the recent conflict is the fact that Ethiopia no longer has a border along the Red Sea and therefore relies on going through other
countries such as Eritrea in order to ship and trade goods along that line. (Some says that then the Ethiopian propaganda has said to its people that one of the things it wants to do is ensure a more amenable government is in place -- of course, one that agrees with Ethiopian interests.).

The fighting between Eritrea and Ethiopia has also spread to Somalia as both governments tried to outflank one another. The Eritrean government began supporting the Oromo Liberation Front, The Ogaden National Liberation Front and other groups and rebels that are seeking independence from Ethiopia, on their side Ethiopia retaliated by supporting groups in southern Somalia who were opposed to General Mohamed Farah Aidid who was in charge of Mogdishu that time, and by renewing relations with the Islamic government in Sudan—which was said it was supporting the Eritrean Islamic Salvation, a Sudan-based group that had launched attacks in the Eritrea–Sudan border region—while also lending support to various Eritrean rebel groups.

At some point Eritrea claimed that 19,000 Eritrean soldiers were killed during the conflict;(Elk Grove, 2010) most reports put the total war casualties from both sides as being around 70,000. All these figures have been contested and other news reports simply state that "tens of thousands" or "as many as 100,000" were killed in the war. The fighting led to massive internal displacement in both countries as civilians fled the war zone.
Ethiopia expelled more than 77,000 Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean origin it deemed a security risk, thus compounding Eritrea's refugee problem. The majority of the 77,000 Eritrean and Ethiopians of Eritrean origin were considered well off by the Ethiopian standard of living. They were deported after their belongings had been confiscated (–, 1998).

On the Eritrean side, around 7,500 Ethiopians living in Eritrea were interned, and thousands of others were deported. Thousands more remain in Eritrea, many of whom are unable to pay the 1,000 Birr tax on Ethiopians relocating to Ethiopia. According to Human Rights Watch, detainees on both sides were subject in some cases to torture, rape, or other degrading treatment. (Tribune, 2007).

The economies of both countries were already weak as a result of decades of cold war politics, civil war and drought. The war exacerbated these problems, resulting in food shortages. Prior to the war, much of Eritrea's trade was with Ethiopia, and much of Ethiopia's foreign trade relied on Eritrean roads and ports.

It is worth noting that this conflict was one of the conflicts that were imposed on communities living in border areas and thought they were the most affected people none of the country rulers (warriors), regional institutions and or international actors has considered to even mention or represent the interest of those indigenous populations across the border of the two countries.

4.3.1 Cessation of hostilities
In 1999, both Ethiopia and Eritrea had accepted a peace plan brokered by the Organization for African Unity (OAU). However, they disagreed on implementation issues and blamed each other for various things, from who started the conflict, to who was not committing to the peace process, thereby making peace harder to come by. Since then the situation escalated and both Ethiopia and Eritrea have been accused of gross human rights violations.

For example, Amnesty International points out that in Ethiopia, a large number of Eritreans are being detained just due to their Eritrean origins and that use of child soldiers on the front lines continue.

There have been many criticisms of the Ethiopian government's continual spending on war while thousands die of starvation. Less reported though, is the fact that Eritreans have also faced similar problems. In the Horn of Africa, some places have gone without enough rain for up to 2 or 3 years, affecting over 8 million people. At the end of May 2000, Ethiopia claimed to have ended the war with Eritrea. They claimed a victory, while Eritrea claimed a tactical withdrawal. Both sides had a meeting again to see if peace can be brokered. According to media reports such as BBC, 750,000 Eritrean refugees fled their homes. Yet, clashes continued up to middle of December 2000, on 18 June 2000, the parties agreed to a comprehensive peace agreement and binding arbitration of their disputes under the Algiers Agreement.
A 25-kilometer-wide Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) was established within Eritrea, patrolled by United Nations peacekeeping forces from over 60 countries the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). On 12 December 2000 a peace agreement was signed by the two governments (BBC, 2000).

4.3.2 Continued tensions

On 13 April 2002, the Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission that was established under the Algiers Agreement in collaboration with Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague agreed upon a "final and binding" verdict. The ruling awarded some territory to each side, but Badme (the flash point of the conflict) was awarded to Eritrea (BBC, 2000). Both countries vowed to accept the decision wholeheartedly the day after the ruling was made official. A few months later Ethiopia requested clarifications, and then stated it was deeply dissatisfied with the ruling. In September 2003 Eritrea refused to agree to a new commission, which they would have had to agree to if the old binding agreement was to be set aside, and asked the international community to put pressure on Ethiopia to accept the ruling. In November 2004, Ethiopia accepted the ruling "in principle" (BBC, 2000).

On 10 December 2005, Ethiopia announced it was withdrawing some of its forces from the Eritrean border "in the interests of peace". Then, on 15 December the
United Nations began to withdraw peacekeepers from Eritrea in response to a UN resolution passed the previous day (Voice of America, December, 2005).


Later in 20015, Ethiopia and Eritrea subsequently remobilized troops along the border, leading to fears that the two countries could return to war (Voice of America, December, 2005). On 7 December 2005, Eritrea banned UN helicopter flights and ordered Western members (particularly from the United States, Canada, Europe and Russia) of the UN peacekeeping mission on its border with Ethiopia to leave within 10 days, sparking concerns of further conflict with its neighbor.

In November 2006 Ethiopia and Eritrea boycotted an Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission meeting at The Hague which would have demarcated their disputed border using UN maps. Ethiopia was not there because it does not accept the decision and as it will not allow physical demarcation it will not accept map demarcation, and Eritrea was not there because although it backs the commission's proposals, it insists that the border should be physically marked out (BBC, 2000).

Both nations have been accused of supporting dissidents and armed opposition groups against each other. John Young, a Canadian analyst and researcher for IRIN, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs news
agency, reported that "the military victory of the EPRDF (Ethiopia) that ended the Ethiopia–Eritrea War, and its occupation of a swath of Eritrean territory, brought yet another change to the configuration of armed groups in the borderlands between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Asmara replaced Khartoum as the leading supporter of anti-EPRDF armed groups operating along the frontier"(Young, November 2007). However, Ethiopia is also accused of supporting rebels opposed to the Eritrean government.

At the November 2007 deadline, some analysts feared the restart of the border war but the date passed without any conflict. There were many reasons why war didn't resume. Former U.S. Ambassador David Shinn said both Ethiopia and Eritrea were in a bad position. Many fears the weak Eritrean economy is not improving like those of other African nations while others say Ethiopia is bogged down in Mogadishu.

David Shinn said Ethiopia has "a very powerful and so far disciplined national army that made pretty short work of the Eritreans in 2000 and the Eritreans has not forgotten that(Voice of America, December, 2005). But he stated Ethiopia is not interested in war because America would condemn Ethiopia if it initiated the war saying "I don't think even the US could sit by and condone an Ethiopian initiated attack on Eritrea.

On 19 June 2008 the BBC published a time line (which they updated periodically) of the conflict and reported that the "Border dispute rumbles on":

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• 2007 September – War could resume between Ethiopia and Eritrea over their border conflict, warns United Nations special envoy to the Horn of Africa, Kjell Magne Bondevik.

• 2007 November – Eritrea accepts border line demarcated by international boundary commission. Ethiopia rejects it.


• 2008 February – UN begins pulling 1,700-strong peacekeeper force out due to lack of fuel supplies following Eritrean government restrictions.

• 2008 April – UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon warns of likelihood of new war between Ethiopia and Eritrea if peacekeeping mission withdraws completely. Outlines options for the future of the UN mission in the two countries.

• Djibouti accuses Eritrean troops of digging trenches at disputed Ras Doumeira border area and infiltrating Djiboutian territory. Eritrea denies charge.

• 2008 May – Eritrea calls on UN to terminate peacekeeping mission.

• 2008 June – Fighting breaks out between Eritrean and Djiboutian troops.
In August 2009 Eritrea and Ethiopia were ordered to pay each other compensation for the war. During 1990 there were reports of rebel groups operating on both sides of the border, and in December the United Nations imposed sanctions on Eritrea for its support for insurgents in Somalia (BBC, 2000).

In March 2011 Ethiopia accused Eritrea of sending bombers across the border. In April Ethiopia acknowledged that it was supporting rebel groups inside Eritrea (BBC, 2000). In July a United Nations Monitoring Group accused Eritrea of being behind a plot to attack an African Union summit in Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia, in January 2011. Eritrea stated the accusation was a total fabrication (BBC, 2000).

In January 2012, five European tourists were killed and another two were kidnapped close to the border with Eritrea in the remote Afar Region in Ethiopia. In early March the kidnappers announced that they had released the two kidnapped Germans. On 15 March Ethiopia ground forces attacked Eritrean military posts that they stated were bases in which Ethiopian rebels, including those involved in the January kidnappings, were trained by the Eritreans.

From the above brief presentation of the conflict history between the two countries of which the study period (2005-2010) was mainly categorized on a tension period it is clear that the conflict has started easily but ending and healing it is affect could
not been easy, hence continued to affect more people, regions and even destabilized the region of the Horn. Talking to some of the affected civilians from both countries the researcher has learned that as of today no social rehabilitation activities or community reconciliation initiatives were allowed by any of the regimes and that most of the affected people considered the conflict as a vague and purely political hence continued to move in between the two countries even some times through navigating borders and obstacles imposed on their movement, those persons believe that the Tigray/Tegrey people at both sides of the border have had no issues but being victimized and now a created problem in the area may trigger future conflicts unless communities and local actors are let live their lives in their traditional manner.

4.4 Cluster of conflicts centered on Somalia
While conducting the literature review of this research the researcher understood that almost all writers and Somalis themselves would agree to the fact that Somalia has by now experienced over 20 years of conflict, taking a toll on generations of Somalis who have grown up in a society without the benefits of peace and security. Economic challenges and drought further contribute to the instability. This has resulted in increasing international concern about humanitarian conditions, restricted access to vulnerable populations, and further deteriorating security. In other words
Somalia has endured two decades of near continuous conflict, with parts of the country debilitated and a power vacuum filled by warlords, militias, and militant groups—and even sometimes Islamic groups most notably the Islamist groups al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam. The Somali Transitional Federal Government (STFG) was restored in 2006 with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) deployed to offer peace support in early 2007. Fighting between the TFG and Islamic insurgents continues, causing civilian casualties and displacement. Additional civilian casualties have been caused by AMISOM both in retaliation against insurgent attacks and during offensive operations against al-Shabaab.

4.1 The War in Somalia

The War in Somalia that is presented here (2005-2010) was an armed conflict involving largely Ethiopian and Somali Transitional Federal Government (STFG) forces and Somali troops from Punt land versus the Somali Islamist umbrella group, the Islamic Court Union (ICU), and other affiliated militias for control of the country.

There is a clear connection between War in Somalia (2009–) and the War of 2006. The war officially began shortly before July 20, 2006 when U.S. backed Ethiopian troops invaded Somalia to prop up the TFG in Baidoa. The TFG in Somalia invited

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10War here is referring to significant conflicts excluding daily localized incidents as detailing a 20 years’ conflict will require an independent research
Ethiopians to intervene, which became an "unpopular decision" that failed to strengthen the government. Subsequently the leader of the ICU, Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys, declared "Somalia is in a state of war, and all Somalis should take part in this struggle against Ethiopia". On same year, December 24, Ethiopia stated it would actively combat the ICU.

Ethiopia's Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, said Ethiopia entered hostilities because it faced a direct threat to its own borders. “Ethiopian defense forces were forced to enter into war to protect the sovereignty of the nation,” he said. “We are not trying to set up a government for Somalia, nor do we have an intention to meddle in Somalia's internal affairs. We have only been forced by the circumstances.”

The ICU, which controlled the coastal areas of southern Somalia, engaged in fighting with the forces of the Somali TFG, and the autonomous regional governments of Punt land and Galmudug, all of whom were backed by Ethiopian troops. The outbreak of heavy fighting began on December 20 2006 with the Battle of Baidoa, after the lapse of a one-week deadline the ICU imposed on Ethiopia (on December 12) to withdraw from the nation.

Ethiopia, however, refused to abandon its positions around the TFG interim capital at Baidoa. On December 29, after several successful battles, TFG and Ethiopian troops entered Mogadishu relatively unopposed. The UN also stated that many Arab nations including Egypt were also supporting the ICU through Eritrea.
Although not announced until later, a small number of U.S. Special Forces troops accompanied Ethiopian and TFG troops after the collapse and withdrawal of the ICU to give military advice and to track suspected al-Qaida fighters. Both American support for the TFG and various Arab Nations' support for the ICU were isolated cases from the central motive of the war between the allied Ethiopian & Somali government forces and the allied ICU & Eritrean forces.

As of January 2007, Ethiopia said it would withdraw "within a few weeks" but the TFG, US and UN officials oppose Ethiopian withdrawal because it would create a "security vacuum," while the ICU has demanded immediate Ethiopian withdrawal. The two sides had traded war declarations and gunfire on several occasions before Eastern African countries and international observers fear the Ethiopian offensive may lead to a regional war, involving Eritrea, which has a complex relationship with Ethiopia and whom Ethiopia claims to be a supporter of the ICU.

As of January 2009, Ethiopian troops withdrew from Somalia following a two-year insurgency, which led to loss of territory and effectiveness of the TFG and a power-sharing deal between Islamists splinter group led by Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed's Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) and TFG Prime Minister Nur Hassan in Djibouti. The al Shabaab who has separated from the ICU rejects the peace deal and continued to take territories including Baidoa. Another Islamist group, Ahlu
Sunnah Waljama'ah, which is allied to the transitional government and supported by Ethiopia, continues to attack al Shabab and take over towns as well. After the parliament took in 200 officials from the moderate Islamist opposition, ARS leader Sheikh Ahmed was elected TFG President on January 31, 2009. Since then, the al shabab radical Islamists have accused the new TFG President of accepting the secular transitional government and have continued the civil war since he arrived in Mogadishu at the presidential palace.

4.1.1 Incidents time line of a selected few years

2006 (Refer to: 2006 timeline of the War in Somalia for more information)

- December 19, 2006: Sh. Hassan Aweys received medical treatment in Egypt just before the beginning of the war against the UN-backed Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and Ethiopian troops.
- December 20, 2006: Major fighting broke out around the TFG capital of Baidoa. Thirteen trucks filled with Ethiopian reinforcements were reported en route to the fighting. Leaders of both groups briefly kept an option open for peace talks brokered by the EU.
- December 21, 2006: As the fighting intensified with Ethiopia, Sh.Hassan (Leader of the ICU) took a flight to an undisclosed location with Yusuf Mohammed Siad Inda'ade, and, rather than news of medical treatment, it was said he was on the Haj.
• December 22, 2006: Nearly 20 Ethiopian tanks headed toward the front line. According to government sources Ethiopia had 20 T-55 tanks and four attack helicopters in Baidoa.

• December 23, 2006: Ethiopian tanks and further reinforcements arrived in Daynuunay, 30 kilometres east of Baidoa; prompting ICU forces to vow all-out war despite a commitment to an EU-brokered peace. Heavy fighting continued in Lidale and Dinsoor.

• December 24, 2006: Ethiopia admitted its troops were fighting the Islamists, after stating earlier in the week it had only sent several hundred military advisors to Baidoa. Heavy fighting erupted in border areas, with reports of air strikes and shelling, including targets near the ICU-held town of Beledweyne. According to Ethiopian Information Minister Berhan Hailu: "The Ethiopian government has taken self-defensive measures and started counter-attacking the aggressive extremist forces of the Islamic Courts and foreign terrorist groups.

• December 25, 2006: Ethiopian and Somali forces captured Beledweyne. Defending ICU forces fled Beledweyne concurrent to Ethiopian airstrikes against the Mogadishu and Bali-Dogle airports. Heavy fighting was also reported in Burhakaba.
• On December 26, the ICU was in retreat on all fronts, losing much of the territory they gained in the months preceding the Ethiopian intervention. They reportedly fell back to Daynuunay and Mogadishu.

• December 27, 2006: Ethiopian and Somali government forces were en-route to Somalia's capital, Mogadishu after capturing the strategic town of Jowhar, 90 km north from the capital. The ICU was in control of little more than the coast, abandoning many towns without putting up a fight. Also, the ICU top two commanders, defense chief Yusuf Mohammed Siad Inda'ade and his deputy Abu Mansur were away on the Hajj pilgrimage in Mecca.

• After the Fall of Mogadishu to the Ethiopian and government forces on December 28, fighting continued in the Juba River valley, where the ICU retreated, establishing a new headquarters in the city of Kismayo. Intense fighting was reported on December 31 in the Battle of Jilib and the ICU frontlines collapsed during the night to artillery fire, causing the ICU to again retreat, abandoning Kismayo, without a fight and retreating towards the Kenyan border.

• December 27, 2006: Aweys, along with a group of several hundred fighters from the Hizbul Shabaab wing of the ICU fled Mogadishu, presumably to the former AIAI base at Ras Kamboni.
On December 31, 2006, he vowed to fight on, and called for others to create an insurgency against the government. Meanwhile, a heavily armed column of government and Ethiopian troops advanced from Mogadishu through Lower Shabelle towards Kismayo. They reached Bulo Marer (Kurtun Warrey district) and were heading to Baravo.

December 28, 2006: after only six months in power and the defeat of the ICU's army, Ahmed the second Islamists leader of ICU committed himself to fighting the Ethiopian forces in Somalia. After the ICU's defeat in the Battle of Jilib and their abandonment of Kismayo, he fled towards the Kenyan border.

January 21, 2007: Kenyan police detained Ahmed and three other Somalis near Hulugo border. He met the US Ambassador to Kenya for talks regarding cooperation with the TFG. He was under the protection of Kenyan authorities staying at a hotel in Nairobi.

February 1, 2007: Sharif Sh. Ahmed was released from Kenyan police authorities. By February 8, Sheikh Sharif Sheik Ahmed had gone to Yemen where other ICU members are thought to have also gone.

Note that most of the books and papers reviewed for this research estimated that about 500 Ethiopian soldiers, 200 Somali soldiers, and 1,000 Insurgents were killed in the fighting in 2006.
2007 *(Refer to: 2007 timeline of the War in Somalia for more information)*

- Military events in January 2007 focused on the southern section of Somalia, primarily the withdrawal of ICU forces from Kismayo, and their pursuit using Ethiopian air strikes in Afmadow district concurrent to the Battle of Ras Kamboni. During this battle, the U.S. launched an airstrike conducted by an AC-130 gunship against suspected Al-Qaeda operatives. A second airstrike was made after the battle later in January 2007.

- By the end of March, the fighting intensified in Mogadishu and more than a thousand people, mostly civilians, were killed. Combat deaths numbered 9 Ethiopian soldiers, 6 Somali soldiers, and an unknown number of insurgents. Hawiye clan militiamen allied with the Islamists clashed with TFG and Ethiopian troops.

- In December 2007, the Ethiopian troops withdrew from the town of Guriel, and the Islamists controlled Guriel after that. Ethiopia had a big military base there to secure the road linking the two countries.

- By the end of December 2007, the ICU forces had taken control of about half of the port city of Kismayo, around half the districts of Mogadishu, and totaling around 80% of their former territories, leaving the Ethiopian-backed regime in the same precarious situation as it was in Baidoa at the start of 2007.
2008 *(Refer to: 2008 timeline of the War in Somalia for more information)*

- In February 2008, the Insurgents captured the town of Dinsoor after probing it several times. This marked a change in their strategy which previously focused mainly on the capital Mogadishu.

- In late May after capturing the two towns near Kismayo, The Insurgents agreed not to attack Kismayo a city ruled by clan militia who took part in the Ethiopian invasion. They agreed to pay 30% to Al-shabab and 30% to the Islamic Courts. Along with that the Islamists were bold enough to start an Islamic court 90 km away from the capital Mogadishu.

- On March 3, 2008, the United States launched an air strike on Dhoble, a Somali town. U.S. officials claimed the town was held by Islamic extremists, but gave few details to the press. It was reported that Hassan Turki (Another leader in the ICU) was in the area. The same area was targeted by U.S. bombers one year earlier. A successful air strike occurred on May 1 in Dhusamareb which killed the leader of Al-Shabab Aden Hashi Eyrow along with another senior commander and several civilians; however, the attack did nothing to slow down the Insurgency.

- After long talks in Djibouti over a ceasefire between the TFG and the moderate Islamists of the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia, agreement was reached that the parliament would be doubled in size to include 200
representatives of the opposition alliance and 75 representatives of the civil society. A new president and prime minister would be elected by the new parliament, and a commission to look into crimes of war would be established. A new constitution was also agreed to be drafted shortly. In July 2008, Ethiopian soldiers and ICU militants clashed at Beledweyne. The fighting was indecisive, and Ethiopian forces withdrew. According to media reports, 39 ICU insurgents were killed in the fighting, while Ethiopia estimated that 71 militants had been killed. Fifty Ethiopian soldiers were also killed. In early December 2008, Ethiopia announced it would withdraw its troops from Somalia shortly, and later announced that it would first help secure the withdrawal of the AMISOM peacekeepers from Burundi and Uganda before withdrawing. The quick withdrawal of the AMISOM peacekeepers was seen as putting additional pressure on the United Nations to provide peacekeeping.

