

Sudan University of Science and Technology
Faculty of Graduate Studies and Scientific Research

Interplay of Ethnic and Gender Factors in Deepening Poverty in
Conflict Areas in West Darfur State.

تداخل العوامل الإثنية والنوع الإجتماعي في تعميق الفقر في مناطق النزاع بولاية
غرب دارفور- السودان

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Abstract

Since the eruption of violent conflict in Darfur between the government and armed movements in 2003, analyses varied from those stressing identity to those emphasizing control and access to resources. This thesis integrates both lines of analysis by maintaining that issues pertaining to identity and governance are not isolated from access and control over resources by competing sectors.

A major concern is to probe deep into extent to which ethnicity has been used by competing groups as a convenient denominator to mediate and legitimize struggle over resources? And how these elements have affected women's livelihood and rights.

The research uses descriptive and historical methodology and case study method and for data collection a number of techniques were adopted; these included participant observation, interviews, official documents, and reports on conflict resolution and compensation, field surveys and disaggregated statistical data on women status and livelihoods reports.

Analysis of research material has led to a number of findings. One major finding is that; in the course of conflict in Darfur, particularly between Arab and Fur conflict in 1987-1989 and afterwards, women's livelihood deteriorated signaling a powerful intertwines between ethnicization and feminization of poverty. With drastic changes in gender roles and gender relations, women from marginalized Zurgha groups came to bear more responsibilities and to device strategies not only for survival but for resistance. Therefore, gender roles and responsibilities were changed rapidly as more women took the tasks done previously by men when their husbands and children died during the conflict.

Zurgha groups showing remarkable resilience by generating new leadership and new skills in organizations belonged to their Shura Council in addition women from Zurgha groups have high skills and potentials in political and social mobilization as they regarded themselves as war victims and changed their livelihood situation.

The ethnicity factor that used during the Arab versus Fur; and Masaleet versus Arabs conflicts in the early 1980s was a mobilizing factor for power control and social status, while the conflicts among Arabs ethnic groups after 2006, ethnicity was used as a sources of gaining economic and political power only. Along with this, gender factors emerged in conflict dimensions as women were mostly affected by conflict, they have been exposed to sexual abuses, sexual violence, forced pregnancies and , rape; in addition some women became widows after losing their husbands due to the war.

On the other hand the tribal reconciliation conferences reflected a decline in the efficacy of indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms compared to the period of

1970s and 1980s; and this was mainly due to less government intervention in native administration system in the past compared to the present. But recently, since the beginning of the 1990s onwards the situation has changed as the current government used to politicize the native administration system.

The major findings of the research are:

1. Achieving equal social and economic development will mitigate the possibility of emerging new conflicts to erupt. Moreover the reconstruction of Darfur regions requires providing income generating activities to both farmers and pastoralists who lost their prosperities during the conflict.
2. New education system should be developed by the government ministry lines to develop a new curriculum to integrate peace, identity, development, justice, and equality and conflict studies into education system so as to create new generation having new ideas on how to live together and respect each other.
3. Further studies in measuring poverty and its dimensions should be taken by the government related institutions and international organizations working in the field in Darfur to provide aggregated data for those who living under poverty line.

مستخلص

منذ إندلاع النزاع المسلح في دارفور بين الحكومة و الحركات المسلحة في العام 2003م هناك تحليلات متنوعة حول أسباب النزاع بعضها تؤكد مسألة الهوية و البعض يركز على السيطرة و الوصول الى الموارد. هذه الأطروحة تدمج كل الخطين التحليليين من خلال الحفاظ على تلك القضايا المتعلقة بالهوية و الحكم التي ليست بمعزل عن الوصول و السيطرة على الموارد بواسطة القطاعات المتنافسة. و مصدر الفلق الرئيسي هو إجراء تحقيق عميق إلى أي مدى تم استخدام الإثنية من قبل الجماعات المتنافسة كقاسم مشترك للتأمل و شرعة النزاع على الموارد؟ وكيف أثرت هذه العوامل الإثنية على سبل كسب المرأة و حقوقها.

البحث يستخدم المنهج الوصفي و المنهج التاريخي بالإضافة إلى منهج دراسة الحالة و يستخدم مجموعة من التقنيات لجمع المعلومات و البيانات و هذه شملت الملاحظة بالمشاركة، المقابلات، الوثائق الرسمية و التقارير حول فض النزاع و التعويض و المسوحات الميدانية و بيانات إحصائية عن وضعية النساء و تقارير سبل كسب العيش.

تحليل المعلومات البحثية أدت الى النتائج التالية: أحد أهم النتائج النزاع في دارفور و خاصة النزاع بين العرب و الفور 1987م-1989م وبعدها تدهورت الاوضاع المعيشية للنساء مما يدل على وجود تشابك قوي بين الطابع العرقي و تأنيث الفقر و حدوث تغيرات جذرية في أدوار النوع الاجتماعي و العلاقات بين الجنسين، جاءت المرأة من المجموعات غير العربية المهمشة لتحمل المزيد من المسؤوليات و إستراتيجيات ليس من أجل البقاء على قيد الحياة ولكن من أجل المقاومة.

أدوار النوع الاجتماعي و المسؤوليات تغيرت بسرعة عندما معظم النساء أخذن المشغوليات التي كان يقوم به الرجال عندما تم قتل أزواجهن و أبناءهن في النزاع. المجموعات النسوية غير العربية أظهرن مرونة ملحوظة عن طريق توليد و إستحداث قيادات جديدة و مهارات جديدة في المنظمات التي لديها مجالس الشورى الخاصة بهن بالإضافة المرأة غير العربية لديها مهارات عالية و إمكانات في التعبئة السياسية و الاجتماعية لأنهن يرون أنفسهن ضحايا الحرب و يجب عليهن تغيير حالة معيشتهن.

عامل العرق استخدم في النزاع بين الفور و العرب و بين العرب و المساليت في أوائل 1980م كان عاملاً للتعبئة من أجل السيطرة على السلطة و المكانة الاجتماعية، بينما استخدم عامل العرق في النزاعات بين القبائل العربية باعتبارها مصدراً لإكتساب القوة الاقتصادية و السياسية فقط. بينما ظهرت عوامل النوع الاجتماعي في أبعاد النزاع عندما تأثرت المرأة بالنزاع و تعرضت للانتهاكات الجنسية و العنف الجنسي و الحمل القسري و الإغتصاب بالإضافة بعض النساء أصبحن أرامل عندما فقدن أزواجهن و بعضهن تم قتلهن.

من ناحية أخرى مؤتمرات الصلح القبلي عكست انخفاض في فعالية آليات فض النزاعات المحلية مقارنة مع فترة السبعينيات و الثمانينيات في القرن الماضي، عموماً يعزى ذلك الى قلة تدخل الدولة في نظام الادارة الاهلية في الماضي مقارنة بالحاضر. لكن في الاوانة الاخيرة منذ بداية التسعينيات من القرن الماضي حتى الان تغير الوضع لان الحكومة الحالية قامت بتأسيس نظام الادارة الاهلية.

اهم توصيات البحث هي:

1. تحقيق التنمية الاجتماعية و الاقتصادية المتساوية سوف يقلل من إمكانية بروز نزاعات جديدة. علاوة على ذلك إعادة إعمار المناطق التي تأثرت بالحرب في دارفور يتطلب توفير الأنشطة المدرة للدخل لكل من الرعاة و المزارعين الذين فقدوا ممتلكاتهم أثناء النزاع.

2. ينبغي وضع نظام تعليمي جديد من قبل الوزارات الحكومية ذات الصلة من أجل تطوير منهج جديد لدمج السلام, الهوية, التنمية, العدالة, المساواة ودراسات النزاع في النظام التعليمي من أجل خلق جيل جديد لديه أفكار جديدة عن التعايش المشترك و احترام الآخر.
3. ينبغي إجراء دراسات إضافية في قياس الفقر و أبعاده من قبل المؤسسات الحكومية و المنظمات الدولية العاملة في الميدان في دارفور لتوفير البيانات لأولئك الذين يعيشون تحت خط الفقر.

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Abbreviations:

1. BU: Beja Union
- 1- CPA: Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
- 2- DPA: Darfur Peace Agreement.
- 3- DAF: Darfur Advancement Front
- 4- DRA: Darfur Regional Authority.
- 5- DPD: Doha Peace Document.
- 6- DUP: Democratic Unionist Party.
- 7- FLM: Free Lions Movement.
- 8- GDP: Gross Domestic Product.
- 9- IPDs: Internal Displaced Persons.
10. IMF: International Monetary Fund.
13. JEM: Justice and Equality Movement.
14. JMF: Joint Military Forces.
16. LJM: liberation and Justice Movement.
17. NCP: National Congress Party.
18. NNS: National Salvation Strategy.
19. NMU: Nuba Mountain Union.
20. NIF: National Islamic Front.
21. RFM: Red Flame Movement.
22. RSF: Rapid Support Forces.
- 23 PCP: Popular Congress Party.
24. PDF: Popular Defense Forces.

25. PP: Popular Police.
26. SFCF: Sudanese Federal Coalition Forces.
27. SLA/M Sudan Liberation Army/ Movement.
28. SPLA/M Sudan People's Liberation Army/ Movement.
29. SSLM: South Sudan Liberation Movement
30. UNDP: United Nations development Fund.
- 31 USP: Union Sociality Party.
32. WB: World Bank.

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- 2- Appendix (2): Tribal Reconciliation Peace Agreement between Salamat and Misiriya , June 2013.
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- 4- Appendix (4): Report of Committee of Inquiry to the conflict between Salamat and Misiriya Central Darfur State, April 2013.

Introduction

Research Subject:

Sudan is one of the most diverse countries in Africa in terms of economic resources, ethnic group compositions, water, and climatic zones. There are two main ethnic groups in Sudan, those who belonged to Arab descendants mainly the northerners who control the power and wealth since the country got its independence in 1956. The second category is the African descendants who have been marginalized by the Arabs ethnic groups. However the patterns of governance that govern Sudan since its independence has made the practice of unity in diversity impossible and hence conflict between the southern and northern parts of the country erupted in three different periods in 1955- 1964-1972 and 1983 -2005.¹

The Northern Sudanese Leaders missed great opportunities to manage the ethnic, religious, cultural, economic diversities of the country by creating governance system that may embrace those diversities in attractive manner but instead the leaders of successive governments focused on a narrow based identity, which subsequently produced a fragile state managed by narrow minded persons which in turn reflected a weak state building institutions and social structures that favor Riverin Arabs culture and inferior African cultures that formed Sudanese civilization since the great Nubian King Baange of Kush Kingdom; Sennar Kingdom and Darfur Sultanate². Thus government institutions failed to prevent

¹ Tigani, Seisi “The Root Causes of Conflict in Sudan and the making of Darfur Tragedy”, A paper presented at the Wilton Park Conference on Conflict Prevention and Development Cooperation in Africa, Jointly organized by the UNDP and the Japan International Cooperation Agency, Wilton Park: Sussex November 8-11, 2007, p.25.

² Lual A, Deng, *The Power of Creative Reasoning, the Ideas and Vision of John Garang* (USA, I universe Books, 2013), p. 89.

ethnically induced conflicts on one hand and regenerating economic growth to be distributed for equal development on the other.³

In 2005 the current Government of Sudan managed to sign a Comprehensive Peace Agreement(CPA) with the South Sudanese Liberation Movement (SPLM) under the Command of John Garang ending along devastated brutal civil war in Africa by granting the Southerners a regional autonomy and at the same time enabling them to participate in the federal government positions in order to create attractive unity that should be expressed by a referendum by the end of the interim period, the Southerners could be part of the mother Country or choose separation and established their own country. Unfortunately by the end of the interim period the Southerners chose a separation from the mother country on 9th of July 2011, and formed their own country named it Republic of South Sudan⁴.

On the other hand, while the government negotiating SPLM/A in Kenya in 2002 a new conflict erupted in Darfur region in 2003, between the government of Sudan and two rebel movements namely Sudan Liberation Army(SLA) and Justice and Equality Movement(JEM) claimed power and wealth sharing and calling for ending the marginalization of the region. Later the two rebel groups split and mushroomed into a number of rebel groups along ethnic, tribal lineage, personal lines mainly among Fur and Zaghawa ethnic groups.⁵

The outbreak of the hostilities and violence between the government and the two rebel movements led to a massive counter- insurgency in which the government recruited and backed the Arabs famous militias known as *Janjaweed* to quell and

³ Andrew, Natsios, *Sudan, South Sudan, and Darfur, What Every One Needs to Know* (United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2012), p.12.

⁴ Mudather, El Nur, "Land Tenure and Conflict in Zalingei Area, Darfur", M.Sc. diss., Development Institute and Research Center, University of Khartoum, 2009, p. 20.

⁵ Thabo, Mebki, 2009 Darfur- the Quest for Peace, Justice and Reconciliation, African Union- High Level Panel on Darfur. Abuja, Nigeria, p.13.

crash the rebellion. The Arab militias in order to fight the rebellions as enemies they instead burnt and destroyed villages belong to the Fur, Zaghawa, Masaleet, Erenga and Midoob ethnic groups whom they perceived by the government and the Arab militias to be supporters of the rebel groups⁶.

The conflict in Darfur has a wide range of economically, socially, environmentally and psychologically damaging effects in which violence and atrocities were committed against both women and men. Many men were killed, imprisoned or conscripted against their will. On the other hand women were raped, killed and mentally abused and are regarded as the most vulnerable groups because some of them lost their husbands as the main family supporters.

The farms of the villagers who have been regarded as the main crop producers such as Millet, Dura, Sorghum, and Vegetables were destroyed by the *Janjaweed* militias and hence they loss a basic source of income. Lack of income, lack of good health care, unemployment, lack of education, lack of adequate water and sanitation, lack of justice and lack of freedom of movement contributed to the increase of poverty rates among the displaced villagers. Poverty here can be seen in two forms; the lack of income for consumption on one hand and lack of social justice and freedom of movement on the other hand.⁷

Problem Statement:

The current conflict in Darfur dates back to the successive failure of the governments of Sudan since independence of the country in 1956 to manage the diversity and develop the region instead; the region plunged into backwardness,

⁶ El Nur. Mudather, "Land Tenure and Conflict in Zalingei Area, Darfur", M.Sc. diss., Development Institute and Research Center, University of Khartoum, 2009, p. 24.

⁷ Barbar, Anita, "Darfur Crisis in the 21th Century", M.A. diss., University for Peace, 2009, p.15.

lack of developmental projects such as large scale agricultural schemes, lack of good infrastructure , lack of industries among others.

With the absence of developmental projects and well based economic infrastructure, ethnicity diffused among the Darfuri elites in the competition of power at the local and national levels which first fueled conflicts between farmers and pastoralists in the early 1980^s and 1990^s and later developed into insurgency against the government in 2003 when the African ethnic groups of the region (Fur, Zaghawa, Berti, Midoob and Masaleet) accused Arab ethnic groups who were backed by the government to impoverish them by destroying their farms and livelihoods through launching a systemic and organized armed banditry against them which later exposed and converted them into poor and vulnerable groups to economic and climatic shocks that stricken the region since 1980^s.

On the other hand, famine, recurrent drought and migration waves that occurred in West Darfur since the beginning of the 1970^s played an essential role in fueling and aggravating the ethnic factor in the sense that the new migrants rise by the passage of time when the Arab descendants from Niger and Chad in collaboration with the Arab tribes of West Darfur formed what is called Arab gathering claiming for power and wealth sharing in the region and calling for changing land usage system well-known by *Hakura* system.

The current conflict in Darfur Region created an interrelation between ethnicity, gender and poverty in the sense that the conflict took the form of ethnic group conflict in which Arab ethnic groups supported by the Government of Khartoum to crash and quell non- Arab ethnic groups (Black Africans) who are supported by SPLM and Chadian Government later after the conflict being escalated. This ethnic factor in deepening the conflict contributed to the mass poverty of non- Arab

ethnic groups whose farms and villages were destroyed and burned by the Arabs militias. Reference Instead gender roles and responsibilities among the affected displaced persons changed in favor of men rather than women in the sense that women have borne the burden of raising the children and searching for income for livelihood. Additionally, many tribal reconciliation conferences were held in Darfur region since the mid of 1980^s of the last century to achieve peace and social stability but most of those conferences failed to achieve their ends and objectives due to factors such as lack of follow up on the decrees and recommendations of the conference, use of weak conflict resolution mechanisms to oversight the peace agreements signed by the conflicting parties, hence conflicts relapse again in more aggressive and brutal manner causing damage to the existing livelihoods and distort the social networks of the community.

Therefore the study aims to answer the following questions:

1. Why ethnicity is been used by the ethnic groups as a convenient common denominator to organize group conflicts in the struggle over resource, land and power in Darfur?
2. How did the current conflict in Darfur affected the interconnections between gender and ethnic factors and to the changing patterns of the livelihood of women as economic producers?
 - 2.1 Why Arab ethnic groups particularly more oppressive and conservative regarding women's rights?
3. Why is the current government relying on ethnic mobilization and tribal militias instead of its military forces to fight the rebels in Darfur?
4. To what extent tribal reconciliation conferences can contribute to the peace building process in Darfur?
5. How did poverty and migration patterns from the Neighboring countries play a core factor in deepening and fueling ethnic conflicts in West Darfur State?

Research Significance.

The research importance stems from the fact that there are no studies and researches integrated gender, poverty and conflict in one context. In addition to lack of deep analysis to review the mechanisms of conflict resolution in the area under the study this contributed negatively to recurrence of the conflicts between the existing ethnic groups. Therefore the research will integrate gender, poverty and conflict concepts in one context to show the interconnections between them and it will review the existing mechanisms of conflict resolution to contribute positively to the mitigation of future conflicts in the region.

Research Objectives.

The study aims to:

1. Explain the critical role of ethnic factors in fueling conflicts in West Darfur, and how these factors contributed to the changing of power relations between Arab and non- Arab ethnic groups;
2. Analyze the concrete interconnections of gender, poverty and conflict;
3. Examine how women as reproductive agents of households were affected by conflict and hence exposed to severe poverty;
4. Explore how the government mobilized ethnic factors to fight the rebels and how armed movements have been created and fragmented on ethnic lines;
5. To review the role of tribal reconciliation conferences in achieving sustainable peace and stability in Darfur.

Research Hypotheses:

1. The destruction of the economic base of non Arab descendants by the Arab militias led to the impoverishment and changing livelihoods of Fur, Masaleet ,

Zaghawa and Berti tribes as they becoming less productive and exposed to severe poverty which later urged them to launch the conflict to protect their dignity and properties.

2. Lack of real political participation and marginalization of the peripheries by the successive governments of Sudan led to the emergence of regional armed movement's insurgency demanding for equal power and wealth sharing.
3. Famine, Migration and recurrent Drought that stricken the African Sahel and Darfur since early 1970th and 1980th of the last century contributed negatively to the emergence of ethnic clashes between the indigenous African and Arabs ethnic groups on seizing lands.
4. The exclusion of women from conflict resolution mechanisms and reconciliation processes contributed to the lack of sustainable peace and social stability in Darfur.
5. The more inter-ethnic relations move from harmony to tensions and conflict, the more women were victimized and exposed to poverty.

Data Analysis Methods.

The data collection will be analyzed by using historical, descriptive and case study methods. By using historical method, the researcher will provide data and information about the root causes of the conflicts and its development through decades that will enable the researchers and policy makers to deal with the current situation and predict the future events. Whereas by using descriptive method the researcher will be able to describe and analyze the conflict whether the conflict is an ethnic conflict or not. In addition by using a case study method the researcher can draw a deep analysis on the interplay between gender, conflict and poverty in the area of the study.

Sources of Data Collection:

The sources of data collection will be books, journals, periodic, reports, official documents, workshop and seminar papers, theses, conference preceding papers, interviews, field survey, focus group discussions and internet.

Research Limits:

The research cover West Darfur State mainly Zalingei, El geneina, Mukjar, Nertiti, Um Dukhun, Kreinik localities. Whereas the time limit for conducting the research is from 2003-2014.

Limitations and Constraints:

A possible limitation of the research will be the insecurity situation, particularly those areas occupied by the rebel groups which are difficult to travel to. The other limitation will be how to interview those women who are raped by the war perpetrators as it's difficult to reach the victimized women due to stigma of reporting.

Research Ethics:

The subject addressed on this research is a sensitive one and people could easily take sides or be offended by some questions. Being aware of this issue, this research will take into consideration and respect the traditions, moral and religious beliefs of the people interviewed. The research will ensure the confidentiality of the interviewees, considering that some of them could jeopardize their own safeties by revealing to have had some procedures performed that are against the security laws. To do this, researcher will use fake names and avoid introducing any information that could lead to the identification of the person to be interrogated, even when asked.

Organization of the Research:

The thesis consists of five chapters as follows; The introduction which consist of the research problem, Research Importance, Research hypotheses and Methodology, Sources of Data Collection, Research Limits, Research Limitations and Constraints, Research Ethics, Organization of the research are laid out.

Chapter One; Explores Literature Review and Frame work of Analysis.

Chapter Two; Sudan economy, society and patterns of governance. This Chapter reflects Sudan's society composition and economy and the patterns of governance in Sudan since independence and how those patterns of governance contributed to rise of ethnicity as a factor of struggle between the Center and the Peripheries.

Chapter Three; Location of West Darfur State, Prevailing Economic Activity, The Ethnic Divide of the State, The Root Causes of Ethnic Conflict in West Darfur, Gender, Migration and the Hakura system, Fur versus Arabs conflict, Masaleet versus Arabs conflict, conflict between Hutiya and Nawaiba, conflict between Misiriya and Rezeigat.

Chapter Four, This chapter explores Dynamics and Implications of conflict by addressing the root causes of the current conflict in Darfur and its consequences in mobilizing ethnic armed militias, evolution of armed movements, why the government of Sudan failed to protect its civilians? And the economic situation of women prior and after the current conflict.

Chapter Five, addresses tribal reconciliation conferences and it is role in promoting peace building. In addition it provides analysis of the interplay of ethnic and gender factors in deepening poverty in conflict in West Darfur State prior and after the current conflict.

Conclusion, it includes summary, findings of the research, recommendation and Bibliography.

Chapter One

Literature Review and Frame Work of Analysis

This Chapter reviews the literature consulted during the research process by reviewing some of the most important books, book chapters, studies, journals, theses, papers and articles and analyses the interconnection between conflict, poverty and gender. The research also focuses on some basic concepts such as conflict, ethnic conflicts, ethnicity, poverty, poverty approaches, gender, and theories of ethnicity. To shed light on complexities of ethnicity, poverty, gender and conflict dynamics in Darfur region, the research discusses concepts of peace making, peace building and reconciliation processes.

1.0 Conflict, Poverty and Gender: Shaping the Debate

The literature food notes written on the interplay of gender and ethnic factors in deepening poverty in conflict in Darfur is rare, many of the scholars and researchers wrote about the causes of the conflict and its consequences. Instead the research will explore the food notes written regionally and internationally in order to contrast and draw similarity between the arguments, theories and findings which will shape the design of the research among them:

1. Sebastian (1992)⁸ on the other hand, states that there are many grievances in the Sri Lankan conflict which in turn have great effects on conflict risk as there were allegations of minority discrimination, under- representation of minority Tamils in the administrative services, the exclusion of students from the university through unfair marking of examination papers. In addition to the language barrier which stood effectively in the way of

⁸Sebastian, Rita, "Ethnic Conflict in Srilanka, its Ecological and Political Consequences", 1992, www.dhf.uu.se/pdfier/92_1_2/92_1-2_10.pdf, accessed Febuary2009.

communal integration between the two main ethnic groups in Sri Lanka which are Tamil and Sinhala. Instead Sinhala nationalism, in turn, gave rise to Tamil nationalism.

2. In a research report by Bridget (1995)⁹, he argued that poverty in itself is not a sufficient condition for conflict as the poor rarely have the resources to mobilize. Instead he emphasized on the inequality generated by unequal development models and programmes in which development models favoring certain group over others will lead to insecurity and increase the potential for violence and instability.
3. According to Tatjana and Solomon, (1999)¹⁰ there are two major streams in feminist thinking that address the linkage between conflict and poverty. The Essentialist Gender Theorists claim that behavior, attitude and values of women and men are differently in nature. This interpretation suggests that throughout history men and women have tended to do what they are naturally good at. Gender difference thus becomes a matter of nature rather than nurture. Consequently the Essentialists position conceptualizes gender identity and gender difference as a static entity all men are masculine and all women are feminine. According to this line of thought the issue of gender and conflict is looked at through a simple dichotomy “men are the aggressors and perpetrators of conflict and women are victims, passive observers and bears of the social burden of societies torn by conflict.
4. Mohammed (1999) in explaining the root causes of the conflict in Darfur emphasized on one basic question that ; Did drought and desertification that struck the African Sahel and Darfur since 1970^s contributed to clashes

⁹ Bridget, Byrne, “Gender, Conflict and Development, “Institute of Development Studies, Brighton, Volume1, 34, 1996,p.19, <http://www-ids.ac.uk/bridge>.

¹⁰ Tatjana, Sikoska and Solomon Juliet, “Introducing Gender in Conflict and Conflict Prevention: Conceptual and Policy Implications”, *Conflict Prevention from Rhetoric to reality, Volume 2.Lexington Books*, 2004, p.33.

between farmers and pastoralists or the eruption of conflicts between Chad and Libya and internal conflicts in Chad led to the conflict in Darfur? He used the Analytical descriptive and historical methods to analyze the data collected from the field. His study came out with the following findings:

a. The torn out of social fabric of the tribes in Darfur led to intolerance and revenge between the tribes themselves and between the tribes and the government institutions.

B. Weakness of the existing mechanisms to deal with the changes that emerge in the nature of the conflicts in addition to the recurrence failure of the reconciliation conference that launched to address the conflicts between the tribes¹¹.

5. In contrast, Jonathan (2001) in a research working paper argues that there are two propositions of the links between conflict and poverty. The first proposition assumes that conflict causes chronic poverty in the sense that conflict deliberately destructed the livelihoods of the people and it has an impact vary according to a range of factors including age, ethnicity, gender and region. The second proposition assumes that poverty causes conflict, the lack of political voice and organization combined with horizontal inequalities and social exclusion, identity problems will predisposition towards violent conflict¹².

6. Similarly Paul and Hoeffler (2002) in their study Greed and Grievance, they use data from 161 countries and 78 civil wars over the period 1960-99 to investigate two alternative hypotheses: (1) that “grievances” inequality, political oppression, and ethnic and religious divisions cause civil wars, and

¹¹ Mohammed, Nur “Tribal Conflicts in Darfur: The Causes, Consequences on Social Structure”, M.A. diss., University of Khartoum, Sudan, 1999, p.10.

¹² Jonathan, Good hand, “Violent Conflict, Poverty and Chronic Poverty,” CPRC Working Paper 6, ISBN Number: 1-904049-05-2, 2001, http://www.chronicpoverty.org/uploads/publication_files/WP06_Goodhand.pdf, accessed March 2009.

(2) that “greed” or sources of finance for conflict income from natural exploitation, Diaspora, and hostile governments largely cause conflicts. There is little statistical evidence to support the grievance model; their greed model provides more explanatory power. Importantly, Collier and Hoeffler find that political rights and exclusion have no effect on conflict risk. In contrast to the conclusion that was made by Collier and Hoeffler that grievance and exclusion have no effect on conflict risk¹³.

7. Lemieux and Felicia (2003) in a working paper on poverty and Prejudice, argue that poverty is a symptom of power inequalities, in the sense that power is not just something one holds, but rather something one has or does not have in relation to others. They emphasized that there are four basic sources of power:
 - a. is freedom from need? Those who are able to meet their own basic needs and stills have sources left over (surplus) are in an enviable high – power position of being able to enter into exchange relationships with others.
 - b. Freedom not to enter relationships. If a party has what it needs without exchanging with others then the poor who have less to offer to others are more compelled to enter into exchange relationships with them.
 - c. Greater control over the conditions of the negotiation or relationship and greater ability to set the price of the thing to be exchanged?¹⁴
 - d. Because those with surplus have less need to be in exchange relationships, they also have more freedom to exit relationships than others. Leaving such relationships or threatening to leave them is a means of exerting power.

¹³ Paul, Collier and Anke, Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” CSAE WPS/2002-1, <http://economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk/12055/1/2002-01text.pdf>, accessed September 2007.

¹⁴ Lemieux, Anthony and Felicia Pratto, “Poverty and Prejudice,” K1018/Carr/2003, http://www.researchgate.net/profile/Felicia_Pratto/publication/251357031_Poverty_and_Prejudice/links/0f31752f1266b35730000000.pdf, accessed May 2008.

8. In contrast to Good Hand's argument on the links between poverty and conflict, a report by the World Bank(2007)¹⁵ states that although poverty itself is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for conflict, poverty factors increase the likelihood of violent conflict in three main ways:

First, a combination of poverty and unequal income levels tends to result in many people particularly young men, who can be easily mobilized and recruited to armed groups.

Second, weak and undemocratic governance structures, usually present in poor countries, are often incapable of preventing the onset of violence by peaceful means.

Third, if a country with a large poor population is endowed with sufficient natural resources, rebel organizations are able to raise finances and galvanize public resentment against perceived or real injustices.

9. While Justino (2006)¹⁶ in a working paper on the links between violent conflict and chronic poverty: How much do we really know? She addressed three key questions: a-Who are the chronically poor affected by/ affecting violent conflict?

b-How are the chronically poor affected by violent conflict?

c- Do persistent levels of poverty impact on the likelihood of an individual, household or group participating in violent conflict.

She came out with the following conclusions that the relationship between violent conflict and chronic poverty is scarce and at times contradictory.

According to her findings violent conflict can cause chronic poverty and

¹⁵ Bank, World, "Towards conflict- Sensitive Poverty Reduction Strategy: A retrospective Analysis" 2nd Edition, June 1st, 2007, pp.2-5, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/244362-1164107274725/3182370-1164110717447/TOWARD_A_CONFLICT_SENSITIVE_PRS.pdf, accessed July 2010.

¹⁶ Patricia, Justino, "On the Links between Violent Conflict and Chronic Poverty: How Much Do We Really Know," CPRC Working paper 61, 2006, http://www.chronicpoverty.org/uploads/publication_files/61Justino.pdf, accessed June2007.

contribute to the creation of poverty traps, the chronically poor are likely to suffer disproportionately from violent conflict and violent conflict can bring benefits to some groups (including chronically poor) which may counterbalance the negative impacts. In turn persistent poverty can create the grounds for increased social discontent which can lead to violent conflict and chronic poverty may lead individuals to become fighters as a form of coping with poverty itself.

In contrast to all above arguments on the link between poverty and conflict, Although the above arguments determined that inequality, grievances, poverty and ethnic domination of power will lead to violent conflict and social and political instability. But they ignored gender factors in conflict, and how conflicts affect gender roles and relations which will have serious impact during peace building and post conflict reconstruction era.

On the other hand the Constructionist Position argues that gender and gender identity are constructed rather than naturally predominate. Hence gender identity is not fixed but constantly shaped by given historical and cultural processes and conditions. Men can be included in non-confrontational methods of conflict resolution.

On Darfur conflict, huge literature has been written on the current ongoing conflict in Darfur.

10. El Bagher (2007)¹⁷, states that the current conflict in Darfur is as a result of the unsolved problem of identity between the northern and southern Sudan in one side and between the northerners themselves. He argues that the two rebel groups that launched insurgency against the government had declared

¹⁷ الباقر, العفيف, وجوه خلف الحرب - الهوية و النزاعات الأهلية في السودان, الطبعة الاولى, مركز الخاتم عدلان للإستشارة و التنمية البشرية, (الخرطوم : مطابع السودان للعملة, 2007م), ص.20-80.

that Sudan since independence is being ruled by the Arab riverian ethnic groups who contributed to the marginalization of the non Arab ethnic groups.

11. Flint and De waal (2008) argue that ethnic factors or what they called Arab supermacism originated in Darfur not only by the Arab ethnic groups who lived in Darfur but by Colonel Gaddafil's dream to establish a vast Sahelian empire extended from Mauritania ,Chad, Niger and Darfur Sudan. As such Gaddafi recruited and mobilized the Arab ethnic groups of Darfur as to serve as the vanguard of his military¹⁸.

12. Mohammed (2010)¹⁹ in a case study on Darfur conflict emphasized on one main question which is; to what extend have the socio-economic and political relations in South Darfur State and Shieriya locality been affected by numerous tribal conflicts?. He used descriptive and historical methods for analyzing his data collection in which his study is based on the main argument of Marxist concept of social conflict which argues that individuals and groups (social classes) within a society have differing amounts of materials and non- material resources and that the more powerful groups use their power in order to exploit groups with less power. He comes out with the following major findings:

a. The tribe as a social institution is still being exploited in the tribal conflicts by the ruling powers and political elites. Moreover the role of Darfur elites in the tribal conflicts is passive.

b. Decrease in major economic activities among the studied population of South Darfur due to the conflicts and which in turn led to a wide transformation of some professions and handicrafts and to a complete

¹⁸ Julie, Flint and Alex, De waal, *Darfur a New History of a Long War* (London: Zed Books, 2008), pp.49-50.

¹⁹ Mohammed, Nur“The Social, Economic and Political Impacts of the conflicts in South Darfur State, case of Sheiriya locality”, Ph.D. diss., University of Khartoum, 2010, pp. 10-16.

impoverishment of some categories while the situation of other categories has improved.

13. In contrast Dewit, (2006)²⁰, States that the current conflict in Darfur is resource based conflict between the farmers and pastoralist over natural resources and land usage in addition to the environmental degradation which played an essential role in raising the conflict between the two groups due to lack of pastures, water and arable land for farming.

The above arguments on the root causes of the conflict in Darfur did not identify the interconnections between gender and ethnic factors in deepening poverty in conflict ridden in West Darfur State, Sudan.

Therefore the study will make benefit from the above arguments and theories to draw a comprehensive picture on the linkage between gender and ethnic factors in deepening poverty in West Darfur State. There is also lack in the literature on how the conflict in Darfur contributed in changing gender roles and livelihoods of the affected people particularly women groups. Therefore this study will fill the gap by concentrating on the gender and ethnic factors in deepening poverty in addressing the root causes of the conflict.

In addition the study criticizes the way tribal reconciliation conferences were launched, the mechanisms for following the recommendations and decrees of the conferences and the study suggests new approach and mechanism for sustainable reconciliation and peace in Darfur region.

One way to critique literature on Darfur by pointing out the fact that, they failed to adopt a holistic approach integrating conflict, gender and poverty

²⁰ Dewit, Paul, *Land Tenure and Management Issues in Dry Land and Post – Conflict Areas*,(Ethiopia: OSSREA, 2006), pp.25-36

together and this what the study will tackle to provide more clarifications of main concepts and generate as in order.

1.1 Ethnic Conflict, Poverty and Gender: a Conceptual Survey

The theoretical frame of the analysis of the study depends on the definitions of some essential concepts of conflict, ethnic conflict, and ethnicity, theories of ethnicity, poverty, poverty approaches, and gender in order to analyze the current situation in Darfur based on the literature food notes and in depth interviews and narrative that was conducted in the study area.

Conflict has various definitions, according to Simon.et.al (2000), conflict is "a relationship between two or more parties, individuals or groups who have, or think they have, incompatible goals."²¹ Where as to Pruitt, Jeffrey and Sung (2003) "conflict means perceived divergence of interest, a belief that the parties' current aspirations are incompatible."²² Peter (2007), defines conflicts as" incompatible positions taken by the parties that motivate their action therefore conflict consists of three elements; incompatibility, action and actors."²³

1.1.1 Relations between Ethnicity and Conflict

According to Rodolfo (1990), ethnic conflict occasionally takes the form of so-called communal or tribal violence. Here the conflict occurs between two relatives self –contained communities within the wider society, communities that identify themselves and each other ethnic terms- that are according to racial –religious or so called tribal criteria. Such confrontations may or may not involve the State directly, except as a keeper of peace. However in most cases of open ethnic

²¹ Simon, Fisher, S., et al, *Working with Conflicts: Skills and Strategies for Action* (London: ZED Books, 2000), p.4.

²² Pruitt, Dean, Jeffrey Rubin and Sung Hee Kim, *Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate and Settlement*, 3rd Edition, (New York, Mc Graw Hill, 2003), p.7.

²³ Peter, Wallensteen, *Conflict Resolution in Divide Societies* (London: ZED Books, 2007), p.14

conflict in the world today, the State is not an impartial on looker or arbiter, but rather a party to the conflict itself²⁴.

Additionally David and Patrick (2004), State that Ethnic conflicts generally involve a clash of interests or a struggle over rights: rights to land, education, and the use of language, political autonomy or self-determination. In other words ethnic conflict may weaken state structure, which in turn encourages the intervention by outside actors who hope to obtain resources or influence the outcome of the strife to their advantage²⁵.

Moreover, Stuart (2004) explores that ethnic conflicts generally fall into three types; civil rights conflict, ethnic rebellions and inter-communal violence. Civil rights conflicts and ethnic rebellions both focus on applying pressure on governments either directly or on its agents. The degree of violence may alter during the course of the conflict, with initially peaceful civil rights protests for example turning violent and descending into full- scale confrontation. Whether this happens or not usually depends on the extent to which there are existing social and political outlets for dissent as well as the willingness of the State and its supporters to use force²⁶.

The nature of the challenges to government may vary. In civil rights conflicts, it may be a call on government to reform or become more inclusive. In full scale rebellions the objective generally becomes either the whole scale replacement of the government (civilians) or the creation of a separate State for a minority ethnic

²⁴ Rodolfo, Stavenhagen, *The Ethnic Question- Conflicts, Development and Human Rights*, (United States Press, 1990), p.77.

²⁵ David, Carment and Patrick, James, "Third- Party States in Ethnic Conflict: Identifying the Domestic Determinants," in *Ethnic Conflict and International Politics: Explaining Diffusion and Escalation*, eds. Steven E. Lobell and Philip Mauceri (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p.13.

²⁶ Stuart, Anotholt, *Fields of Fire. An atlas of Ethnic Conflict*, extended edition (London: Communication Ltd, 2004), p.103-107

group (secessionism). In inter communal violence the immediate target for aggression is not directly the government but members of another ethnic group. In these conflicts the government may be a neutral by stander, policemen, or arbiter or may be partisan towards one side or the other.²⁷

Whereas civil rights conflicts occur when a group which may or may not be the majority, feels it is denied access to State resources or to cultural rights, civil rights. Civil rights contests may start with non – violent, protest, demonstrations, strikes and political mobilization. Three paths to escalation can then occur, either individually or in combination. Thirdly retaliatory violence may be initiated by rival ethnic groups particularly where these are aligned to the State civil rights conflicts can escalate depending on the political geography into full secessionist or civil wars.

Whereas ethnic rebellion take a number of different forms, depending on the goals of the belligerents and the nature of the government response to what may in the first instance be peaceful civil protest. The majority of modern ethnic conflicts contain some form of separatist element where an ethnic group seeks to detach or distance itself politically from the State in which it currently resides as the case of South Sudan People's Liberation when it choose separation from the Mother country Sudan, as the Arab and Islamization orientation of the current government of Khartoum which ignored the South Sudan's ethnic background who are non – Arab speakers²⁸.

1.1.2 Interrogating Ethnic Conflicts

Ethnicity is a very broad term which can be defined in different ways depending on the context. However in this context ethnicity is defined as a shared cultural

²⁷ Ibid., 2004, p.108.

²⁸ Ibid., 2004, p.109.

identity involving similar practices, initiations, beliefs and linguistic features passed over from one generation to another²⁹.

On the other hand according to Enloe (1973), ethnicity has both a communal and a personal dimension. It refers to a peculiar bond among persons that cause them to consider themselves a group, distinguishable from others. The context of the bond is shared culture in turn is a pattern of fundamental beliefs and values differentiating right from defining rules for interaction, setting priorities, expectations and goals. Cultural bonds grow out of men's recognition of the distinctiveness of their own standards of behavior and prizing of those standards to the extent that they feel most comfortable and secure when among persons sharing them. On the personal level ethnicity equips an individual with a sense of belonging it positions him in society. As social relations become complex and impersonal, ethnic identity may be grasped tenaciously.³⁰

According to Michael (2003)³¹ there are six criteria that must be met for a group to be called an ethnic community:

First, the group must have a name for itself. This is not trivial a lack of a Name reflects an insufficiently developed collective identity.

Second, the people in the group must believe in a common ancestry. This is more important than genetic ties which may exist, but are not essential.

²⁹ Crisford, Chogugudza, "Ethnicity Main Cause of Instability, Civil Conflict and Poverty in Africa," January 2008, <http://www.africaresource.com/essays-a-reviews/politics/478-ethnicity-main-cause-of-instability-civil-conflict-and-poverty-in-africa>, accessed November 2010.

³⁰ Enloe. Cynthia, *Ethnic Conflict and Political Development* (London: Little Polity Press, 1973), p.22.

³¹ Michael E, Brown, "Ethnicity and Violence: Causes and Implications of Ethnic Conflict," in *The Ethnicity-Reader- Nationalism – Multi Culturalism and Migration*, edited by Montserrat Guibernau and John Rex (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2003), p.82.

Third, the members of the group must share historical memories often myths or legends passed from generation to generation by word of mouth.

Fourth, the group must have a shared culture generally based on a combination of dress, music, crafts, architecture even food.

Fifth, the group must feel an attachment to a specific piece of territory, which it may or may not actually inhabit.

Sixth, and last the people in a group have to think of themselves as a group in order to constitute an ethnic community that is they must have a sense of their common ethnicity.

1.1. 3. Theories of Ethnicity.

Ethnic conflicts erupted from different causes and it has different manifestations. According to political Scientists and Sociologists there are three main schools of thought concerning theories of ethnic conflict and these are:

1. Primordialist Approach.

The scholars of this school argued that ethnic conflict and nationalists exist due to the actions that tied with biological features and territorial boundary. The Primordialist Scholars based in their interpretation on kinship between members of ethnic group, while other Scholars from the same school of thought argue that for the ethnic group to think in terms of family ties should base on kinship relations.³²

2. Instrumentalist Approach.

This school of thought sought to explain ethnic conflict as the result of actions committed by community leaders who mobilized their cultural groups as sites of mass mobilization and as constituencies in their competition for power and resource sharing. In approach ethnicity and race are viewed as instrumental

³² Wikipedia, "Theories of Ethnic Conflict," 2011. [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethnic_conflict#Theories_of_ethnic_conflict], accessed 10 January 2011.

identities, organized as means to particular ends. The scholars of this school argue that ethnic difference is not sufficient to explain conflict.³³

Our study will use the arguments of this school of thought to explain the situation in Darfur Region by analyzing the factors that cause ethnic conflicts between different ethnic groups and how ethnic factors were been used to mobilize ethnic clashes and conflicts in the seek of seizing power and gaining economic interests and whether the conflicts have ethnic character or not.

3. Constructivist Approach.

The scholars of this school of thought view national and ethnic identities as the product of historical forces often recent even when the identities are presented as old.³⁴

1.1.4 Definitions and Concepts of Gender

Gender has been defined by different scholars and institutions. According to Kabonesa (2005), Gender refers to the social and cultural constructions of female and male identities. The social and cultural constructions about men and women lead to socially constructed roles, responsibilities and obligations of, attitudes about, and relationships between men and women. The differentiated perceptions and expectations of men and women lead them to occupy specific positions and/ or space in society. In addition, the differences that arise out of these social constructions, attitudes, perceptions and expectations change over time; vary

³³ Ibid., 2011, p.1.

³⁴ Ibid, 2011, p.1.

within and among cultures; and vary within specific political and economic contexts.³⁵

Whereas according to Sikoska and Tattajana (1999)³⁶ Gender is a concept that refers to a system of roles and relationships between women and men which are determined not by biology but by the social, political and economic context. Therefore gender can be seen as a process by which individuals who are born into male or female become the social categories of women and men through the acquisition of locally defined attributes of masculinity and femininity.

To adopt a gender perspective is to distinguish between the naturally and socially constructed and in the process to renegotiate the boundaries between the natural and hence relatively inflexible and the social and hence relatively transformable. As analytical category, gender propels us to ask whether women and men as social and political agents are carriers of different and distinctive sets of values. And if so how does this affect their role within society, their interests and needs and their capacities to actively engage in diverse social, economic and political processes? It also propels us to adopt approaches that consider the factors rooted in the division of labor and power between women and men and inform us of their impact on the origins of conflict, on conflict dynamics as well as on poverty reduction strategies.

Whereas according to UNESCO (2002), Gender refers to the roles and responsibilities of men and women that are created in our families, our societies and our cultures. The concept of gender also includes the aptitudes and likely behaviors of both women and men (femininity and masculinity). The concept of gender is vital because applied to social analysis; it reveals how women's

³⁵Consolata, Kabonesa, "Gender Mainstreaming and Implications for Peace," in *Gender and Peace Building in Africa*, edited by Dina and Natuunda (Costa Rica, University for Peace, 2005),p.14.

³⁶ Tatjana, Sikoska and Solomon Juliet, "Introducing Gender in Conflict and Conflict Prevention: Conceptual and Policy Implications", *Conflict Prevention from Rhetoric to reality, Volume 2.Lexington Books*, 2004, p.2.

subordination (or men's domination) is socially constructed. As such the subordination can be changed or ended. It is not biologically predetermined nor is it fixed for ever.³⁷

In Africa today and indeed elsewhere in the developing world issues of good governance, ethnicity, democracy and development continue to be of great importance in politics and other aspects of life. This is mainly because bad governance accompanied with lack of political vision to integrate the ethnic composition in nation building programmes, lack of managing diversity and the existing of poor democratic institutions led to the mass violent conflicts over power and wealth sharing.

Gender issues such as gender based violence, gender mainstreaming in budgeting and planning, gender and peace building are regarded as essential issues to be addressed during and after conflict era, this is mainly because gender during conflict times faced and exposed to crimes against humanity such as rape, sexual violence, torture, kidnapping, killing, sexual assault, human trafficking and forced migration whereas during peace building time gender also faced the same crimes as in pre- conflict situation. Therefore the importance of studying or integrating gender into peace and conflict studies is essential and required scholars, policy makers to have a gender sensitive strategy to address the impacts of both conflict and peace on gender roles³⁸.

Conflicts always caused gender roles to change, men who were responsible of their families were killed, disappeared or have become handicapped. Leaving women to instead face new challenges of taking care of their children, with jobs such as tea makers, food sellers, wood sellers, or any marginal jobs to generate income to

³⁷ UNESCO, "UNESCO'S Gender Mainstreaming Implementation Framework (GMIF) for 2002-2007," <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001318/131854e.pdf>, accessed April 2007, p.17

³⁸ Ibid, 2002, p.18.

support their livelihood. Conflicts also changes the patterns of livelihoods to new ones that women and men are not familiar with, this will create a challenge to cope with the new patterns of livelihoods and may not fulfill their needs and expenditure.

1.1.5 Definitions and Manifestations of Poverty

In relation to poverty, it has also been defined by several different scholars and institutions. According to Sylvia (2007)³⁹, poverty can be defined as:

[...poverty] has long been open to different definitions, tools of measurement and modes of representation. In the last three decades, however, momentum has gathered in support of more holistic views of poverty which expand on a rather narrow and static focus on incomes and consumption and embrace poverty as multidimensional and dynamic. In addition to aspects of physical deprivation, poverty is increasingly acknowledged as encompassing factors pertaining to social deprivation such as self-esteem, respect and power. This requires moving beyond poverty as an objective money-metric entity, collected and presented in a quantitative form to taking on board subjective experiences of poverty via more qualitative and participatory methods.