2009 (Refer to: 2009 timeline of the War in Somalia for more information)

- Somalian troops on December 31, 2008, were seen by civilians packing up supplies and forwarding troop deployments except in the city of Mogadishu.
- December 31, 2008 was supposed to be when the troops were to withdraw from Somalia but it appears it will be several weeks after the resignation of
President Yusuf earlier in December. With a power vacuum growing, it is unknown who will capitalize on the situation.

- Combat continued throughout January. Fourteen Ethiopian soldiers were killed, mostly in roadside bombings and attacks.

- On January 25, 2009, Ethiopian troops completely pulled out of Somalia. While the Ethiopian government claimed mission accomplished in its effort to give TFG presence in Mogadishu to lead to a coalition government, most saw Ethiopia's intervention was a failure, given the Islamists' quick advance following the Ethiopian withdrawal.

- Al-Shabab captured Baidoa, where the TFG parliament was based, on January 26. Following the collapse of the TFG, pro-TFG moderate Islamist group Ahlu Sunnah continued to fight al-Shabaab and captured a few towns.

- Moderate Islamist leader Sheikh Sharif Ahmed was elected to become the new President of a United Somali government signaling the end of the Transitional Federal Government marked by the resignation of Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed the previous month and a joint unity government of the STFG. Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, 42 years old, has promised to "forge peace with east African neighbors, tackle rampant piracy offshore and rein in hard-liner insurgents". Some, like the deputy major of Mogadishu Abdelfatah, said that the Ethiopian intervention was instrumental in establishing the internationally-recognized
government in the capital, However, most of the territory that came under the
control of the new ARS-TFG government was controlled by the moderate
wing of the insurgency, the ARS, which was made up mostly of former
members of the Islamic Courts Union.

- "Analysts say Ahmed has a real possibility of reuniting Somalis, given his
Islamist roots, the backing of parliament and a feeling in once hostile Western
nations that he should now be given a chance to try to stabilize the Horn of
Africa nation".

- New TFG President Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmed arrived in Mogadishu as a
president for the first time on February 7, 2009. The al Shabaab and other
radical Islamists began firing at the new TFG president hours later. They
accuse the new President of accepting the secular transitional government.

- Mediation has begun between the Islamic Party and the Transitional
Government of Sharif as well as a growing divide is being reported in the Al
Shabaab organization that controls much of southern Somalia as a large
number of Al Shabaab leaders that held positions in government during the
six-month reign of the Islamic Courts Union in 2006 have met behind closed
doors with the President of the Transitional Government and the TFG have
announced that Sharia law will be implemented in Somalia, but it has not acted
on it. TFG President Sharif's moderate Islamist forces and AU troops clashed
with the Islamic Party and al Shabaab forces, leading to at least 23 deaths. Moderate Islamist and other pro-TFG militias are allegedly being trained by Ethiopia, while the newly formed Islamist Party is established by Eritrea-based Sheikh Aweys.

When all the above listed incidents were happening still Somali native elders and most of the modern religious leaders were consistently calling on all parties to the conflict to avoid civilians, including the STFG, AMISOM, and armed insurgents. It is on the same line that the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has documented and published a report examining traditional and existing mechanisms of compensation, and called upon those warring parties purporting to abide by international laws of civilian protection (namely the African Union) to better track civilian harm and offer amends to civilians incidentally harmed by its operations. Nevertheless, those voices were not heard by the parties of the conflict and their partners; hence Somali remain to be overwhelmed with endless conflicts with no conclusion on the horizon.

4.2 The Conflict over the Somali region of Ethiopia (Known as Ogaden)

As one of the most complicated conflicts and tensions in the Horn of Africa, the conflict on the Somali Regional State of Ethiopia (known as of today) which was known as OGADEN continued since the colonization period. The Ogaden war, a
brief but costly war fought by Ethiopia and Somalia that ended in Somalia defeat and withdrawal in the summer of 1978, was viewed differently by different sides. To the Ethiopian government, it was a war of aggression, and the Ethiopian Army was fighting to defend the territorial integrity of its country. To Ethiopian Marxist radicals on the other hand, it was a "reactionary war" which diverted attention from crucial national, political and economic issues.

The African governments by and large condemned Somalia as the aggressor, citing the sanctity of the colonially fixed boundaries accepted by the OAU at the Cairo Conference in 1964. When Somalia invaded Ethiopia's OGADEN region in September 1977, the OAU condemned the move and as a consequence the irredentist claim of Somalia found little or no support at all in Africa. To put the OGADEN war into perspective, it is appropriate to begin with a brief analysis and historical background of both Ethiopia and Somalia.

People on the Horn of Africa has conflicting cultural and religious traditions and has been an arena of uninterrupted armed conflict for many decades prior to the OGADEN War. This conflict, rooted in history and geography, has been aggravated by outside intervention for many years, and in the 1970s, by the so called
"superpowers". At the heart of the issues underlying the OGADEN War in the Horn lie three legacies of the past (BRIGADIER JOSEPH K. NKAISSELY, 1997)

- European colonial rule;
- Somali irredentism;
- And superpower intervention or penetration (with Ethiopia as the main focus).

4.2.1 The legacy of the European colonial rule

The fact remains that most of Africa's fifty-three states are multi-ethnic, and with artificially created borders, hence sustains largely the product of the European scramble for Africa in the 1880s. The colonial powers divided peoples in the territories they claimed largely for their own administrative convenience, generally ignoring pre-colonial social or political organizations and arrangements. Consequently, during the colonial period, African peoples of very different cultures were thrown together in new politics containing ethnic groups with few (if any) prior relationships.

4.2.2 The legacy of Somalia irredentism

It is, true that the Somali people are not the only ones divided up into territories claimed by different colonial powers. However, the OGADEN differs from other colonial territories in Africa in a number of ways. First, in the late 19th century,
Emperor Menelik of Ethiopia took advantage of European rivalry to extend the borders of his empire at the expense of the Somali speaking people of the OGADEN. The eventual demarcation of boundaries between Ethiopia and the European colonial powers imposed an artificial separation between closely-related Somali peoples who never recognized the authority of the colonizers. Ethiopian control over the region, always tenuous, was disrupted by the Italian conquest of Ethiopia (from Somalia and Eritrea) in the mid-1930s, followed by British "Liberation" and occupation. The departure of the British from the OGADEN in 1948, and its subsequent re-occupation by Ethiopia without due regard to the wishes of the local Somalis, has turned the Horn of Africa into a persistent area of conflicts. In 1960 Somalia obtained its independence and the new republic set for itself the task of recovering all the "lost territories", including the OGADEN, which was (as still is) a part of Ethiopia (Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1991).

4.2.3 The legacy of superpowers rivalry and intervention

In the 1970s and 1980s the two major World Blocs were heavily involved in supporting clients in the Horn. In the process of pursuing what they considered their own vital interests, the superpowers contributed to an escalation of a regional arms race. It was the norm during this period that, while the Soviets and the Americans jockeyed to check each other, the Ethiopians and Somalis tried to outfox one another,
that is why one of a particular negative consequence for the Horn was the disaster now known by the name of "The OGADEN War" of 1977-1978.

4.2.4 Brief analyses of the Somali-Ethiopian conflict (re-Ogaden)

In the Horn of Africa, the Somalis have religious and cultural similarities to those of the Arabs live just to their north across the Red Sea. (The Arabs and the people of the Horn traded for millennia). The contact intensified with the spread of Islam after the 7th century.

On the other hand, the Ethiopians, are mostly dominated by Christians, and are believed to be descendants of Afro-Asiatic speaking peoples who migrated from the north along the Great Rift Valley. Christianity in the region dates back to the 4th Century (Bereket H Selassie, 1980).

The kings of Ethiopia were thought to have divine powers, as their subjects accepted the notion that they derived their powers from a perceived legendary union between the Israeli King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba. The Ethiopian king’s legitimacy depended largely on this purported lineage. In the 16th Century, the Christian-Muslim conflict emerged in form of raids and counter raids for material and slaves. In 1529, the renowned Somali leader Ahmed “Gran – Guray” won a major battle at Shimra Kure. However, in 1543 the Ethiopian Emperor Guladewos (with the support of the Portuguese) defeated Ahmed and subsequently killed him (Robert F. Gorman,
1981). When the European Scramble for Africa began in the late 19th Century, the Ethiopian Emperor Menelik II laid claim to the whole of OGADEN region and was duly recognized as one of the three colonial players in the dismemberment of Somalia, the other two being Britain and Italy.

Menelik who had founded the present day Addis Ababa in 1893 extended his control over most of present-day Ethiopian especially after 1896 when he defeated the Italians at the Battle of Adowa. As it is believed by the people of Ethiopia today, Menelik unified the region into one centralized state. However, when Menelik died in December 1913, Lij Liyasu who succeeded him and who was a Muslim, sought to revive Muslim predominance and established cordial relations with the Somali revolutionary leader Mohammed Abdulla Hassan. Lij Liyasu was quickly deposed.

Since then, Ethiopian attitudes towards Somalia has been influenced by the fears of Somali irredentism. The Ethiopian Somali border, which is a key bone of contention between the two countries, underwent changes or shifts several times by treaties and conventions from 1888 to 1950. Some of the most notable are as follows:

- Anglo - Italian treaties of 1891
- Anglo - Italian protocol of 1894
- Franco - Ethiopian convention of 1897
• Italian - Ethiopian convention of 1908

In 1936 in order to avenge the defeat of Adowa, Italy invaded Ethiopia assisted by approximately 40,000 Somalis. Emperor Hale Selassie was forced into exile and the Somali speaking areas of Ethiopia were annexed to Italian Somaliland in May, 1936. Then, when the Italians were defeated in the Horn of Africa by the British in 1941, the OGADEN remained united with Somalia under the British rule. When the British withdrew from Somalia at the end of the war, Ethiopia claimed and quickly reoccupied the OGADEN region (Marina Ottaway, 1982).

To further understand the nature of the Ogaden conflict which is the major conflict in the Horn of Africa it is important to understand the geographical complications between Somalis and the Ethiopians, therefore the following paragraphs will detail both Ethiopia and Somalia set up.

Ethiopia is one of the biggest countries in the Horn and has an area of approximately 1,251,282 Sq. Km. It stretches from Eritrea to the Sudan in the north and west, southwards to Kenya, and to the east and southeast to Djibouti and Somalia. Elevations in the country range from 100M below sea level in the Dallow Depression to 4000M above sea level in the South Mountains of central highlands. Some of this includes part of the OGADEN region. The southern half of Ethiopia is bisected by the Great Rift Valley which ranges from 40Km - 60Km in width. The highlands to
the east which extend to OGADEN region are drained south-eastward by rivers Shabelle and Juba. These highlands overlook the OGADEN plains which are predominated by sandstones and limestone’s as they extend into Somalia. The road network is not fully developed and in some areas of the OGADEN it is virtually non-existent, hence movement is significantly impeded especially during rainy seasons.

The Somalia republic, like Ethiopia, also lies in the Horn of Africa. It has a long coastline on the Indian Ocean extending to the Gulf of Aden. To the north, Somalia faces the Arabian Peninsula, to the northeast it is bounded by the republic of Djibouti, while to the western and southern is bounded by Ethiopia and Kenya respectively. The dry savanna plains characterized by lava rocks and sand, offer unrestricted mobility for tanks though they pose formidable obstacles to wheeled vehicles. It is worth noting that these dry savanna plains common to Somalia extend into the OGADEN region. The climate is generally hot and dry throughout the year in the OGADEN region. The strategic location of the Horn of Africa (and the surrounding areas) such as the Red Sea, East Africa and Persian Gulf probably invited more than its fair share of interest and involvement by external powers (John Markakis, 1987).

4.2.5 Cause of the Ogaden War
The republic of Somalia is made up of the former colonies of Italian Somaliland and British Somaliland. The two were united in 1960 as a result of popular insistence on union (and despite objection from some members of newly elected government). The foreign policy of Somalia since independence consists in large part of attempting to achieve more than symbolic unity between the republic and three fragments of the Somali nation still considered to be under "foreign" control (William Zartman, 1985). Somalia refused out of hand to acknowledge in particular the validity of the 1954 Anglo-Ethiopian treaty recognizing Ethiopia's claim over the OGADEN or in general the relevance of treaties defining the common border between the two countries. Its position was based on three crucial issues. First, the treaties disregarded the agreements made with the clans that put themselves under the British protection. Second, Somalis were not consulted on the terms of these treaties and as far as they were concerned they had not been informed of their existence. Third, these treaties violated the principle of self-determination of the Somali people (Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1991). Therefore, the new Somali republic set itself the task of recovering the "lost territories". These included the OGADEN which was and still is part of Ethiopia, Djibouti which is an independent sovereign state and the Northern Frontier District which was and still is part of Kenya. To symbolize this historic mission, the Somali flag was emblazoned with Five Stars each representing one part of the greater Somali nation, the two final stars
represented the former Italian and British colonies now constituting the Somali republic.

Underlying the territorial claim which was based on historical, ethnic, linguistic and cultural continuity, there was extraordinary phenomenon of Somali nationalism which encompassed all Somalis, both in Somalia and in the "lost territories" (Bereket H Selassie, 1980). Somalia's defiance of African post-colonial order, which the rest of Africa has accepted as the inevitable result of the colonial past, has been brave and laudable, and unfortunately is the main route cause of many other conflicts in the region. It is therefore important to understand its roots, and how it has been able to survive both European colonial rule and the Ethiopian imperial experience. It is also particularly important to understand that Somalia is the only state in Africa virtually all of whose citizens share a history, language, culture and religion. As a result of all the aforementioned, the dispute over the OGADEN region therefore became the main bone of contention between Ethiopia and Somalia.

All along the provisional border between the two countries, as well as in the OGADEN, tension was rampant for the first five years of Somalia independence in 1960. Minor clashes between Ethiopian police and armed parties of Somalia nomads began within six months of Somalia's independence. Hostilities grew steadily in scope, eventually involving small scale actions between the Somali and the Ethiopian armed forces along the common border. In February 1964, an armed
conflict erupted along the entire length of the Somali – Ethiopia frontier and Ethiopian warplanes conducted raids on targets well inside the Somali territory. Open hostilities were brought to an end in April through the mediation of the Sudan, which acted under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity. Although further significant military clashes ended for the time, the potential for future conflict remained very high. On 21 October 1969, the Somali army took over the government, with Major General Mohammed Siad Barre as the new leader of the Supreme Revolutionary Council.

The democratic governmental structure was abolished and "scientific socialism" was introduced as the new ideology. At the same time, Somalia intensified its military buildup with the assistance of the Soviet Union. In 1973 oil and natural gas were being prospected by ARMCO, a US company on the Ethiopian side along the common border. Somalia reacted by moving troops to the border to shadow the activities of both the Ethiopian army and the prospecting American company. This once again increased tension in the Ogaden but no direct confrontation occurred.

The country has always faced an uphill struggle in keeping its diverse regional factions and politically unruly population united under one central direction. In two years before the OGADEN war, a breakdown in internal security in Ethiopia reached alarming proportions. A new regime, which overthrew the government of Emperor Haile Selassie on 12 September 1974, faced various security threats. Key problems
included the Eritrea Liberation Front fighting for the secession of the province of Eritrea from Ethiopia and the Western Somalia Liberation Front (supported by Somalia) fighting for the liberation of the OGADEN region from Ethiopia and its subsequent union with Somalia.

The Ethiopian regime also found itself opposed by domestic groups such as the Tigray People Liberation Front which was advocating autonomy for Tigray province. After 1977, also the new US Administration of president-elect Carter expressed displeasure with Ethiopia's deteriorating human rights record, and consequently reduced sharply its aid. Realizing the desperation of his situation and the unwillingness of the US to provide support to his regime, Chairman Mengistu Haile Mariam expelled US diplomatic and military advisors and turned to the Soviet Union for financial and military support (C. Legum and B. Lee, 1978).

In the wake of this new development, the superpowers switched their backing in the Horn of Africa. This trend escalated the conflict in the OGADEN. During this time of turmoil in Ethiopia, the new Ethiopian regime managed to win support from the Soviet Union and their Eastern Bloc allies. The Somali government, on the other hand, expelled the Soviets and the Cubans from the country and offered the strategic (Soviet built) Berbera military base to the Americans. The shift of the superpowers alliances created uncertainty in the Horn and led to Somali misperceptions of Soviet and US intentions.
Firstly, it was later clear that the Somali leaders miscalculated how changing alliance patterns would affect the local balance of power. Second, the Somalis misjudged the nature of military aid that the US (and its allies) would be willing to provide. Third, the Somalis miscalculated how their intervention in Ethiopia would affect subsequent international involvement on the Horn.

With regard to the latter, the Somalis miscalculated Soviet and US willingness (and capacities) to intervene in the Horn. They underestimated the degree of Soviet interest in maintaining an influence on the Horn, the length to which the Soviets were prepared to go in order to see their interests preserved, and the Soviet capacity to intervene in order to preserve those interests (Marina Ottaway, 1982).

Somalia badly overestimated the extent of the support it could expect from the West to counter Ethiopia's massive support from the Eastern Bloc. Somali strongman Siad Barre underestimated the degree of US interest, will, and capacity to intervene on his behalf. The Somalis failed to realize that the US was in no position to actively support their irredentist claims, least of all when those claims were pursued by overt military intervention against the territory of another sovereign state.

These Somalia's misperceptions resulted from the failure to realize the international and regional trends affecting the two superpowers at the time. These included US reluctance after Vietnam to become involved in foreign conflicts. Moreover, the US
considered Somalia to be the aggressor in the OGADEN conflict, and still regarded Ethiopia as the prize of the struggle (Robert G Patman, 1990).

Similarly, the Soviet Union's involvement in Africa primarily was designed to undermined Western influence. Africa, and particularly the Horn, was the "boards" on which the game was played because they offered the ripest opportunities, not to mention Ethiopia's increasing strategic importance to the Soviets. The ultimate fact was that the Soviet Union had the inside track on the Horn and both the US and Soviet policy makers knew it.

The Soviet advantage arose out of a variety of trends in international politics and certain circumstances of the local situation. But in summation, the shift of super power alliances, changes of political ideologies, Somali irredentism and the Ethiopian domestic instability were the major causes of the OGADEN war.

In conclusion issues at the heart of the underlying OGADEN war were the three legacies, detailed above, but the war also was due to serious errors in judgment by the Somali leaders. As an aggressor, Somalia's perceptions were accurate only with respect to the existence of a local power imbalance. Regarding the prospects of external support for its irredentist claims, Somalia overestimated the degree of potential Western support and underestimated the potential intensity of Soviet and Cuban support for Ethiopia.
There are other regional, local and international factors that contributed to the outbreak of the conflict; notable among these were the domestic instability of Ethiopia, the rise of Somali power, and the ambiguous signals by Western countries concerning potential support for Somalia. Despite concerted efforts from the Soviets, the US, OAU and the UN to restrain them, the Somalis would not accept a peaceful settlement of the dispute.

This costly war did not achieve any tangible positive result as far as the Horn of Africa is concerned. Indeed, in the long run it contributed to the collapse of Somalia as a state in 1990, a condition still true as this is written in 1997. Fundamentally, OGADEN and other border issues between Ethiopia, Somalia and other regional neighbors remain unresolved some 30 years after the OGADEN war.

4.2.5 Tensions and situation of the Somali Regional State (Ogaden) for the period of 2005-1010

The recent (Still ongoing) conflict in southeastern Ethiopia now known as the Somali region and historically known as Ogaden has been referred by some as the next Darfur. The conflict has claimed thousands of lives over the last 15 years, but particularly during 2005-2010.

Ethiopia sealed off the region to media so there is little accurate information about the conflict, including claims of human rights abuses.
The region is rich in natural gas and is home to about 5 million predominantly Muslim people, mainly ethnic Somali nomadic tribes. The U.S. has said little about the conflict, as Ethiopia is its main regional ally in the increasingly unstable Horn of Africa region. World focus interviewed David H. Shinn, a former U.S. ambassador to Ethiopia and Burkina Faso. Amb. Shinn is currently an adjunct professor of international affairs at The George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs.

His research interests include China-Africa relations, East Africa and the Horn, terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, conflict situations, U.S. policy in Africa and the African brain drain. In the interview World focus asked: Ethiopia has labeled the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) as a terrorist organization. Is this an accurate description? Amb. Shinn responded: While the ONLF has on occasion used tactics that qualify as terrorist — for example the kidnapping and/or killing of civilian Ethiopian government officials — it does not have any links of which I am aware with international terrorist organizations. It receives external support from the government of Eritrea, which opposes the government of Ethiopia. It also receives financial assistance from Ogadenis in the Somali Diaspora. In 2007, 74 persons, including nine Chinese oil field personnel, were killed during an ONLF attack on a Chinese oil exploration work site in the Ogaden protected by Ethiopian troops. The Chinese may have died in crossfire between Ethiopian and ONLF forces.
In the view of the U.S. government, ONLF activity so far does not meet the test of a terrorist organization. Should the ONLF escalate its tactics, however, this could change.

For number of years the information coming out of the Ogaden was coming from either the Ethiopian government or the ONLF. Much of the information from both sides is unreliable, and regardless of peoples suffering situation continued sealed for many years to the extent that it was impossible to know with any certainty what Somalis in southeastern Ethiopia really are, because of the difficult security situation, and also because there are no public opinion polls in the area added to a zero interest from the so called international community to support or the Ethiopian government to listen. In addition to the historic conflicts and ongoing tensions, the Somali Regional State is an area of Ethiopia synonymous with drought, famine and conflict - each disaster exacerbated by political turmoil that has gripped the region. The region annual rainfall is one of the lowest in Ethiopia - have wreaked havoc on the population. The people in the region are among the least educated in the Horn of Africa, with barely 10 per cent of the population ever making it into schools and with the highest dropout rate in the country. In rural parts of the region most never make it to school at all(Ismail, 2013). The Somali Regional State - also known as Killil Five is one of the largest areas in Ethiopia, and with some tension it has a state government that introduced some sort of self-governing and development
projects of which Somalis in that region have recently started to concentrate, trying to recover from the painful history.

4.3. Borders and People

_Brief on Situation on the Borders in the Greater Horn of Africa_

While the great majority of borders in Africa are porous and constitute no real obstacle to the borderland communities, the borders in the Horn of Africa region have quite symbolic meanings that are contested and fought over. Whereas overall only 20 per cent of African boundaries are demarcated, yet do not cause conflict, in the Horn of Africa borders are a common conflict trigger, While the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia was fought over a small border village with little strategic interest but high emotional value and cost more than 70,000 lives, Symbolic of the border conflicts is the small village of Badme on the Eritrean-Ethiopian border. Other contested borders are many in the region including Djibouti and Eritrea, Somali and Ethiopia, and Somali to Kenya.

Those areas have witnessed full-fledged internal conflicts and sometimes resolvable conflicts which can re-start any time. Although the Ethiopia-Somalia border and the Kenya-Somalia border were not contested in the last decade (only from a greater Somalia perspective), the borders are quite insecure. Recent initiatives by the two countries to install a buffer zone inside Somalia – in order to curtail the threat of the
Somalia jihadist group al-Shabaab crossing over – show the severity of border insecurity in the region. The relatively stable and functioning quasi-state entities in northern Somalia, Somaliland, and Puntland are also engaged in border skirmishes in the Sool and Sanaag regions.

Other border issues are: the Ilemi triangle between South Sudan, Kenya, and Ethiopia; as well as some border conflicts between Eritrea and Djibouti. Distinctively different from the hard border dealings in the Horn is the border approach in the East African Community (EAC) region, where the idea of a common market thrives and the establishment of soft border management with easy access for trade and borderland populations – rather than hard border regimes and border disputes – is the preferred solution in the EACs proposal. The Horn of Africa, as described before, has a variety of borders, border issues, and border conflicts, which can be grouped into three categories, that is being summarized from number of books and online articles reviewed.

4.3.1 Border Conflicts

Under the category of border conflicts, and the research period one main border issue stand out: the border between Eritrea and Ethiopia with its symbolic border town Badme – Besides the contested international borders in the Horn of Africa, piracy resulting from the lack of control of maritime boundaries might be added to the list of active border conflicts in the region.
4.3.2 Borders with Issues

This category includes borders where security issues, the so called terrorism, crime, uncontrolled migration, and illicit trade constitute problems. Currently this is the case on the Somali border with Kenya and Ethiopia. There is a fear from those governments from infiltration of al-Shabaab jihadist fighters into the neighboring countries as well as a humanitarian challenge posed by refugee streams from Somalia to the neighboring countries. Similarly, the Somaliland administration fears an increasing influx of militia from southern Somalia.

Another border with security issues is the triangle between South Sudan, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, but not explained in this research as it is limited to those in the very Horn of Africa.

During the 1990s, borderlands in the Horn of Africa were used by armed insurgent groups to seek shelter in neighboring countries. Most insurgents were supported by the neighboring governments. For example, Sudan supported the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front and the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front fighting against the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia, which, at the same time, supported, trained, and equipped the Sudan People’s Liberation Army in southern Sudan and allowed the SPLA-controlled refugee camps to be based on the Ethiopian side. Today, the continuation of civil wars and armed insurrections in many of the countries in the Horn of Africa have resulted in a never-ending stream of refugees – some of them,
seeking shelter in the neighboring country for the third or fourth time in just two decades.

4.3.3 Border Opportunities

The category of opportunities needs to be analyzed more thoroughly, since the opportunity depends on the actor. Whereas grassing agreements and secondary rights for pastoralists might serve the interests of two border populations for living in peace, it might be diametrically opposed to the interests of the state(s) with a primary interest in sovereignty. The category of border opportunities builds upon the foundation of the African Union’s Border Programme (AUBP), which is based on three pillars: a) co-operation and co-ordination, b) capacity building, and c) community involvement. Their outlook is regional and states that mutually tended borders, border security, and easy movement across borders through cooperation and co-ordination will enhance regional and continental integration.

4.3.4 History and Statehood

Pre-colonial African states are less bound to a territorial concept, mainly because the land was vast and the populations were thin. The movement of people in pre-colonial African states was not so much based on identification with the state or the ruler but oriented more towards fertile land. People could occupy and use but not own land, and the limited control of the periphery by the center – either of territory or citizens – made boundaries as territorial demarcations of sovereign states obsolete. However,
in order to bind citizens to the center, the rulers needed to invest in proxy authorities representing the state’s interests in the periphery. Throughout Africa, boundaries distinguishing different sovereign state entities were drawn by colonial powers in the late 19th century without local knowledge and interest in the political, social, and regional particularities.

But besides the colonial borders, one needs to look into the history as well as the use of borders by the various sovereigns, empires, and groups in the region. As for Sudan, Douglas Johnson (2010) provides some insights into the border regimes of kingdoms and sultanates (Darfur and Sennar), which were drawn as concentric circles of power. The main method to ensure power and loyalty was the conferring of land grants to tribal leaders.

The regimes under Turco-Egyptian (1821-1885) and Anglo-Egyptian (1899-1956) rule used flexible boundaries amongst various local authorities as competing centres of power. In the case of the Eritrean-Ethiopian border, Wolbert Smidt (2010) argues that boundaries were nothing new or artificial to the Tigrinya speakers. However, former boundaries now installed as state borders have changed the perception.

What is particularly interesting in the case of the war over Badme are the different references to statehood, and therefore to boundaries made by Eritrea and Ethiopia. Eritrea claimed to be established as a modern state with a colonial history that was bound to international law. For the Tigrayans on the Ethiopian side however, the
boundary was from ancient history, the history of settlement, and through the border practice of the borderland population.

With the introduction of a new currency in Eritrea in 1997 and the subsequent halting of trade by Ethiopia, the border turned from a unifying bridge into a barrier. Besides the distinction between borders conceptualized as boundaries of a modern nation-state and those based on ethnic or language identities, other borders were drawn by local powers, separating areas of enslaved villages and those of free people. Wendy James (2007) shows this with the case of the Sudan-Ethiopian border of the Southern Blue Nile.

The Horn of Africa is composed of a variety of states originating and based on different types of statehood. However, there is possibly one unifying factor: the negligence of its peripheral regions by the central powers – many of them being border regions. While a mix of negligence and ambiguity of central powers towards their peripheral borders often constitutes a lack of power, services, and recognition of those marginalized, it can also be of advantage to the borderland communities.

To them, the absence of the state translates into freedom of movement. If border disputes mainly stem from conflicts in the centre, the border becomes the centre and focus of national security concerns. In most cases, this leads to armed conflict and violent border disputes without any gain, nor recognition nor representation of the
needs and interests of the border communities. It is therefore more likely that border issues do not turn into violent conflicts when the states remain ambivalent.

On the other hand, precisely because of the neglect of borderland communities with regard to national education, health, and other services – and because borderland communities are rarely integrated into the legal trade of a state – the development of illicit trade routes and illegal trade in unmanaged borderlands is increasing and is not beneficial to the state’s economy.

4.3.5 Interests, Issues, and Concerns

Cross-border concerns can be roughly summarized as resources, including water, people, and security as well as environmental concerns. No matter how effectively a border is protected, water and environmental degradation know no borders. The easy movement of goods and people, the prevention of crime, and profitable cross-border trading instead of smuggling are in the interests of both the state as well as the borderland population.

Furthermore, enhanced border management – based on the principles of the AUBP – would even go beyond the national interest and strengthen regional integration. These would be pre-conditions for more prosperity and a more peaceful region in the now conflict-prone Horn of Africa. One could argue that the border demonstrates most vividly the divergence between state and citizen. While the state has an interest
in demarcating its sovereign territory, the borderland population’s need is for freedom of movement and soft border management.

In order to enhance and encourage a soft border approach with local representation on mutual border management, the following recommendations call upon the various actors to improve the stability in the region, enhance the opportunities, and include borderland populations in boundary-making.

**4.3.6 Borderland Communities**

It is worth stating that inviting the right people is the best and most sustainable solution for all border issues, as such presenting local stakeholders and their role in conflict transformation in some of the research sections.

Borderland populations have their own interests that need to be considered. Yet they are also often instrumental for the central states. They fight for the territorial gains of the central state and are, in response, promised secondary or seasonal rights. This makes it difficult but mandatory for local border administration mechanisms to carefully include the legitimized representatives of the communities and not delegate proxies of the governments so that instead of collecting pure politics and economic issues of states in border dispute other common interests of communities living in the area is prioritized.

**4.3.7 Links between Governance and politics in the region**
Governance structures in the Horn have regularly been authoritarian, heavily militarized and have contributed to high levels of political marginalization and economic inequalities. In particular, with the partial exception of Kenya, none of the region’s ruling regimes have permitted the growth of genuinely independent judicial, security or media institutions, nor have they facilitated genuine space in which civil society groups can flourish. Instead, narrow agendas aimed at preserving regime security have generally trumped calls for policies aimed at promoting genuinely national or human security.

Although the meaning of the concept of governance remains widely debated, it is used here in this research to refer to public and private institutions, structures and mechanisms, including but not limited to the official system of national governments and political parties geared toward the management and regulation of populations that are intended to produce at least a minimal degree of routine and order. At its core, governance is about conflict management among diverse populations. In the Horn, one of the basic cleavages in the region is between Islamic and Christian cultures, and in some states this fact has exercised a considerable stranglehold on what governance and legal structures are considered legitimate by local populations. Defined in this manner, governance lies at the heart of every one of the Horn’s armed conflicts.
As Terrence Lyons has argued, “Governance that blocks the aspirations of significant constituencies is central to the shift from less violent forms of contentious politics to widespread armed conflict. Civil wars last because alternative systems of governance are established that reward strategies of violence and predation and those militarized organizations that thrive in a context of fear and insecurity.

The governance question is also at the core of the process to end the war and create new institutions that can demilitarize politics and sustain long-term peace building.” Reforming governance structures must therefore be part of any peace building and conflict resolution strategies. Indeed, Lyons has also made the persuasive case that in essence the management of postwar contexts should be conceptualized as a process of demilitarizing governance structures, especially where this involves turning insurgency movements into political parties which are content to pursue power through the ballot box rather than the barrel of a gun.

Contemporary government structures across the Horn remain repressive and have contributed to a woeful set of regional (under)development statistics. From the year of 2005 governance was particularly getting very poor and oppressive in Eritrea, and Somalia, although none of the region’s a state do well in global terms. In terms of economic growth and development, the Horn has not been helped by difficult climatic conditions and the recent global recession has affected as well.
4.4 International reactions and involvement in conflicts of the Horn

4.4.1 Episodes of political violence

The episodes of political violence in the Horn have stimulated international reactions that are varied and inconsistent. Of most significance for this research are the ongoing peacekeeping operations, peace processes and peacemaking initiatives, including the proliferation of special envoys and the concomitant international contact groups on Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea.

It is also important to note that since December 2009, Eritrea has been the target of United Nations (UN) sanctions for its role in supporting insurgents in Somalia and its actions against Djibouti. Security Council Resolution 1907, which imposed these sanctions. These sanctions have been controversial – not least because Ethiopia and Kenya have also provided military support to armed groups not allied with Somalia’s transitional government. Nevertheless, there does seem to be strong evidence of Eritrean support for the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) in Ethiopia and of Hizbul Islam and Ras Kamboni in Somalia. But there has been considerable recent questioning of whether Eritrea provided similar support to al-Shabaab forces. Such criticism was strengthened by suggestions that the allegations made by the UN Monitoring Group – that about 2,000 Eritrean soldiers entered Somalia in 2006 to support al-Shabaab – are false. (One suggestion was that these soldiers in Somalia were in fact from the ONLF and the Oromo Liberation Front.) The Monitoring
Group also later acknowledged that in recent years “the scale and nature” of Eritrean support for such groups had “either diminished or become less visible.” However, the Monitoring Group was more forthright, concluding that Eritrea was providing “training, financial and logistical support to armed opposition groups in Djibouti, Ethiopia, the Sudan and possibly Uganda” and that its continued involvement in Somalia and relationship with *al-Shabaab* represented “a small but troubling part of the overall equation.” In 2009, three respected academic analysts concluded that “one central characteristic of the Horn is that analysis can start with any conflict situation … and map out a trail linking to other countries and their internal or bilateral conflicts.” This is a useful insight for advocates of peace building and conflict resolution in as much as solutions to one conflict may have positive knock on effects for others. But it also complicates the regions situations because it raises the fundamental question of *how* these conflicts are interrelated. Analysts who address this problem have usually focused on dynamics at the regional level and hence described the Horn of Africa as a “regional security complex.” Following Barry Buzan’s work, a regional security complex is defined as “a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national security cannot realistically be considered apart from one another.” More recently, Buzan and Ole Wæver revised their definition to suggest regional security complexes are “durable patterns of amity and enmity taking the form of sub global,
geographically coherent patterns of security interdependence.” They are both socially constructed (i.e. “they are contingent on the security practice of the actors”) and “mutually exclusive” in a geographical sense. Buzan and Wæver integrate the involvement of external actors in a regional security complex via their concepts of “penetration” and “overlay.” In this framework, the Horn of Africa is described as a “proto-complex” characterized by the existence of “sufficient manifest security interdependence to delineate a region and differentiate it from its neighbors, but when the regional dynamics are still too thin and too weak to think of the region as a fully-fledged regional security complex.”

*Their general conclusions about Africa are twofold;*

First, non-state actors have a large impact on the continent’s security dynamics.

Second, “the framework of notional interstate boundaries may be more misleading than helpful as a way of understanding the security actors and dynamics in play.” While the idea of a regional security complex is helpful in some respects, it is too simplistic in as much as it captures only part of the relevant conflict and security dynamics in the Horn. In practice, the Horn’s conflicts are not just regionalized – they are also often localized, nationalized and globalized all at the same time. Consequently, the region is the site of multiple interrelated security complexes which operate at a variety of levels. To understand the multiple interrelationships,
networks, processes and structures evident across the Horn’s conflicts, it is helpful to revisit what international relations scholars refer to as the “levels-of-analysis” problem. This allows us to recognize that the conflicts in the Horn are complex social processes which are *simultaneously*, but to varying degrees, local, national, regional and global. Within academic international relations, the levels-of-analysis *problem* is generally thought to revolve around “how to identify and treat different types of location in which sources of explanation for observed phenomena can be found.” In this sense, there are actually two problems: First, how to locate and identify the relevant levels, and second, deciding how explanatory weight should be distributed among them. Consequently, there exists what might be called a “levels-of-analysis” problem and a “levels-of-explanation” problem. In this part of the research four distinct levels are identified (as listed below) which are of most direct relevance for understanding the dynamics of political violence in the Horn of Africa.

### 4.4.2 Local Wars

The region’s wars all have local roots, that is, their origins lie in the relationships between individuals and their immediate politico-geographic context. In spatial terms, this immediate context is defined as sub-state to separate it from national level dynamics (discussed below). In many of the Horn’s conflicts, local agendas and the contours of domestic politics played decisive roles.
These agendas have taken a variety of forms, including a sense of entitlement to land and other resources, attempts to control systems of governance in particular towns and localities, as well as questions about identity, belonging and citizenship. Violence has thus flared around issues such as local election results, political appointments to public office, cattle rustling, competition for access to pasturage, and water sources, between agriculturalists and pastoralists.

With regard to the onset of war, the importance of local, sub-state dynamics has been affirmed in statistical analyses across a range of cases. Using data collected from first-level administrative units in 22 African states (rather than national-level data), one study showed that armed conflict was more likely to occur in sub-state regions that lacked education services, were relatively deprived compared to the country mean, had strong intra-regional inequalities, and combined the presence of natural resources and relative deprivation. In relation to the dynamics that sustain war, detailed studies of Sudan’s conflicts, for example, have concluded that local ethnic/tribal/political identity dynamics were crucial to understanding the conflicts’ twists and turns. Similarly, the UN characterized the country’s political transition as being marred by “persistent, localized conflict.” Given the importance of local agendas in the onset and sustenance of conflict, it makes sense that they will also be crucial in ending them as well. More attention must therefore be given to local mechanisms of dispute resolution. The localized distribution of violence across the Horn’s states can
be seen quite clearly from emerging data-sets such as the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED).

4.4.3 National Wars

Although many regimes in Africa’s weak states have often found it difficult to effectively broadcast their power far beyond the capital city and other strategic locales, struggles to control state institutions have at times been crucial for understanding why wars began and how they unfolded. Capturing the capital city as a route to claiming sovereignty has been a central goal of rebel groups in Africa and in Horn of Africa over the last 50 years. Capturing the state has been important for several reasons, not least the resources that can accrue to regimes from bilateral donors and the international financial institutions, the diplomatic recognition that allows a regime to select its individual representatives in many international organizations, and the fact that the first generation of leaders in Africa’s independent states decided to retain the continent’s colonial boundaries as their own. Although few insurgencies now seriously threaten to overthrow incumbent regimes, they exert localized violence in large part to gain a greater say in national political decisions, often related to resource allocation. With regard to the outbreak of conflict, national level factors are often crucial because, as Christopher Clapham put it, “The place to start trying to understand any political crisis is always with the government in power.” This insight also finds support in more quantitative studies. For example,
one recent analysis of all ethnic groups worldwide between 1946 and 2005 concluded that exclusion from state power was a crucial factor in whether ethnic groups started rebellions, especially if this was combined with prior experience of conflict and the group’s potential to mobilize support was high. This suggests that conflict resolution and peace building initiatives must take account of national governance structures and how central institutions relate to more local settings in war-torn states.

4.4.4 Regional Wars

As discussed above, particularly since the end of the Cold War, regional developments have also been identified as crucial for understanding contemporary security dynamics in Africa and elsewhere. The Horn is no different and the importance of its regional political geography has been intensified by three main factors:

(1) Military inefficiency (in the sense that most of the region’s militaries could not easily project power well beyond their national borders);

(2) The disjuncture between political identities and state/political boundaries; and

(3) The combination of weak states with porous borders.
In the Horn, regional dynamics have assumed different forms. Sometimes government forces have crossed into neighboring states to eliminate rebel bases and supply lines, to intimidate countries which gave sanctuary to rebels, or conversely to support incumbent regimes against insurgents. These tactics have produced a regular stream of IDPs and refugees, with the resulting camps often becoming potential pools for rebel recruitment. In the case of the Horn, there are also intensifying linkages with developments in other regions, including the Arabian Peninsula, especially in Yemen, and other countries.

4.4.5 Global Wars

Despite the stubborn prevalence of the view that Africa is the place that globalization forgot, in reality the continent and its conflicts have all been deeply affected by an array of globalizing structures, networks, processes, institutions and belief systems. At an abstract level, international processes have long played a crucial role in perpetuating (and often escalating) conflicts in three main ways:

(1) They have affected the dynamics of state behavior and civil wars by conferring statehood on some entities and not others

(2) They have sustained particular models of appropriate state structures; and

(3) They have diffused cultural scripts which have informed and guided state behavior.
These globalizing dynamics are exemplified in what Thomas Callaghy and his colleagues called “transboundary formations,” which link the local to the global through an array of structures, networks and discourses that ultimately produce and/or sustain forms of authority and order. Whether analysis focuses on Diaspora politics, the diffusion of religious belief systems, the trade in small arms and light weapons or the trade in khat, the Horn’s conflicts are intimately bound up with a wide range of globalizing processes.

With the above summary of what is going on or was happening in the Horn of Africa region the regional situation was and it is a volatile and unstable one and one of the major reason could be because the right local people, local knowledge and local solutions are not well tested instead international stake holders are still the major leading actor in creating or resolving the ongoing issues. It is with that respect that the following section will present the role of the regional and international actors in the Horn of Africa such as the AU, IGAD and USA.