Whereas, the World Bank Group uses the basic needs approach to define poverty as:

[...] multidimensional and a situation in which people are unable to fulfil their basic human needs as well as lack of control over resources, lack of

³⁹ Sylvia, Chan, *Gender Generation and Poverty; Exploring the Feminization of Poverty in Africa, Asia and Latin America* (London: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2007), p. 31.

education and skills, poor access to water and sanitation, vulnerability to shocks of violence and crime and the lack of political freedom and voice.⁴⁰

Whereas to Mary and Meleck (2005)⁴¹; poverty is defined as denial of opportunities and choices most basic to human development. This definition assumes the existence of two actors the impoverishers and the impoverished. The impoverished denies poor people choices while the poor are the victims. Based on this argument, poverty is defined as lack of choices to lead a long healthy life, enjoy a decent standard of living, freedom, dignity, self-respect and the respect for others. The definition of poverty is extended to include human rights, again assuming that some actors elsewhere are responsible for denying others their basic human right. This definition of poverty does not identify the actor responsible for making other people poor and why the poor are not responding or resisting this actor.

Poverty may be manifested at individual level or at the community level. At the individual level signs of poverty include facial expression lack of will power and unwillingness to share resources with others. At the community level, poverty is reflected in the nature of human condition, resources such as infrastructure and general living conditions.

1.1.6 Approaches to Poverty.

The study has explored the approaches to poverty to using one or combination of them in analysing poverty phenomena in West Darfur State.

⁴⁰ Rasheed, Draman, "Poverty and Conflict in Africa, Explaining a Complex Relationship", 2003, http://www.parlcent.ca/povertyreduction/seminar1_e.pdf, accessed, May 15, 2010.

⁴¹ Mary Kinyanjui and Meleck Idzedek, *Social Capital, Micro and Small Enterprises and Poverty Alleviation in East Africa* (Addis Ababa: OSSREA Publications, 2005), p.30.

Poverty measurement has three approaches used worldwide. Mukhopadhyay and Ghatak define two approaches to measure poverty the Poverty Line Approach and the Capability Approach. Whereas, Sylvia (2007)⁴² defined the participatory approach. These approaches include;

1. The Poverty Line Approach:

It measures the economic `means´ that households and individuals have to meet their basic needs. However, the poverty line approach suffers from certain loopholes:

a-People meet their survival needs not only through monetary income, but through a variety of resources like common property resources, social overheads, etc.

b-People can have stocks of assets, stores and claims which they can exchange.

c-Well-being may not only depend on purchasing power, but also less tangible aspects like political rights, dignity and self-respect. The poverty line approach does not say much about women’s experience of poverty relative to men within the same household since it is based on the assumption that the household is organized around the pooling of income and meeting the welfare needs of all members⁴³.

2. The Capability Approach:

The capability approach widens the idea of `means´ to include other than market-generated earnings –essential services that could help people meet essential needs like safe drinking water, sanitation, health facilities, etc.

The capability approach blurs the distinction between means and ends. Health and education, for example, are both functioning achievements in themselves, as well

⁴² Sylvia, Chan, *Gender Generation and Poverty; Exploring the Feminization of Poverty in Africa, Asia and Latin America*,(London: Edwart Elgar Publishing Limited, 2007), p.14.

⁴³ Ibid., 2007, p.15.

as capabilities that allow people to achieve other values, because capabilities are defined in relation to the individual. Unlike the poverty line, which is defined in relation to the household, they can also be interpreted and measured in gender-disaggregated ways, for example, the use of the gender development index and gender empowerment measures.

3. The Participatory Approach:

The participatory approach to poverty explores the causes and outcomes of poverty taking into account subjective views on poverty by the poor, particularly in analyzing poverty by taking into account the level of social inclusion and political participation.

1.1.7 Interconnection between Gender, Conflict and Poverty

There are main lines of theorizing the interplay of gender and ethnic factors in conflict and poverty as have been explored by many scholars and researchers. Today there has been limited empirical research which examines the nature of the relationship between poverty and conflict and virtually rare researches which focus on the relation between conflict and poverty.

According to Jonathan (2001)⁴⁴, the nature of the links between conflict and poverty are explored by critically examining three propositions:

1-Conflict causes Chronic Poverty:

The macro and micro impacts of conflict are examined with a particular focus on how rural livelihoods and entitlements are affected. Conflict has a more severe impact than other external shocks, chronic insecurity increases chronic poverty,

⁴⁴ Good hand, Jonathan, "Violent Conflict, Poverty and Chronic Poverty," CPRC Working Paper 6, ISBN Number: 1-904049-05-2, 2001, http://www.chronicpoverty.org/uploads/publication_files/WP06_Goodhand.pdf, accessed March 2009.

but the impacts vary according to average of factors including age, ethnicity, gender and region.

2-Poverty causes Conflict:

Chronic poverty by itself is unlikely to lead to conflict because the poor often lack political voice and organization. However horizontal inequalities and social exclusion particularly when they coincide with identity or regional boundaries may increase a society's predisposition towards violent conflict. Chronic poverty may also be a significant factor in sustaining wars as violent crime and predation become the only viable livelihood strategy for the chronically poor.

3-Resource Wealth Causes Conflict:

A political economy approach is essentially about analysing the production and distribution of power, wealth and destitution during violent conflict, in order to explore the motives and responsibility of those involved. These motives may change during the course of conflict wars may mutate and chronic conflicts are often characterized by a switch from political to economic agenda.

On the other hand there is some agreement in the literature that conflict causes poverty, the hypothesis that poverty causes conflict is more contentious. Modern conflicts are multi causal with a range of short term and long term factors coming into play, including a sudden economic slowdown in the face of rising expectations, external shocks and state crises.

Isolating and weighting the different risk factors is difficult. Is poverty a permissive or causal factor? Is it a structural cause, a trigger or accelerator of violent conflict? Searching for root causes may have limited value given the capacity of conflicts to mutate overtime.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ Ibid., 2001,p.13.

Whereas to Suzanne (2001)⁴⁶, poverty and conflict are commonly understood to be closely related. Both recall images of destitution, destruction and human suffering. Violent conflicts have led to high numbers of death and displaced people, material destruction and even state collapse. In this way years of development efforts and investments are destroyed. Poverty however is also thought of a being cause of fight. When grievances are not met, it is argued poor people will not question government altogether and join rebel groups. Economic decline and extreme poverty may then reinforce tendencies to resort to violent means.

The economic explanations which have received much attention on the causes of civil wars in developing countries. The prominent studies in this field include Ibrahim(1999)⁴⁷ Civil Wars and Poverty; David (1998)⁴⁸, The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars; Paul(1999)⁴⁹, Doing well out of War; Paul and Anke (2004)⁵⁰, Greed and Grievance in Civil War; Easterly and Gatti(2000)⁵¹, What Causes Political Violence; and Berdal and Malone⁵²(2001), Economic Agendas in Civil Wars.

Mostly commissioned by the World Bank, these studies demonstrate that conflicts in Africa and most of the developing world are fuelled by greed rather than

⁴⁶ Suzanne, Verstegen, "Poverty and Conflict: An entitlement Perspective," September 2001, SWP- CPN Briefing paper, http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20010900_cru_other_verstegen.pdf, accessed August 2008.

⁴⁷ Ibrahim, El badawi, "Civil Wars and Poverty: The Role of External Interventions, Political Rights and Economic Growth," 1999, [<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.17.5573&rep=rep1&type=pdf>], accessed December 2008.

⁴⁸ David, Keen, *The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars*, London: oxford University Press, 1998, p.20.

⁴⁹ Paul, Collier, Doing Well Out of War, April 1999, Paper prepared for Conference on Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, London, <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTKNOWLEDGEFORCHANGE/Resources/491519-1199818447826/28137.pdf>, accessed July 2009.

⁵⁰ Paul, Collier and Anke, Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War, 2004, Oxford University Press, 56(2004). 563-595-doi:10.1093/oep/gpf064 , <http://www.econ.nyu.edu/user/debraj/Courses/Readings/CollierHoeffler.pdf>, accessed, May 2009.

⁵¹ Dollar, D. Easterly and Gatti, R, "What Causes Political Violence?" A research outline, Washington, DC, World Bank: Development Research Group,

⁵² Mats, Berdal and David, Malone, eds., *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*, Canadian Journal of African Studies, Vol, 35, No 1(Taylor and Francis Ltd, 2001).

grievance. They reject the grievance (political) argument and note that in most instances of conflict, rebel movements do not have any coherent political agenda that they seek to advance. They are only interested in looting the resources of the state and enriching themselves and their disciples. Consequently Paul Collier argues that the real cause of most rebellions is not the loud discourse of grievance but the silent voice of greed. Similarly, David Keen argues that civil wars in most developing countries should not be written off as simply (irrational). For him, they constitute more than a breakdown of social order. They are an economic explanation by segments of the elite whose aspiration has been stymied by competing elites.

In contrast to the above views of the connection between poverty and conflict Mark (2001)⁵³ argued that there is no direct relationship between poverty and conflict rather poverty associated with conflict as a relation of probability. At the same time violence itself is portrayed as complicating and Deeping poverty, for instance there are many poor countries that are relatively stable and at the same time middle income regions such Balkans have succumbed to violence and widespread of dislocation.

On the other hand the linkages between conflict and ethnicity occupied much discussion in the recent studies and researches this is due to the special importance placed on the necessity to understand the factors that fuel ethnic conflicts.

According to Mpangala (2000); in the discussion of the origin of ethnicity and ethnic conflicts in Africa, two main positions have emerged. One position has emphasized the invention and or creation of ethnicity under colonialism. According to this theoretical discourse, pre-colonial African societies were not characterized by ethnicity; ethnic groups were characterized by their primordial

⁵³ Mark, Duffield. *Global Governance and the New War* (USA: Zed Books, 2001), p.121.

forms of ethnic identity. Whereas the other position emphasizes historical continuity in the development of ethnicity from the pre-colonial period through the colonial period and the post-colonial period to the changes in the nature and character of ethnicity during the three periods⁵⁴.

On the other hand Paul and Anke (2000) use the concept of ethnic fragmentation as a proxy for the coordination cost of a rebellion. They argued that the greater dividend of ethnic groups the great coordination cost and the lower the risk of conflict eruption. They came out with a conclusion that ethno-linguistic fractionalization is actually not a significant determinant of the onset of conflicts; and ethnic dominance is really harmful since it permits an ethnic group to prejudice the minority⁵⁵.

On the other hand Ibrahim and Sambanis (2001)⁵⁶ find a significant parabolic between ethnic fragmentation and the prevalence of eruption of civil war, this lends support to the Paul and Anke (2000).

In this thesis' frame work of analysis of the current conflict in Darfur since 2003 and the ethnic clashes during the 1980s to 1990s we use instrumentalist approach to identify the ethnic factors that led to the onset of the conflict between Furs versus Arabs in 1987-89. Also the study used capability approach to poverty in exploring the manifestation of poverty as a social and economic phenomenon and how poverty is linked to ethnicity and conflict and the consequence of conflict in a gender perspective.

⁵⁴ Gaudens, Mpangala, *Ethnic Conflicts in the Region of the Great Lakes: Origins and Prospects for Change*, Dar-es Salam. Tanzania: Institute of Kiswahili Research, 2000,p.9

⁵⁵ Paul, Collier and Anke, Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil Wars", World Bank, Development Research Group Working Paper No. 2355, 2000, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/18853/multi_page.pdf?sequence=1, accessed May 2010.

⁵⁶ Ibrahim, El- badawi and Nicholas, Sambanis, "Why are there so many Civil Wars in Africa? Understanding and Preventing Violent Conflict," *Journal of African Economics*, No. 9-3, December, 2000, pp.244-269.

The impact of conflict and poverty on gender is quietly obvious in the sense that both men and women are severely affected by conflicts and its consequences such as damage of livelihoods patterns, killing, forced migration, social disintegration, sexual abuse, sexual violence, kidnapping, human trafficking and looting properties. Therefore the impact of conflict and poverty cannot be avoided since women and men are part of conflict.

1.2 Resolving and Transforming Complex Conflicts: Towards a Framework of Analysis

In the context of complex conflict like in a situation of Darfur region where ethnic conflicts intertwine with gender and poverty, it is suggested here that a synthesis bringing together major concepts (ethnicity, gender and poverty) should be related and situated within the debate of conflict resolution and transformation. It is this exercise that can assist in shedding light on complexities and dynamics of the crisis in Darfur region. To accomplish this, it is important to discuss concepts of peace building and reconciliation.

1.2.1 Concept of Peace building

Peace building has been defined by many scholars, academia, institutions, INGOs and researchers. Hence there is no one common definition agreed on it; therefore the study will explore the definitions of peace building in order to provide deep analysis of how the tribal reconciliation conferences were made and to what extent they can promote the process of peace building in Darfur region.

The first official definition of peace building came in the *Agenda for Peace*, where it is defined broadly as an “action to identify and support structures which tend to

strengthen and solidify peace to avoid a relapse into conflict.”⁵⁷ On the other hand, the International Peace Academy provides a slightly more precise definition:

“Peace building is an attempt to reduce the sources of present and ongoing antagonisms and build local capacities for conflict resolution in divided societies – often in the face of open hostilities and raw trauma.”⁵⁸

Whereas according to the Canadian Peace Building Coordination Committee it developed the concept even further by introducing the notion of human security. The Committee defines peace building as “the effort to promote human security in societies marked by conflict. The overarching goal of peace building is to strengthen the capacity of societies to manage conflict without violence, as a means to achieving sustainable human security.”⁵⁹

The Brahimi Report⁶⁰ focuses on the actors involved in peace building, arguing that peace building has a strong civilian element and that it is “a hybrid of political and development activities targeted at the sources of conflict.”

Similar to this, Necla Tshirgi defines peace building as “non-military interventions by external actors to help war-torn societies not only to avoid a relapse into conflict, but more importantly, to establish the conditions for sustainable peace” This approach views peace building as a stage which comes after military peacekeeping. In fact, some scholars and practitioners see establishing security and maintaining law and order as central tasks of peace building and would therefore include military activities, such as protection and disarmament, as central elements in any definition.

⁵⁷ Ghali, Boutros, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace Keeping* (New York: United Nations, 1992), p.11.

⁵⁸ Jacob, Bercovitch and Richard, Jackson, *Conflict Resolution in the Twenty-first Century: Principles, Methods and Approaches* (USA: University of Michigan Press, 2009), p.170.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 2007, p.171.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 2007, p.171.

1.2.2 Aims of Peace Building:

Peace building has various aims depending on the nature of the conflict and the devastated level caused by the conflict in a given area and it differs from one conflict to another. According to Krishna Kumar (2007)⁶¹ “peace building has three interrelated tasks: the restoration of essential government functions, basic social services, and a minimal level of physical infrastructure and facilities; the structural reform of political, economic, social, and security sectors which may include creating and/or dismantling organizations, institutions and administrative structures; and institution building, which entails rehabilitating existing political and social institutions to hold reconciliation conferences at the national and local levels in order to maintain the social fabric of the society that has been torn by conflict with the aim of creating new structures that can lead to sustainable peace and stability after healing processes taken place and achieving of justice.

1.2.3 Debate on Reconciliation

Reconciliation has been defined by different scholars, academia and institutions, depending on the values, norms, traditions and culture of a given society. According to Johan (2001)⁶² “Reconciliation is the process of healing the traumas of both victims and perpetrators after violence, providing a closure of the bad relations. The process prepares the Parties for relations with justice and peace.”

Whereas to Paul (2001)⁶³ “Reconciliation is a process of encounter and as social space, points us in that direction, reconciliation can be thus understood as both a *focus* and a *locus*. In more specific terms reconciliation can be seen as dealing with

⁶¹ Ibid., 2007, p.174.

⁶² Johan, Galtung, “After Reconstruction, Reconciliation and Resolution,” in *Reconciliation, Justice and Coexistence: Theory and Practice*, edited by Abu Nimer Mohammed (Lexington Books, 2001), p.5.

⁶³ John,P., Lederach, “Five Qualities of Practice in Support of Reconciliation Processes,” in *Forgiveness and Reconciliation*, edited by Raymond G, Helmick and Rodney Lawrence Peterson (Philadelphia: Templeton Foundation Press, 2001), p. 193.

three specific paradoxes. First in an overall sense, reconciliation promotes an encounter between the open expression of the painful past, on the one hand and the search for the articulation of a long –term, interdependence future, on the other hand. Second, reconciliation provides a place for truth and mercy to meet, where concerns for exposing what has happened and for letting go in favor of renewed relationship are validated and embraced. Third, reconciliation reorganizes the need to give time and place to both justice and peace, where redressing the wrong is held together with the envisioning of a common, connected future.”

Reconciliation is the way out. It is a way to transform individuals and the whole of society. It is away to look at perpetrators of human rights abuses and see brothers and sisters. Through reconciliation we can see the fluidity of everything in the universe : how the past influences the present and the future; how punishment is just the flip side of redemption, how the religious and the political are inseparable, how we are all victims, perpetrators by standers, every one part of the same family of humanity. Reconciliation embodies the idea of the oneness of everything. Reconciliation is the engine that helps people transform themselves from victims full of hatred into survivors who have moved beyond their pain and trauma. It helps whole societies transform themselves from violent and chaotic places into communities where people work together to Raise children and live productive and hopeful lives.⁶⁴

Reconciliation is being regarded as one of major important activities of peace building that will prohibit the resumption of conflict if it implemented in away victims satisfied with the justice processes in which the perpetrators are punished. Therefore peace building is regarded as process that facilitates the establishment of durable peace and tries to prevent the recurrence of violence by addressing root

⁶⁴ Erin, Daly and Jeremy, Sarkin. *Reconciliation in Divided Societies finding Common Grounds* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), p. 38.

causes and effects of conflict through reconciliation, institution building and political as well as economic transformation⁶⁵.

1.2.4 The Reconciliation Process:

Reconciliation has five major processes in which traumas and painful can be healed.

1.2.4.1 Mutual Acknowledgment of the Other's Nationhood and Humanity:

In so far as Reconciliation means removing the negation and exclusion of the other from one's own identity, it requires the accumulation of steps that indicate acceptable of the other as an authentic nation and inclusion of the other in one's own moral community. Such steps include political recognition and acknowledgement of the other's legitimacy, of the authenticity of their historical links to the land and of their national rights, including the right to national self – determination⁶⁶.

Recognition of the others politically and historically. This process is important in the sense that acknowledging the nationhood after the violence for any ethnic group that experienced racism and discrimination during the war time, will encourage the parties in conflict to accept and recognize each other in a responsible manner, because in doing so the grievance suffered by one group will diminish and hatred will be replaced by love and respect. But however if one party still sees the other party as an inferior such as the case between in the conflict between Northern Sudan and Southern Sudan, reconciliation process by acknowledging the nationhood and humanity of the other will be less effective and unsustainable even if it's being imposed by a peace agreement because it will be regard as protracted

⁶⁵ Craig, Zelizer, "Trauma –Sensitive Peace-Building: Lessons for Theory and Practice," *African Peace and Conflict Journal*, Volume (1), 2008, p. 85.

⁶⁶ Arie, Nadler, Thomas, Malloy and Jeffrey, D. Fisher. *The Social Psychology of Inter group Reconciliation* (Oxford University Press, 2008), p.43.

social conflict that passed from one generation to generation, and the chance of healing the traumas will be less effective.

1.2.4.2 Development of a Common Moral Basis for Peace:

To create conducive conditions for reconciliation, it is necessary to move beyond peace anchored entirely in pragmatic considerations –essential as these are to peace based on moral considerations. This condition is relatively easy to meet when the moral basis is widely accepted and shared from the beginning of the peace making effort as in the case of rejection of Nazism or the rejection of apartheid in South Africa.⁶⁷

It is believed that to develop a common moral basis for peace is an essential process particularly during the peace making because, the conflicting parties need to share moral and ethical basis for implementing the peace agreements and show their responsibilities and obligations to their nation. In doing so when they came to implement the peace agreement there will not be exchange of accuse concerning violation or breaching of the agreement. The case of Salamat and Misiriya tribe in Central Darfur State, after they signed a peace agreement the conflict relapse more brutally and each part blame the other part for launching the conflict.

In this process some scholars concentrated on the basis of creating justice through reconciliation, but this needs a common consensus about what type of justice is required is it transitional justice, or retributive justice or restorative justice. This required the willingness of the parties in conflict to decide whether transitional justice required or the other two types of justice and this depends on the nature and stage of the conflict.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 2008, p.45.

1.2.4.3 Peace versus Justice:

The more pragmatic idea, which has dominated the conflict resolution literature, is that States in civil war situation do occasionally have to choose between peace and justice. Combatants of war and others community crimes against humanity are considered as rational actors that may not be willing to lay down their weapons if they knew that they are regarded as criminals and will be prosecuted if they do. Peace negotiation and settlement do therefore commonly involve an aspect of amnesty or exile for the combatants, making them immune to post-conflict prosecution.⁶⁸

Although justice is highly required during the reconciliation process in order to avoid impunity from committing crime against humanity and war crimes which will encourage other perpetrators to commit more crimes in the future. By leaving the perpetrators free, the victims will try to retaliate from them soon or later, if today the victims are weak tomorrow if they become strong they will revenge from their enemies.

1.2.4.4 Confrontation with History:

Confronting history and coming to terms with the truth is an essential component of any reconciliation effort. The reexamination of historical narratives and the re-evaluation of national myths on both sides of a conflict are valuable contributions to such an effort.

Confronting history is good in the sense that the perpetrators and victims sometimes need to know why they hated each other, why they are killing each other etc. Reconciliation does not require writing a joint consensual history but it does require admitting the other's truth into one's own narrative. For example if the conflicting ethnic groups in Darfur sit together and asked themselves why they

⁶⁸ Tove, Lie, Helga, Malmin and Scott, Gate, "Post- Conflict Justice and Sustainable Peace," Post Conflict Transitional Working Paper No. 5, 2007, http://www.prio.no/.../file47830_post_conflict_justice_and_sustainable_peace.pdf, accessed May 2010

killed each other without listening and having dialogue with the other and if they confronted themselves without bitterness and hatred they will convince themselves that they have to stop killing each other and seek to live together in peace and in a cooperative manner.⁶⁹

1.2.4.5 Acknowledgment of Responsibility:

Reconciliation also requires acceptance, by each side, taking responsibility for the wrong it has done to the other and for the course of the conflict. Responsibility must be expressed symbolically, in acknowledgment of one's actions and their effect on the other and appropriate apologies and concretely, in appropriate steps of compensation, reparation and restitution.

Acknowledging the responsibility for what had been done during the war time is essential in achieving sustainable reconciliation in the sense that if there is a conflict between two parties, if one party who initiated the conflict did not apologize for the wrong doings of it is members this may lay down any reconciliation process particularly if the victimized party insisted that it cannot reconcile if the other party shouldn't apologize and acknowledged the wrong doings. But this process sometimes is not effective if the conflict ended with equal peace requirements in which perpetrators were being punished and not all parties in conflict required this process to be taken⁷⁰.

1.2.4.6 Establishment of Patterns and Institutional Mechanisms of Cooperation:

Promotion of functional relations through cooperative activities in the economic sphere and in such domains as public health, environmental protection, communication, education, science, culture and tourism cannot in itself lead to reconciliation in the absence of a mutually satisfactory political agreement. It can,

⁶⁹ Ibid., 2007, p. 34.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 2007, p.37.

however help increase openness to the search for political solutions and it can play an important role in peace building in the wake of a political solution.