4.5 The Role of the IGAD/AU/USA

The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is the regional organisation of Eight East African countries, aiming to achieve regional peace, prosperity and integration. This research will briefly assesses IGAD's development and contribution to two major peace processes, in Sudan (*Sudan is not a major part*
of this research yet it is examples are used as it affects the happenings of the region) and Somalia. Despite a significant influence on the outcomes, IGAD is undermined by weak institutional systems and an entrenched political culture of military aggression across the region.

The Horn of Africa is exceptionally politically unstable, and a high proportion of IGAD leaders came to power through violent means. The regional culture tends to produce militarized 'peace processes'. The use of force to achieve political goals is a regional norm, and member state leaders have frequently been driven from office.

A brief interlude of stability occurred during the period in which IGAD's peace and security mandate was established, and the organization appeared to be an ideal vehicle for achieving development, stability and integration. However the regional alliance structure which provided this basis disintegrated and reconfigured in rapid succession, massively undermining the autonomy and institutional strength IGAD required.

IGAD has nonetheless played a crucial agenda-setting role in directing African and wider international responses to conflict in the region. Despite institutional weakness and lack of authority over member states, IGAD successfully institutionalised donor support through the IGAD Partners Forum. IGAD's nominal ownership of the peace processes helped to draw support from the West, and to secure the exclusion of interested secondary actors from outside the region. However:
• The region's authoritarian political culture militates against IGAD attempting to play a proactive or autonomous role in peace and security.

• IGAD's leaders have not recognized the limitations of the organization’s remit or legal framework, often adopting bold initiatives outside its mandate.

• Member states seek to direct IGAD activity in pursuit of their own interests, compromising its neutrality.

• The peace processes in Sudan and Somalia were politically initiated and largely executed by member states, including lead regional mediators; IGAD had neither the institutional capacity nor the authority to lead or manage the process delivered under its name.

• The IGAD region lacks a clearly distinguishable lead country; Ethiopia's recent efforts to secure this position appear to have only exacerbated regional tensions.

IGAD is far from providing an institutional basis for regional security. The relatively successful mediations in Sudan and Somalia stand alongside IGAD's inability to prevent or resolve other violent conflicts in the area.

• To consolidate its role both regionally and internationally, IGAD is busy to secure either actual success in conflict resolution (as in Sudan); or align its peacemaking activity with the interests of powerful external actors (as in Somalia and the global war on terrorism).
Institutional strengthening is crucial if IGAD is to assert its autonomous position within the region. Without autonomy, IGAD's authority may continue to be used to legitimize the regional policies of member states.

Regional (and some extra-regional) powers who have dominated previous peace processes may be reluctant to provide IGAD with the means or authority to develop its independent conflict-resolution capability.

Provided that member states recognize its utility, over the longer term IGAD has the potential to serve as the forum in which unequal relationships and localized hegemony might be managed non-violently.

The intense mutual hostility between Ethiopia and Eritrea continues to poison regional relations and exacerbate other conflicts. IGAD's success in finalizing a peace settlement or normalizing relations would remove a key obstacle to progress in developing an improved regional security framework.

The Horn of Africa's regional body, which is the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), faces the daunting task of helping to resolve unrest in a region that has seen many decades of warfare. Current conflicts in the region include an Islamic insurgency in Somalia, long-lasting hostility between Ethiopia and Eritrea, a fragile peace agreement between Sudan and South Sudan, as well as continued fighting in the Sudanese states of Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile. In this challenging context, the speaker of IGAD Mr Mahbuub outlined IGAD's
efforts to improve stability and security in the Horn of Africa as follows when speaking at the Gatham House in London; he has discussed the current capacity and future potential of the organization and the role it is playing in the region for the last one decade.

He said: IGAD Continue to promote a regional integration and build on the EAC’s four pillars: customs union, common market, monetary union, and political federation. Include the north/south border of Sudan as well as South Sudan’s southern borders into the IGAD/ Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism pastoralist networks. Strengthen cross-border security and mutual co-operation by localizing border management and calling for vigilance by the border population. Enhance efficiency and inclusiveness in peace-building along the borders. Promote the sense of belonging for all citizens; encourage women in border-conflict management.

4.5.1 Role of the International Actors on the Horn of Africa Peace and Conflict

4.5.1.2 Peacekeeping Operations

Peacekeeping operations are currently being run by the African Union (with UN support) in Somalia (AMISOM, 2007-present) and by the United Nations in Sudan (UNAMID, 2008-present; UNMISS, July 2011-present; and UNISFA, June 2011-present). In addition to these missions, the African Union is in the process of authorizing a Regional Task Force involving the armed forces of Uganda, South
Sudan, Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo to neutralize the threat to civilians posed by the wandering Lord’s Resistance Army.

4.5.2 African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

Established in early 2007, AMISOM was deployed to Mogadishu under a controversial African Union mandate in the aftermath of the Ethiopian military campaign to remove the Islamic Courts Union and install Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in the capital city. Its mandate was to protect the TFG, not least by countering al-Shabaab’s insurgency. AMISOM was initially comprised of about 1,000 Ugandan soldiers until a small contingent of Burundian troops were also deployed at the end of that year. With the departure of Ethiopian soldiers from Mogadishu in early 2009, AMISOM and the TFG’s own forces were left alone to battle al-Shabaab militia for control of Mogadishu’s various districts. Since then, AMISOM’s strength grew in fits and starts, reaching just over 9,000 troops and a small number of police officers by early 2011.

Arguably the most controversial aspect of AMISOM’s operations was its indiscriminate use of force, including mortars and artillery, in response to al-Shabaab attacks. This may have been directly responsible for several hundred civilian deaths and led to calls from a variety of NGOs for AMISOM to give much greater attention to civilian protection. (At the time of writing, AMISOM is in the
process of developing a new strategy for civilian protection.) AMISOM’s major breakthrough came in August 2011 when *al-Shabaab* forces signaled their withdrawal from Mogadishu.

However, the suicide truck bomb which killed over 70 people outside the Ministry of Education in Mogadishu in early October demonstrated the switch in *al-Shabaab*’s tactics from overt to covert confrontation. As of September 2011, Uganda and Burundi remain the only troop contributing countries but AMISOM is trying to reach its authorized level of 12,000 troops through the speedy deployment of additional troops pledged by Burundi, Uganda, Djibouti, the Republic of Guinea, and Sierra Leone.

It is also in the process of establishing a Guard Force of some 850 soldiers to provide security, escort and protection services to international personnel, including from the UN. Although it has often been referred to as a peacekeeping mission, from the outset AMISOM had no genuine peace to keep. With the collapse of the Djibouti Agreement AMISOM’s principal function was to protect the TFG by supporting the Ethiopian-led counterinsurgency efforts against *al-Shabaab* forces.

Along the way, AMISOM has been supported by the UN’s Political Office (UNPOS) and, since 2009, its Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), as well as a variety of donor governments which provided it with equipment, training and
financial support. Training, equipment and support have also been provided by the EU and U.S. to AMISOM’s troop-contributing countries, Uganda and Burundi, as well as to Somalia’s TFG. In recent years, AMISOM troops have received training and support from a U.S.-based private security firm, Bancroft Global Development. Bancroft had been hired by the governments of Uganda and Burundi to train their soldiers, but the U.S. government has since then reimbursed these two countries for this expense, totaling some $7 million during 2010 and the first half of 2011.

From the start, AMISOM’s operations were hampered by a lack of adequate equipment, logistical support and bureaucratic management structures. It was therefore not surprising that it took over four years for it to establish control of Mogadishu. Indeed, for its first three and a half years, it did little more than keep the TFG alive, the air and sea ports open, and hold onto several strategic junctions in the city. In the process, AMISOM has taken significant casualties.

Casualties: estimates suggest approximately 500 peacekeepers have been killed and many more wounded. Reports indicate that more than 50 AMISOM peacekeepers were killed between mid-February and early March 2011 alone when they conducted a major offensive against al-Shabaab forces. In another major incident, this time
after *al-Shabaab*’s ostensible expulsion from Mogadishu, a contingent of Burundian soldiers suffered heavy casualties when they found themselves exposed in the city’s Dayniile district.

Although the total number of fatalities is disputed (claims from each side ranged between 10 and 70 Burundian deaths), following the battle, *al-Shabaab* forces paraded the corpses of some two-dozen men dressed in military fatigues. AMISOM’s casualty figures are not publicly available, on the grounds that they would lower morale in the mission and bolster its opponents. Since 2008, AMISOM’s activities on land have taken place in parallel with a set of maritime security operations aimed at combating piracy off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden. These have been undertaken by the European Union (EUNAVFOR), NATO, China, India, Russia and Japan, among others.

### 4.5.3 The United States of America

US government is the international key player over the issues of the Horn but like any other place in the world it is role may not be a very direct one. Some think that it is time for the U.S. government to make conflict resolution and building peace its number one priority in the Horn of Africa as they think it is also in the best interest of the US’s future relation with the people of the Horn.
• Though the US have invaded some of the countries like Somali and established military basis on others, it is administration argues that the U.S. adopts a multi-dimensional peace building strategy in the region that incorporates the below listed elements.

• Listens to a variety of local, non-state voices.

• Improves its own understanding of localized and regionalized conflict dynamics in the Horn

• Facilitates the establishment of regional forums for dialogue about peace and security challenges.

• Provides political and financial support for peace building initiatives, from mediation and negotiation training for local stakeholders to trust building and the creation of collaborative capacities among key leaders within the Horn.
CHAPTER FIVE

HISTORIC ROLE OF THE TRADITIONAL LEADERSHIP SYSTEMS

and INTERLINKS BETWEEN LOCAL MECHANISMS AND

GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES

5.1. Former and current functionality of local mechanisms, and it is integration to modernized systems of peace processes.

Studying the traditional system as African Indigenous Knowledge System (IKS) for conflict resolutions and transformation (CR & T) before government systems were realized will require many constructive researches, however in this chapter we will focus on historical development and formation of the key aspects of such traditions.

The analysis of traditional methods of conflict resolution is not a new phenomenon. However, the extant literature on these institutions and processes is inward-looking, presenting them as if they existed in a political and structural vacuum. This part of this research enlightens the hybrid nature of the relationships between state structures and traditional systems of governance, justice and conflict resolution. Its focus is on analyzing the functionality patterns and interactions between state and local mechanism for conflict resolution.
The Horn of Africa region especially those regions where Somalis live have faced the reality of numerous evolving administrations that have to grapple with the inevitability of conflict. On their own, the fledgling institutions in these states cannot cope with the huge demands unleashed by everyday conflict. It is within this context that the functionality and complementarity between traditional/local systems and the modern state systems becomes not only observable but also imperative.

As the research examines the functioning of the Somali led local mechanisms the researcher conceptualized and refers to the theory of Structural Functionalism this is because the content of the same are interlinked and the practice presented here does explain the same, the theory explains why certain aspects of society continue as they always have, despite some phenomena being clearly less beneficial for society as a whole, and this seems to be the case with most of the locally led mechanisms in this region. Structural functionalism is one of the most structural theories in conflict studies. Functionalism assumes that’ There are a number of key assumptions in Structural Functionalist theory. One of these, that societies strives toward equilibrium, is detailed in this research. Another assumption is that institutions are distinct and should be studied individually. Many Structural Functionalists look at institutions individually as though they are divorced from other institutions. This is a mistake, as institutions are
interlinked in society and those employing a structural functionalist approach should be taken into consideration and within the network of relationships that exist between these institutions.

The continuing role and influence of traditional leadership in modern Horn of Africa is hard to miss. Nonetheless, the relationship between the state and traditional systems should not be taken for granted for it is a contested terrain fraught with complexities. While traditional systems are rooted in the culture and history of African societies including Somalis, the modern state governing system exerts a large amount of influence on these systems but also equally the other way round. In some cases, the traditional institutions are politicized and have become instruments of propagating state ideology, while on the other side failed states such as Somalia may find itself only able to function by referring to the local mechanisms and borrow the traditional system of resolving conflicts and disputes. In other cases, especially where the tradition express dissent with the state, these traditional systems have often been undermined or usurped by the state.

However, the uniqueness of traditional systems, by virtue of their indigeneity and use of local actors, cumulatively enables them to either resist or even sometimes subvert the state. These traditional systems, also known as endogenous conflict resolution institutions continue to demonstrate their relevance in pre and post-
conflict states. This is especially true in the context of weak states that are overwhelmed with ongoing state-building processes – as the case is now in Somalia. There is no clear-cut formula regarding the interactions between the state and traditional systems but the fact remains that without considering the local approaches of resolving conflicts there will be no sustainable peace and in the case of Somalis it is becoming an evidence that without bottom up approach with enabled traditional systems new or modernized government institutions will not even make peace.

A relationship definitely exists between the two and understanding this could be central in the promotion of sustainable peace in post-conflict regions such as Somalia. Local mechanisms in the Horn of Africa region, especially those led by elders, play a critical role in resolving conflicts between clans and sub-clans. The cultural fusions between states and local traditional mechanisms is clearly noted and these can be observed on the government administrations in IGAD umbrella including Somalia, Ethiopia, and Djibouti relies upon the peace committees composed of elders from the clans to monitor conflict and promote peacebuilding. Following random discussions with elders and think-tanks it is reported that the inherent contradictions and paradoxes between the state governments and local mechanisms are not defined well and mostly attended on a need basis, challenges observed also include the issue of overlap between the
formal state apparatus and traditional systems, especially when the same individuals (Traditional leaders and or their relatives) play dual role and occupy different official positions in government offices.

By comparing the two systems it is obvious that local mechanisms are a grassroots system of arbitration that focuses on reconciliation and the restoration of social relationships in the community and it is a mechanism that is voluntarily accepted by clans as it also provides trusted assurances with a local control methods, while the state governing systems of governments give more focus on state building a and general justice and instead of community based approaches taking a total rely on international systems and methods for addressing conflicts.

While the local mechanisms found to be responsive to the local contexts, the government is much more internationalized. This is not only the case in such local systems of the Horn of Africa but also in other parts of the world especially African countries and relevant studies in Darfur, and Rwanda have also revealed similar results. The Juddiya system in Darfur and the Abunzi medication system in Rwanda can be referred for further explanations in those regions as well.

From Ethiopia, (Afar), Sudan (Darfur), Rwanda, Uganda and ultimately to Somalia, traditional systems of conflict resolution have demonstrated their resilience and utility in twenty-first century post-colonial and post-conflict
Africa. Despite some identifiable gaps, these institutions are likely to remain a key defining feature of the face of conflict resolution in Africa.

5.2. The role of the traditional administrations and local mechanisms in the Horn of Africa (Somali communities)

Role of local mechanisms in Somalia:

Disputes and conflicts in Somali society are resolved through recourse to an unwritten code of conduct or social contract called xeer: traditional law agreed upon by the clans in each area, and dependent on the deliberations of elders who gather to resolve specific problems within a clan or between clans. Originally and before the name was dominated by the locally activated mechanism in Hargeisa any gathering of senior elders considering issues of governance and general well-being in the Somali communities was known as a guurti, although the same term can be applied at different levels, depending on the magnitude of the issue under consideration. ‘The Somali system employs a mix of Islamic sharia and customary law, in which precedence plays a considerable part, and is applied to all issues from the smallest to the largest (Abdirahman Osman Raghe, 2010)’. In the early days the social and criminal matters in the Somali communities were guided by unwritten sets of moral and social rules, which form the basis for resolution of issues arising within or between clans or sub-clan groups. This is now changing as new xeer rules have been developed in the years of systemizing
the old local mechanisms especially the one of Guurti in Hargeisa and this is mainly to address unforeseen occurrences, so the system is a dynamic and evolving one.

Traditionally any aggrieved parties in any Somali communities would negotiate under the auspices of a group of mediators known as Ergo that may be dispatched to attempt to mediate between the parties without becoming overly engaged in the subject-matter of the dispute. If a settlement is not agreed at this stage, a Xeer-beegti, may be appointed to pass judgement on a given case with each party being expected to accept the verdict. The disputing parties must be satisfied that members of either the Ergo or Xeer-beegti are independent and qualified for their task in terms of their knowledge of customary law and expertise on traditional mechanisms for resolution of clan conflicts. In addition, the venue for negotiation must be considered neutral by those involved. Talking to many of the elders of the Somali community in different places it is important to note that the above explanation of the historic role of the traditional systems and specifically it is categorization and titles are considered indicative as there is a great deal of fluidity in the terminology used from case to case and sometimes from clan to another, however the fact remains that the traditional method of conflict resolution was the main and most trusted way to address any arising conflicts.
Both blood-ties and Xeer link every individual to his or her respective lineage, sub-clan, clan, and to the clan-family. Somali society follows a system based on agnatic or patrilineal descent, where individuals trace descent through the male line and take the name of their father (Lewis, 1961/1999). Furthermore, there is also an extensive practice of intermarriage between different sub-clans in order to establish and to strengthen inter-clan relationships and Xeer agreements, especially on the usage of grazing and water resources (Gundel and Dharbaxo, 2006).

_Elders and their Traditional Roles_

The Somali honorific Caaqil has been adopted from the Arabic, meaning brain, or knowledgeable person. In the Somali community Caaqil as one or Cuqala as many means: a man of good judgement and, more specifically, the head of a diya or mag-paying group. ‘In a similar vein, the Somali term Garaad carries the meaning of understanding, judgement, wisdom, and intelligence’ (Somali-Partner-Academicians, 2000). As the head of the diya-paying group, the Caaqil is selected by them. He is actively involved in resolving conflicts amongst his diya group members as well as with other groups. One of the Caaqil’s roles, with the support of clan elders, is to negotiate the amount and timing of any payment under Xeer (unwritten customary law). Each sub-clan or sub-sub-clan may have one or more Caaqil, all of whom are subordinate to the clan garaad, suldaan or
ugaas (Saleebaan Afqarshe, 2007b). However, all of these roles rely on a high level of dialogue and debate; none offer the incumbent autocratic authority. All the roles named above are elders, although each clan will also recognize many other, untitled elders (the generic term Oday can be applied), as well as religious leaders (sheekh) who are actively involved in clan affairs, and businessmen. The Somali proverb Raganimo dantaa moogi-bay ku Jirtaa, meaning that true respect can be achieved by neglecting your own private business to focus on the interests of all, gives a flavor of the expectations placed on elders. Elders therefore have always been the only tradition system of mediation, and preventing crisis and the first actors to become involved in dispute-resolution.

Somali society has been exclusively oral until relatively recently, so the skilled orator (hadal yaqaan) and the ability to memorize is highly respected. Indeed, oratory is a talent that can help one qualify to become a very important member of the clan. A good orator is one who can convince others through oratory, and such a person can then become a successful negotiator for his clan, provided he is Xeer yaqaan (conversant with customary law). A religious scholar or sheekh is also a respected authority in the clan and can play a major role in conflict-resolution.

The term Guurti was normally applied to a group of elders selected to resolve a specific problem within a clan or between clans. When a problem arises among
the clans or sub-clans, elders come together to discuss possible resolutions, and in so doing form a group which is called Guurti. The Somali system of clan-based discursive democracy, famously characterized by Ioan Lewis in the title of his seminal text as a pastoral democracy (Lewis, 1961/1999), underpinned much of the operational structures of the recent Somali movements and their governing systems even when modernized.

Traditional clan democracy and Xeer were the basis on which internal conflicts of Somalis were generally resolved especially when kingdom, and or later the colonization systems could not, and many of those traditions carried through to the post modernization and establishment of government phases, and continued to the present day. The system allows for considerable participation in issues relating to governance, conflict resolution and so on for all adult males. As such, women are systemically excluded from the formal process of negotiation, debate and state-building. However, for men, the system was remarkably open to participation for those who wish to do so.

A times of resolving crisis and conflicts there is a strong expectation that positions of responsibility will be shared among different clans, with each clan holding a degree of influence that is commensurate with size and historic significance. This principle carried through to the operational structure of any governance system that have been experienced in any Somali communities and
or regions up to today whereby for example a central Committee of any political organization and or representation body were distributed among the different clans in the area.

5.2. **Key strengths and weaknesses of local Mechanisms-Somalia as a case study**

The aim of locally led Somali peace mechanisms is to restore social relations between communities and reinstitute a system of law and order. Reconciliation is considered central to success and is achieved through restitution and restorative justice rather than retribution.

The declaration of responsibility by the aggressor is seen as representing more than a third of the path to a solution. (See annex B) stress the importance of ‘telling truth’ or ‘confessing wrongdoing’ as an essential precursor to a settlement.

Some of the local peace processes may even sometimes reach agreements on re-establishing institutions for governance.

Alike any other arrangement for human beings in this world local mechanisms also comes with it stories that includes weakness and elements of failings and of course brings it is positive and success side, this part of the research examines things that have worked well for local mechanisms and things that may not worked well using Somalia as a case study.
The reality is that since 1991 numerous Somali-led reconciliation processes have taken place at local levels. Often these have proven more sustainable than the better resourced and better publicized national or regional reconciliation processes sponsored by the international community.

Some local Somali reconciliation processes have provided a basis for lasting stability and development, such as those in the regions of Puntland and Somaliland. Others have addressed an immediate crisis but have not been sustained. But few processes are known beyond their immediate context. A recent study by Interpeace and its partner organizations has catalogued over 100 such indigenous peace processes in south central Somalia, Puntland and Somaliland since 1991. This has deepened the researchers understanding of the methods and efficacy of Somali peacemaking. The analyses that make up this part of the research refer to different types of locally led peace processes in Somalia.

Agreements usually institute sanctions for those violating the accord, as highlighted below by both Suldan Korfe and Hajji-Abusita. Often there is an agreement on mechanisms for monitoring implementation and managing future conflicts.

Restorative justice supports social reconciliation through collective responsibility but militates against individual responsibility. Some local accords tackle this by
specifying that violations will be addressed through application of Shari’a (Islamic law), rather than payment of diya.

Many processes draw on traditional practices of negotiation and mediation conducted by clan elders that have a long heritage in managing relations between clans and sub-clans. Adapting to the context, they also incorporate modern practices and technologies and involve educated professionals.

Several local mechanisms showed innovative peace initiatives by women and other civic activists to end violence and deal with security threats, which do not draw directly on traditional practices but could be understood as essential growing features of Somali peacemaking and the generic lessons coming up in practices of locally introduced peacemaking in the Somali context.

**Key strengths**

- **Procedure**

Thorough preparation is an essential feature of locally led Somali peace processes. Typically, this involves making initial contacts to establish a cessation of hostilities (colaad joojin) and the formation of a preparatory committee to mobilize people and resources and to ensure security. The committee will usually set guidelines on the number, selection and approval of delegates and the procedures for conducting the negotiations.
The preparatory committee will assign other committees to oversee different aspects of the process, including fundraising. The choice of venue is critical for practical, political and symbolic reasons. The hosting community has responsibility for providing security and covering many of the expenses, which are predominantly raised locally.

Respected and authoritative leadership and mediation talks are chaired by a committee of elders (shir-guudon), sometimes from neutral clans. Since effective reconciliation is heavily influenced by the quality of the mediation, facilitation and management, it is fundamentally important that the chair is a trusted and respected person who commands moral authority, and is often a senior elder.

In a brief conversation the researcher had with two senior Somali elders and experts namely Suldan Korfe, and Haji-Abu-Sitta, they have described the vital role that elders play in maintaining peace within their own community, in their own time and how quality and sustainability in settling disputes with neighboring clans is a strength. For further information and to see a similar note provided by the Guurti members refer to Annex B.

- Inclusiveness

Participation of all targeted and also others that could be concerned is an important principle of locally led Somali peace processes, Though it is open for
all and mostly managed under a tree (see Annex D picture of the Guurti) however it is systematically facilitated whereby the numbers of official delegates are agreed in advance according to an established formula, usually based on proportional representation by clan. Delegates speak and negotiate on behalf of their community, to which they are also accountable. Parties that are not directly involved but who could become an obstacle to a settlement also have to be accommodated.

To ensure participation from all concerned and influence them be part of the solution that shall be reached, different mobilization strategies are used. Poetry, religion and ritual are all significant features, helping to facilitate or sanctify an agreement, and therefore the range of actors includes not only traditional and religious leaders, but also politicians, military officers, diaspora, business people and civic activists, but also poets, ‘opinion makers’ and representatives of the media – all with recognized roles to play.

In terms of the agenda for peace conferences, a clear and pressing objective of virtually every Somali led peace process studied was that of ending violence and re-establishing public security. The cessation of hostilities that preceded many initiatives was reaffirmed and translated into a ceasefire at the conference, and measures were instituted to maintain security and build confidence.

Consensus decision making:
Consensus and acceptable decision making is another key principle of locally led Somali peacemaking. It is true that sometimes this point may cause length time for reaching conclusions in peace processes, however it is for sure the only known method for long lasting peace. It is a Somali community culture that negotiators adopt an incremental approach to peacemaking, and indeed sometimes the first attempts to resolve a conflict fail and a process may be restarted with new strategies and participants learning from one initiative to the next, this also shows the importance of having consensus as an approach for such mechanisms.

In places where disarmament has taken place, like Somaliland and Puntland, consensus is reached to put weapons at the service of the local authorities. But there is an implicit understanding that communities may withdraw these commitments should the agreements be violated, thereby generating sufficient confidence for the peace accord to be sustained. The Somali commitment to consensus in peacemaking processes is reflected in commitments to joint responsibility and management of ceasefires and social control of the means of violence.

**Key Weaknesses:**

- Limited role for Women
Women’s roles in most of the locally led Somali peace process are rarely recognized beyond their support for logistics in traditional inter-clan processes. As Faiza Jama Mohamed explains in her article on women and peacebuilding (Faiza Jama, 2014), women’s position in society as daughters of one clan or lineage and often married to another has denied them a formal role in decision making in both local processes and politics. Nevertheless, women have organized themselves using innovative tactics to mobilize support and to pressurize parties to stop fighting and continue dialogue when it appears to be faltering. In many occasions of peace processes women recited poetry to influence proceedings, women have regularly pressed elders to reach an accord and avoid conflict by offering to pay outstanding Diya (blood compensation).

Despite the fact that women are culturally and historically excluded from the decision making process we could still and especially in recent times observe a change in attitude, whereby outside the formal Somali framework of dispute settlement and peace conferences, Somali men and women in many walks of life have had to find innovative ways of dealing with the security challenges they face. Women have played a particularly important role as civil society activists seeking to broker new arrangements for public security, as Faiza Jama’s article describes.

- Time consuming
It is not uncommon for Somali peace processes to spread over many months or even years. The process leading to gatherings of clan elders and or to conferences and implementation of the accords that is produced in the peace takes long time to conclude, and this is mainly because of poor communication facilities and distances that people live in as most of the communities concerned live in rural areas and has to be part of the same process. This locally led Somali peace discussions typically ensure effective public outreach throughout the process and wide dissemination to ratify the outcomes, hence time consuming. This is however recognized as critical to the legitimacy and sustainability of peace accords.

In addition to the above listed weaknesses and strengthens, members of the Guurti interviewed stated that a general weakness of locally negotiated agreements in Somalia is the absence of a capable central (or local) authority or administration to uphold or enforce them.

Finally, local processes are not divorced from national or regional level politics, they can be heavily influenced by factors beyond the control of the local communities, whether political maneuvering by their elite, external sponsors of local conflict (including the diaspora), or dynamics emerging from national level peace conferences.
Both Sultan Korfe and Hajji Abu-Sitta observe how difficult it is to make or keep a sustainable peace when ‘politicians’ are involved, people who are generally perceived as self-interested, unrepresentative and unaccountable. And as the brief conversation with the elders noted, the neighborhood security arrangements that had flourished in Mogadishu foundered largely as a result of national and international politics.

5.3. The Guurti mechanism under study

To the inception of presenting the Guurti mechanism it is essential to highlight a brief note about the Northern region of Somalia known as ‘Somaliland’ as the home for the Guurti.

Somaliland lays claim to the territory of the former British Somaliland and covers up an area of 137,600 square kilometers. Due to its unrecognized status, its recent history of war, migration and displacement, as well as nomadic culture, it is not possible to accurately estimate the size of the population with any accuracy. In 1997, the Ministry of National Planning and Coordination had estimated the population at three million people and about 55 percent are thought to be nomadic. The urban population has increased rapidly, and was in 2002 estimated to be between 748,000 and 1.2 million. Recently (2014), the World Bank has estimated the total population of the ‘Somaliland’ region to be approximately 3.5 million people. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for 2012
have been estimated to be $1.4 billion with its GDP per capita estimated at $347. This is the 4th lowest in the world, ahead of Malawi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Burundi. About 30 percent of GDP is derived from the livestock industry followed by 20 percent from wholesale and retail trade, including the informal sector, 8 percent from crops (in the north) and 6 percent from real estate activities. In 2012, ‘Somaliland’s’ trade deficit was approximately $496 million which was financed through a combination of remittances and external aid (World Bank, 2014). Current school enrolment is much lower in ‘Somaliland’ than in all countries in the region. Only about half of the 6-13 year olds attend school. With low levels of foreign aid (‘Somaliland’ did not benefit much from the high levels of aid to Somalia in the 1970s and 80s) and an embargo on livestock exports, ‘Somaliland’ has, nevertheless, formed a system of basic public administration, rebuild its security structures, its public and private infrastructure, and absorbed hundreds of thousands of returnees and held four elections. A major part of the reconstruction work has been financed locally through Diaspora remittances and trade networks. Remittance services have also provided a lifeline for the majority of poor households in ‘Somaliland’ as they mitigate vulnerability and sustain livelihoods among the population, through timely cash payments.
The Guurti in Somaliland (Hargeisa) is a body of 92 clan elders, into a contemporary formalized structure with codified operating procedures. It currently functions as one half of the legislative body of the government just as the Senate does in the US system. However, it is still functions informally and as one official from the Hargiesa government told the researcher, the Guurti today can “decide to intentionally break the law for the good of the country.” This hybrid of formal and informal systems may be an example that many other places can learn from in trying to navigate tensions between traditional and western political systems.

The function and responsibilities of the Guurti is briefly a translation of the role of Somaliland elders in making and keeping peace accordingly Guurti is the elder’s house for Somali land which is the only such systemized local mechanism in all over Somalia.

It is a home grown peacemaking and political reconstruction mechanism that is in the lead seat for the Somali land region and maybe for the country of Somalia in making peace, keeping peace and building peace with reconciliation efforts and sustainable approaches.

Though the desire of Somali land for an international recognition – within the borders of former British Somaliland has provided a strong incentive for stability,
it has become clear for the researcher that the existence of the Guurti system is the key factor for having stable regions in the northern parts of Somalia.

In view of the continuing significance of the clans and due to the additional internal conflicts within the Northern regions of Somalia (known as Somali land), the political system had to accommodate clan-based power sharing within electoral democratic representation usually based on nominations of the Guurti. Following the clan-based power and resource sharing the northern regions of Somalia moved incrementally from peacemaking to state formation and state building, in parallel with reconciliation and democratization. Although all ‘grand’ clan conferences had an element of each of these components, the respective emphasis was shifted carefully and each new step was shaped along the way to allow room for ‘organic’ growth and continuing, pragmatic adaptation whenever the need arose.

Contrary to many ‘national’ government-making processes, the Somaliland model has not been defined by timeframes and explicit targets. Rather, it has focused on internal dynamics, and this has been further supported by the hesitant, incremental growth of international assistance for institutional capacity building and democratization.
State and government capacity in Somali land expanded gradually from the administration’s strongholds of the modernized international governing systems to a mixed power holding system between the Guurti and the government. In contrast to a prescriptive and blanket ‘top down’ deals, this gradual (and still ongoing) approach has enabled a heterogeneous process of both community peace and state building, granting time and political space to accommodate different needs and challenges at the local level.

Although the clan system has been an obstacle to some elements of quickly rebuilding the state and nation, it also provided essential checks and balances so that conflict is prevented.

Principles of compromise and consensus building have remained important after Somaliland embarked upon the democratization process. Where Somaliland’s legal framework has not provided either sufficient regulation or room for maneuver, the process remained sufficiently lenient to accommodate the underlying reality of the clan social structure. Codes of conduct, a ‘give and take’ approach and mediated solutions were used to maintain the greater good of stability.

The move to a constitutionally-based multi-party democracy after 2001 presented new challenges to stability, however. The key question was whether and how political stability built on local mechanism could successfully evolve into a
constitutional democracy based on the rights of its citizens, this has then created a severe structural resistance from within Somaliland’s traditional clan society demanding a highly flexible democratic system, in order to ensure that the trusted local systems are not destroyed.

Political parties, the National Electoral Commission, candidate nomination procedures, the election system itself, voter registration and other formal institutions all needed to accommodate a vast array of social and political forces that are all respecting the original local systems of the Guurti. This left little room to transform government bodies into the western formal known systems as professional institutions, however the fact remained that peace prevailed and clear indicators for the existence of positive peace can be detected from the public life of the people in the Northern regions of Somalia (Somali land).

Though the modern judiciary and the legislature systems remain weak the community based models are able to resolve conflicts. Despite the existence of a constitution, in reality the actual checks and balances still relies with traditional leaders and they are stronger than these other branches of governments.

The presidential elections in 2003 gave the ruling party a narrow victory over the opposition by a margin of 80 votes. The opposition contested the results and the Supreme Court eventually ruled in favor of the government, however it was only
after intense mediation and strong public pressure that the opposition conceded victory to the incumbent President Dahir Rayale.

Though the credibility of the Guurti leaders has been recently damaged because of the said political allegiance to the executive committee of the government, which is undermining its constitutional mandate to mediate political conflicts in the country it has remained the main body of reference for all types of disputes and conflicts.

*History of the Guurti and it is establishment*

The central government of the Republic of Somalia collapsed in 1991. Since then, the southern part of the country has experienced bloodshed and chaos. Soon after the state collapsed, clan leaders formed, and clan-based armed groups remain at large in Somalia. Warlords, and then, Islamist insurgents with assistance from external actors, looted, raped and ruined much of the country, including the capital city, Mogadishu. The state’s collapse did not result in chaos in the whole of the republic, however, and inhabitants of the northern region of the country decided to reconcile their differences. After peace making and reconciliation efforts concluded, once-hostile clans agreed to turn their peacebuilding to state-building within the former borders of British Somaliland. Today, the Northern regions of Somalia (known as Somaliland) has internationally unrecognized but functioning government, and is relatively peaceful compared to the surrounding
region. This is mainly reasoned by the existence of the Guurti as a leading local mechanism for peace making in the area of Horn of Africa.

Somaliland announced its withdrawal from the 1960 voluntary union with the South Somalia in 1991. The Somali National Movement (SNM) – an armed insurgency group which had helped to overthrow the Siad Barre regime and assumed leadership of the country – promised that power would be transferred to a civilian government within two years.

The SNM fulfilled its promise and at the 1993 Borama Conference of Elders, Mohamed Egal was chosen as the country's first president. Also at Borama, it was decided that the parliament in Somaliland would be made up of two chambers: The House of Elders (The Guurti) and The House of Representatives. The House of Elders – or Guurti – then become the institutionalized version of a traditional council of which was established as a strong local mechanism of governance. In recognition of the central role played by clan leaders in the demobilization and disarmament process, the Guurti became part of the very well community and government formal political system in the area and it remains to be the same.

*The role of the Guurti in conflict resolution*

The Guurti role was very visible in all stages of Norther region of Somalia ‘Somaliland’ state formation and particularly in the Borama conference. After
the SNM succeeded in its struggle, there were only two options: the winner-takes-it-all, which implied that SNM which toppled the regime and constituted mainly of Isaq clan takes everything’ or to reach a comprehensive power-sharing arrangement and involve all those clans who were not part of the struggle. A key outcome of the research group discussions were that it was indeed the Guurti who suggested the second option is adopted in order to ensure inclusivity and long last peace and security in the region.

It was because of this arrangement that the various politicians were nominated by their clans for the positions of regional president and vice president and the delegates voted for them. In the end, the Somali land region had a president from the Isaq clan and a vice president from the Gadabuursi clan. According to the participants of the group discussion this was a successful political reconciliation which was made possible due to the social reconciliation that was already going on. In a nutshell, the elders (Guurti) facilitated social reconciliation, disarmament of militias, fostering public trust and political reconciliation and they also facilitated the transition period where SNM interim government transferred power to a civilian government in a peaceful manner in 1993.

The Guurti remained an informal body until 1993 when they were formalized, by their inclusion in the national charter and governance structure of 1993. In 2001, the Guurti was constitutionalized after being included in the national constitution.
which was passed through a referendum in 2001. Chapter Two, Articles 57 - 79 of the Somali Land constitution provides for the House of Elders. The constitution granted them legislative powers which is much developed compare to their earlier traditional powers that they enjoyed before. At present, the Guurti reviews all legislation (including that which has been approved by the House of Representatives) before forwarding it to the president, except for financial-related laws. The Guurti also has a special responsibility of passing laws related to security, culture (tradition) and religion. In addition, the House has the powers to amend or block laws which are not of national interest. From 2001, the Guurti role took a new angle as they became part of modern governance and this is how the current hybrid system of governance emerged.

After 25 years of this system working, a lot has changed and the behavior of the people is gradually changing. The Guurti, however, still remain quite relevant and whenever there is a crisis, Guurti is the only mechanism who are capable of diffusing the tensions and no one challenges their jurisdiction. When political parties have internal disputes and leadership wrangles, Guurti is the only body that mediates their conflicts and their mediation renders relief to the people. The peace and stability that ‘Somaliland’ enjoys today is therefore brought by the Guurti mechanism and without them, Somali land would not be so different from the other unstable parts of Somalia.
One of the key outcome of the group discussions conducted on the Guurti role’
is that the people of Northern part of Somalia (Somali Land) feel about the Guurti
whereby participants acknowledged the importance and the positive role of the
Guurti in peacemaking and peace-building in ‘Somaliland.’

In conclusion’ the main role of the Guurti has been to maintain peace. They have
been able to resolve conflicts in ways that are familiar to them and to avoid
military intervention. Somali culture provides that elders are representatives of
the clans. They speak on behalf of their clan and also have full authority to make
decisions on its behalf. They have enormous power that they can exert on two
conflicting parties. During the 1993 Borama National Reconciliation Conference,
where the Somaliland clans came together to decide upon the future system of
government, the Guurti was involved in discussions on deciding what political
systems we should adopt. The Guurti suggested that the best political structure is
the presidential system, they argued the presidential system had three advantages
for the peace and security of the country.

Firstly, a directly elected president would not create tension among the clans.
Secondly, the president needed to be given full power in order to maintain a
strong and effective central government.

And finally, the president could only be removed from office through an
impeachment process and not by violent means.
Despite the fact that Guurti system has been able to resolve conflicts it also have had challenges including criticisms about their relevance in a post-conflict setting, and the opportunities for integrating such traditional structures in similar post-conflict states in the Horn and or Eastern Africa.

Challenges and Weaknesses of the Guurti in Modern Governance Dispensation

Both Guurti members interviewed and participants of the group discussions were in consensus that the Guurti is a very much-needed institution in ‘Somaliland.’ They however acknowledged that the Guurti is currently facing some challenges which need to be addressed so that it can be able to effectively exercise its mandate. These challenges include the fact that the replacement of the Guurti still remains a highly contentious issue. The laws that are supposed to guide this process are somewhat vague in the Constitution. Article 58 of the Constitution, for example, says that the members of the House of Elders (Guurti) shall be elected in a manner to be determined by law. This determining law has never come into existence. In addition, the Constitution has contradictions on whether the Guurti should be replaced through selection or ‘election.’ The replacement today is done through heredity, something that most of the participants were not happy with. They argued that ideally, when a Guurti member dies, another elder should be selected from his clan group to replace him. However, this is not the case. The Guurti select a member of the same family, such as a son or grandson.
to replace the deceased member. Sometimes this is done so that the person who takes over can continue to earn a livelihood and support the deceased family. Some of the participants of the research discussions observed that the replacement process today is done through heredity and anybody today is able to become a Guurti member. The initial structure was very good but it is not the same anymore. The earlier Guurti members had wisdom, credibility, honesty and they were trustworthy. The original criterion for members has been diluted and the quality of the House is declining. The structure today defeats the whole purpose of the House with young members taking the place of their fathers or grandfathers. When asked why they do this, the Guurti members interviewed argued that many disputes and issues arise when they do not follow the heredity procedure. So, they just do this to avoid conflict with the families. In addition, those who are selected to replace the deceased members of the Guurti are sometimes too young. The constitution defines a minimum age of 45 years for membership in to the Guurti house and this is not always followed. The current Guurti has many young men below the age of 45. This is also an issue that some of the participants of the research discussion were not happy with. One of the participants observed that the Guurti is losing its ingredients....it is this tendency of inheritance which is killing the Guurti. The Guurti now is no longer the Guurti of 1993/97, and it will soon become the house of youth not the House of Elders.
Also in the Group Discussion with the Guurti and other elders most of them pointed out that it is the age factor in the house of Guurti which, according to them is affecting the overall quality of the House. For example, some argue that the youth members who have joined the house are detached from the reality in ‘Somaliland’ and they are lacking in conflict resolution skills. Others argued that the Guurti members (old and young) do not understand each other because of the age barrier while others maintained that the young members still show respect to the old members. However, all participated in the discussions of this research were in contention that the youthful members maybe lacking in wisdom and experience, something which affects the overall effectiveness of the house.

Another challenge that is facing the Guurti house is that most of its old members have passed away. Most of the group discussion members argued that this is what is causing the decline of the House. Unfortunately, there is so far no documentation of their experiences, therefore they die with all the knowledge that they possess.

Another weakness is that the Guurti does not always follow the Constitution to the letter. A key participant stated that: ‘Sometimes the Guurti has mediated a compromised solution dictated to them by the circumstances at the time. For example, there was a scenario where a woman joined the House after she inherited the position from her deceased husband. In this case, the Guurti did not
follow the law to the letter. After some time however, although the woman’s participation was appreciated and her efforts were well recognized, a binding decision of her resignation was made by the same Guurti.