By establishing cross cutting ties, common interests, and family and personal relations can help stabilize and cement the way towards achieving and creating new relationships that will enable the parties in conflict to look for common future for their children and common interests in managing their economic, political and social problems that will arise in the future. Although creating relations is important and can play an essential role in reconciling the parties in conflicts but it needs strong leaders from both parties to recognize its importance. For example in Darfur Sultanate before Darfur been annexed to Sudan by the British colonial in 1916, the social system of the Sultanate is based on marital status between the tribes in which the native administrative leaders married four women as maximum according to Quran law from different tribes, because if a conflict arise between the tribe of the native administrative leader and other tribe the marital social relations will be used to heal the existing problem and as such many conflicts were been solved . But currently this pattern of relations was being worsened by the current conflict and nobody pays attention to such relation⁷¹.

The conflicts between the ethnic components of Darfur region become renewable and endless, conflicts started between Arabs versus African ethnic groups in 1980s and mid 1990s of the last century and recently the conflict dynamic turned over between the same ethnic groups i.e. conflict between Arabs tribes and conflicts between African tribes. Efforts undertaken to peacefully resolve conflict have impacted in varying degrees on the interplay of ethnic conflict, gender and poverty. Failures of these efforts have compounded and aggravated the situation for women in Darfur and single them out as the embodiment of a failed peace process amid complexities and dynamics of the crisis in Darfur region.

⁷¹ Ibid., 2007, p.54.

Chapter Two

Sudan Economy, Society and Patterns of Governance

This Chapter reflects Sudan's society composition and economy and the patterns of governance since independence and how those patterns of governance contributed to rise of ethnicity as a factor of struggle between the Center and the Peripheries which took the form of armed insurgency claiming for power and wealth sharing.

2.0 Sudan Society.

Sudan is composed of a total surface area of 2.5 million squared kilometers and estimated total population of 40 million according to 2010 census before the separation of South Sudan in July 2011. Sudan like other countries in Africa has undergone different patterns of governance since its independence in 1956. Sudan poses millions of arable land and its where one of the world's longest river passes through. With divergence in mineral resources, oil and soil in addition to different climatic zones ranging from Savanna, desert, semi desert, and equatorial which in turn gives it the privilege to be a food basket of the Arab and African countries.⁷²

According to Atta (2009)⁷³, Religious cleavage in Sudan can be related to ethnic and geographical areas of the country, for instance in the western part of Sudan mainly Darfur and Kordofan the followers of Mahdi are numerous as well as the followers of Tigania route, whereas in the eastern part there existed Mirghania followers and Wahabia followers as well as in some parts of northern Sudan. The dichotomy of Islam- Christianity is misleading as the Arab- African one, because

⁷² Tigani, Seisi "The Root Causes of Conflict in Sudan and the making of Darfur Tragedy", A paper presented at the Wilton Park Conference on Conflict Prevention and Development Cooperation in Africa, Jointly organized by the UNDP and the Japan International Cooperation Agency, Wilton Park: Sussex November 8-11, 2007, p.15.

⁷³ Atta, El- Battahani, *Nationalism and Peasant Politics in the Nuba Mountains Region of Sudan, 1924-1966* (Sudan: Khartoum University Printing Press, 2009), p. 34.

there are many Black Africans from South Sudan who believe in Islam and the same to Darfur where the inhabitants of the region both Arabs and non- Arab ethnic groups are strongly Islam believers.

Whereas according to El- Sadig (2011), most of the Sudan's population is Muslim particularly in the northern part of the country but there are some Christians and Local African religious believers in South Sudan, Nuba Mountain and Blue Nile. Ethnically Sudan's society is composed of hundreds of ethnic groups that distributed to five roots; Arabs, Negros, Nubian, Nubawia and Bejja. The old history of Sudan witnessed mass migrations from neighboring countries and Arab Peninsula which in turn positively contributed to the social tolerance and peacefully coexistence.⁷⁴

Tigani (2007)⁷⁵ pointed out to two major distinct cultures "*Arab*" and "*Black African*". Sudan has different ethnic groups with more than 300 tribes and with more than 100 widely spoken local dialects. This diversity in resource and culture required governance pattern to integrate all these differences in a manner that will lead to unity in diversity.

Sudan society composed of 175 major ethnic and linguistics groups and another 350 smaller groups who speak more than 200 languages besides Arabic language forming a wide diverse society in Africa, it has been estimated that 30 percent of the South's 8 million people profess Christianity, 5 percent are Muslim and 65 percent followers of various indigenous African worship, whereas the North part of the country is composed of over 90% Muslim and 2% Christians mainly from the displaced persons from the South Sudan living in the periphery of Khartoum city,

⁷⁴ الصادق, المهدي, "الهوية: جدلية الصراع و التعايش السلمي", مجلة المنتدى العدد 18. مركز الراصد للدراسات, 2011م, ص.8.

⁷⁵ Tigani, Seisi "The Root Causes of Conflict in Sudan and the making of Darfur Tragedy", A paper presented at the Wilton Park Conference on Conflict Prevention and Development Cooperation in Africa, Jointly organized by the UNDP and the Japan International Cooperation Agency, Wilton Park: Sussex November 8-11, 2007, p.6.

people of Nuba mountain and Coptic. The Sudan society since independence is not a homogenous society suffered from un equal development patterns between the rural and urban centers in which some regional peaceful protesting movements emerged in 1964 claiming for equal development and power sharing such as Beja Conference, Nuba Mountain Union, Darfur Renaissance Front and recently in 2003 there emerged an armed movements that raised insurgency against the federal government in Khartoum claiming for equal power and wealth sharing namely Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), Free Lions, Sudan Liberation Army North Sector.⁷⁶

The following table shows the composition of ethnic groups of Sudan in 1955/56 after the independence of the country.

Table (1)

The table shows the percentage of main Sudanese ethnic groups in 1955/56.

No	Name of the ethnic group	Population census	Percentage%	No	Name of the ethnic group	Population census	Percentage %
1	Arabs	21,000,000	55%	2	Dinka	3,000,000	8%
3	Nuba	2,100,000	6%	4	Nuer	1,400,000	4%
5	Fur	1,000,000	2.7%	6	Zande	600,000	1.8%
7	Shilluk	600,000	1.6%	8	Zaghawa	480,000	1.3%
9	Nubians	200,000	0.5%	10	Other peoples	6,300,000	17%

Source: <http://looklex.com/e.o/sudan.history.htm>⁷⁷.

From the above table, it is clear that Sudan's society is divided into two main ethnic group, those who spoke Arabic language mainly Arabs of riverin, some parts of Darfur, central region and Kordofan region and non-Arabic speaking ,

⁷⁶ J.Madut, Jok, *Sudan; Race, Religion and Violence* (England: One World Publication, 2007), p.133.

⁷⁷ Tore, Kjeilen, "History of Sudan", [<http://looklex.com/e.o/sudan.history.htm>], accessed February 2009.

they include South Sudan ethnic groups living in Sudan, Fur, Beja, Zaghawa, Nuba, and Nubian of the north Sudan.

Although non-Arabs composed of 45%, they were marginalized by the successive national governments who ruled the country, they were given marginal Ministries to run, this in itself led to the emergence of armed movements in the South Sudan in 1964 led by General Josef Lago, and later in 1983 another rebellion movement emerged in South Sudan named as Sudan People's Liberation Army/ Movement (SPLA/M) claiming for new Sudan to end marginalization of the peripheries. Prior to the signature of Niavasha peace agreement in Kenya in 2005, two rebellion movements in Darfur launched an insurgency against the government calling for justice and equality in power and wealth sharing mainly those movements are Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).

The successive national government of Sudan instead of building the nation to avoid the resumption of future conflicts, they continued ruling the country in the same pattern of divide and rule that was inherited from the British Colonial with completely absence of permanent constitution that can set laws for citizenship, form of governance, absence of measures of wealth and power sharing, lack of development strategies to develop the rural areas as well as urban ones and weak political institutions for democratic transitions.⁷⁸ The population census of Sudan in 2008 has different features as it was made after the Niavasha Peace agreement in 2005 ending African Longest Civil war. The following table shows the population census.

⁷⁸ عبدالرحيم بلال, "نظام الحكم ونمط التنمية في السودان: علاقة الإخضاع بين المركز و الاطراف", في التنمية مفتاح السلام في دارفور, تحرير آدم الزين (الخرطوم: مطابع السودان للعملة, 2003) و ص. 137-138.

Table (2): Sudan Population Census in 2008.

No	State	Pop. census	No	State	Pop. census
1	Khartoum	5,274,321	13	Sennar	1,258,58
2	South Darfur	4,93,594	14	River Nile	1,120,441
3	Al jazera	3,575,280	15	Central Equatorial	1,103,592
4	North Kordofan	2,920,992	16	Warab	972,928
5	North Darfur	2,113,626	17	East equatorial	906,126
6	Kassala	1,789,806	18	Blue Nile	832,112
7	White Nile	1,730,588	19	NorthBahre Al ghazal	720,898
8	South Kordofan	1,406,404	20	Northern	699,60
9	Red Sea	1,396,110	21	Lakes	695,730
10	Jongali	1,358,602	22	West Equatorial	619,29
11	El- Gadarif	1,348,378	23	Unity	585,801
12	West Darfur	1,308,225	24	West Bahre Al ghazal	333,431

Source: <http://kordofanonline.net/vb/showthread.php?t=3669>.

From the above table, the total population of Sudan was 39,154,490 Million censuses. That was before the separation of South Sudan. Khartoum state is the biggest in population, then followed by South Darfur, although the IDPs of Darfur regions did not participate in the population census but the statistical numbers showed that there were many people and that was not true, may be new migrants from neighboring countries participated in the census. Northern state and River Nile combined did not reach 2 million census but they monopolized the resources

of the country and power. If the development process in Sudan undergone to the number of population census we will discover the size of injustice committed against the peripheries of Sudan. Therefore the logic of Dr. Garang to create a new Sudan based in equality and justice between the regions of the Sudan is true and logical.

However according to Atta (2007)⁷⁹, Sudan inherited more paradox and acute social complexity since its independence in which its consequences reflected in almost structures and activities in post-independence era. The Sudan society is characterized by ethnic, religious, linguistic, and regional diversity which regarded as strong loyalties than national loyalties this in turn led to the absentees of national reconciliation which later led ethnicity to be a social factor dominating the society. On the other hand the colonial rule contributed negatively in enlarging the space between the ethnic groups of Sudan. The most contradictions that characterized Sudan's society is inequality in power and wealth distribution, most studies pointed out that there are three patterns of inequality and these are:

Firstly, inequality in distributing income among various society segments which led to the emergence of bourgeoisie class controlling money and wealth leaving the rest of the society without wealth accumulation.

Secondly, inequality in service and governmental development opportunities between the urban centers and rural peripheries which reflected in mass migration from rural to urban centers.

Lastly, the inequality between rural areas, population growth in urban centers declared the failure of the governments to distribute social and economic services

⁷⁹ عطا, البطحاني, التحديات التي تواجه المرأة, مركز الجندر للبحوث و التدريب, الطبعة الثانية. (الخرطوم, 2007م), ص.12.

equally between the urban centers and rural areas which automatically induced migration from rural areas to urban centers for the seek of finding better jobs, better health care, better economic condition this by itself led to the gathering of the same migrated ethnic group to live in one place as it is clear in Khartoum city in which those from western Sudan are located in Mayo, Jebel Awliya, Haj yousif, soba, El ingaz and Eid hussein, whereas those who descended from northern Sudan are located in El sahafa, arkawit, El ma 'amora, El menshiyia, and etc.

The successive governments since independence of Sudan failed to accomplish equal development not only between the rural and urban centers but also between the regions, it is clear that 90% of the developmental projects were concentrated in Khartoum, Central region and North Sudan leaving the rest regions of Sudan without basic services, basic infrastructures, lack of adequate water and sanitation, and lack of electricity services. This situation later grew rapidly with new perception of prejudices, grievance and marginalization particularly when SPLM launch an insurgency against the government in 1983 calling for new Sudan in which people of all Sudan be equal in power and wealth sharing, this in itself led to the emergence of marginalized identities to challenge the State which they perceive to be unwilling to address their marginalization, identity and their economic interests as well as social welfare. The successive governments instead failed to recognize the ethnic, economic, social, religious, cultural and linguistic differences since independence of the Sudan, thus led to the emergence of armed movements in Darfur, Eastern Sudan, South Sudan, Blue Nile and Nuba Mountain claiming for new Sudan in which equal distribution of services and governance will be due to the citizenship not due to political or religion or ethnic loyalties.

Sudan after the separation of the South suffered from inappropriate policies and programmes that can unify the ethnic, economic, social and cultural diversity into

homogenous national unity and cohesion. If the current government failed to find a permanent solution to identify the problems of an equal distribution of power and wealth Sudan will witness another separation of one of its regions particularly Blue Nile or South Kordofan or Darfur region due to accumulated grievance and inequality, and the separation of South Sudan will induce and encourage the armed movements in Darfur and South Kordofan to continue persuading the same goal of struggle for secular state in which people will be traced according to their citizenship not on their ethnic, religion or cultural backgrounds⁸⁰.

2.1 Sudan Economy:

Sudan is a diverse country in its resources and identity groups, according to Human Development Index of 2010; Sudan is regarded as the world's least developed country. After independence in 1956 Sudan became more integrated into the global economy as a significant producer of cotton in El gezira scheme, as well as through production of Gum Arabic which allocated wealth to be accumulated by Northern and Central Sudan Merchants, who in many instances don't return the revenues of the exported products to the rural areas in terms of provision of services in which they extracted. In doing so rural poverty has grown rapidly and under development continued to be the prevailing situation in the peripheries.⁸¹

According to Atta (2006), the un equal economic development of Sudan's regions since the colonial era followed by the national successive governments after the independence of the country in 1956 till now, showed wide disparities and

⁸⁰ Tigani, Seisi "The Root Causes of Conflict in Sudan and the making of Darfur Tragedy", A paper presented at the Wilton Park Conference on Conflict Prevention and Development Cooperation in Africa, Jointly organized by the UNDP and the Japan International Cooperation Agency, Wilton Park: Sussex November 8-11, 2007, p.38.

⁸¹ Report, Country, 2010, African Women Decade 2010-2020, R <http://www.bti-project.de/fileadmin/.../pdf/BTI%2020%20Sudan.pdf>, accessed 29/9/2012.

marginalization of Darfur, Kordofan, East and South Sudan regions whereas most of the development projects and investment opportunities were allocated in the Northern and Central regions. The flow of foreign capital to purchase the primary commodities in Central and North regions has had economic, social and political implications as armed movements in Darfur, Blue Nile, Nuba Mountain and Eastern Sudan emerged in the early 1960th stressing for equal development opportunities by using peaceful means whereas in early 2000th the same regional armed groups launched rebellion insurgency against the current government when it ignored to allocate equitable resource sharing and development of its peripheries.⁸²

Meanwhile, social services are extremely limited and as such are to be found mainly in urban areas, neglect of the outlying rural areas has been particularly notable. Although Sudan poses vast fertile agricultural lands but famine and food shortage occurs in some instances and this mainly due to the failure of successive Governments to develop the agricultural sector which constitutes about 90% of total population in Sudan. On the other hand oil extraction and supply brought boom with little benefit to rural people hence led to economic disparities and marginalization of the peripheries.⁸³

A common problem facing Sudan's economy is lack of data on economic indicators in particular on poverty levels, income inequalities as well as human development indicators. Sudan's economy has gone through different phases of macro –economic policies. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2006), Identified five phases of macroeconomic policies during the period 1970-

⁸² Atta, El- Battahani, "A complex web: Politics and Conflict in Sudan," *ACCORD*, Issue18, 2006, pp.3-13, <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/sudan/politics-conflict.php>, accessed October 2006.

⁸³ Report, Country, 2010, African Women Decade 2010-2020, R <http://www.bti-project.de/fileadmin/.../pdf/BTI%2020%20Sudan.pdf>, accessed 29/9/2012, p.18.

2001 with corresponding Growth Domestic Product (GDP) growth rates, inflation rates and policy response.

The macroeconomic policy adopted during the sub-period 1979-81 focused on exchange rate devaluations, implementation of administrative control policies and expansion of money supply to finance the fiscal deficit. These policies have caused a drop in the real GDP growth to 5.5 percent⁸⁴.

The sub –period 1982-89 was dominated by policy reforms with the help of International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) that emphasized outward orientation, nominal devaluation, aggregated demand retrenchment and trade and institutional reform to create incentive structure consistent with the reform strategy.

Following the Ingaz regime in 1989, the government implemented liberalization programme in 1992 as a part of its National Salvation Strategy (NSS) (1992-2002).

The main elements of this programme are:

- Decontrol and deregulation of imports, foreign exchange and prices.
- Privatization of non- profitable public enterprises.
- Stabilization of the foreign currency exchange rate.

The results of this programme led to a decline in real per-capita consumption by about 11 percent and increase in inflation rates which in turn led more people to fall under poverty line suffering from high food prices, high house rent and lack of good health services in rural areas.⁸⁵

⁸⁴ Tigani, Seisi “The Root Causes of Conflict in Sudan and the making of Darfur Tragedy”, A paper presented at the Wilton Park Conference on Conflict Prevention and Development Cooperation in Africa, Jointly organized by the UNDP and the Japan International Cooperation Agency, Wilton Park: Sussex November 8-11, 2007, p.18.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 2007, 19.

In other words the Islamists adopted unstable policies of restructuring the economy by pursued a liberalized policy behind which the most beneficiaries were the Islamists members rather than the majority of the people who suffered much from hyper inflation and unstable growth rates as well as increasing numbers of poor people in the peripheries mainly in Darfur region, Eastern Sudan, South Sudan, Nuba Mountain and Blue Nile.

The Islamists with their business collaboration in Sudan, Malaysia and Turkey built a system of crony capitalism characterized with high corruption and lack of transparency and accountability which reflected to poor performance of the economy this is mainly emerged visible when oil has been extracted in South Sudan (Unity State). The extraction of oil led the Government to strengthen its economic position particularly in fighting SPLM in South Sudan⁸⁶.

The Islamists make use of oil extraction to build their crony capitalists in a programme named by the God father of Ingaz regime Dr, Hassan El Turabi, *Eltamkeen* which means empowering the members of the Islamic Movement and National Congress Party so as to rule for a long time, their logic behind economic empowerment is that whenever you have good and strong economic position, you will be able to fight your enemy for years and at the same time you will govern the people by controlling their livelihoods, lessening the opportunities for them to compete in market economy. But when the National Congress Party (NCP) split in 2000 into two factions, El Turabi faction named by Popular Congress Party (PCP) and regarded as the most Extremists and Omer El Bashir faction named as National Congress Party and regarded as the most beneficiaries and utilitarian.

⁸⁶ Report, Country, 2010, African Women Decade 2010-2020, R <http://www.bti-project.de/fileadmin/.../pdf/BTI%2020%20Sudan.pdf>, accessed 29/9/2012, p.5

The economy of Sudan witnessed new dilemma either to continue fighting SPLM or to stop the war and search for peace, therefore the government under the international and internal pressure decided to negotiate with SPLM in Kenya in Machakos and Naivasha in 2000 and 2005 respectively. The internal pressure was reluctant or lack of Islamic motivation by the Mijahedeen to fight in the South Sudan because Hassan ElTurabi in the Quran University and in many public places after the split of National Congress Party in 2000, announced that those who were killed in South Sudan are not martyrs but rather *Fatiz* and Allah will not grant them paradise.

The escalating situation between Islamists fuel tensions in Darfur region as two armed movements called Sudan Liberation Army SLA/M and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) raised insurgency against the government claiming for equal wealth and power sharing. At the same time Eastern Sudan witnessed an insurgency against the government launched by Beja Union (BU) and Free Lions (FL). Sudan economy continued fluctuating in growth rate due to the wars in its peripheries which costs the government to pay more millions of dollars to stop those insurgencies; the situation deteriorated more when South Sudan gained its independence in July 2011.

The economy of the country experienced high inflation rates, lack of hard currency, low productivity and production of exported commodities, lack of appropriate economic policies accompanied with huge federal government expenditures at the federal and regional level which led the government to cut the expenditures federal and state government staff that belonged to NCP in order to adopt a new policy of controlling government expenditures but the situation remains worse with devaluation of the national currency in front USA Dollar which reached 9:5 pounds for exchange of one Dollar with reluctant or inability of

the productive sectors of agriculture, animal resources and infant industries to continue in producing export commodities to gain hard currency that may reduce the demand for foreign currency and stop speculation in currency trading.⁸⁷

If the government is not willing to fight corruption and make good relations with Republic of South Sudan in order to make benefit of the consumption market in the South Sudan to the Sudanese products such as onion, potato, food oil, sugar, dura, and non-food materials, the government budget will not be improved and hence deficit will continue affecting balance of payment negatively. Furthermore, fighting corruption among the national congress members who are in power and who abusing their power and positions to accumulate money and create better social status to their families should be seriously addressed and send the guiltiers to the jails and prisons. In doing so the government will provide money for developmental projects that faced deficit financing such as Jebel Marra Rural Development in Central Darfur State, western savannah corporation.

2.2 Patterns of Governance in Sudan:

The Government regimes that ruled the country since its independence have failed to recognize the importance of ethnic, economic, cultural and religious diversity as an essential element in the process of nation building and building democratic institutions that will serve the interests of the citizens rather than the interests of the elites who dominate power. Instead, they have abused and exploited this diversity, turning it from a wellspring of strength into a source of diversion, violence, prejudices, grievances and conflicts. This resulted in the entire country

⁸⁷ Ibid., 2010, p.23.

becoming at war with itself through protracted conflicts that retarded the country's economic and political development and jeopardized its unity.⁸⁸

Adopting an ideal system of governance that represents the divergence of the country will pave the way for political, economic and social stability of the country which is necessary for achieving development and sustainable peace. Sudan experienced different patterns of government system such as secular, socialist and Islamist. However those patterns of government evolve around three main periods as follows:

2.2.1 Government Pattern from 1937-56 and 1956-1971.

Sudan witnessed many types of governance patterns since the condominium rule in 1899, accordingly Sudan was being ruled directly from the center till the first of the twentieth century in 1920s and then Sudan has transferred into indirect pattern of ruling pattern till 1937.

The British ruling policy was a centralized pattern which deepened the heterogeneous of the social and cultural structure of Sudan's population by adopting the policy of divide and rule.⁸⁹

The first legislations been issued related to the local government was known as laws of local government for principalities, urban and rural for year 1937. The goals of the local government before the independence was characterized by the colonial manner which seeks to maintain security and stability to guarantee its

⁸⁸ Tigani, Seisi "The Root Causes of Conflict in Sudan and the making of Darfur Tragedy", A paper presented at the Wilton Park Conference on Conflict Prevention and Development Cooperation in Africa, Jointly organized by the UNDP and the Japan International Cooperation Agency, Wilton Park: Sussex November 8-11, 2007, p.55.

⁸⁹السودان, المجالس "تطور نظام الحكم في السودان الجزء الاول", 2008م. <http://www.sudan.goodbb.net/t67-topic>, 10 مارس 2012.

sustainability in addition to provide social service and training to the Sudanese elites on ruling skills.

This situation continued until 1951 when a new issue was declared concerning establishment of institutions due to the following reasons:

1. The need for decentralization to provide services at the local level.
2. Development of political and administrative responsibility through local government practicing.