Talking to a group of women in Somaliland the researcher learned that the interviewed women believe that members of the Guurti should have been selected or ‘elected’ based on their knowledge of culture and religion and not politics. The Guurti members do not have to be the most educated or hold a diploma of some sort, which is all unnecessary. That the Guurti has been accused of being undemocratic in making some of its key decisions. It has also been accused of bowing down to the government demands. Also, the government has been accused of using the Guurti to reject policies which it deems unfavorable.

In addition to the above, the Guurti has remained in office for over 25 years now while the Constitution clearly stipulates that the period of office for the House of Elders is six years beginning from the date of its first meeting.

5.4. Guurti as a model for peace keeping, peacemaking and peace building

The Guurti experience illustrates the potential and especially in the Somali context impressive sustainability that ‘home-grown’ peacemaking and reconciliation can generate.

With relatively little international help except from its huge diaspora in the Gulf region, Europe and North America – the Guurti in Somaliland accomplished
gigantic tasks such as demobilization, the restoration of law and order, the management of a deregulated economy, making a constitution and at least initial steps towards a plural democracy.

All of this has been achieved without peace being imposed either from above or from outside. National compromise in Somaliland has grown locally and with the liberty of different speeds in different contexts and regions, ‘quick and dirty’ short-cuts in the peace process were largely avoided.

Also avoided has been resort to ‘cake-cutting’ power-sharing exercises, which have been unsuccessfully attempted elsewhere in Somalia. Instead the overlapping but consecutive peacemaking, institution-building and democratization processes in Somaliland have followed the successive establishment of a ceasefire, the careful restoration of relationships, genuine reconciliation, and a locally-owned process that has determined the future design of the polity.

None of the accomplishments in Somaliland can be taken for granted, however. Post-war political reconstruction is not a linear, let alone an irreversible process. The recurrent need to ‘reinvent’ political institutions (eg the changing role of traditional authorities) and the recent setbacks in the democratization process underline that consolidation requires continuous effort – and favorable circumstances – at every juncture.
Looking at lessons to draw from the Guurti case in Somaliland’s, it is important to note the unique combination of circumstances that worked in Somaliland’s favor: a strong traditional and local mechanism system, the absence of ‘war-economic’ resources, and the incentives from the search for international recognition.

Though the Guurti system in Hargeisa may not be easily transferable to southern Somalia or beyond. But it should be very much possible to encourage to draw lessons and utilize the key elements that enabled them function of which could be very interlinked to any community that is based on clans and trust of elders, so that practitioners and policy makers must start recognizing the need for having the support of ‘home-grown’ peacemaking mechanisms so that political reconstruction can be possible wherever the circumstances permit, be it on a national, regional or local level.

5.5. Voices to reform the Guurti

The problem comes now, twenty years later, as Somaliland is striving to enhance its multi-party democratic system and seeks international recognition. Many of the original members of the Guurti have died since it was first established. The Guurti has essentially become hereditary. Most have no formal education. There is a widespread feeling that the Guurti is being called upon to perform tasks which are beyond its original remit and current abilities. "We need to reassess the
mandate and membership of the Guurti", says SNM veteran Consensus, representation and parliament in Somaliland. "When it was first set up in 1990, its role was primarily one of mediation. What we have now is an old group of inexperienced people with a central role in legislation."

What shape should this reform take? Part of this ongoing debate relates to the issue of selection. If the members of the upper house were elected, there would be two elected chambers. Once again, only those who wield sufficient political clout – and with the means of financing a political campaign – would be able to secure a voice in the formal political system, rendering an upper house redundant. An alternative is for the nomination of individuals to an upper house containing representatives from minority communities, civil society and experts in appropriate fields. As was envisaged – albeit briefly – in Malawi in 1994.

Perhaps the biggest opposition to reform comes from the current members of the Guurti. Changing the composition of the upper house will not prove popular with the incumbents. A position in traditional leadership structures has become an important way to gain influence – and, for some, to do business – in Somaliland. Even those who were not part of the original peace-making process of the early 1990s are likely to be reluctant to accept changes.

As voices rise from here and there for a possible reform of the Guurti system from a pure traditional structure to a one that is modified to the current demands’
a question that is not yet answered is whether the Guurti is hindering the development of a modern viable state in the region ‘Somaliland.’ And despite the fact that the ‘Somaliland’ constitution contains clearly stipulated guidelines laying out the powers and functions of the Guurti members, the House’s appointment process remains a contentious and divisive issue. While certain provisions in the constitution hold that members of the House are to be selected, other provisions state that the members of the House are to be elected. It remains unclear whether or how these seemingly incongruous processes – selection and/or election – could complement each other or whether a complete reformulation of the appointment process is in order.
CHAPTER SIX

RESULTS and FINDINGS

This chapter will enlighten the practices and cultures of the Guurti that maybe strengthened to enable them achieve more sustainable peace that is relevant to their respective area, it will also examine possibilities to broaden them in to elements and ideas that can be expanded or even adopted regionally, it reports the results and findings of the research thematically and according to the objectives of the study outlined in the introduction. These findings are informed by the qualitative information gathered, group discussions, and data collected from the elders from three different regions of Somalia.

6.1. Preliminary results and findings of Guurti as Model for sustainable peace

A. The Northern part of Somalia (Called Somali Land region) has been relatively peaceful for the past 23 years owing to its hybrid leadership and conflict resolution and management but also political system where the modern governing systems of governments and traditional leadership (Here call Guurti) are integrated together. The modern is represented by the elected representatives forming the lower house of parliament; while the traditional system i.e. the Guurti
constitute the upper house and the highest structure for peace and conflict management in the region.

B. This research established that despite 25 years absence of a central government in Somalia, a lot has changed in the North ‘Somaliland.’ And the house of elders (Guurti) remains quite relevant as whenever there is a crisis, elders are the only ones capable of diffusing the tensions and restoring peace.

C. The research also identified a number of challenges facing the Guurti such as replacement of members in the house, the perceived non-independence from the modern government system, the perceived involvement in politics and an overall lack of women representation.

D. The research concludes that the Guurti is a good model and has demonstrated elements that can practically enable it to address local problems, it is clear that the Guurti system managed to set traditional rules, contribute to the constitution of Somali land, mediate in conflicts but also dealt a lot with post-conflict issues, it is also clear that the same system and or structure could be adopted in the lawless South regions of Somalia. Emphasis is, however, placed on the lessons that can be learnt from the model, as opposed to copy-pasting it.

E. Through this research it has come clearer that emerging after the collapse of the former Somali government in 1991, the Northern regions ‘Somaliland’ has developed into one of the Horn of Africa’s most stable democracies, which
indeed is the result of efforts made by many actors but mostly through the Guurti mechanism.

F. Over the past 25 years, the Somali communities in the Northern region of Somalia ‘Somaliland’ have gone to the polls on five separate occasions to affirm the country’s first constitution, and elect four presidents as well as local and national representatives. Domestic participants and international observers considered each contest peaceful, fair and free. The current and fourth President of the region is Ahmed Mohamoud Silanyo who was elected to office on 27 July 2010 who continue to lead the country with a great involvement of the elder’s house (The Guurti). Although the government lacks capacity and resources, they foster an active business community, its own central bank, a functioning national army and police force, and a relatively independent media sector capable of holding its public officials accountable. These achievements are highly remarkable especially when they are contrasted against South Somalia’s situation and in the absence of the overall collapsed statehood.

G. The success in re-building the norther region of Somalia (Somali Land) can be attributed to, among other factors, its unique hybrid political structure in which the modern operates alongside the traditional mechanism of Guurti.
H. The ‘traditional’ institution of the Guurti is by now a very well established system, and perceived by the population as the major power that keeps and build peace in the region.

It is important to note that declaration of independence for the Norther regions (Somali Land) in 1991 was made up of 92 clan elders from across the region whose primary responsibilities were to maintain ‘Somaliland’s’ fragile peace and mediate all outstanding disputes and any future conflicts. This combination was designed to balance clan representation within the new government so that the institution would best reflect the region’s dynamics and eliminate clan pressures from unnecessarily influencing other branches of government. In addition, the constituents of the lower house in this hybrid system were to be determined according to a formula for division of clan power that neutralized competing clan families in the region’s new government. The constituents also agreed that regional and local disputes would be managed by the respective clans through the use of traditional Somali customs, which effectively reduced the administrative burden on the emerging government; ensured the local credibility of those intervening in the conflict; and safeguarded against the rise of a second predatory state. Creating a ‘thin’ and decentralized government, one with a limited mandate and functions, explicitly acknowledged that sensitivity to ‘Somaliland’s’
contextual realities was imperative towards ensuring the government’s future stability.

- This political and peaceful order has attracted significant attention from academic circles to the extent that some writers and commentators have viewed the regional leadership as a perfect laboratory of statehood in Africa, providing numerous lessons about how the concept and idea of statehood can be relevant and important in Africa today – albeit not in the sense perhaps anticipated by hopeful policymakers expecting to find a magic state-building potion (Renders and Terlinden, 2010; Hagmann and Peclard, 2010).

- The process of internal peace and state building has been anchored by traditional values as commitment to dialogue and other non-violent means of resolving conflict is an adopted approach by the Guurti.

Many people in ‘Somaliland’ assert that the Guurti has played an instrumental role in the country’s state-building process and are crucial for maintaining peace and order. However, the hybrid system has been criticized for containing elements that limit progress and democratic development. For example; the Guurti have on many occasions hindered the democratic process by either extending their term in office or extending that of the executive committee. In
addition, the legitimacy of its members has become increasingly compromised, to the point that many people in the region ‘Somaliland’ today question whether the Guurti is at all a source of legitimacy for the government, this seems a challenge that traditional systems face when their power exceeds the traditional basis and interacts with government systems of which (at least in the results of this research) is considered a threat of the modernization to the traditional mechanisms and systems. Having said so, it has to be clear that this is not a matter of traditional authority having lost legitimacy in the ‘Somaliland’ context, but one that is not representing the only classic traditional authority. In light of the above findings, it is clear that there is need to further study the developing Guurti as a new model of House of elders in order to understand and further clarify their evolving governance space especially interlinks with the government, and how responsibilities of peace and security has to be coordinated with the relevant line ministries in the government.

Many countries, which have gone through a period of civil war, struggle to build peace and security, a necessary precondition for state-building. This has not been an easy task for most countries such as Somalia which has in many occasions continuously relapsed back to violence. Different actors (national, regional, sub-regional and international) have been invited in such war-torn states to help in the process of building peace and enforcing security, and mostly this has been in
the form of sending troops, hosting leaders of warring clans and facilitating and/or brokering peace agreements. In some countries this has worked while in others it has not. However, the case of the Northern region of Somalia ‘Somaliland’, provides a unique and valuable lesson in peace-building to be learnt by neighboring regions and countries seeking to consolidate peace and security. The recognition of the house of elders (Guurti) in this region and the use of their mobilization and peace-making skills have proved that locally-led, community-driven, bottom up peace building processes are more reliable and productive than internationally driven, donor-sponsored, top-down ones.

This study contributed to clarify and present a knowledge on the governance space of traditional structures in the Somaliland region and in generally the Horn of Africa particularly in the area of peace and conflict consolidation. In addition, the findings of this research are of use to policy makers and different actors keen on integrating traditional structures in peace building and state building processes. In other words, the research is contributing to enlighten the existing body of knowledge as well as to the ongoing policy debates in this field; hence the importance to consider the proposed ideas to the way forward in this research.

6.2. Enlightening the major practices and cultures of the Guurti model

It is the culture of both local Somali communities and clan elders (Guurti) to lead reconciliation process as a result of their traditional mandate to resolve conflicts
and preserve peace. In it is early stages of forming the Guurti organized 39 clan reconciliation conferences immediately after the fall of the Siad Barre regime, which fulfilled a variety of functions including:

- Restoration of peaceful relations between communities affected by war;
- Establishment of a relatively stable security regime in which law and order have increasingly fallen within the ambit of the partially–decentralized government;
- Establishment of local and national institutions of governance;
- Creation of a conducive environment to economic growth and the kick start of what might be considered a more broadly–defined process of development.

The Burao7 conference organized by the Guurti of various clans in 1991 fundamentally transformed ‘Somaliland’s political history. Dozens of Sultaans, Garaads, Ugaas, (Titles for different members of the Guurti) and other traditional titled leaders participated representing the different clans of ‘Somaliland’ including the Isaaq, Harti and Dir clans. As it had no legislative mandate at that time to approve the outcomes of the conference, the Guurti played only a mediating role. The deliberations of the conference were, therefore, submitted for approval to the SNM Central Committee, which was the only decision making body present at the time.

The Central Committee of the Guurti then presented the following outcomes:
• Reconciliation of the warring parties to the conflict;
• Declaration of the ‘Republic of Somaliland’ on 18 May 1991;
• A two-year transitional rule by the SNM and the incorporation of the non-Isaaq clans and sub-clans into the government structure during this period;
• Initiation of a separate reconciliation process for the Sanaag region.

These community-based, Guurti-led national reconciliation conferences paved the way for state-building efforts to begin. The Guurti had successfully managed to organize conferences and restore trust among the different clans. It was well understood by the traditional leaders of this region that building peace is a necessary precondition for state-building and only once conflicts are resolved and trust among warring parties is restored can the state-building processes truly commence. On this premise, the Guurti was successful in establishing these preconditions by resolving inter-clan conflicts between the SNM and Siyad Barre’s supporters in the north. Following the Burao Conference a two-year transitional government was elected, SNM internal tensions emerged over power sharing arrangements. The Guurti did little to resolve tension within the SNM as they put their focus on the neutralization of potential violent conflict between the Isaaq (supporters of SNM) and their neighbors. This neglected internal SNM conflict became an obstacle to the state-building processes. Violent armed clashes between competing factions within the SNM erupted in Burao, Berbera
and Hargeysa the matter have forced the Guurti to step in, a cease-fire was reached in the town of Sheikh, and a grand conference was held in Borama in 1993.

As it has been explained elsewhere in this research the word “Guurti” refers to male elders in any Somali communities but knowingly and mostly in the ‘Somaliland’ region, therefore the House of Guurti is supposed to be a ‘men only’ house.

All the different elders and groups the researcher met with have agreed upon this definition of the term. The current Guurti consists of 92 male elders. Most of the respondents argued that despite the constitution clearly stipulating the criteria that should be used in selecting members of the Guurti, the criterion was in most instances overlooked. One elder observed the following:

“Their specialized knowledge in religion and culture were the main criteria used to select the Guurti members. Additionally, age was an important factor; the constitution talks about a minimum age of 45 years. Women were not allowed to become members of the Guurti. He stated that the word Guurti means male elders acting as mediators and the constitution talks strictly of a house for the male elders, unless the constitution is amended.”

Members from the Guurti themselves argued that in terms of representation, the Guurti house is the fairest of them all as it ensures that all clans and sub-clans in
‘Somaliland’ are represented. This is unlike the lower house (the House of Representatives) where minority clans and sub-clans do not have representatives since members go through elections and minorities most often lose as they are unable to buy seats in the house.

Another elder (key informant) originally from Borama argued that:

“The Guurti has served their purpose and they deserve to be praised and rewarded. The structure is very clan-based; it is the only house where every existing clan is fairly represented and accommodates even the minority clan groups....”

There have been no elections or nominations in the House of Guurti since the 1993 conference held in Borama that formalised the house. Therefore, the current membership of the Guurti has been in place since 1993. Although the majority of the senior members have died, every clan and sub-clan is represented in the house.

The Guurti members interviewed agreed that the constitution requires them to be in the house for a period of six years but their term has been extended four times. Members of their immediate family have replaced those who have died; and the replacement has therefore been kind of hereditary.

The Guurti in Somaliland performs many duties and responsibilities. These include: debating and passing legislation related to religion, tradition (culture)
and security. The Guurti also reviews legislation approved by the House of Representatives with the exception of financial legislation. The Guurti are therefore not only peace makers but also law-makers but they do not debate or pass financial-related laws, as this is the responsibility of the Lower House. The argument for this is that most of the Guurti members are not educated and they have no background knowledge on financial and or law matters. In addition, historically, their role has been one of mediation and conflict resolution as opposed to dealing with financial and other related issues.

When a conflict arises the Guurti sends a delegation of elders (from the House) to help mediate between the parties, resolve the conflict and restore peace in that particular region. They also do a lot of proactive activities meant to raise awareness on the importance of peace. For example, before general elections, they travel all around the country together with other groups, for example, religious leaders and they talk to people about the need to maintain peace before, during and after the elections. Therefore, in that way, they act to prevent chaos and conflict.

The Guurti also arbitrate or mediate between the power struggles of the different organs of the state. They also summon members of the different organs of the state such as the heads of ministries and ask them questions about the fulfillment of their duties. The two houses (Guurti and the parliament) in ‘Somaliland’ are
located in the same compound. The buildings are a look-alike, in terms of size and design. The two buildings overlook each other and they are located at the centre of the city of Hargeisa. Most of the time, the two houses hold separate meetings but once in a while they may sit jointly, such as when the President is opening the two houses.

The Lower House performs the following key duties:

• Confirming the appointments of ministers, deputy ministers and other heads of the organs of state;

• Debating and approving the programme of the government;

• Ratifying governmental (international) agreements and treaties such as economic, political and security agreements or those agreements which impose new financial burdens, which are not usually covered in the budget; In addition, their legislative powers extend to financial matters such as the imposition of taxes, duties and other schemes for raising revenue, printing of currency and the issue of bonds and other securities as well as the regulation of the economic and financial systems.

Just like the Upper House, (Guurti) the Lower House (Parliament) has the power to summon the government’s organs or agencies in order to question them about the fulfillment of their responsibilities and performance of their duties. The
Incorporation of the Guurti in the Current Governance Dispensation in ‘Somaliland’

All the respondents acknowledged that the Guurti has a long history in ‘Somaliland,’ long before its formalization and subsequent constitutionalization in the later years. One Guurti member noted that:

“Before colonization, the people of ‘Somaliland’ were nomadic pastoralists and, at the time, there were no centralized governance structures that existed. Elders, however, filled this gap and communities/clans lived together in harmony. The elders did not have official offices but came together on an ad-hoc basis during conflicts, marriages or when responding to any other social issues. As incidents unfolded, an ad-hoc committee of elders would ask if a similar incident had taken place in the past and whether there were provisions in the customary law to resolve it or whether it was a new unfolding incident which required the establishment of a new customary law (xeer)....”

“It has been the tradition of the people of Somaliland to resolve their disputes under the tree, a process always led by elders.”

These observations concur with available literature which suggests that traditional structures such as the elders were largely active and intact in ‘Somaliland,’ just like in other parts of Somalia, before, during and after colonization. According to the respondents, the history of the current Guurti dates
back to the period between 1988 and 1989 during the SNM struggle (in the north) against the dictatorship regime in Somalia.

Considering the grass root acceptance of this mechanism, it is long history in the community, and also the reported and verified progress and developments of the Guurti it is at a stage that it could share learnings with other regions and perhaps become a reference for those newly merging mechanisms to build on it is expertise.

6.3. Elements of learnings from the Guurti that can be expanded to other regions.

Number one lesson that Somaliland region learned from the conflicts is that social reconciliation and sorting out differences within the community is a precursor to state-building. During the SNM struggle, there were those who were in support of the struggle and those who still supported the central government. SNM could not reconcile these people/clans as it largely represented one clan; the Isaq. SNM could either represent nor could it be trusted by other clans such as the Gadabuursi, the Issa, the Harti and others who were neither part of its structure nor the struggle. Some of the participants of the research group discussions argued that at the time, there was need for a neutral and impartial party to lead the social and political reconciliation processes and the Guurti identified itself as
this party. In 1992, the Guurti of different clans organized the historic Sheikh conference on 20 October. The conference concluded with a 19-point declaration of strengthening peace and reconciliation in ‘Somaliland.’ The elders agreed that clans should reconcile and forgive each other. In addition, the Guurti were also to start disarming the militia groups within the SNM as they had successfully completed their other tasks. In the Sheikh meeting, the Guurti agreed to organize the historic Borama conference and selected the delegates that would represent them. “The Guurti members selected in Burao were different from the old only traditional elders in the sense that traditional elders represented their specific clans but the Guurti members were unified, gained respect of neutrality, led the process of forgiveness and reconciliation and played an important role in the social cohesion which was a precondition for political reconciliation and state building, the Sheikh conference coincided with the arrival of the United Nations office for Somalia (UNOSOM). The British ambassador to Ethiopia, James Glaze went to the Sheikh conference and was handed a declaration from the conference. Part of the declaration said that clans in ‘Somaliland’ would not welcome the UN peacekeeping mission in their land, as the clans can solve their conflicts using indigenous approaches. A historic outcome of the locally led Conferences were that UNOSOM did not come to Somaliland, hence a second lesson from this Guurti system is that where there is a unified and strong local
mechanism to resolve conflicts a possibility to push the international mechanisms is more likely.