The stage after independence of Sudan was characterized by party, and personal competitions which in turn affected the experience of parliament with conflicts of the two major parties Umma Party and Democratic Union, each party was willing to defeat the other and control the government instead of concentrating on the building nation and managing the diversity this in itself led the marginalized forces to be totally excluded from the political processes. For instance the South Sudanese people in the first democratic government felt disappointed and depressed due to their inability and failure to affect the ongoing political situation effectively because the Northern Sudanese elites promised to grant South Sudan a federal government when the permanent constitution discussed but this wasn't happened.⁹⁰

This situation led the Sudan Communist Party and Muslim Brotherhood to acknowledge that they are unable to win elections and they tend to seek for other alternative to seize power mainly via military coup. The first military coup in 1958 was handover of power to General Ibrahim Aboud by the Prime Minister Abdella Khalil ; a popular uprising in 1964 led to a return to elections and coalition rule. In 1969 the Communist party supported Neimeri military coup which later on brought

⁹⁰ بيتر، ودوارد، السودان الدولة المضطربة 1898—1989 (السودان، الخرطوم: مركز محمد بشير عمر للدراسات السودانية، جامعة أم درمان الأهلية، 2002) ص.113.

economic nationalism in the name of socialism. During Jaafar Neimeri regime (1969-85), the political exclusion of the peripheries continued and perpetuated under representation at regional particularly when Neimeri appointed El- Tayeb El Mardi as a governor of Darfur region in 1981 this led to popular uprising in Darfur claiming President Neimeri to change El tayeb El- Mardi and replaced him with a person from Darfur region. In 1985 a popular uprising brought down the Neimeri regime and paved the way for the third democratic civil government under the Prime Minister El-Sadiq El Mahdi (1986-1989), in this period, Sudan witnessed brutal fighting in the south with SPLM and John Garang near to conquer Juba.⁹¹

In 1971 a new law of local popular governance was issued which led to the qualitative transfer in decentralizing governance system as follows:

1. Transfer of the authority to local entities known as the executive popular councils in the principalities.
2. Utilizing the institutions of the local popular governance to motivate development and achieving comprehensive budgeting at the local level.
3. The local popular governance contains two levels, the executive councils at the principality level and area councils include rural and urban councils.⁹²

The patterns of governance during 1956 to 1979 failed to address the cultural and religious differences of the country in the sense that new regional movements and unions emerged claiming for equal development and fair participation at the government levels. Beja Union in Eastern Sudan was emerged in 1958 and Red Flame Movement (RFM) in Darfur during 1959-1965 also claiming for equal development and parliamentary representation, in addition to Soni Movement

⁹¹ Report, Country, 2010, African Women Decade 2010-2020, R <http://www.bti-project.de/fileadmin/.../pdf/BTI%2020%20Sudan.pdf>, accessed 29/9/2012, p.9.

⁹² السودان, المجالس "تطور نظام الحكم في السودان الجزء الاول", 2008م. , 10 مارس 2012, <http://www.sudan.goodbb.net/t67-topic>.

which emerged in 1964, and Darfur Advancement Front (DAF) in 1964 and Nuba Mountain Union (NMU) in early 1960s. The lack of permanent constitution to absorb the cultural differences and to build democratic institutions to achieve equal development in addition to the lack of political will by the reverin elites to change the economic and political situation inherited from the British government led to the emergence of ethnicity as a factor of gaining power with new perceptions of struggling for new Sudan in which all people of Sudan are equalize in power and wealth sharing and the character of identifying people will be citizen ship rather than ethnic or religious or even geographical elements.

According to Atta (2011)⁹³, there are three patterns of domination that existed in Sudan since independence.

First, pattern of domination is integrated domination, in this pattern El-Battahani pointed out that a society shows an organic relation between the governors and governorates, a relation without heterogeneousness or hostilities on the social or moral levels. In this sort of domination the opposition group is excluded and other cultures are marginalized.

The ruling forces here perform a function of advanced productivity process in which their culture dominate the social structure of the society by the expansion in economic, and productivity activities that tries to absorb other cultures in one culture that can born new cultures that everybody can find himself in it.

Second, pattern of domination is freeze domination, in this type of domination, there exists a crisis of domination by a minor group, in this sense the minor group expired their project gradually and pushed the society and its components to a critical status in which it fails to push the society forefront and hence the society

⁹³عطا , البطحاني, أزمة الحكم في السودان- أزمة هيمنة أم هيمنة أزمة, (دار جامعة الخرطوم للنشر, 2011م),ص.298.

will witness fragmentation and crisis, no new ideas are invented to change the situation.

Third, sort of domination is Limited domination, this sort of domination concentrates on the ideological unit of economics, political and intellectual elite, beside hatred to any intervene by the popular people in the state affairs this is due to the contradiction of the economic interests and cultural values of the dominated cast. The dominated cast in this manner conserve on ruling pattern they created by integrating the competitive groups within their network with the goal of formulating ruling cast that can include others⁹⁴.

The three types of dominations are found in the current history of Sudan in different periods, but the study will concentrate on the integrated type of domination. It happened during Jafaar Neimeri regime from 1969 to 1985, during that period, President Jafaar Niemeri for the sake of seizing power introduced only one party called the Union Socialist Party (USP) to absorb the opposition group in one body regardless of the divergence in the Sudanese society, this policy aggravated the political situation to become worse when *Anyanya* two launched fighting in South Sudan claiming for regional autonomy and equal development. The situation of cultural domination was continued when the riverin elites had lion percentage in Niemeri's government.

Whereas this type of domination is severely clear during the era of *Ingaz* regime since 1989. The Islamists adopted destructive policy of divide and rule by fragmenting the political parties to weaken them not to compete in ruling the country in addition there arose ethnic and religion factors as policy of mobilizing Majahedeen to fight SPLA/M in South Sudan, by using ethnic and religion factors

⁹⁴ Ibid., 2011, p.299.

Sudan experienced mass and acute ethnic polarization and ethnic competition to show political loyalty to the government at the federal and state levels, this encouraged some minority ethnic groups to mount high political ranks than the mass majority ethnic groups, which in turn led to the fragmentation of society into Arab and Africans particularly in Darfur region where ethnic loyalty became much more stronger than the national loyalty.

In addition the government in order to domain the political sense, it created what was called *El-tawali* system to absorb the fragmented weak political parties in National Congress's political line it is the same idea of Socialist Union Party that was adopted by Niemeri regime⁹⁵.

The failure of the successive governments of Sudan since its independence to solve the problem of identity, wealth and power sharing, and equal development led to the emergence of armed movements in South Sudan, Darfur, Blue Nile, Nuba Mountain, and Eastern Sudan challenging the government which is perceived to be uninterested in solving their marginalization, poverty problems and underdevelopment. Darfur region witnessed two rebellion movements in 2003 fighting the government for inclusion in political and wealth sharing. The conflict in Darfur region was regarded as the most destructive one after South Sudan in which more than one million people were displaced and more than 200 thousands were killed.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 2011, p. 320.

The following table shows the pattern of governance in Sudan since its independence in 1956.

Table (3): Patterns of Governance since independence of Sudan.

Date	Pattern of Government	Date	Pattern of Government
Jan/1956	Multi democracy sectarian parties led by Ismail AL Azheri	May 1969	Military coup led by General Jaafar Numeri
November 1958	Military coup led by General Ibrahim Aboud	April 1985	Transitional Military Council led General Swar EIDaheb.
October 1964	A transitional government led by Sir El- Khatim Al khalifa (intended to prepare the country for democratic elections and devise a constitution).	April 1985	Multiparty Democracy government led by Sadiq El mahdi as a prime minister and Ahmed Al mirghani as Head of the State.
July 1966	Coalition government of Sadiq El Mahadi who won the parliamentary vote.	June 1989	Military coup led by General Omer Al basher (National Salvation Government).
May 1967	Mohammed Ahmed Mahjoub replaced Sadiq El Mahdi	March 2005	National Unity Government formed from National congress members+ SLPA/M members according to comprehensive peace agreement that was signed in Niavasha, Kenya.
Early 1968	Elections returned Mohamed Ahmed Mahjoub to power	October 2010	Elections won by General Al Omer Bashir

Source: <http://looklex.com/e.o/sudan.history.htm>

From the above table, it is clear that the riverin elites dominated the monopolization of devolution of power and excluded the elites from the peripheries. This monopolization created unequal development between the peripheries and the center; in addition it created insurgency towards the existing political institutions that did not allow people from the peripheries to gain power.

As a result of imbalance of power between the center and the peripheries, civil war was launched in South Sudan, Eastern Sudan, Darfur, Blue Nile and Nuba Mountain which caused damage to the economy, environment and led to social disintegration as a consequence of migration and low wages earned by the migrants.

Sudan still needs a package of solutions starting from rebuilding nation programme, building new social and economic structures to achieve social justice and tolerance. Reforming the security and military systems that can allow people from the peripheries to be absorbed or integrated in the security and military system at high rank positions without discrimination as its happening now. The current political institutions are biased and unable to transform the hatred and bitterness of those who suffered from the impacts of conflicts in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile. If this situation continued for another decade Sudan will not be united. More fragmentations will occur and some regional states may seek for self-autonomy and confederation.

In addition to that, the current social system in Sudan needs to tolerate with the periphery citizens who suffered from social exclusion that fail to integrate them in the social life. Few people from the peripheries married from northern Sudan, and those who managed to marry from the northerners suffered from ill treatment and a sense of inferiority. This is mainly because of the absence of social justice that provides fair trial to those who treat others in an inferior and degrading manner.

The economic system in Sudan since independence is monopolized by the elites of riverin who owned large scale companies and schemes without creating policies of redistributing the revenues to the periphery areas although most of the revenues were extracted from the periphery areas, the accumulated economic problems and

distorted social system led to the separation of South Sudan will encourage more periphery areas to separate from Sudan.

The next chapter will explore the root causes of the Darfur conflict and conflict in West Darfur state. The chapter will also highlight on gender and migrations patterns that occurred in West Darfur and how those migrations caused demographic changes in the region.

Chapter Three

Chronology of Conflicts in West Darfur State

This chapter reflects the location of West Darfur State, its population and prevailing economic activity as well as migration patterns that occurred in the State since the 1970s and how those migration patterns caused ethnic conflicts between the exiting ethnic groups that occurred before 2003 by taking some conflicts as examples.

3.0 Location of West Darfur State:

West Darfur State covers more than 75,000 sq. kilometers in the western most region of Sudan. It features a marked agro-climatic gradient, with its northern zone (situated north of latitude 14° N) consisting largely of semi-desert hills and rocky landscapes. The annual rainfall is an average of 200 mm in part of the north. The state's central zone, located between latitudes 12°-14° N, contains a dry savannah, as well as the Jebel Marra mountain range and plateau, with its fertile and forested land. The area south of latitude 12° N generally receives the most rain, averaging 1200 mm per year in some places, and this rich savannah reflects the wetter conditions. West Darfur has more than one million inhabitants who are distributed in 16 administrative localities, with El Geneina serving as the capital. The service sector of the state is limited to only very basic administrative activities. The inadequacy of the transport sector and other infrastructure contributes significantly to the current economic fragility of West Darfur.⁹⁶

⁹⁶ Mohammed O.Mohammed, 2009, The Role of Religion and Custom in Conflict and Peace in West Darfur, University of Khartoum Department of Sociology.

3.1 Prevailing Economic Activity:

The production base of Western Darfur State's economy evolves mainly around traditional rain-fed agriculture and livestock rearing. Those who practice subsistence millet and sorghum cultivation are the indigenous tribes i.e. Fur, Masaleet, Dajo, Gimer, Bargo, Singar, Erenga and Tama... etc, and those who rear animals are Arab tribes. This doesn't mean that every group practices one activity alone; the settlers also rear animals but not as much as those who practice pastoralism. These activities are inter-mixed; the pastoralists sell part of their animals to obtain cash to buy grain surpluses brought onto the market by peasant farmers. The pastoral and peasant subsistence economies though separate are complementary and linked by exchanges in which each is influenced by the other.⁹⁷

There is also well irrigated agriculture which uses pumps for water lifting and it concentrated in wadi areas. In recent years this activity is playing an essential role in providing cash crops such as potato, to the local markets in Zalingei, El Geneina, and Wadi Salih areas.

The service sector in the State is of limited economic impact and includes only the very basic services of government administration. The inadequacy of the transport sector and other infrastructures are particularly responsible for the current state of economic fragility of Western Darfur States.⁹⁸

⁹⁷ Khalid, El- Amin, "Some Environmental Consequences of Human Response to Drought in Sudan Darfur Region," (*DSRC, University of Khartoum*, 1999), p.20.

⁹⁸ Mohammed, Suliman, 1999, *The Sudan a Continent of Conflicts*, A report on the State of war and peace in the Sudan, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/publiehouse/fast/crp/Suliman_99.htm, accessed on 23 May 2008.

3.2 The Ethnic Divide of West Darfur State:

The ethnic divide of West Darfur State, as it is the case for Sudan in general, are not that clear cut. Following the two main sub-divisions, the population of State can be divided into those with Arabs ancestry and the local non-Arab, indigenous inhabitants. The indigenous tribes consist mainly of settled farmers and small-scale traditional cultivators generally referred to as Fur, Masaleet, Tama, Mararit, Dajo, Gimer and Zaghowa. On the other hand the Arab tribes are pastoralists who consist of Beni Hussien, Rezeigat, Misiriya, Beni Helba⁹⁹ ...

Inter-tribal marriage between those of Arab origin and the indigenous ones contributed to peaceful coexistence in early days of Fur sultanate. It has helped in avoiding conflict till the beginning of the 1980s. The policy, which was adopted by the governors of the Fur of motivating migrants to settle in the sultanate's Dar with the purpose of rehabilitating uncultivated lands encouraged inter-tribal marriage for instance, Dar of Fitigoro tribe was separated from Dar Kobbra until 1938, but when Shertyi Abdul Mawala Jabur died the Dar of Fitigoro was added to Shartawia of Dar Kobbra and this resulted in the intermixing of the Fitigoro tribe with the Fur tribe¹⁰⁰.

3.3 The Root Causes of Ethnic Conflict in West Darfur:

The inhabitants of Darfur region are ethnically diverse in economic and cultural modes of life; the settled peasants are mainly African ethnic group whereas the nomadic ethnic groups are mainly Arabs. Both the African and Arabs ethnic groups are Muslims. The ethnic lines are not clear cut and it is controversy to distinct ethnic factors between the Arabs and the African particularly in color, religion and economic practices. The Arab and African ethnic groups have lived in

⁹⁹ Ibid., 1999, p.20.

¹⁰⁰ يوسف, تكتنه, 1997, "تقرير عن الصراعات القبلية في دارفور", قدمت في مؤتمر الامن الشامل بنيالا, ص.4-24.

Darfur region for many centuries and intermarriage relations have further blurred ethnic distinctions. However this harmonious coexistence was disrupted when the current government took power through military coup in 1989, when they created ethnic loyalty as a main source of being participated in the government at federal and state levels¹⁰¹.

Ethnic diversity by it is self is not a cause of conflict between the different ethnic groups living together in one geographical area but the way of managing the differences that a rise from time to time on economic, social and political matters is regarded as the major source that may lead to stability and peace or it may lead to conflicts with a violent character. Ethnicity as a powerful force for intimidation and divide and rule policies was cleverly used by the British administration during their preparation for the invasion of Darfur in 1915. British policies at that time involved arming Arab groups in the borders between Darfur and Kordofan and using Arab militias to track Sultan Ali Dinar in Jebel Marra which resulted in his murder in 1916. In Darfur this was the first time in which ethnically based Arab militias were recruited by an invading army against the rulers of Darfur¹⁰².

Greater Darfur region experienced since the 1980^s brutal tribal conflicts between the farmers and the pastoralists competing over scarce resources for grazing, pasture and water resources, particular during the drought periods which recurrently stricken the African Sahelian in the 1970^s and 1980^s of the last century, as well as due to the competition over economic resources and land ownership which induced conflicts to occur even between the same ethnic group.¹⁰³

¹⁰¹ Sulieman, Mahmoud A, *Darfur a Crisis of Identity and Governance* (USA, Author house, 2011), p.4

¹⁰² Salim, Ali, "The Historical Revolutions in Darfur", M.A. diss., University of Zalingei- Peace Center, 2008, pp.34-35.

¹⁰³ Christle, Campna, "Conflict in Darfur: Ethnicity as a main factor in fueling the conflict," M.A.diss., University for Peace, Costa Rica, 2010, p.45.

3.4 Gender, Migration and the *Hakura* System in West Darfur State

The ongoing conflict in Darfur since 2003 has destructive impacts on the livelihoods of the people of Darfur, it led to mass migration from rural to urban areas searching for peace and security. However the number of the people who migrated due to the current conflict is more than the number of people who migrated during the tribal conflicts between the farmers and the pastoralist in the mid of the eighties of the last century, it was estimated by UN agencies that more than two millions were displaced and about three hundred thousands were killed. Both women and men were badly and brutally affected by the conflict. However there are some people migrated to due to the climatic changes that stricken the African Sahel and Darfur in the early 1970^s.

Accordingly gender roles and responsibilities in the society were changed; new cultural practices and norms were acquainted by the migrants. Women who lost their husbands and children became head of households and hence they migrated to urban cities searching for jobs to improve their income.

Men and women on the other hand migrated not only from rural to urban areas but also some of them migrated to the neighboring countries in Chad, Central Africa and Libya but the reality shows that most of the types of migration in Darfur were men habit rather than women habit.

Over the past four decades, the total numbers of international migrants are doubling and the world population migrating has remained fairly constant. There are now 175 million international migrants worldwide whom most of them are women, despite the common misconception that men are the migrants.

There are different types of migration such as voluntary migration, forced migration and international and internal migration. Mostly migrations happen due to several

factors such as economic, social, environmental factors, wars and conflicts and political factors. Migration might provide new opportunities to improve both women's and men's lives and it can also give rise to the changes that will happen to gender relations and roles¹⁰⁴.

Migrations of population in Darfur started since the establishment of an ancient Islamic Sultanates, such as the Sultanate of Dajo, Tunjur and Fur. Migrations that occurred in Darfur in the past were either mass migrations of tribes in search for pasture and water sources or migrations of individuals for the sake of religion learning or improving their livelihoods. Consequently, forced migration occurred in Darfur during Khalifa Abdullah Al taishi in 1888th when the handover of power in Darfur was given to Emir Osman Adam Jano, who continued the policy of transmigration, which was pursued by the Khalifa Altaishi to bring the tribes of Darfur to Omdurman, to support him against the riverin people who had declared their refusal to Khalifa Al-taishi to take over the reins of power after the death of Imam Al Mahdi¹⁰⁵.

As a result of those migrations there was a disruption in agricultural activity which led to food scarcity which later on led to revolution against Khalifa's regime by Abi Gemaiza who almost racked by supporters in Darfur.

The Hakura system which is dated back to the Fur Sultanate played an essential role in fueling the ethnic conflicts between Hakura owners and non Hakura ones particularly when those migrants from Arab descendants claimed the government authorities to grant them lands within the Hakura system which gives the rights to

¹⁰⁴ Jolly, Susie and Reeves, Hazel, "Gender and Migration overview report", 2011, [www.bridge.ids.ac.uk], accessed March 2012.

¹⁰⁵ Ali, Dawood Hussein, *Chief of Pastoralists Union, Elgeneina West Darfur State*, Interview by Yassir Satti. 29/ June, 2009.

the indigenous tribes of Fur, Masaleet, Gimer and Erenga to monopoly the land and its usages.¹⁰⁶

Land tenure arrangements in Darfur have evolved over centuries and are largely based on an original system in which communal families were given usufruct rights to farm land based on their needs as long as it was regularly cultivated. When a family stopped cultivating the land for any reason it reverted back to the community and could be reallocated and utilized by another family. Under this system the community leader (normally the village head man) was responsible for land allocation and for recognizing new occupants.

During the Keira Dynasty of Sultan Musa Ibn Suliman (1680-1700) a new system of granting land titles called Hakura was introduced. It ranged from limited rights of taxation over people occupying a certain territory to full rights to collect taxes and religious dues. Administrative Hakuras were usually granted to tribal leaders and came to be known as a dar (- literally meaning -home land -) -. This confirmed communal ownership of land for- a given group of people who usually make up a tribe or sub-tribe under a recognized leader¹⁰⁷.

Historically the Hakura¹⁰⁸ system was inclusive in that everyone if he respects its rules and institutions could have access to land or other natural resources. Hakura represented a full system with a clearly defined hierarchy of rights and corresponding obligations; including provisions for outsiders passing by. Amenities range from the allocation of a specific plot for cultivation to access to common territory. Secondary rights were also frequently attached to primary rights so as to grant access to water and trees.

¹⁰⁶ Bank, World, *Darfur Dimensions of Challenges for Development*, , a back ground volume, 2007, p. 10.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 2007, p.19.

¹⁰⁸ Hakura system means ownership of land granted by the Sultan of Fur Sultanate to individuals and tribal groups that live in the Sultanate Jurisdictions.

The Hakura system effectively managed the allocation of land among tribes and regulated access to and use of natural resources in a harmonious ways during times of plenty and maintained a complementary economy based on the exchange of water and access to pasture land for meat and dairy. However in times of scarcity the system came under great stress; increased demand for access to grazing land and water from nomadic tribes; combined with the allocation of fertile land for large –scale agricultural production by the government. While not all land was officially a warded as Hakura by the Sultan, as far as tribal groups were concerned the land they occupied effectively became synonymous with an administrative Hakura whether recognized by an official charter or not¹⁰⁹.

To distinguish the territories in the absence of charters, tribal homelands were frequently named after the associated tribe for instance Dar Zaghawa, (land of the Zaghawa people), and Dar Rezeigat (land of Rezeigat people), etc. In addition to identifying land ownership this branding of territory based on tribal affiliation meant that overtime, the land became a symbol of group identity in addition to being an economic asserts. The British Administration gave some legitimacy to the already existing tribal boundaries recognizing that this form of land ownership and use corresponds to the mode of living prevalent among the pastoralist tribes.

Animal movement and the expansive land on which they graze, with no fixed land on which to settle all have made this type of communal land ownership the most suitable form of land use. This form of land use also allows access to pasture and water by all members of the tribe. Seasonal movement dictated by the environment over vast areas of land, has led to the development of an accepted regulatory custom which allows for inter-penetration between different tribes according to

¹⁰⁹ Bank, World, *Darfur Dimensions of Challenges for Development, , a back ground volume*, 2007, p. 24.

which land use is exchanged without any tribe losing its dar or claiming the others.¹¹⁰

Individual use of communal land is restricted to members of the community (- be it a tribe; clan or village) - However tenure rights could be granted to strangers or others who are not members of the same tribe or community. Such rights are limited by some conditions which strangers have to abide by. Among settled farming communities individual land rights are regulated by custom. Land tenure differ , depending on whether the individual beneficiary is a member of the tribe or a member of the village community and whether the land in question is subjected to cultivation or grazing and whether it's a wadi or goz land or mud land.

The individual who is a member of the tribe, the clan or village has the rights to use the land which he clears and brings under cultivation and reserves that right in as long as he continues to maintain it under cultivation on El goz land or sandy land. The individual has the right to crops and other products the land yields and also has the right to keep it fallow for a period varying between eight to twelve years. With regard to wadi land the right to land transfer by inheritance is recognized besides leasing the land for cash or get a share of the crop.

The right to use and benefit from the Hakura land is not restricted merely to the owner tribe, the owners of the land share the benefit of their land with the non-owners, they gave them pieces of land to cultivate and use it for pasture. But in the recent time particularly in the mid of the eighties many grass root conflict were erupted between the owners and non-owners of the Hakura land and the

¹¹⁰ Khalid A, ElAmin, *Some Environmental Consequences of Human Response to Drought in Sudan Darfur Region* (Published by: DSRC University of Khartoum Press, 1999), P. 18.

government authorities played a negative role in escalating the conflict by taking side the existing Arabs and the newly migrants from Chad due to the drought and desertification and due to the Chadian- Chadian war. For instance the conflict between Masaleet and Arabs in 1996-1998 when the Wali Governor of West Darfur Mohammed el Fadul divided the Masaleet Dar into 13 Dars in which 7 of them were given to Arabs¹¹¹.

In the era after the national independence of Sudan in 1956 voluntary and forced migrations occurred in West Darfur in early Seventieths and eighties of the last century, as well as after the armed rebellion against the Government of Khartoum in 2003.

3.4.1 Migration of Population from Chad into West Darfur State:

The linkages and interrelations between the ethnic groups of Sudan and Chad have historical roots that cannot be distinguished easily due to the open borders that uneasy to control and monitor. Therefore the two countries exposed to the consequences of the conflict that erupted in Darfur in 2003, human migrations from Chad to Sudan was not new as the two countries shared more than 15 ethnic groups alongside the borders. But the most important migration from Chad to Sudan was in the beginning of the 1970^s of the last century.

3.4.1.1 The first Stage of Migration was in the early 1970s:

In the seventies of the last century, migration of population has occurred in West Darfur and can be classified into two types:

a. Migration from outside West Darfur State.

Regular migrations that occurred from outside West Darfur State started at the beginning of the 1970^s of the last century due to the Chadian- Chadian conflict that broke out for the sake of capturing political power in Chad, between Jkoni Oaidy

¹¹¹ Ibid., 1999, p.19.

allied with Hussein Habre which was sponsored and supported by Libya against President Tempelbe because President Ghadafi (late) dreams to annex Chad as a prelude to establish a vast Sahelian empire and spoke of an Arab belt into Central Africa¹¹².

The consequences of the political conflict in Chad has led to population migrations of some ethnic groups from Chad to Sudan such as Misiriya, shujarat, Awalad Zeid, Mahameed, Tama and Bargo who settled in tribal homelands of Fur, Gimer and Masaleet. According to Fursha Mohammed Arabab (2011)¹¹³, Bargo and Moby ethnic groups migrated from Chad to West Darfur State and settled in Mestiri south west of El geneina town under the native administration of Dar Masaleet but some of them returned to Chad after they spent nine years and the rest of them stayed in El geneina town at a place called Donkey 13. Whereas another migration took place by Tama ethnic group and settled in Kulubus in Dar Gimer and part of them continued their migration and stayed at Um shalayia and Mukjar localities places administratively dominated by fur tribe.

These kinds of migration has led to demographic changes in those areas by increasing the number of population size and later immigrants adapting Sudanese nationality and they contributed to the local economy by paying taxes and zaka in addition they participated in the political sense by voting to the national congress party and some of them have become active members in the national congress party.¹¹⁴

The immigrants have been accompanied with families for the sake of stability especially when the migrated ethnic groups to Sudan opposed the political regime in Chad, that was due to political system in Chad which tied with ethnicity and

¹¹²Julie, Flint and Alex, De waal, *Darfur a New History of a Long War* (London: Zed Books, 2008), p.22.

¹¹³ Fursha Mohammed Arab, *Masaleet tribal leader*, Interview by Yassir Satti, El geneina, April, 2011.

¹¹⁴بله, عباس, العلاقات القبلية بين دول الجوار, (الخرطوم: مطبعة السودان للعملة, 2009م), ص.23.

tribal loyalties in the absence of peaceful transfer of power and democracy that provide opportunities for parties to fair competition for access to power, ethnicity become an essential factor in capturing power and wealth sharing. Tribes of Chad, which have settled in West Darfur in the seventies of the last century have no ambitions or political purposes to participate in power, they only practice their nomadic habits but a change immediately occurred after the second migration in the early eighties of the last century when the Arab decedents formed their ethnic entity called as "Arab Gathering" demanding for power sharing¹¹⁵.

The Native administration in the seventies was a strong in administration, judiciary and the maintenance of security. Most of the tribes migrated from Chad settled under the Native administration of Sudan after correspondence request occurred between the departments of arrivals and settlers in which the arrivals requested the settlers to select a place where they can stay with their families and cattle. After the settled tribe selected the place of residence for the arrivals they allow them to use and benefit from land usage, whether in agriculture or grazing. Respect to the local customs by the arrivals particularly in uses of land in grazing and agriculture has led to the integration and stability of arrival tribes without causing conflicts over pasture and water sources¹¹⁶.

But a change in the situation occurred when President Jaafar Nimeiri abolished the native administration in the early 1970s and substituted by Popular Councils, which lacked a sense of security and justice, which was carried out by the native administration, in which a man of native administration knows the tribes that migrated and settled in his area this in itself enabled the local authorities to mitigate and control grass root conflicts, but after the abolition of native administration a change was happened when a mass migration of some tribes from

¹¹⁵ Fursha Mohammed Arab, *Masaleet tribal leader*, interview by Yassir Satti, El geneina, April, 2011

¹¹⁶ Saad, Baher eldeen, Sultan of Dar Masaleet, West Darfur State, Interviewed by Yassir Satti, El geneina, March 2010.

Chad migrated to West Darfur without being asked of their identity and where they are going to settle. This later on led the new immigrants after they have access to Sudanese nationality to claim for Land ownership within the old Hakura system this manner resulted in brutal tribal conflicts between the Arab tribes and Fur in 1987 and the conflict between Arabs and Masaleet 1996 and 1998.¹¹⁷

b. Migration inside West Darfur State:

The internal migration that has occurred in West Darfur State in the seventieth of the last century was due to recurrent famine, drought and desertification that hit the African Sahel that is Niger, Chad, Mali, Senegal and Mauritania and north and west parts of Darfur region that was Dar Zaghawa, Dar Gemir, Dar Kerni, and Dar Masaleet. As a result of that famine and drought, Zaghawa and Bediyat ethnic groups from north Darfur migrated to southward to Dar Gemir in West Darfur State and settled in Habila, Jabed el Aud and Telatel valley, valley of Abu Aradeb.¹¹⁸

As the consequence of the mass movements of Zaghawa, Bediyat, Tama to the new places they migrated to a competition for pasture and water resources between Gemir and Zaghawa continued sporadically since the seventieth until eruption of the rebellion in 2003. In Dar Meri in Nertiti Locality in Jebel Marra due to drought and desertification, Zaghawa ethnic group from North Darfur migrated to Dar Meri in Jebel Marra and settled in the surrounding of Wadi Hashaba and Khor Ramella in inside Nertiti in a place called Esterina. Not only Zaghawa ethnic group

¹¹⁷ Yassir, Satti, "The Role of the Government in the Tribal Conflicts in Darfur," Higher Diploma. diss., Development Studies and Research Institute, University of Khartoum, 2001, p.23.

¹¹⁸ Hashim Mohamed Hashim, *Sultan of Dar Gemir, West Darfur*, Interview by Yassir Satti, Nertiti April, 2011.

migrated to Dar Meri but also some Arab ethnic group called Rezeigat and Nawaiba who settled in Kebbi, um Haraz and Wadi hashaba¹¹⁹.

3.4.1.2 The Second Stage of Migration was in 1983:

The second stage of migration into and within West Darfur State can be classified as follows:

1. Migration within the State:

At the beginning of the eighties of last century, and due to recurrence drought, desertification and famine which led to the migration of population to both pastoral and non-pastoral tribes searching for stability and better livelihoods. Misiriya, Jebel, Masaleet, Tama and Erienqa migrated from the northern part of the State to the Southern part of the State and settled in Dar Cobra, now Mukjar and Wadi Salih localities. Whereas Fur tribe from the northern Darfur migrated and settled in Darfur Meri in areas of Kudy and Broanga. The new arrivals to Dar Meri particularly Fur tribe integrated with the local people without causing conflicts over land use and water sources, this is mainly because they are descending from one ethnic group which contributed positively in mitigating and preventing resource based conflicts¹²⁰.

Additionally, there was an internal migration of Gimer tribe to Dar Cobra, Dar Dima and Kerini in which they settled in areas of Um shalaya, Mukjar and Morni. There are two main factors leading to stability and social peace in those areas that Gemir migrated to:

Firstly, Fur tribe holds the teachings of Islam which calls for cooperation and advocate for victims during humanitarian crisis and they are famous by accepting others¹²¹.

¹¹⁹ Hassan Abu Bakaer, *Sharatay of Dar Meri Nertiti Locality*, Interview by Yassir Satti. Nertiti, April, 2011.

¹²⁰ Hassan Abu Bakaer, *Sharatay of Dar Meri Nertiti Locality*, Interview by Yassir Satti. Nertiti, April, 2011.

¹²¹ Mohammed Arab, *Masaleet tribal leader*, Interview by Yassir Satti., El geneina, April, 2011.

Secondly, the respect by the new arrivals to the existing customs and traditions that govern the community they migrated to played an essential role in maintaining stability and social tolerance. In contrast the Arab migrants to Fur and Masaleet areas did not respect and obey the norms and traditions that govern the land usage which later led to brutal tribal conflicts between Arab tribes and Fur and Masaleet tribes who are regarded as owners of the land in 1987, and in 1996 and 1998 respectively.

Despite the exodus of some tribes by drought and famine in 1983 but Fur tribe did not migrate, as some tribes did that was due to the adaptation of climatic condition done by Fur where they sought to rely on the fruits of some local trees like *Kusul* tree that has grinding seeds, which is used in making porridge. Land ownership is regarded as an identity and power to Fur tribe that cannot be compromised or abandoned easily.

Despite the brutal and bloody tribal conflict between the Fur and Arab tribes in 1987 Fur tribe did not migrate away from their areas for the following reasons:

- 1 - There is a balance of power between the Fur and Arab tribes in the battle field.
- 2 - The government is not a third party in the conflict as it is now.

2. Migrations from outside the State:

The inter cross sectional ethnic identity between Chad and Sudan has serious implications for political, social, economic and security situation to both countries, the existence of tribes shared common ethnic identity and language between the two countries, such as Mahamid, Misiriya, Maharia, Bargo, Tama, and Masaleet that have lineages and clans inside West Darfur have important consequences to both Sudanese and Chadian Governments.

Lack of financial resources and lack of control by the governments of Sudan and Chad on the borders led to ongoing cross-border migrations. Some Arab tribes migrated to Dar Dima, and Dar Krini in Zalingei Locality and settled in areas of Karkar, Eid del Galaja and Traje¹²².

The migrations from Chad to Sudan that occurred in the seventieth and eighties of the last century have negative and positive impacts on social and political situation.

Among the negative impacts were:

1. Arabs ethnic groups that migrated to west Darfur combined with their counterparts Arab ethnic group have an ambitions to govern Darfur region and they claimed the government authorities to detached their native administrative system from Fur, Masaleet and Zaghawa in doing so they wanted to create their administrative independence in order to claim the government in the second step that they are contributors to the economy of the country and hence they should be presented at the government levels according to their economic and social sharing.

According to Atta (2006)¹²³, the Islamist's regime plan in early 1990^s was to destroy the native administrative system and replaced it by new regime allies from minority ethnic groups and tribal groups elites that against the traditional parties of Umma and Union Democratic party; the systematic destruction of the native administration system led Arab ethnic groups to form their own native administration and called for abolition of Hakura system.

2. The emergence of armed robbery for the first time in areas of Fur, Masaleet which was considered as the one of the safest areas and that was due to the

¹²² Yagoub Khamis, Wali Advisor for internal and refugees affairs, Central Darfur State, interviewed by Yassir Satti, Zalingei March 2010.

¹²³ Atta, El-Battahani, "A complex web: Politics and Conflict in Sudan," *ACCORD*, Issue18, 2006, pp.3-13, <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/sudan/politics-conflict.php>, accessed October 2006.

spread of small arms and weapons as a result of Chadian- Chadian war which led to the influx of refugees with their arms into west Darfur state.

According to Sultan Hashim (2011)¹²⁴ Sultan of Dar Gemir the Libyan regime also played a negative role in the spread of small arms and weapons, because the late President Gaddafi supported Jkoni Aoidy against Hussein Habre, who had been receiving support from the Sudanese President Jaafar Nimeiri. Qadhafi's support for Jkoni represent the creation of the Islamic Legion, led by the Ibn Omar and the Arab leader Ahmed Aseel and their support was sought to recruit Arab tribes based in West Darfur to fight with them in Chad, which was devoted to ethnic Arab identity. Possession of small arms and weapons by the Arab tribes have led to imbalance of power between the Arab tribes on one hand, and Fur and Masaleet on the other hand, which later on led to the violation of the rights of Fur and Masaleet tribes by intentionally using their cattle to destroy the farms of Fur and Masaleet.

3- The Islamic Front took power by military coup in 1989 and sought to impose Islamic values and norms as the Government thinker Dr. El Truabi sought the Islamic State has no boundaries, no nationality, this declaration have led to a wave of migrations from Chad to Sudan, and from Sudan to Chad. At the beginning of ninetieth of last century some Zaghawa youth and Bideyat migrated from Sudan to Chad to support Idriss Deby in his war against President Hussein Habre because the components of political action in Chad based on the ethnic lines.

The following tables is a list showing percentage of Chadian refugees living at Um shalaya and Mukjar camps in West Darfur State since the 1980^s by gender classification:

¹²⁴ Hashim Mohamed Hashim, *Sultan of Dar Gemir, West Darfur*, Interview by Yassir Satti, Nertiti April, 2011.

Table :(4): Um shalaya Refugee camp.

Name of Population Planning Group:			Refugees and Asylum seekers in Darfur			
Age Group	Male		Female		Total	
	Number s	n %	number s	n %	number s	n %
0-4	1,043	48 %	1,132	52 %	2,175	31 %
5-17	1,006	52 %	964	48 %	1,970	28 %
18-59	773	33 %	1,575	67 %	2,348	34 %
60 and >	171	34 %	328	66 %	499	7%
Total :	2,993		3,999		6,992	100%
Major locations:			Umshalaya Refugee Camp			

Source: UNHCR , El geneina office April 2011

Table (5): Mukjar Refugee camp. They compose of refugees from Central African Republic and Chad.

Name of Population Planning Group:			Refugees and Asylum seekers in Darfur		
Male		Female		Total	
in numbers	In %	In numbers	in %	in numbers	in %
370	52%	334	48%		
Total:				704	100 %
Major locations:			Makujar Refugee Camp		

Source: UNHCR El geneina office April 2011.

The above two tables showed that engendered of migration which is an important factor in analyzing the current situation in West Darfur, as the consequences of migration the roles of gender has been changed, women became head of households, working in stress environment in an informal sector which exposed them sometimes to sex harassment. It is obvious that the number of migrant men are more than the number of female migrants in Mukjar refugee camp where as in Um shalaya refugee camp the number of female migrants are more than men migrants this ensured the reality that women are also exposed to serious factors which led them to migrate as men always migrate by forced factors or voluntarily.

3.4.1.3 The Third Stage of Migration was after 2003:

A conflict erupted in Darfur region in 2003, between the government of Sudan and two rebel movements namely Sudan Liberation Army and Justice and Equality Movement claiming for power and wealth sharing and calling for ending the marginalization of the region. The two rebel groups divided largely along ethnic lines, they mainly belong to African ethnic groups composed of Fur, Zaghawa, Masaleet and Berti¹²⁵.

The outbreak of the hostilities and violence between the government and the two rebel movements led to a massive counter- insurgency in which *Janjaweed* were badly used to quell and crash the rebellion. The Arab militias in order to fight the rebellions as enemies they burnt and destroyed the villages of Fur, Zaghawa, Masaleet and Berti ethnic groups whom they perceived by the government and the Arab militias to be supporters of the rebel groups¹²⁶.

¹²⁵ Thabo, Mebki, 2009 Darfur- the Quest for Peace, Justice and Reconciliation, African Union- High Level Panel on Darfur, Abuja. Nigeria, p.xiv.

¹²⁶ Mudather, El Nur, "Land Tenure and Conflict in Zalingei Area, Darfur," M.Sc. diss., Development Institute and Research Center, University of Khartoum, 2009, p.44.

Table (6): Refugee camps in Chad.

No	Camp of refugees	Number of refugees	of NO	Camp of refugees	Number of refugees
1	Ghoz amir	22079	7	Berigeen	33056
2	Ghozamir beida	15693	8	Farshana	21153
3	Terigeen	17239	9	Gaga	18652
4	Girida	16433	10	Melih	14488
5	Um nabek	17529	11	Teloom	23873
6	Aukarsani	30745	12	Ardemi	18302

Source: High Commissioner of Refugees, El geneina, March 2011.

Forced migration occurred inside west Darfur where the rural people migrated to urban peripheries depending on food and shelter provided to them by UN agencies and International Organizations. The below table shows an example of internal displaced camps in Zalingei Locality.

Table (7): Camps of internal displaced persons in West Darfur State.

No	Camps of displaced persons	Number of displaced persons	Remarks
1	Hasahesa	3714	From number one to number Are Fur displaced persons Who forced to flee from their Villages by Arab militias in 2003. These are camps of Huteya an Arab tribe who forced to migrate From their places by another Arab camel herders called NawaybaIn 2005.
2	Shabab block 8	6207	
3	El hamadeya	43419	
4	Khamsa dagayek	17429	
5	Tabeyba	4620	
6	Salam	15799	

Source: UNHCR, Zalingei office March 2011.

3.5 Fur versus Arabs Conflict 1987-1989.

The conflict between Fur and some Arab ethnic groups in 1987-89 was regarded as an ethnic conflict because Arab ethnic groups gathered themselves in one group named as Arab gathering which consisted from 25 Arab tribes fighting Fur tribe. The origin of the conflict was a round incompatible interest between the farmers and northern Rezeigat tribe when some Rezeigat nomads intentionally used their cattle to enter into Farms of Fur in Kabkabia locality before the harvesting period which in turn led to the friction between the two ethnic groups in which mass destructive weapons were used by both sides. The conflict soon spread all over Darfur region causing damage and destruction to the villages and fariqs as well as the economy and social network.¹²⁷

According to Harir and Tvedt (1994)¹²⁸; the root causes of the conflict between Arabs and Fur can be backed to mutual accusation between the conflicting parties, as Fur in the inauguration session interpreted the causes of the conflict was the Arabs attempt to occupy the fertile lands of Fur boosted by racist ideology which aimed to expand Arabs Belt into Black Africa through capturing the territories of Fur, for that purpose to achieved as Fur argued the Arabs mobilized more than 25 Arab ethnic groups from Chad, Niger, Central African Republic, and Kordofan to fight Fur which has no regional extension as Arabs had.

Whereas the root causes of the conflict according to Arabs ethnic groups were the attempts made by Fur to block animal routes by expanding in agricultural lands

¹²⁷ منى، أيوب، مهيدات التعايش السلمي في دارفور. دراسة حالة، نشرت بمركز دراسات السلام و التنمية بجامعة زانجي، 2001، ص.25.

¹²⁸ Sharif, Harir and Terje, Tvedt, eds, *Short- Cut to Decay- the Case of the Sudan* (Sweden: Publisher Motala Grafiska, 1994), p.148.

and prevent the Arabs cattle to access to water sources and grazing land. Furthermore Arabs accused Fur that they were willing to extend what is called Black African Belt by evacuating Arabs outside Darfur¹²⁹.

Worth noting, there are internal and external ethnic factors which contributed to the eruption of the conflict between Fur and Arab group:

Firstly, the internal ethnic factor that can be considered in the conflict, was the emergence of Arab gathering in 1980s but other scholars referred the emergence of the Arab gathering to the 1960s when Umma Party and Muslim Brothers had supported and provided the Arab factions in Darfur and the Chadian opposition with arms, money and rear bases believing that they were fighting for the rights of Muslims against the Chadian government's Christian. But when President Nimeri normalized the diplomatic relations with Chad in 1969, the axis of Sahelian Arabism shifted to Libya where Colonel Ghaddafi was dreaming of an Arab State is straddling the desert¹³⁰.

According to Abdullahi (2007)¹³¹, the might of the geopolitical dimension of the Arab gathering was chillingly demonstrated in Darfur in early 1980s when some Arab political scholars met with the Prime Minister El Sadiq el Mahadi and claimed for more participation and representation in decision making in Darfur region. As such two secret documents were distributed known as Qoriesh 1 and 2. In addition to the two documents, the Arab gathering warned the Prime Minister El Sadiq El Mahadi stressing that they were worried that should the neglect of representation of the Arab race prevail, things may go out control and matters may pass the hands of the wise to the ignorant. Consequences of that will be disastrous and unpalatable.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 1994, 149.

¹³⁰ Julie, Flint and Alex, De waal, *Darfur a New History of a Long War* (London: Zed Books, 2008), p.26.

¹³¹ Abdullahi, Al tom, "The Arab Congregation and the Ideology of Genocide in Darfur, Sudan", 2007, www.aletomadmin.com, accessed March 2007.

Moreover according to Julie and Alex (2008)¹³², the first signs of an Arab racist political platform emerged in the early 1980s. Candidatures had taken an ethnic dimension during regional elections in 1981 and the Arab had been hopelessly split, allowing the Fur politician Ahmed Diraige to sweep to power as governor of Darfur. Others argued that Arab gathering emerged as the result of African belt led by Fur and other non- Arab identities claiming to evacuate Arabs from Darfur. This has an origin in history when two underground Fur Revanchist movements over the preceding decades, Red Flame and Suni had vowed to restore Fur rule across the land.

In addition to the above argument Atta (2009)¹³³ argues that Arab tribes believe that Zurqa¹³⁴ or non- Arab tribes such as Zaghawa are willing to establishing Greater Zaghawa State, and at the same time they accused Fur tribe that their tendency to evacuate them from Darfur. In contrast to this argument non- Arab tribes believe that Arab tribes are using the Islamic government to marginalize them out of decision making and power sharing as well as attaching insurgency phenomenon to them.

According to Mahmood (2009)¹³⁵, ethnicity in Darfur developed around two axes: One north south (between camel nomads of the north and sedentary tribes in the south) and the other south-south (with cattle nomad (Baggara) tribes of South pitted against one another). In both cases those with Dars were pitted against those without. The tendency has been for those with homeland rights to call for native

¹³² Julie, Flint and Alex, De waal, *Darfur a New History of a Long War* (London: Zed Books, 2008), p.49.

¹³³ Atta, El- Battahani, "Ideological Expansionist Movements Versus Historical Indigenous Rights in the Darfur Region of Sudan: from Actual Homicide to Potential Genocide," in *Darfur and the Crisis of Governance in Sudan- A critical Reader*, edited by Salah M, and Carina(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2009), p.43.

¹³⁴ Zurqa, is a local name means those who belong to non Arab ethnic groups.

¹³⁵ Mahmood, Mamdani, *Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics and the War on Terror* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2009), p.242.

rights alongside regional autonomy and for those without homeland rights to call for citizenship rights while looking to the central government for support.

Another ethnic factor in conflict between Arabs and non-Arab ethnic groups was the frequent verbal abuse; racial epithets the words (Zurqa) means black or (Ambay) means slave perhaps most often shouted claims to Arab ownership of the land. Classifying the community of Darfur Arabs and Zurqa is a manifestation of ethnic classification although all the Darfuri community is Muslim; this in itself divided the community into rivals with supremacy to Arab descendents who claimed that their descendants are from Arabian Peninsula.

Therefore the conflict between Fur and Arabs shaped an ethnic alliance in conflicts which later broke out in 2003 which led to non-Arab alliance (Fur, Masaleet, Zaghawa and Berti) to launch insurgency against the Federal government of Khartoum that was backed by the Arab militias against them.

3.6 Masaleet versus Arabs Conflict in 1996-98:

Another conflict erupted between Arab and Masaleet tribe in 1996 and 1998 when Wali Governor of West Darfur State Mohammed El fadul divided Dar Masaleet into 13 Dars in which seven of them were given to Arab ethnic groups, this in itself aggravated the situation and led to the eruption of conflict between the Arabs and Masaleet. Many of the scholars described the conflict as an ethnic conflict; this is mainly because the same Arab Alliance that confronted Fur tribe did the same scenario with Masaleet tribe. The conflict between the two ethnic groups left bad image to the Darfurians as they famous of keeping the Quran values and Sunna¹³⁶.

It has been urged that, some external ethnic factors also emerged during the conflict between Arab and non- Arabs (Fur and Masaleet).

¹³⁶ منى، أيوب، مهندات التعايش السلمي في دارفور. دراسة حالة، نشرت بمركز دراسات السلام و التنمية بجامعة زانجي، 2001، ص.14.