Third lesson is that a community led negotiations and an inclusive approach for reconciliation would lead to a long lasting solution.

Fourth lesson is that the selection of clan delegates that would attend the reconciliation conferences has to be carefully managed so that each and every clan and or community is represented not matter how big, small or active they are.

A fifth lesson is that the transfer of authority to local structures such as Guurti could be the temporarily transition between politicians especially in a fragile and very unstable situation.

Sixth learning is that the traditional mechanisms such as Guurti has to learn from the developing world when it comes to documentation and use of technology so that their memory based knowledge could be supported by the modern way of working and as such meetings has to be minuted, declaration has to be recorded, and locality sets up of peace committees has to be structured so that responsibilities are not only known by elders but it can also be defined and disseminated.

Additionally, and finally a major learning is that setting a clear vision that bring all people behind the local mechanisms has to be established, here and in the case
of the Guurti in Somali land they have agreed and announced the declaration which salvaged people of ‘Somaliland’ from killing each other.

6.4. Proposal to strengthen the Guurti Model.

This section will draw a proposal on how such local mechanisms should be strengthened and will lay out clear steps that will enable practitioners implement the outcome of this research.

Brief description on how the Guurti Model can improve it is effectiveness and be formulated to a regional model

- Improving Guurti’s effectiveness

Clearly all those who have participated in the discussions conducted for this research through an interview, a meeting and or a group discussion expressed their concern over the replacement of the deceased Guurti members through this ‘next of kin’ inheritance culture which facilitated youth to become members of the House. They agreed that there was need to change this method of replacement. Some were for selection while others preferred ‘elections.’ Most of the participants however, advocated for selection. Those who were for selection argued that the Guurti is a house based on the traditions of Somalis in ‘Somaliland’ and need not, therefore, be subjected to the vagaries of electoral
competition. Elders and other community dignitaries cannot put up themselves for election; in the cultural context, however, they have to be recognized and hence selected for their service to society. Furthermore, it is claimed that elections do not necessarily bring to the fore the right people for leadership. In addition, selection was the only way that would ensure that all were represented in the House. Election of the Guurti would also compromise their neutrality and impartiality as they would be elected through a political party. This means that their loyalty would be divided. It also means that there would be no difference between them and the House of Representatives. All participants however agreed that there was need to revise the laws that govern the selection process. Strict criteria, principles and guidelines must be set and followed to the letter in order to ensure that good elders come into the House. Secondly, they argued that the members of each clan and consequent sub-clans should be given a chance to nominate and/or select the best person amongst them, someone with extensive knowledge and wisdom.

As mentioned in the preceding discussion, those who argued for the ‘election’ of the Guurti were few and they argued that the selection process worked well before because of the post-conflict nature of the country and that there were no governance structures. It was, however, especially in this modern day and having
established a democratic government, important for Guurti members to be elected, this later argument seems not very popular and not cutlery yet digested. From the research it is also becoming clear that the there is need to refresh the house and infuse new blood in it and the new blood should have specialized knowledge on religion and culture and if possible also possess modern knowledge.

There is a need to review the mandate and powers of the house of Guurti as some of the group participants raised the current Guurti has more powers than the Lower House despite the fact that they are selected, and though they are most trusted body by the people still the elected lower house should also exercise some relevant powers to fully exercise it is rights.

The Guurti should regain its independence and neutrality as this is very important for the credibility and trustworthiness of the House. Participants of the group discussions mentioned that despite the trust and the power that people have given to the Guurti as the only mechanism of problem solving and peace making yet it is necessary for the protection of the same mechanism that the Guurti members avoid getting involved into politics, it is very important that they remain neutral and impartial.

- Formulating Guurti to a regional model
Those participated in the discussions of this research had varied answers to the applicability of the ‘Somaliland’ Guurti mechanism to other post-conflict societies. Almost quarter of those interviewed were of the view that the ‘Somaliland’ model may not easily work in other countries, especially in the rest of Somalia - mainly in South-central; while more than half believed that the model could be replicated in the rest of Somalia and as well as in other countries. Some have argued that Guurti is now becoming a hybrid system between the traditional elder’s systems of the Somali communities and the modern westerner governing systems and therefore it is a unique model that has to be applied in other contexts in similar circumstances with the condition to first carefully understood and study well, and while applying the model may not be that easy taking most of the lessons learned by this model to other countries must be much easier.

In applying this model to other regions and or countries it is important to note the integration of traditional aspects into modern governance in Somaliland, has come with both advantages and disadvantages and that the option to integrate or not integrate has to be measured in each context and study well the benefits that it may bring and or challenges it may create.

The bottom-up peace-building approach which is culturally and traditionally rooted and mainly based on grassroots reconciliation is one thing that can be
learned from the Guurti mechanism in Somaliland and must be easy to apply it in any African community – of course as per it is cultures and traditions.

As this model is formulated into a regional model the researcher observed that the traditional structures represented by elders have played an important role in the formulation of the current administration in Somaliland and that it is neighboring region of Puntland have tried to recently attempted to move to local council elections and possibly to a multi-party system, an attempt which backfired and which finally led them to resort to traditional elders who selected the current members of the administration.

Remarkably’ Elders have played a vital role in conflict resolution and mediation during the last elections in both Somaliland and it is neighboring ‘Puntland’ which is also now enjoys some relative peace compared to Southcentral.

Having said the above the research is alerting the need for this model not be copy-pasted; rather, it should be tailor-made to the circumstances and contexts of other states. For example, if the Somalis in South-central Somalia would want to adopt this model they may need to go back to their traditions and cultural norms and need to the call of the traditional elders. They also need to successfully integrate religion, tradition and the modern governance systems so that a possible clash between systems is pre-empted and that the context is well studded.
This research establishes few important facts if and when this model is to be applied in other context and those include the following:

- Traditional elders of any location, region or clan should have full confidence that they can represent their clans and that they can speak on their behalf.
- It is only when a full confidence of the people that elders represent is secured that elders can gather for issues of reconciliation and conflict resolution this is because the traditional power of elders is based in trust of each clan community to the selected elder.
- Any community that may decide to adopt this model has to ensure that other surrounding powers (nontraditional) such as modern western supported systems of parts, governments, think-tanks etc are in full support for the clan traditional leaders to take a lead role in steeling peace and conflict matters of the relevant region.
- Timing is very important for allowing elders to settle conflicts and or contribute to peacemaking efforts, this is clear as the Guurti of Somali land have taken the initiative immediately after the collapse of the central Somalia government, which has allowed them to be placed in a power full position to mediate, but to also push back international interferences, and therefore the research attempts that for example South-central Somalia
would have achieved relative peace if they would have adopted such a model early on after the conflict, and it may therefore be very difficult to apply it to the current context today.

- Total unity of all community and society section in the given region behind elders is a must for this model to work it out, this is because the Guurti model is not based on a physical power earned by the elders but support from people with an approach of inclusiveness and also a culture of forgiving each other.

- The culture of a society has to be one that have norms of peace and less nature of crimes and distrust so that this model can work as well.

- Believing in something such as religion will empower those trusted with decision making this is the case of the Guurti as people will trust the elders based on their experience, leadership but also a shared believe in religion.

- An additional supporting element for this model to work regionally is that the business men, diaspora and or international community has to contribute and or in some case sponsor conferences as it may cost more than a normal traditional and local conflict resolution would require.

- The culture of elders controlling the behavior of their sons will be an important element for any reconciliation, demobilization and disarmament of armed militias, and for the elders
6.5. Steps that will enable practitioners to further study and implement the outcome of this research.

Drawing from the findings of this study, a number of steps and conclusions which will enable practitioners to further study and implement the outcome of this research can be recommended:

First, the study has confirmed the findings of available literature which suggests that traditional structures and in particular the elders were largely active and intact in ‘Somaliland’ before, during and after colonization.

Second, this study has examined the current structure of the Guurti and how it has been incorporated in the current modern governance dispensation. In addition, the study has examined -- in detail -- the role of the Guurti in peace and security consolidation, the challenges and weaknesses facing the Guurti and the opportunities for integrating traditional structures in similar post-conflict situations. In a nutshell, the study has achieved its objectives.

Third, the study concludes that after 25 years, a lot has changed in Somalia but the elders in Somaliland still remain quite relevant. Whenever there is a crisis, elders are the only ones capable of diffusing the tensions and restoring peace. There is, therefore, need to address the challenges and weaknesses currently facing the House to enable it effectively carry out its mandate.
Fourth, this research has identified many lessons that can be learnt from the ‘Somaliland’ experience, which South-central and other post-conflict societies in the Horn of Africa can emulate. One of them the steps to take therefore is to study further on how to reconcile traditional and modern aspects of governance. Another is to review the importance and relevance of bottom-up peace-building approach - which is culturally and traditionally rooted on grassroots participation and reconciliation in Somalia, but consider context analyses in the specified region. A step to be considered is that it is examined in other contexts if actually Social reconciliation is a necessary precondition to political reconciliation and state-building or if bringing low and order is first action to be considered.

As the Guurti mechanisms is a progressing model it will be important to further study the right standard or semi standard process for different cultures and or multi ethnicity communities and examine cultures and societies with regards the interlinks of peace culture and forgiveness with political reconciliation as the later has to do with power-sharing and the formation of government, while the other is more based on trust between people and more of closer to fairness, neutral and impartiality principles.

Lastly, the research concludes that the Guurti is a good model that post-conflict societies can adopt, and it is pre-conflict tactics has to be further developed. Emphasis is, however, placed on the lessons that can be learnt from the model.
For those who may be interested in adopting this model, they however must be cautious not to copy-paste it. Instead, such a model should be tailored to specific contexts, realities and circumstances.

6.6. Brief Recommendations and conclusions

In addition to the above mentioned recommendations the research recommends the following:

First, there is need to revise the constitution of Somali land so as to remove all ambiguity associated with the replacement of Guurti members. A specific law should be formulated so as to set out the criteria, principles and guidelines of selection or ‘election’ of members into the Guurti. This will address the challenge of the ‘next-of-kin’ replacement and youth getting into the House.

Second, after 25 years, clearly there is need to reform and refresh the Guurti as most members of the original Guurti have passed on. The replacement criteria should be strict and provisions for the same should be followed to the letter.

Third, in order to regain their neutrality and independence, members of the Guurti should refrain from interfering in local politics and political parties. They should also not allow any political party or the executive to influence their decisions. This is very important for the credibility and trustworthiness of the House.
Fourth, ‘Somaliland’ needs to build and strengthen its institutions; particularly the judiciary which is, at present, weak. The judiciary is not independent; it lacks public trust and capacity. This has made the political parties resort to the Guurti for arbitration of disputes, whereas this is a function that should be carried out by the courts. This function is not within the jurisdiction of the Guurti but they find themselves arbitrating anyway and getting entangled into the politics of the parties.

Fifth, the experiences of the Guurti must be further and in detail documented. This is important for knowledge transmission to the new members joining the House. For example, most cases handled by the Guurti in the past can be used as reference points that can guide mediation and conflict resolution of future conflicts and disputes.

Sixth, both Houses (Lower and Upper) need to consider and implement a women quota in both houses so that participation is actually inclusive.

Lastly, the study recommends further research on the future of the Guurti. There is currently an ongoing debate in ‘Somaliland’ on how to refresh the Guurti as well as the future of the House.
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ANNEXESS

Annex A.

Communications and initial documents for both Guurti and non Guurti participants.

A. Brief note about the Research methodology;

The research adopted a qualitative approach. Yin (1994) argues that the choice of a research strategy should be determined by the nature of the particular research question posed. The research questions in this study pointed to a qualitative approach. For example, questions on how local mechanisms such as the Guurti has been incorporated into the new governance dispensation as well as their contribution to peace and security consolidation in ‘Somaliland’ required a direct engagement with the Guurti members themselves, but also with regional experts that knows the history of such mechanisms. The researcher could not get this kind of information through the use of quantitative methods, it was also must to involve think-tanks and decision makers and approach them from the qualitative side of the research so that all the dots scattered in the minds of many are linked.

Although many surveyors and researchers implies the use of some form of questionnaire to be administered to a sample of respondents, the questionnaire is simply one instrument that can be employed in a research problem. As such, it can only contribute to the task at hand and will not be the only tool to be used, and the fact remains that know-a-days it may not be easy to secure actual and reliable information through questions and data gathered from many, but rather discussions and engagements that is deepened to people’s minds especially under such social researches.

The methodology undertaken in this research is therefore a qualitative one and it is chosen as the appropriate methodology for such a social but complicated research.

Having said so some of the persons targeted by this research particularly those directly involved in the Guurti are interviewed, such hybrid research methodology approach shall therefore enable the researcher to secure most of the required
information on this mechanism which is most probably unwritten, but also produce a comprehensive picture of the matter under study.

Considering that the issues of peace and conflicts in the horn of Africa are complex and that in most cases there is no single response that could be straight to black or white, the research will use more of the qualitative methodology to reach in to conclusions on some of the issues arising from the interviews of the Guurti system, and the below are the steps that will be followed.

- A questioner will be designed and will be distributed to about 10 participants from the Guurti systems to collect basic information about the mechanism.
- Results of those questioners will be combined and analyzed and minimum of key topics is developed’ then it is presented to two different groups for further discussion. (Elders from the region and regional experts), maximum of 10 as well-5 from each.
- The outcome of those group discussions compared with the information gathered from the Guurti members shall be presented as part of the findings of the research to respond to the research objectives.

Details of the analyzed information gathered from all the three groups will be presented in narratives and tables and will be documented in this research as part of the annexes of the research.

**B. Soma of the Non Guurti members that participated in the group discussion’s and interviews**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Role and background</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Hajj Abusitta</td>
<td>Addis-Ababa, Ethiopia</td>
<td>An elder-leader of communities in Somali Land, and a well-known businessman. The owner of Daallo Airlines.</td>
<td>Meetings and discussions organized three times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Suldan Korfa Suldan Garane</td>
<td>Somali region, Ethiopia</td>
<td>The Sultan of the clans in the border between Ethiopia and Somalia and known as the Suldan for Somalis in Ethiopia</td>
<td>Meeting facilitated three times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ustad Mohamoud Ahmed</td>
<td>Hargiesa</td>
<td>A researcher and expert on Horn of Africa issues. Adviser</td>
<td>Meeting facilitated two times</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
C. First e-mail for sent for each group member;

Dear,

Greetings and hope this e-mail will find you in good health.

I am Ahmednur, a PhD researcher in the Sudan University for Science and Technology (SUST), College of Post Graduate, Center for Studies and Culture of Peace (CSCP) and under the supervision of Professor Abulgasim Gor, copied to this e-mail. I am currently in the middle of my research which is in the field of Peace and conflict studies titled on: Strengthening local mechanisms for sustainable peace; a Study of the role of Indigenous Culture in peace building and Conflict Transformation Systems (Case Studies from the Horn of Africa). My research will follow the Delphi research methodology and as one of it is requirements I need to facilitate a discussion with selected experts, so that I can analyze the outcome of the discussion for the research. It is because of this that I am communicating with you to first seek your acceptance to please be part of a panel of experts that I will engage with for the next few months.

I have so far selected two groups each of ten experts, the members of the first group are all in Sudan and they will be meeting face to face, while the second group (which I am requesting you to be a member) are Experts on the Horn of Africa, Highly educated persons, and knowledgeable/indigenous persons from the region (Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eretria).

I assume that you are more than busy but as my research is taking a qualitative research approach I need your contribution. I will simplify questions as much as I can and I will also share the analyses of the discussions with you.

If you may kindly accept to participate in the discussions of this research, then please share with me and or advice on the following:

1. Your full address (as sometimes I may need to send printed documents)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>4</th>
<th>Ustad Mohamed Mohamoud</th>
<th>Hargeisa</th>
<th>Education experts with UNICEF, Hargeisa Somali Land</th>
<th>Meeting facilitated two times</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Professor Samuel SK Ewusi</td>
<td>Addis-Ababa</td>
<td>Head of U-PEACE-African programme</td>
<td>Meeting facilitated three times</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. Preferable time/date to send the questions/questioners and discussion agenda’s, if any (As some may prefer to receive them during weekends etc)

3. A brief summary about yourself, or your CV if you wish. (as I will need to prepare a brief note about the participants in order to present it as part of the annexes of this research)

4. Please feel free to share any information that has to do with the region of Horn of Africa and or with Peace and Conflict studies- role of the Indigenous Culture in peace building and Conflict Transformation Systems.

5. The research is limited to a specific period of time (2005-2010), and local mechanisms in mind (for now) include the Guurti System in Hargeisa, and the traditional administration of the Issa tripe as one of the indigenous cultures and well established mechanisms in the region. Please let me know if there is any other local mechanism or indigenous culture that you know which you think it has any affect on the peace and conflict situations in the region.

Looking forward to your response,

Best regards, Ahmednur, Ahmednuurl1@gmail.com. +251915741158 for the month of June, +249912158945 from July onwards.

**D. Sample of Questions to the selected Professionals and Elders in the Region**

The following questions are all an Open Ended question where you can input long text.

1. Does Elders systems function as an indigenous mechanism, if yes, what type of systems, please describe the traditional/indigenous elements that you know as a Somali elder/professional
2. What is the role of the elders in Somalia in peace initiatives, peacemaking and peace building?
3. List 5 key challenges that face the Somali traditional system in Somali Land describing how those challenges could be overcome.
4. Describe the work relations between the traditional as community leadership system and the Government as modern structure. Tell us advantages and disadvantages of the Guurti function in Somali land.

5. What are key weakness of the traditional mechanisms? Are there any weakening elements that are imported, if any?

6. Which of the governing systems (Guurti or Government) that is a reason for the sustainable peace in Somali land and why

7. What are the conflict prevention steps that the Guurti affects when a conflict is reported?

Annex B.

Questions to Guurti members in Somali Land region (1)

The following questions are all an Open Ended question where you can input long text.

1. Does Guurti systems function as an indigenous mechanism, if yes, what type of systems, please describe the traditional/indigenous elements that you practice in your role as a Guurti member

   Yes, it has roots on culture, they use traditional practices, Islamic teachings and Sharia to solve conflicts and it long practiced culture.

2. What is the role of the Guurti/House of elders in Somali Land in peace initiatives, peacemaking and peace building?

   The House of Guurti plays major role in peacemaking in Somaliland and the reason is because it is of its mandated role. They bring together clans to solve their disputed issues. They give special consideration where conflicts is alerted.
3. List 5 key challenges that face the Guurti administration system in Somali Land describing how those challenges could be overcome.

1. The House budget is clearly states which budget line is for trips and which is for peacemaking.
2. Lack of developing of country laws like those related with culture and religion.
3. Government is leaning and giving more powers to traditional clan leaders than of that of Guurti.
4. No official direct relation of the House and the public.
5. The senior elders in the House is getting less and less because of natural death and the new inherited members do not get trainings for their roles and 

4. Describe the work relations between the Guurti as community leadership system and the Government as modern structure. Tell us advantages and disadvantages of the Guurti function in Somali land.

The relation between the government and the Gurrti is direct. And its benefits is to cooperate and intervene together when even a conflict is reported. Usually, before the Guurti intervene and starting peacemaking efforts, the Government sends peacekeeping units from defending force. And in this way conflicts are resettled.

5. What are key weakness of the Guurti and or the older traditional mechanisms? Are there any weakening elements that are imported, if any?

The biggest weakness is that the house turned full of youth rather elders. However, the youth could even be better Guurti if train well and coached.

6. Which of the governing systems (Guurti or Government) that is a reason for the sustainable peace in Somali land and why

One of the elements that sustained peace in Somaliland is based on the culture and tradition. Because if it was not the traditional practices, rule of law would not exist, and they won’t be respect among clans. They would not be a peace settlements amongst communities. Hence, the cultural practice is far more effective, respected and fruitful than the modern systems.
7. What are the conflict prevention steps that the Guurti affects when a conflict is reported?

The steps Guurti takes when a conflict is reported are:
1. To study the severity of the conflict
2. To request to send peacekeeping mission from the national army
3. To nominate key members from Guurti who are suitable for that particular conflict
4. To call for the conflicting clans and start listing what each is complaining?
5. And finally Guurti releases resolution on the conflict.

Questions to Guurti members in Somali Land region: 2

The following questions are all an Open Ended question where you can input long text.

1. Does Guurti systems function as an indigenous mechanism, if yes, what type of systems, please describe the traditional/indigenous elements that you practice in your role as a Guurti member

Yes, it is based on the culture and the law they use is Islamic and traditional practices.

2. What is the role of the Guurti/House of elders in Somali Land in peace initiatives, peacemaking and peace building?

The house of Guurti plays crucial role in peace making for the whole country using numerous elements. These are included to go for social mobilization on peace building to communities so that peace is strengthened.
3. List 5 key challenges that face the Guurti administration system in Somali Land describing how those challenges could be overcome.

- Limited budget that is not enough for the workload they do.
- The house is only has office at the capital and all the people in the country do not have equal access to them as they cannot all come to the capital.
- Only the speakers of the house have vehicles and house do not have assigned vehicles to operate when conflict are reported.
- The known and respected members are either passed away or on the bed and no equivalent replacement.
- The house does not have a record for documentation or library to record their roles and history unique for the Guurti.
- The challenges could be overcomes to tackle all above mentioned challenges as they are well aware and known for so long.