According to Daly (2007)¹³⁷: Efforts to organize the Arabs against the Fur, Masaleet and Zaghawa were not limited to Darfur or even to the Sudan. Both Abdallah Safi Al nur and Musa Hillal recruited thousands of Arabs in Chad who depending on their tribal affiliations, were sent to one of several camps in Darfur- Mistiriha for Rezeigat, Jebel Adula for Baggara Rezeigat and Maalia, Gardud for Salamat they were trained and outfitted by the National Islamic Front government.

Where as to Julie and Alex (2008) the roots of Arab supermacism in Darfur don't lie in the Arabized elite ruling in Khartoum. They lie in the politics of the Sahara when President Gaddafi of Libya dreamed to establishing a vast Sahelian empire and spoke of Arab belt or corridor into Central Africa. To achieve his dreams Gaddafi established an Islamic legion serve as the vanguard of his military adventures and recruited militia men from Sahelian lands as a part of Mauritania and Sudan.¹³⁸

On the hand and according to Yagaoub Khamis (2011)¹³⁹ a member of Umma party in West Darfur argued that when the Islamic legion entered West Darfur they stayed in areas that belonged to Dar Kirni(Fur land) and Dar Gemir in which Ibn Omer and Ahmed Aseel recruited only Arab ethnic groups by providing them weapons and small arms and training which later led to the changing balance of power between Arabs and non-Arab tribes. This changing balance of power played a negative role in fueling and aggravating the ethnic conflicts between Fur and Arab and between Arabs and Masaleet in 1987 and 1996 respectively in which mass destructive weapons were being used.

¹³⁷ Daly, M.W, *Darfur's Sorrow- a History of Destruction and Genocide* (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p.277.

¹³⁸ Julie, Flint and Alex, De waal, *Darfur a New History of a Long War* (London: Zed Books, 2008), p.22.

¹³⁹ Yagoub Khamis, Wali Advisor for internal and refugees affairs, Central Darfur State, interviewed by Yassir Satti, Zalingei March 2010.

The reality in Darfur is obvious, Arab gathering currently dominating the military as well as the political field; they became a political and economic power that cannot be excluded easily. They penetrate the military and security institutions, even the government of Khartoum cannot disarm them without their willingness, this is mainly because the situation in Darfur is based on ethnic balance of power rather than on citizenship. Furthermore, Arab ethnic groups committed war crimes against non-Arab ethnic groups and are the ones who led the International Criminal Court (ICC) to accuse President Omer El basher for committing war crimes in Darfur since he is unable to handover Ahmed Haroon State Governor of North Kordofan and Ali Kosheib Janjaweed¹⁴⁰ Commander to the ICC. The government in Khartoum if it tries to handover the Arab leaders who are wanted by ICC, El basher regime will be in trouble because the Arab leaders may acknowledge to the international community that Ingaz regime ordered them to kill the civilians that belonged to African ethnic groups and this will led the ICC to captured El basher or the Security Council will pass more degrees to deploy more especial troops or give orders to the existing Peace keeping forces under chapter Seven to capture El basher and the rest of the persons of his regime who are being wanted by ICC since 2005.

It should be noted that, the African belt cannot be eliminated by destroying their economy and livelihoods, the international community will protect any violations of human rights against Fur, Zaghawa and Masaleet tribes, the international Criminal Court will not give up chasing and prosecuting the President El basher for committing war crimes in Darfur, therefore there will be a balance of power whenever the current government collapses or changed by uprising or by nonviolent movements as currently it is happening in North Africa and the Middle

¹⁴⁰ Janjaweed, a local term meant a man riding a horse carrying a gun.

East. Internal and external ethnic factors in Darfur have an important impact on peace and stability. The bad political relations between Chad and Sudan played an important role in aggravating and worsening the diplomatic relations between the two countries in which both Chad and Sudan supported the opposition groups in both side, this in itself prolonged the current conflict and it has been characterized as more complex conflict in 21th Century.

Although Darfur had witnessed ethnic conflicts between Arabs and non-Arab groups since the 1980s of the last century but also there were conflicts that occurred within the same ethnic group due to completion over natural resources and economic resources. Among those conflicts in West Darfur State is the conflict between Hutiya and Nawaiba in 2005 and between Rezeigat and Misiriya in 2010. As highlighted in the following session.

3.7 Conflict between Hutiya and Nawaiba in 2005:

The conflict between the Hutiya (cattle herders) and Nawaiba (camel herders) erupted in Zalingei locality as the result of dual exchange of moral accusations between the conflicting parties. It all started when the Nawaiba accused one of the Hutiya members for raping a girl of their' tribe. The customary law of conflict resolution between the two tribes obligates the culprit to pay fourteen thousands pounds for one case. Hutiya had paid the fine three times already. But at the end, the guiltiness of the Hutiya insulted Nawaiba tribe during one of the conflict resolution process noting that “if I paid the fine, Nawabia women will walk without their internal clothes”, The Nawabia group immediately regarded this statement as an insult and fighting t between the two groups broke out¹⁴¹.

¹⁴¹ Mudather, El Nur, “Land Tenure and Conflict in Zalingei Area, Darfur,” M.Sc. diss., Development Institute and Research Center, University of Khartoum, 2009, p.20.

The eruption of the conflict led to mass displacement, killing and destruction of livelihoods of the two tribes. The victims from both parties were estimated to be 249 dead and 300 injured. Worth mentioning, the real reasons for the conflict between the Hutiya and Nawaiba are competition for natural resources. The Hutiya have adopted settled farming besides cattle breeding. The two economic activities lead to expansion of farm sizes and increase in number of animals. On the contrary, the environmental degradation and decreased rainfall have reduced the carrying capacity of the grazing lands.

The issue of the land ownership is another factor. The land doesn't belong to either of them; this land belongs to the Fur people who have fled to IDP camps. But the Hutiya and Nawaiba contest on who has the right to use and manage these resources in the absence of original owners of the land. Nawaiba tribe argued that they are being denied access to pastures and resource in Zalingei area by the Hutiya. The gap of mistrust increased between the two parties as a result of this competition. Nawaiba are convinced that they have the same rights as Hutiya in using pasture and water resources. The movement of Nawaiba during the rainy season and their pattern of life do not help them to settle as Hutiya did. All these factors indicate that the fight was not due to moral issues and pride keeping, but over natural resources management and economic interests¹⁴².

3.8 The Conflict between Misiriya and Rezeigat 2010:

Another conflict that took place in West Darfur State was between the same ethnic group; between Misiriya and Rezeigat Arab tribes in 2010, between the Zalingei and Jebel Marra areas in which hundreds of people died, the main reason of the conflict was due to the armed robbery when some Rezeigat Gangsters attacked and

¹⁴² Ibid., 2009, p.24.

robbed a car that belonged to Water and Sanitation Institution in which the robbers killed one person belonging to the Misiriya tribe.

When a joint popular force from the existing tribes in area of Khur Ramla near Jebel Marra area chased the criminals, they managed to restore the looted car and other two cars belonging to UNAMID forces previously been robbed. The robbers were known have joined popular forces¹⁴³.

According to Omda El zubir (2011)¹⁴⁴, after Rezeigat tribe acknowledged that they had stolen the car and they were ready to pay money for the death of Misiriya guard who had been killed by Rezeigat bandits, Rezeigat tribe refused to pay the rest of the money and instead they attacked Omda of Misiriya while he was moving from Bargo village to Khur ramla village and he was killed together with three of his followers who accompanied him. The situation became worse and the conflict shifted to Wadi Salih locality when some Misiriya tribe attacked caravans of Rezeigat people.

The conflict led the two tribes to create alliance to fight each other, Misiriya tribe allied with some Baggara tribes such as Beni Helba, Salamat, Sulihab who were living in Wadi Salih and Mukjar localities and Rezeigat tribe allied with Maharia and Eiraygat tribes. Each tribe accused the other for fueling the conflicts while Rezeigat tribe accused Misiriya tribe that they are willing to make alliance with JEM to eliminate them.

The conflict between the two tribes was based on economic ground, because Rezeigat tribe owned Land Cruiser vehicles to fight their rivalries, when the government of Khartoum recruited Rezeigat tribes in order to fight the Darfur rebels from non-Arab ethnic groups. After the conflict become less intensified

¹⁴³ Yagoub Khamis, Wali Advisor for internal and refugees affairs, Central Darfur State, interviewed by Yassir Satti, Zalingei March 2010.

¹⁴⁴ Al-Zubier, Khamis. Omada of Fur tribe in Zalingei locality, Central Darfur State. Interview by Yassir Satti. June, 2013.

Rezeigat tribes used the Land Cruiser vehicles for local transportation carrying passengers from one place to another, soon they became an economic power, whereas Misiriya tribes didn't own land cruiser as their counterparts Rezeigat tribe have.

Gaining economic power in Darfur is an essential power beside the political power, therefore conflicts between Rezeigat and Misiriya will not stopped as there are some Opposition group from Salamat tribe in Mukjar locality who have named themselves Justice and Equality Movement wing of peace, claimed the end of marginalization particularly during the conflict between the government and SLA/JEM movements they have been recruited by the government as a part of Janjaweed militias to quell and crash the rebellion movements, but when they observed that the government of Khartoum supporting Rezeigat tribes more than them, they joined JEM and after JEM has been crashed by the government in 2010 in Jebel moon area, the Salamat tribe youth who joined JEM returned to their home land and established JEM wing of peace and they negotiated with the government of West Darfur to include them in power and wealth sharing.

Changing the dynamic of conflict in Darfur from conflict between Arabs and non-Arab ethnic groups into conflicts between Arabs ethnic groups is regarded by many scholars and researchers as the curse of small arms proliferation when the government of Khartoum armed Arabs militias to fight the rebels because it did not have enough national army force to send to Darfur because at that time the government was negotiating with SPLM in the South Sudan to bring a lasting peace under the pressure of international community and IGAD. In addition most of the members of the Sudanese army who fought SLPA in the South were from Western Sudan particularly Darfur and Kordofan States and the government was hesitant to send the troops who had been withdrawal from South Sudan to fight in

Darfur instead the government decided to recruited the Arabs youth and mobilized them via popular defense forces to fight on behalf of the government.

The continuation of the conflicts between the same Arabs ethnic groups witnessed a classification and alliance between camel herders as Jenideen (it includes tribes of Rezeigat, Awlad Zeid, AwladJjanoub, Misiriya, Alwad Tako, Nawabia, Mahameed, Mahria, Abu Jalolo and cattle herders as Abassiyeen (i.e tribes of Salmat, Beni Hussein, Tarjem, Hutiya, Ghazam, Alwal Rashed). Such sort of classification led to acute polarization of ethnic groups from both sides and a series of conflicts erupted in north of Zalingei Locality between Maharia hajaya and Beshishat in September 2012 and between Rezeigat and beni Hussein in Sailili in Um dukhun locality in January 2013 and between Misiriya and Salmat in Um Dukhun Locality on 2-8th of April 2013. In all those conflicts many people were killed and many villages were burnt down and some people have fled to Chad as refugees. If the government does not plan to deconstruct the ethnic alliances, Darfur region will plunged again into more destructive conflicts as long as the conflicting parties both have weapons and arms some of which belonging to the government and some gained by the ethnic groups from Libya and Chad. The next destructive conflicts between the Arabs ethnic groups will turn Darfur into another Somalia in the region.

The current conflict in Darfur that erupted in 2003, was regarded by many scholars and politician as one of the worst civil conflicts in Sudan as it led to mobilization of ethnic militias, destroyed livelihood of the people particularly women who suffered from mass violence committed against them during and after the conflict.

Chapter Four

Dynamics and Implications of Conflict in West Darfur

This chapter explores the root causes of the current conflict in Darfur and its consequences in mobilizing ethnic armed militias, emergence of armed movements and its chronology and it also addresses women's situation in pre and post conflict situation.

4.0 The Root Causes of the Current Conflict.

Many scholars and researchers have attempted to explore and determine the root causes of the current conflict in Darfur region. In one context economic analysis of the causes of conflict and economic motives of parties to gain power is increasing paying attention. The most famous research in this regard is Paul and Anke (2000)¹⁴⁵, which presents civil wars as a function of the opportunity structure for the organization of rebellion. They argued that the rebellion survive by looting natural resources such as mines, oil, diamond and gold. In addition they get support from ethnic Diasporas and regional regimes.

Furthermore in an earlier paper, Paul and Anke (1998)¹⁴⁶ argued that higher percentage income reduces the possibility of arising civil war due to the high opportunity cost of rebellion, while the existence of natural resources in low income countries together with a large dually polarized population increase its probability. Similarly Fearon and Laitin (2002)¹⁴⁷ elaborate that 127 civil wars in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia regardless of how ethnicity mixed a country is, the

¹⁴⁵ Paul, Collier and Anke, Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil Wars", World Bank, Development Research Group Working Paper No. 2355, 2000.

¹⁴⁶ Paul, Collier and Anke, Hoeffler, "On Economic Causes of Civil wars," *Oxford Economic Papers* 50, 1988, pp-563-573.

¹⁴⁷ Fearon, D and D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War", *Forthcoming in American Political Science Review*, August 27, 2002, p.46.

likelihood of a civil war decreases as countries get richer and that there is little evidence in favor of the dominant view that one can predict where a civil war will break out by looking for where ethnic or other broad political grievances are strongest.

In our analysis to the root causes of the current conflict we will depend on grievance and greed theory in explaining the motives of the armed movements in fighting the government and how economic motives led to the split of armed movements in Darfur to more than 30 armed factions.

The causes of the current conflict in Darfur cannot be easily traced to one factor; instead there are many factors that led to the current conflict. Therefore we will explore the different views for different scholars and researchers who wrote on the causes of the current conflict in Darfur since 2003 in order to provide a comprehensive view to the conflict and to distinguish it from the traditional based natural resource conflicts in order to draw suitable packages of solutions.

According to Al Haj (2005)¹⁴⁸, the causes of the current conflict in Darfur is a result of Islamic Front policies when it seeks to let Darfur as a part of the Arabic-Islamic Security belt, to achieve this goal the government of Khartoum backed and supported the *Janjaweed* militias within the context of Popular Defense Forces (PDF) and popular police (PP) to protect the civilized project of Ingaz regime. Also the role of Arab gathering and leaflets of *Quriech*¹⁴⁹ 1 and 2 which calls for power sharing this in itself contributed badly to social network which has been torn because Ingaz regime used the ethnic factor in order to divide and rule by supporting the Arab ethnic groups against the non- Arab ethnic groups.

¹⁴⁸الحاج, سليمان, دارفور وضع النقاط على الحروف, (الخرطوم: الشركة العالمية للطباعة و النشر, 2005), ص20

¹⁴⁹ Quriech, leaf lets denounced non- Arab's rule to Darfur.

On the other hand according to Ahmed (2007)¹⁵⁰, the root causes of the current conflict in Darfur are referred to conflicts between Farmers and Pastoralists since the 1980th of the last century. He denied that there is no ethnic conflict in Darfur instead the conflict in Darfur referred to the political conflict between Umma party and Democratic Party in addition to the fragmentation of the National Congress which aggravated and deepen the conflict in Darfur.

Whereas according to Mohammed (2006)¹⁵¹, the current conflict in Darfur refers to the dissolution or abolition of native administration in 1970th during the Niemiri regime which contributed negatively to the current chaos. Also he focused on the role of South Sudanese people Liberation to support the Darfurian rebels and in addition to this the split of the National Congress into two parties also contributed badly to escalation of conflict in Darfur. Also he focused on foreign forces' interests in addition to mass unemployment youth which led to the emergence of military militias.

Another scholar Osman and Abul Mawala (2005)¹⁵² viewed the current conflict as a result of conflict between farmers and pastoralists on grass root scarce natural resources and the willingness of some migrant tribes to own land within the old Hakura system. Politicizing the native administration and the openness of the borders between Chad and Sudan also played an essential role in deepening the conflict. The adoption of the Arabization policy by Islamic government in Khartoum also aggravated and fueled the racial supracism. In addition to this there are some intellectuals having tribal agendas and personal interests mislead the

¹⁵⁰ أحمد, الأصبحي, دارفور الازمة و الحل. (مطابع المتنوعة- صفاء اليمن, 2007م), ص.23.
¹⁵¹ محمد , النحاس, " أزمة دارفور بداياتها و تطوراتها", في السودان على مفترق الطرق- بعد الحرب وقيل السلام, تحرير إجلال رأفت وأخرون(مركز دراسات الوحدة, بيروت:2006م), ص.50.
¹⁵² عثمان , طارق و عبدالمولى, مبارك, "الصراع في دارفور- الجنور- الأسباب تطورت الأزمة", مكي حسن و فليفل السيد(تحرير) في أعمال الحلقة النقاشية حول أزمة دارفور: الأصول و المواقف و سيناريوهات الحل والتدخل تحرير مكي, حسن و فليفل السيد.(اهرة: معهد البحوث و الدراسات الأفريقية, 2005م), ص.160.

government by providing wrong and accurate information about the situation in Darfur.

Moreover Atta (2006) argues that; the policy of the Islamist regime since the early 1990s was one of the systematic destruction of native administrative rule particularly land owners administration of the black Africans which intentionally been weakened and politicized by the government authorities and its replacement by new pro- regime allies who lack of wisdom and experience to solve conflicts and disputes between individuals and tribes. Thus conflicts erupted easily between the tribes with the absence of powerful native administration leaders who were expertise in solving grass based conflicts¹⁵³.

Meanwhile, Millard and Robert (2006)¹⁵⁴, argue that the current problem in Darfur is due to the role of the Arab gathering to establish a triangular Arab State from Tripoli, N'djamena and Khartoum and to whom the Late Gaddafi provided military training at the Kufra oasis during the 1980s and the distributing of the leaflets in Darfur denouncing the rule of Zurqa fueled the ethnic factor in conflict because in Quriesh 1 the Arab gathering determine the use force to seize the regional government and change its name.

According to both Ruth and Gilbert (2006)¹⁵⁵ and Thabo's report of the African Union High Level Panel on Darfur in 2009¹⁵⁶, they referred the root causes of the current conflict in Darfur lies in a history of neglect of the Sudanese peripheries dating from the colonial times and continuing during the years of Sudan's

¹⁵³ Atta, El- Battahani, "A complex web: Politics and Conflict in Sudan", *ACCORD*, Issue18, 2006, pp.3-13.
<http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/sudan/politics-conflict.php>, accessed October 2006.

¹⁵⁴ J. Millard, Burr and Robert O. Collins, *Darfur the Long Road to Disaster*, (USA: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2006), p.283.

¹⁵⁵ Ruth, Iyob and Gilbert M. Khadiagala, *Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace*, (USA: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006), pp.133-134.

¹⁵⁶ Thabo, Mebki, 2009 Darfur- the Quest for Peace, Justice and Reconciliation, African Union- High Level Panel on Darfur, Abuja. Nigeria, p.3.

independence. They mentioned that the crisis in Darfur is a manifestation of Sudan's inequitable distribution of wealth and power. The crisis in Darfur consists of different levels of conflict including local disputes over resources and administrative authority, conflict between Darfur and the Center of power in Khartoum and an internationalized conflict between Sudan and Chad. In contrast to the above views there are some scholars referred the current problem to environmental degradation and changing climatic conditions among them are:

According to Sean (2004)¹⁵⁷, one of the root causes of the present crisis goes back to the 1980s when prolonged drought accelerated the desertification of northern and central Darfur and led to pressure on water and grazing resources the camel nomads were forced to move south wards causing frictions between farmers and pastoralists.

Whereas to [Mulugeta and Butera (2012)¹⁵⁸, Hatim(2005)¹⁵⁹; and Ahmed(2003)¹⁶⁰] they argue that the root causes of the current conflict was the environmental degradation that strake Darfur since the early 1970s which led to mass migration of Rezeigat tribe and Zaghawa to southward and central of Jebel Marra, those migrations changed the population map in the areas they migrated to and later led to conflict over the scarce natural resources between the farmers and the pastoralists in mid 1980s.

In contrast to the above views that the causes of the current conflict in Darfur is environmental factor, Khloid (2009), argues that environmental factors as well as those emanating from inter and intra state spillovers of the conflict to which be

¹⁵⁷ Sean O', Fahey, "Sudan a Complex Ethnic Reality with a long History," 2004, Sudan Tribune, <http://www.sudantribune.com>, accessed May 2004.

¹⁵⁸ Mulugeta, Berhe and Jean, Butera, *Climate Change and Pastoralism: Traditional Coping mechanisms and Conflict in the Horn of Africa*, Institute for Peace and Security Studies and University for Peace, 2012, p.344.

¹⁵⁹ حاتم, دينار. حريق دارفور: قصة الصراع الأهلي و السياسي, الطبعة الاولى, (هيئة الخرطوم الجديدة للصحافة و النشر, 2005م), ص.19.
¹⁶⁰ أحمد, بوش, "جدلية العلاقة بين العوامل البيئية و النزاعات في دارفور", الملف الدوري مركز دراسات الشرق الأوسط و أفريقيا العدد 37:22:(2003).

treated as multipliers not causes of conflict. Suffice to say that environmental degradation neither produces armies nor furnishes arms to combatants men do.¹⁶¹

Whereas Atta (2009) argues that the root causes of the Darfurian conflict stem from a complex of multiple factors contributed to insecurity and violent conflicts. These factors can be classified into three levels, local intertribal or inter ethnic conflicts, regional conflicts and conflict over power and wealth sharing with the central government¹⁶².

More over Atta argues that ethnic factor between Zurga and Arabs for some time ethnicity was not a serious problem because the Arabs and non Arabs had been living together in peace and stability for centuries with intermarriage and cooperation in social and economic fields. However new developments have a wakened ethnic consciousness and ethnicity has become a factor exacerbating if not generating conflicts. For example the conflict between Fur and Arabs and Between Arabs and Masaleet in 1987 and 1996 respectively were conflict over ownership of land and land usages, the ethnic factor intensified and aggravated the situation.

The above root causes have an interplay of ethnic factors in the sense that the policy of Arabization that was adopted by Ingaz government since 1989, created antagonistic and hatred and led to rebellion against the government, ignoring the components of cultural diversity to Sudanese community and particularly Darfur region contributed to the eruption of the conflict with ethnic factors when two rebellion movement mostly from Fur, Masaleet and Zaghawa ethnic groups

¹⁶¹ Mansour, Khalid, "Darfur a problem within a wider problem," in *Darfur and the Crisis of Governance in Sudan- A critical Reader*, edited by Salih M. and Carina E, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2009, p.41.

¹⁶² Atta, El- Battahani, "Ideological Expansionist Movements Versus Historical Indigenous Rights in the Darfur Region of Sudan: from Actual Homicide to Potential Genocide," in *Darfur and the Crisis of Governance in Sudan- A critical Reader*, edited by Salah M, and Carina (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2009),p.46.

launched insurgency against the government of Khartoum accusing the government from its continues support to the Arab ethnic groups in the region disregarding the crimes and atrocities committed against them.

The exclusion of Fur tribe to be trained in Shawa popular defense camp in the early 1990s in Zalingei locality showed the intention of the government to adopt the Arabization orientation, because some of Arab gathering elites at the Federal and regional level accused Fur tribe as rebels and frightened the government from recruiting Fur ethnic group in popular defense forces this mainly due to the fact that the Arabs wanted the military balance of power to be in their favor particularly after the end of Fur versus Arab conflict in 1989.

Moreover to some scholars migration of new migrants from Chad accentuated the ethnic factor because the new migrant when they migrated to Darfur they settled with their counterparts Sudanese ethnic group, this by itself after they have the access of Sudanese nationality they claim for land ownership within the old Hakura system, which in turn led to tribal conflicts between Arabs and Fur and Masaleet and Arabs.

The origin of the current conflict in Darfur began in 2003 when two rebellion movements Sudan Liberation Army and Justice and Equality Movement launched an insurgency against the government of Khartoum claiming for an end marginalization and calling for inclusion in power and wealth sharing at both national and local levels¹⁶³.