4. Describe the work relations between the Guurti as community leadership system and the Government as modern structure. Tell us advantages and disadvantages of the Guurti function in Somali land.

There is good relationship and they cooperate on works related to peace. It is benefits are that each party should fulfil its mandated role. This will bring Guurti to effective carry out its roles and to the best interest to the community and the country at large. And its disadvantage will then be when they fail to work together and it happens at times.

5. What are key weakness of the Guurti and or the older traditional mechanisms? Are there any weakening elements that are imported, if any?

The weakness is that there is no law developed on how to select the future guurti house members.
6. Which of the governing systems (Guurti or Government) that is a reason for the sustainable peace in Somali land and why

The system that made possible for the peace is the Islamic law that is shared by the people who resides in Somaliland and the Guurti elders; because the people of the North known as Somaliland practice respecting traditional leaders and it is what differentiate from the people in Mogadishu and administration in Souther Somalia.

7. What are the conflict prevention steps that the Guurti affects when a conflict is reported?

When a problem is reported, all Guurti House members are immediately called in. even if they are on vocation, they are called in. when problem happen, immediate discussion is set, the suitable members is nominated and set to settle the dispute and put off the fire.

Questions to Guurti members in Somali Land region: 3

The following questions are all an Open Ended question where you can input long text.

1. Does Guurti systems function as an indigenous mechanism, if yes, what type of systems, please describe the traditional/indigenous elements that you practice in your role as a Guurti member

Yes, it is a cultural system, and it is an arrangement that the people from the North or Somaliland govern themselves.
2. What is the role of the Guurti/House of elders in Somali Land in peace initiatives, peacemaking and peace building?

The Guurti take part in peacemaking directly. They respond to any problem that can evoke instability in the country regardless of its nature. They mobilize communities to report to Guurti anything that is against people and bring violence and conflicts.

3. List 5 key challenges that face the Guurti administration system in Somali Land describing how those challenges could be overcome.

- The government does not listen well at all
- Lack of trainings or coaching session for the youth that join the house.
- Limited vehicles for the houses
- Government drag its feet in implementation of decisions made by the house
- Limited budget for the house

4. Describe the work relations between the Guurti as community leadership system and the Government as modern structure. Tell us advantages and disadvantages of the Guurti function in Somali land.

The relationship between the Guurti and the government is direct and smooth. The benefits of it is to cooperate in strengthening peace in the country. There is no disadvantage regarding their cooperation.

5. What are key weakness of the Guurti and or the older traditional mechanisms? Are there any weakening elements that are imported, if any?

The bill that details the selection of the future Guurti members is not prepared and in place.
6. Which of the governing systems (Guurti or Government) that is a reason for the sustainable peace in Somali land and why

The elements that sustained peace are many but the key is the traditional culture. It plays important role in peace building. The of this country respect more in elders, Guurti and traditional system; and these are the key pillars of Somaliland peace.

7. What are the conflict prevention steps that the Guurti affects when a conflict is reported?

It reports reach the house, they immediately response the occurred conflict. They nominate members who have acquaintance of the conflict area and people and in this way, conflict are intervened.

Questions to Guurti members in Somali Land region: 4

The following questions are all an Open Ended question where you can input long text.

1. Does Guurti systems function as an indigenous mechanism, if yes, what type of systems, please describe the traditional/indigenous elements that you practice in your role as a Guurti member

Yes, it is cultural. For example as a member when I meet where two communities quarrel, I use this traditional practice to intervene whether it is a blood paying or bruises. When solving these cases, it is usually referred to similar incidents that occur in the past as a references. The reason is to learn from the previous resolutions of similar cases.

2. What is the role of the Guurti/House of elders in Somali Land in peace initiatives, peacemaking and peace building?

1. The role Guurti played is remarkable and will not be forgotten in here in Republic of Somaliland.
2. The house of Guurti is the only institution the people listen it decisions whenever there is a political crisis.
3. List 5 key challenges that face the Guurti administration system in Somali Land describing how those challenges could be overcome.

1. The replacement of deceased members of the house. It is usually his son who replace him and this will diminished the role of house in the future.
2. Lack of age limit of a member to retire from the house. Now, only death can take him from the membership.
3. We do not have regular vehicles to travel to regions of the country. It is usually to hire vehicles and when it comes for emergency response, it proves difficult to mobilize fund to hire immediately.
4. How to be selected for the next house of Guurti is not yet discussed and not clear
5. At time the members from the Executive branch of the government make political interference to the Guurti efforts of restoring peace to conflicting clans that jeopardizes decisions made by the Guurti.

Resolutions:
1. Not to replace the deceased member to his son but to select an experiences from his clan.

4. Describe the work relations between the Guurti as community leadership system and the Government as modern structure. Tell us advantages and disadvantages of the Guurti function in Somali land.

The relationship between the Guurti and the government is based on both serving the nation by keeping the security issues and its territorial integrity. Their advantage and disadvantage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disadvantage</th>
<th>Advantage</th>
</tr>
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</table>
| Sometime, it is thought that Guurti is against the democratization for Process. | they solve things that was difficult for the government to solve.

5. What are key weakness of the Guurti and or the older traditional mechanisms? Are there any weakening elements that are imported, if any?

The only weakness is that the Guurti rulings is against the democratization process and principles and this is what causes the Guurti to fail to solve or bring resolutions for the mediation amongst the political parties.
6. Which of the governing systems (Guurti or Government) that is a reason for the sustainable peace in Somali land and why

The reason peace in Somaliland is sustained is because of the old tradition unique for Somaliland which is based on respecting the traditional elders and Guurti. It is this tradition, which makes the elders the ultimate reference, which helps police and eye jail do their duties and without it, the government could not bring the perpetuators to justice and does it role of operational.

7. What are the conflict prevention steps that the Guurti affects when a conflict is reported?

When a conflict is reported aroused from a place, Guurti members who do not bring to the conflicting parties are nominated to work on the conflict. This makes conflict to be resolved and bring parties together.

Questions to Guurti members in Somali Land region: 5

The following questions are all an Open Ended question where you can input long text.

1. Does Guurti systems function as an indigenous mechanism, if yes, what type of systems, please describe the traditional/indigenous elements that you practice in your role as a Guurti member

The system Guurti uses to serve the nation is old traditional practice that was in use for many years. The intervention will then on the scale of the conflict whether it is pasture, water point, land dispute, and a conflict between two clans reside in Somaliland; and it is arbitrated on the traditional rule which is in line with the culture.

2. What is the role of the Guurti/House of elders in Somali Land in peace initiatives, peacemaking and peace building?

The role Guurti plays in peacemaking/peacebuilding is witnessed by the public. What makes our work easy is the traditional practices that are in place amongst the community. When the clan militias were every street, it was Guurti and the elders who brought peace and stability.
3. List 5 key challenges that face the Guurti administration system in Somali Land describing how those challenges could be overcome.

The challenges Guurti faces included:
1. The modern government system and the traditional practices are quite different
2. The judiciary decision come against the Guurti decisions
3. The security berries for the Guurti members’ access in the some of the conflict areas.
4. Financial resources to immediate use to response to a conflict.
5. Filling the deceased members of the Guurti

**Resolutions:**
1. Not to overlook and leave the Guurti system that brings long lasting peace.
2. And use the democratic system for the rule of law, politics, and anything that we borrow.
3. Not to make filling the deceased members replacement inheritance by his son; and

4. Describe the work relations between the Guurti as community leadership system and the Government as modern structure. Tell us advantages and disadvantages of the Guurti function in Somali land.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Long lasting decision</td>
<td>1. Implementation of democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Confident from the public</td>
<td>2. Judiciary system not in line with Guurti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Stronger patriotism than the politicians</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. What are key weakness of the Guurti and or the older traditional mechanisms? Are there any weakening elements that are imported, if any?

They do not have a weakness that can be mentioned; because when glimpse back from where they have started peace and where the country is today; and how they sacrificed their lives to the peace of the land without personal gains except to lead the country into peace and prosperous.
6. Which of the governing systems (Guurti or Government) that is a reason for the sustainable peace in Somali land and why

The peace and arbitrating neutrally is the first things that makes Somaliland peace sustainable with strong foundations; and how Guurti implements in Diya (blood compensations) paying and wounds compensations amongst the clans in the Republic of Somaliland.

7. What are the conflict prevention steps that the Guurti affects when a conflict is reported?

Questions to Guurti members in Somali Land region: 6

The following questions are all an Open Ended question where you can input long text.

1. Does Guurti systems function as an indigenous mechanism, if yes, what type of systems, please describe the traditional/indigenous elements that you practice in your role as a Guurti member

Yes, it is cultural system; this system is hybrid one that combines the old and moderns systems of governance.

2. What is the role of the Guurti/House of elders in Somali Land in peace initiatives, peacemaking and peace building?

The role of Guurti is mediation based on first understand the conflict and meet the concerned parties. Then meet the conflicting parties collectively and individually before they reach and issue resolutions to keep peace.
3. List 5 key challenges that face the Guurti administration system in Somali Land describing how those challenges could be overcome.

- No sufficient funds
- Communication challenges in remote areas and lack of offices that documents events
- Because of the conflict on the ground, decisions take long time that at times could be close to year.
- Communities and government not implement on Guurti decisions on time
- At times finding the conflicting parties proves difficult.

Solution:
It is to find solutions to the above listed challenges.

4. Describe the work relations between the Guurti as community leadership system and the Government as modern structure. Tell us advantages and disadvantages of the Guurti function in Somali land.

The relationship between then is good and obligatory. The benefits of it is to find functional branches of the government that are supportive to one another. If that does not happen, the government system will look ugly and malfunctioning which would have bad implications.

5. What are key weakness of the Guurti and or the older traditional mechanisms? Are there any weakening elements that are imported, if any?

The bylaws of the house is not followed well.

6. Which of the governing systems (Guurti or Government) that is a reason for the sustainable peace in Somali land and why

To sustain peace, government (executive) should not makes decisions unilaterally but rather consult with the elders; and if the government stay connected with the elders, the peace in Somaliland will sustain because elders are bridges that connects communities, government and the tradition.
7. What are the conflict prevention steps that the Guurti affects when a conflict is reported?

The best approach they take is to collectively face the emerged or reported conflict. When conflict arises, first the government security personnel to keep peace, then the Guurti go to make peace through mediation.

Questions to Guurti members in Somali Land region: 7

The following questions are all an Open Ended question where you can input long text.

1. Does Guurti systems function as an indigenous mechanism, if yes, what type of systems, please describe the traditional/indigenous elements that you practice in your role as a Guurti member

Yes, it is cultural system, it is old practice from the people of Somaliland; it is tradition that full of wisdoms. The bases of this system is Islamic Law and Sharia from the Holly Quran.

2. What is the role of the Guurti/House of elders in Somali Land in peace initiatives, peacemaking and peace building?

The Guurti faces conflict by first nominating Guurti members based on their knowledge on the culture and Sharia who could mediate and arbitrate the conflicting parties. People of Somaliland respects very well with the culture and elders and this contribute people’s acceptance of Guurti Resolutions.

3. List 5 key challenges that face the Guurti administration system in Somali Land describing how those challenges could be overcome.

- Some people refuse and come against the Guurti resolutions
- When the term of government ends, a resolution is asked from the Guurti and that brings pressure to the House.
- At times, multiple revenge killings happen between clans, Guurti is sent to solve and it brings heavy duty for the House.
- The budget of the House has only salary headings not much for conflict resolutions efforts.
- At times, the government intervenes conflicts without the consulting the Guurti and it brings unrest.
4. Describe the work relations between the Guurti as community leadership system and the Government as modern structure. Tell us advantages and disadvantages of the Guurti function in Somaliland.

The relationship between Guurti and the government is cooperative. The advantages is that the government sends peacekeepers to the conflict area before Guurti go for mediations. The disadvantages will be if the government will not act immediately which will also prolongs Guurti to reach there and make peace.

5. What are key weakness of the Guurti and or the older traditional mechanisms? Are there any weakening elements that are imported, if any?

No, they do not have a weakness at all.

6. Which of the governing systems (Guurti or Government) that is a reason for the sustainable peace in Somaliland and why

The suitability of peace depends on Guurti after Allah. Guurti keeps peace and as long as Guurti exists, peace in Somaliland will sustain because the Guurti is cultural system and people of Somaliland respect too much on tradition and elders.

7. What are the conflict prevention steps that the Guurti affects when a conflict is reported?

When a conflict is reported, Guurti immediately study the conflict, how it happened, causes, and the magnitude, then nominate selected members who suits for the conflict based on their experiences and knowledge.
Questions to Guurti members in Somali Land region: 8

The following questions are all an Open Ended question where you can input long text.

1. Does Guurti systems function as an indigenous mechanism, if yes, what type of systems, please describe the traditional/indigenous elements that you practice in your role as a Guurti member

Yes, it is cultural and it is a Somali tradition that they govern themselves and helps them solve their problems. It is a system that Sharia is a bases. They use to solve their problems rules from the Holly Quran.

2. What is the role of the Guurti/House of elders in Somali Land in peace initiatives, peacemaking and peace building?

Guurti play a crucial role in peace making in Somaliland. They act swiftly to respond when conflict is reported from an area. They made all efforts to stop conflict to escalate and they do social awareness on benefits of keeping people for the people and the country.

3. List 5 key challenges that face the Guurti administration system in Somali Land describing how those challenges could be overcome.

- At times, not to follow the decisions made by the house.
- At times, conflicting parties not accept decisions made by the Guurti.
- There is no enough budget to cater for the peacemaking efforts
- Guurti do not have offices at the regions
- Some of the members are old enough to serve

Solutions:
Solutions are to solve the above listed

4. Describe the work relations between the Guurti as community leadership system and the Government as modern structure. Tell us advantages and disadvantages of the Guurti function in Somali land.
5. What are key weakness of the Guurti and or the older traditional mechanisms? Are there any weakening elements that are imported, if any?

There is no weakness

6. Which of the governing systems (Guurti or Government) that is a reason for the sustainable peace in Somali land and why

What brings peace to sustain is the cooperation amongst the branches of the government and when they collectively approach aroused conflict and make follow up of the implementations of the decisions made. What makes the huge work of Guurti simple is because the people of the North respect the elders and the culture very well.

7. What are the conflict prevention steps that the Guurti affects when a conflict is reported?

When conflict happen in a place, most it is either land or killings. Therefore, when a conflict is reported, the House of Guurti first request the government to send peacekeeping security personnel so that the problem would not escalate from where it was. Then we nominate members who are knowledgeable to the conflict area and the conflicting people. Those members using many different methods solve the conflict.
Questions to Guurti members in Somali Land region: 9

The following questions are all an Open Ended question where you can input long text.

1. Does Guurti systems function as an indigenous mechanism, if yes, what type of systems, please describe the traditional/indigenous elements that you practice in your role as a Guurti member

   Yes, the Guurti function as an indigenous mechanism because it is a common law if we according to the tradition such us damage and “mag” and clannish. The elements Guurti uses is traditional leaders, Sultan and Chiefs.

2. What is the role of the Guurti/House of elders in Somali Land in peace initiatives, peacemaking and peace building?

   Guurti plays in peacemaking and development and rebuilding the country by young or old. For example, mediating the clans, demobilization efforts of SNM movement. They made mobilization to elders to rebuild the country.

3. List 5 key challenges that face the Guurti administration system in Somali Land describing how those challenges could be overcome.

   There are challenges that face the Guurti that most result from revenge killings that come more than once. Where Guurti establish peace is violated by revenge, and clans fail to keep their word to pay the blood paying compensations (Diya paying). They solve such cases:
   1. That another revenge killing is not good
   2. And the resolutions made by the judiciary is valid
   3. And all killings should be compensated.
4. Describe the work relations between the Guurti as community leadership system and the Government as modern structure. Tell us advantages and disadvantages of the Guurti function in Somali land.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advantage</th>
<th>What happens is that a lot financial resources and time that used lost in judiciary processes and steps is reduced by Guurti is saved because Guurti does work without much delays and resources.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disadvantages:</td>
<td>For a criminal to find a save heaven amongst his clan men.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. What are key weakness of the Guurti and or the older traditional mechanisms? Are there any weakening elements that are imported, if any?

It is important to implement the agreement and written in a language that is understandable to all so that it should be implemented smoothly.

6. Which of the governing systems (Guurti or Government) that is a reason for the sustainable peace in Somali land and why

It is recommended to combine the two systems of modern and traditional systems of governance. If it is leaned to one system, people will come against it like Mogadishu where people are either in jails or in the bush for fighting. Therefore, people still have their traditional system and it better to combine the two systems.
7. What are the conflict prevention steps that the Guurti affects when a conflict is reported?

When a conflict arise in an areas, a news is reach to Guurti then they act. And a team of Guurti is sent. Usually the chairman and the oldest and most experiences members lead the intervention.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions to Guurti members in Somali Land region: 10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The following questions are all an Open Ended question where you can input long text.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Does Guurti systems function as an indigenous mechanism, if yes, what type of systems, please describe the traditional/indigenous elements that you practice in your role as a Guurti member

| Yes, they do practice an indigenous mechanism and the traditional elements we/l practice including checking the historical background of the conflict, the previous events between the conflicting parties. How they were solved and any laws that were developed and documented if any. Then with the reference of the background, they set the best approach to intervene and these should be in line with the culture and the laws of the area. |

2. What is the role of the Guurti/House of elders in Somali Land in peace initiatives, peacemaking and peace building?

| -They are the supreme house in peacemaking/peacebuilding and when even a conflict is reported they immediately mobile a team from Guurti members who have an in-depth knowledge of the area/people/clans. - those members usually should not be from the area/or should not be from the conflict clans. |
3. List 5 key challenges that face the Guurti administration system in Somali Land describing how those challenges could be overcome.

1. The house does not have a law pinpointing of the selecting of the future members.
2. The house is hybrid system between modern/Western way of state running and Somali traditional indigenous ways. And often they are in confusion of their roles.

4. Describe the work relations between the Guurti as community leadership system and the Government as modern structure. Tell us advantages and disadvantages of the Guurti function in Somali land.

The relationship is seasonal. In a normal situation, the government is in fighting and often disregard Guurti and refers as unnecessary structure of the government, but in a difficult situation, the government returns Guurti and asks for solution. The advantages is Guurti is represented by all clans of Somaliland and its voice is stronger than any institution or organ of the government.

5. What are key weakness of the Guurti and or the older traditional mechanisms? Are there any weakening elements that are imported, if any?

The weakness of the Guurti is that its roles and systems/practices is not documented. Yes, there are imported elements that is weakening its roles such as liberal democracy that Somaliland practices now with multiparty system rather than multi-clan system.

6. Which of the governing systems (Guurti or Government) that is a reason for the sustainable peace in Somali land and why

The system that sustains peace in Somaliland are because of Guurti and reason is
1. Because anytime a difficult stage/situation faces Somaliland, it is Guurti that saved Somaliland in more than once and
2. Because it is close to context of the community.
7. What are the conflict prevention steps that the Guurti affects when a conflict is reported?

1. They first try the conflict not to escalate
2. Secondly, they reach the areas quickly
3. Thirdly, they intervene
4. They do not return until they restore people between the conflicting parties.

List of names of the Guurti members that participated in the above recorded responses:

2. Mohamud xareed rooble.
5. Xuseen madar xoosh.
7. Mubaarik ahmed faarax.
8. Sh.cumarr sh.amhed fure.
10. Muuse ibraahin aw nuur.
Annex C:

Somali Map during the Civil big war’s, 2007-2009
Annex D:
Pictures from the Guurti and their offices (New and Old)

At the start of the Guurti (House of Elder)

As the Guurti developed in to a systemized and organized House of Elders
The Building that is currently utilized by the Guurti
**Annex E.**

National reconciliation conferences held for Somalia, none of which produced a lasting accord as it was mostly led and or facilitated by external actors.

National meetings:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conference</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Host country</th>
<th>Facilitator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti I</td>
<td>5-11 June 1991</td>
<td>SSDF,SPM,USC SAMO, SNU, SDM</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>Government of Djibouti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal Preparatory Meeting on National Reconciliation</td>
<td>January 1993</td>
<td>15 factions</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cairo Conference</td>
<td>November 1997</td>
<td>Hussein Aideed’s government and NSC</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Government of Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conference</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Parties</td>
<td>Host country</td>
<td>Facilitator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia National Reconciliation Conference (Eldoret/ Mbagathi)</td>
<td>2002-2004</td>
<td>xx</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>IGAD/Government of Kenya</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Multi Party meetings**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conference</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Host country</th>
<th>Facilitator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi Informals</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>May 1997</td>
<td>Ali Mahdi, Hussein Aideed, Osman Ato</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>Government of Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nakuru talks</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Government of Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khartoum</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>TFG, ICU</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Arab League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>2008-2009</td>
<td>TFG,ARSDjibouti</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>