The government of Sudan responded with a sustained counter- insurgency offensive to defeat the arming uprising. During this conflict, millions of civilians in Darfur were either displaced internally or turned into refugees or were killed. The

¹⁶³ Thabo, Mebki, 2009 Darfur- the Quest for Peace, Justice and Reconciliation, African Union- High Level Panel on Darfur, Abuja. Nigeria, p.3.

extreme violence and gross violations of human rights that followed this mobilization resulted in a massive humanitarian crisis, occasioned by the death of many people. The displacement of over two million people within Sudan and up to 25,000 refugees spilling across the border into Chad. The role of nomadic groups in forming the militias and more broadly in the counter- insurgency has created deep rifts and tensions within Darfurian society that need to be healed. Among the gravest losses was the destruction of Darfur as a multi-ethnic community with vibrant traditions of good neighbor lines and mutual respect¹⁶⁴.

The war has witnessed the collapse of livelihoods in many areas, farming has been abandoned, and pastoralism has suffered because of the collapse of markets and the closing of nomadic routes. The mass displacement has fueled urbanization and it's probably that many of those currently in IDPs camps, or displaced in the towns will end up as long term urban residents reliant on new forms of livelihood.

4.1. Mobilization of Armed Militias:

Mobilizing armed militias to fight in proxy war in Sudan is not something new, because during El sadiq el Mahadi era in 1987, he recruited Arab of Misiriya and Rezeigat named as Murahaleen to fight Garang in Baher el Ghazal State. An external ethnic factor was included in Sudan when the Libyan government sponsored and supported the Murahleen. As Libya continues supporting the Islamic legion by recruiting Arab ethnic groups in Darfur in order to fight Hussein Habre in Chad, Habre did the same scenario by starting delivering weapons and guns to Fur militias instead of simply carrying out hit and run across the borders.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., 2009, p.27.

¹⁶⁵ Gerard, Prunier, "Genocide in Rwanda," in *Ethno political Warfare, Causes, Consequences and Possible Solutions*, edited by Daniel and Martin (Washington: American Psychological Association, 2001), p.73..

The second scenario of mobilizing armed militias in Darfur was during the insurgency of Dawood Bolat in 1992 who was an Islamic active leader from Fur tribe. Bolat before he declared his anger against his government of Islamic Front (NIF) had gone to Chad to Hussein Habre in 1989 hoping to get support from Habre to start a guerrilla movement in Darfur. When he failed to get that support he went to Ethiopia to meet John Garang and he joined the SPLA. After Bolat joined SPLA/M he had been sent to Darfur through Baher el ghazal State to enter Darfur in which his last destination was Jebel Marra an area occupied by Fur tribe characterized by rich of natural resources and difficult to be penetrated by Government military forces. When Bolat's campaign entered West Darfur State territory was captured in a place called Deelage in Wadi Salih locality and later killed by the military forces without sending him to fair trial. To crush the forces of Bolat the government used and recruited Arabs militias named as Fursan mainly compose of Beni Helba, Salamat, and Tarjem tribes.

Sudan Liberation Army and Justice and Equality Movement in 2004 during the peak of conflict and high escalation attacked government and military installations of Sudan, and after the crash down of military helicopter and Antinov attacking planes lying at El fasher airport the government decided to crush and defeat the rebels and their supporters. Therefore the government of Sudan renders a tactic of sponsoring loosely aligned militias known as *Janjaweed* recently nicked by the Government as Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The reaction of the government appears to manipulate a long standing tribal rivalry between the Arabs and the Africans since ethnically based response has been made to what appear to be an ethnically based insurgency¹⁶⁶.

¹⁶⁶ Serekebrhan, Fiquremariam, *Human Security in the Sudan: Reflections on the Humanitarian Crisis of the Darfur Conflict* (USA: VDM Veriag Dr. Muller), pp.18-22.

The *Janjaweed* militias became famous and well known to the international, regional and local media as they committed the atrocities and violated human rights of the non-Arab ethnic groups. The *Janjaweed* militias to other scholars seem to have been of six main groups: former bandits and high way men who had been in the trade since the 1990s; demobilized soldiers from the regular army; young members of Arab tribes having a running land conflict with a neighboring African group- most appeared to be members of the smaller Arab tribes. Common criminals who were pardoned and released from jail if they join the militia; practical members of Arab gathering and young unemployed Arab men quite similar to those who joined rebels on the African side.¹⁶⁷

In addition to the above view about who are the *Janjaweed*, according to Mahmood (2009), the term *Janjaweed* had first been used for the nomadic tribal militia- predominantly but on exclusively Arab fighting in the Fur –Arab war of the late 1980s. Then it involved two main groups: members of nomadic groups without access to land and a variety of outlaws, bandits and common criminals. *Janjaweed* covers a variety of tribal militias operating in Darfur today each with its own resources and autonomy of command¹⁶⁸.

In contrast to this definition of the *Janjaweed*, other scholars saw *Janjaweed* as part of the Popular Defense Forces a paramilitary force established by the Sudan government and intended to act on behalf of the State when the Sudan armed forces or other security organs are unable to fulfill their function as part of the machinery of government.

In addition to above mentioned ethnic factors in the Darfur conflict and according to Julie and Alex (2008) an other ethnic factor was used when the Governor Wali

¹⁶⁷ Gerard, Prunier, *Darfur a 21st Century Genocide*, 3rd edition (UK: C.Hurst and Co. Publishers Ltd, 2008), p.97.

¹⁶⁸ Mahmood, Mamdani, *Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics and the War on Terror*. (New York: Pantheon Books, 2009), p.256.

of South Darfur State Major Adam Hamid Musa an Arab leader ordered the recruitment of three hundred fursan¹⁶⁹ for Khartoum in the same breath as he promised to vaccinate camels and horses and build class rooms, a health unit and twenty –four water pumps in eight villages. Three month later in a directive issued the governor established an eight –man security committee composed largely of leaders of small Arab tribes of Chadian origin which had been involved in clashes with Fur and other groups over access to land and ordered Nyala commission Saeed Adam Jaama to swiftly deliver provisions and immunity to the new militia camps to secure the South Western part of the State¹⁷⁰.

On the other hand Fur, Zaghawa and Masaleet ethnic groups formed their own militias correspond to Janjaweed militias that were backed by the government of Khartoum and South Darfur, the militias of non-Arab group or the rebel groups were supported by the South Sudanese People Liberation Army chaired by John Garang and part of weapons they gained from government military and police stations. Garang's support to the newly established rebel groups was to draw government's attention that the problem of Sudan in power and wealth sharing is not only a problem between South Sudan and North Sudan but the problem concerning the whole Sudan, problem of identity, power and wealth sharing. When Garang started to support the Darfurian rebels he was nearly reaching the final peace agreement with the government of Khartoum to end the civil war in the South.

There is an external ethnic factor that played a crucial role in aggravating the situation in Darfur, in the early times of insurgency against the government of Sudan in 2003, the Chadian government was standing as a neutral body although the SLA and JEM, fighters composed eighty percent from Zaghawa ethnic group

¹⁶⁹ Militia fighters belong to Arab ethnic groups.

¹⁷⁰ Julie, Flint and Alex, De waal, *Darfur a New History of a Long War* (London: Zed Books, 2008), p.142.

who have ethnic relations with Chadian Zaghawa, but the situation changed when Idriss Deby former President of Chad faced a huge pressure from his mother and members of his tribe to support the rebels by providing them with logistics and weapons as the President of Sudan General Omer Al basher declared in Al fasher in 2002 that “he didn’t like war prisoners or injuries instead he authorized the military and security forces to crash and quell the rebels.

Involving Chad into the Darfurian conflict has a serious implications to the military operations on the ground, the balance of power changed in favor of the rebels, they became stronger in their guerrilla war against the Khartoum Government, and they were able to shift the war from the areas of north and west Darfur to south Darfur where the majority of its inhabitants are Arab ethnic groups who fought beside the government. Therefore the conflict was prolonged as the government failed to achieve quick victory on the ground.

The situation became worse when JEM forces attacked Um durman city in a campaign of invasion named as “long arm” causing damage to government institutions and they neared to occupy Khartoum city in 2008. After JEM’S invasion to Um durman the government proceeded to arrest all those who belong to Darfur in the areas of Umbada, El- fitayhab and El- jameab. These arrests though seemed to be evident of racist and selective in nature.

The government recognized that improving the political relations with Chad is strategy to both Sudan and Chad. The president’s advisor Dr. Ghazi Atabani, took over the Darfur issue to Chad, to seek to improve the relations between the two countries. Chadian President then Idriss Deby suddenly visited Sudan and declared a refusal against ICC to captured Al basher as he has been accused by ICC for committing war crimes in Darfur. Forming the joint Military forces (JMF) between Chad and Sudan to provide stability and solve security problems alongside the

borders between the two countries and to prevent the armed movements of Darfur and opposition groups of Chad from using Sudan or Chad as a place to launch attacks against the two governments.

4.2. Why the Government of Sudan failed to protect its Civilians:

The government of Sudan after the conflict broke out in 2003 and when the conflict reached the peak between the rebels and government forces supported by *Janjaweed* militias, in the beginning of the conflict there was no media to report the news within and outside Darfur region. But due to the efforts led by some Darfurian scholars in the Diaspora and Tigani Seisi, former Governor of Darfur region during El Sadiq El mahadi government in 1989 and currently President of Darfur Regional Authority (DRA) he sent a message to Khafeer Solana of European Union and Koffi Anan the general secretary of the United Nations, the international community began to pay attention to what was going on in Darfur and immediately a pressure was made to Khartoum government to allow the humanitarian organizations to enter Darfur to provide assistances to the affected civilians.

From that time the international community via Security Council issued more than five degrees concerning protecting the civilians in Darfur, but because the international community is not homogenous, this in itself led the government of Khartoum to delay in protecting the civilians as the government denied all the time that its military and security forces were not directly committing war crimes. The *Janjaweed* militias are the only forces who are responsible for committing the war crimes against the civilians and in addition the government in an indirect manner defines *Janjaweed* in fake and un-clear terms.

Sometimes the government referred the causes of the current conflict as a conflict between farmers and pastoralists over competition over natural resources and not as a political conflict over power and wealth sharing.

Secondly the government failed to protect the civilians due to ethnic factor as most of the rebels belonged to non-Arab ethnic groups and many people who witnessed the conflict noted that the *Janjaweed* militias when they attacked villages burnt them completely so as to evacuate the people from their original villages in order to replaced them and allow Arabs non-Dar owners to settle into their places. In addition to this, the government of Khartoum continuously accused Hassan El Turabi the leader of Popular Congress for supporting JEM and Hassan El Turabi according to the government he is regarded as a dangerous man to the national security of the country and to the regime as Hassan El Turabi currently called Omer Al basher to submit himself to ICC.

After the pressure of the international community increased towards the *Janjaweed* militias the government of Khartoum absorbed the *Janjaweed* in what is called the Reserve Army Forces and Border Forces. Nonetheless, everybody knows the *Janjaweed* militias from the real soldiers as they are not so highly trained and not regularly obeyed to their commanders' instructions.

Lastly the government failed to protect the civilians in Darfur particularly non-Arab ethnic groups because the government believed that non-Arab ethnic groups are against its Arabization and Islamization orientation and they seek to undermine it by launching insurgency against it.

4.3 Evolution of Armed Movements in Darfur:

The chronology or the evolution of armed movements in Darfur is not something new rather it dates back to the 1960s when three Darfurian movements were formed namely, Red Flame Movement, 1958-1959, Sonni Movement 1964-1966, and Darfur Advancement Front 1964, the above mentioned movements were claimed for equal political participation, equal development opportunities, and more inclusion in power and wealth sharing by peaceful means not by force.

The consciousness of marginalization in Darfur increased in the 1960s when Ahmed Draige formed what was called Darfur Advancement Front demanding for more political voice and presentation at the national level in the national parliament in which Darfurian elites were rare presented. The idea of resisting marginalization by violent means was also raised during the 1960s when two movements emerged one was called Soni a name of place in Jebel Marra and Red Flame which also considered using violence to change the situation in Darfur is necessary condition.¹⁷¹

The above mentioned movements did not continue in resistance because, Draige left Darfur Advancement Front to join Umma Party and he became the spokesman in the parliament opposing the government in the name of Umma party, whereas Ali El Haj join the Muslim Brotherhood.

But recently as the successive governments failed to recognize and acknowledge the cultural, social, economic and religious diversity of Sudan, the conflict between the center (Government in Khartoum) and the periphery continued in a wider manner, hatred and mistrust grew rapidly among the periphery elites as long as the riverin elites failed to solve problems of identity, economic backwardness, and

¹⁷¹ Johan, Brosche, "Darfur- Dimensions and Dilemmas of a complex Situation," 2008, <http://www.ucdp.uu-se>, accessed September 2012.

equal power and wealth sharing, this situation continued until 2003 when two armed movements namely Sudan Liberation Army and Justice and Equality Movement launched an insurgency against the government claiming for equal distribution of power and wealth and ending of marginalization of Darfur region.

4.3.1 Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M).

The SLA/M was established in 2003 from African ethnic groups mainly Fur, Zaghawa, Masaleet and Berti led by Abdel Wahid Nur a fur lawyer, the manifesto of SLM is to end marginalization of the region, and racial discrimination, in addition it called for inclusion in the federal and state government levels. The rebels were former policemen who had been disarmed by the government, youth who left the school due to their inability to pay school fees and some came from the self-defense force of Fur and Masaleet which had been organized in late 1990s to defend their farms, families and properties from the organized armed banditry led by Arab militias whose rapacious raids were studiously ignored by the government security forces.¹⁷²

By 2002 the insurgency had escalated and intensified the conflict and it managed to carry out a successful military operation in Gulu and Thur in Jebel Marra locality, the attack led to death among the military and police men of the government. The manifesto of the SLM was to establish a secular government not a theocratic government in which religion is badly and intentionally abused by the National Congress Party. The events escalated when the SLA conquered El fashir airport and hence destroyed the landed military aircraft causing huge damage and then flee out of the town by detained military aviation general commander called Ibrahim El bushra. The SLA/M managed to use guerrilla war against the

¹⁷² Burr, J. Millard and Robert O. Collins, *Darfur the Long Road to Disaster* (USA: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2006), p. 289.

government, in which the government forces failed till now to defeat SLM and other rebellion groups.

In October 2005 after the conference of Haskanita the Sudan Liberation Movement split into two factions one led by Minni Arko Minnawi from Zaghawa and Abdel Wahid Nur from Fur tribe this is mainly due to a continuous disagreement between Zaghawa and Fur tribe in the way Abdel Wahid was running the affairs of the Movement against the government. But in fact Zaghawa ethnic group decided to detach from Fur as they perceived themselves powerful in terms of economy and military fighters. They often accused Fur militias as not brave in fighting the Janjawid and the government forces, Zaghawa by doing so they were willing to get involved in peace negotiations with the government and gain the fruitfulness of their struggle by ruling Darfur in which no Zaghawa person was appointed by the successive governments since independence of Sudan as state governor, this dream led Zaghawa to be a dominant opposition armed group in Darfur, they are found as members of JEM, PCP and NCP.

Moreover according to El-nur (2014)¹⁷³, the young age of the movement's leaders and lack of experience to deal with internal conflicts that ravaged their movement in addition to the emerging of ethnic lobbying and competition on the gains that can be achieved by the Abuja peace agreement, which the movement was negotiating with the government on issues of wealth and power sharing.

The split of SLM weakened the Movement as it has been divided along ethnic lines, this division led the Vice President Ali Osman Taha in Cairo in a public press in late 2005 to declare that the current conflict in Darfur was not a political but rather it is a cumulated grievance between the farmers and the pastoralists in

¹⁷³ Mudather, El-Nur, "Land Tenure and Conflict in Zalingei Area, Darfur," M.Sc. diss., Development Institute and Research Center, University of Khartoum, 2009, p.67.

competing for natural resources management. The SLM faction of Minni Minnawi signed a peace agreement with the government of Sudan in Abuja in 2006, while Abdel Wahid Nur continued opposing the government and he with Draige formed what was called the Sudanese Federal Coalition Forces (SFCE) in order to create better coordination in launching military operations and to follow peace negotiations with the government but this process was not successful because the differences in views of the two leaders were being enlarged and then Abdel Wahid flee to France for voluntary asylum until in 2010 France government sent him to Uganda from France.

Minni Arko Minnawi after he signed Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) and being a Senior Consultant to the President in the Republican Palace, he again went back to the bush and jointed his former colleagues in Juba, Abdel Wahid, Abul gasim Imam, Abdelshafei, Khalil Ibrahim, and new comrades from Nuba Mountain Abdelaziz El helo and Malek Agar from Blue Nile they jointly formed what is called the Sudanese Revolutionary Front to fight the government of Sudan.

The situation of SLM deteriorated after Haskanita conference in 18 October 2005, following that event, many factions from SLM were split from both Abdel Wahid Nur and Minni Minnawi , their split as some scholars announced were based on reformation aim but most of the political analysts confirmed that the split among the SLM was based on ethnic lines and personal interests due to lack of logistics, lack of military bullets and trucks, lack of fuel for the Toyota cars, and lack of funds to pay the fighters. Among the split factions are; Sudan Liberation Movement (Historic Leadership) split from Abdel Wahid Nur in 2011 and led by Osman Ibrahim Musa and he signed a peace agreement with the government of South Darfur in July 2011; Sudan Liberation Movement (General Command) formed in November 2010 by former members of SLM factions as well as from

former JEM members led by Adam Ali Shogar; and Sudan Liberation Movement (Unity Wing) formed in 2010 led by Mahjoub Hussein.¹⁷⁴

4.3.2 Justice and Equality Movement (JEM):

Justice and Equality Movement(JEM) was different from SLA/M in the vision of ruling Sudan according to its manifesto, it was formed in 2000 in Netherlands from Zaghawa ethnic group, and the Darfurian riverin elites living in Khartoum who became conscious about the marginalization of the region and led by Dr. Khalil Ibrahim former member of Islamic Movement. JEM looked to the current conflict in Darfur as a problem or crisis of governance in whole Sudan and hence the solution to the conflict in Darfur will be treated through changing the government in Khartoum¹⁷⁵.

In doing so JEM entered into counter attack with the government in which JEM decided to transfer the fighting into Khartoum in 2008 in what was called the Long Arm, that invasion was astonishing to all political analysts how JEM managed to overcome all military barriers and arrived Um durman without government resistant. From that time the government decided to defeat JEM in the battle field but it failed totally to crush and quell JEM, because JEM's forces were still patrolling in Darfur region using guerrilla war tactics. But in 25 December 2011 the government managed to assassinate Dr. Khalil Ibrahim by air bomb in wad banda in Kordofan while he was receiving the fullness of his troops. The death of Khalil Ibrahim was not the end of the conflict but rather it escalated the situation in the region when JEM aligned with SLM, Abdel Wahid Nur, Minni Minnawi and Abulgasim Imam Factions and Revolutionary Front to have a jointly military operation against the government forces. JEM also exposed to split during an

¹⁷⁴ Mohammed Shref, SLA, Historical Leadership member, interviewed by Yassir Satti, Zalingei, 2013.

¹⁷⁵ Burr, J. Millard and Robet O. Collins, *Darfur the Long Road to Disaster* (USA: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2006), p. 283.

evolution, some of the movement that split from JEM were; Justice and Equality wing of peace led by Bahr Abu Garda in 2007 and many other minor groups with less capability to fight the government. , They mainly turned into armed robbers and banditries used to block roads and raid cattle and get fuel from the vehicles that passed by.

4.3.3 Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM):

Liberation and Justice Movement a newly formed movement when the international community and the stakeholders of regional governments such as Libya, Eretria, Ethiopia and Egypt failed to unify the split armed movements both from SLM and JEM to bring them to peace negotiations in Doha. LJM is alliance of ten smaller Darfuri rebel groups based in Addis and Libya and it's led by Dr. Tigani Seisi the former governor of Darfur region in 1989. On March 2010, the LJM signed a cease fire agreement with the government and agreed to negotiate peace and finally signed Darfur Peace Document (DPD) in Doha in July 2011. LJM currently faced crucial problems of military preparation on the site of the government because it had signed the DPD. The government faced financial deficits to support and fund the military preparation which required the government to feed and provide logistics to the LJM forces before disarmament and demobilization took place, this situation now encouraged the outlaws to exploit the fragile situation by launching armed banditry across the region without being questioning by the government.

In addition to the fact LJM also faced a critical situation on the ground. Many of its young fighters who were members of LJM from Fur and Arab ethnic groups left the movement and joined SLA and JEM as they expected to be appointed in higher military ranks or political positions such as commissioners, and ministers.

4.3.4 Sudanese Liberation Movement- Historical Leadership:

After the split of Minni Arko Minnawi from Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM) in 2005 and formed his SLA/M Faction after Haskanita conference which was regarded as the first jolt in the fragmentation of the armed movements in Darfur into ethnic lines. Some commanders of SLM from Fur tribe particularly Mohammed Abdel Shafi Toba who was responsible for arms coordination, thought that the movement is deviating from its objectives, his views were to restructure the movement to avoid future fragmentations.

The leader of SLM Abdul Wahid Nur communicated with some commanders in the field urging them not to listen to Toba' views on restructuring the movement and more painfully Abdul Wahid Nur instructed his military commanders that Toba is willing to exclude Fur of Jebel Marra from the high rank positions in the movement and because most of his military commanders of SLM at that time were from Jebel Marra Mountain they easily believed Abdul Wahid's words as Toba is from Fur of Wadi Salih locality that was another division of SLM based on regional factor¹⁷⁶.

After Minni Arko split from SLM with the absence of its leader Abdul Wahid Nur from the battle field more fragmentations occurred followed by Abulgassim Imam who signed a peace agreement with the government in Tripoli in Libya in 2007 in which he was appointed as Wali Governor of West Darfur State.

After Toba and Imam formed their movements, Dr Osman Ibrahim Musa and Mohamed Sheref Aldeen in 2011 split from SLM and formed Sudanese Liberation Army- historical leadership due to following reasons:

¹⁷⁶ Mohammed Sheref Eldeen, Presidential Commissioner of Central Darfur State, and a leader of Sudan Liberation Army, Historical Leadership, Interviewed by Yassir Satti, Zalingei March 2013.

1. Lack of freedom inside the SLM as Abdul Wahid Nur was not willing to listen to views of his comrades in the war field calling for the restructure and reformation of the movement.
2. Lack of weapons and food stuff for the fighters in the field to enable them fight the government troops for a long time. The government's weaponry was well advanced.
3. The need to unite Fur ethnic group to search for peace as some ethnic groups benefited from their signing to peace agreement with the government.

The new split movement signed a peace agreement with government of South Darfur State in Beli Serif town in East Jebel Locality in January 2011. The peace agreement they signed confirmed political participation to the movement of SLM historical leadership in the political ranks in Darfur states and the government should absorbed the fighters of SLM- historical movement in the military and police through DDR.

The SLM/A faced a critical situation when Minni Minnawi split from it in 2005, the split of Minni Minnawi was for political and economic interests as the government of Sudan at that time was willing to negotiate with Abdul Wahid Nur the leader of SLM/A and because the SLM/A was formed along ethnic lines. It was clear that ethnic groups tended to gain the fruitfulness of signing peace agreement with the government by creating fragmentations on the basis of litigating reform movement. In addition the government of Khartoum was facing huge pressure from the international community to achieve peace in the war torn region; therefore the government according to some politicians from Darfur was ready to pay millions of money for each commander from the armed movements who were willing to sign a peace agreement with the government.

The policy of fragmenting the armed movements that was adopted by the government to weaken the armed movements and exposed them to ethnic line

divisions succeeded to some extent to weaken and disintegrate the efforts of uniting the armed movements. The government published in the media that the conflict in Darfur was on ethnic clashes rather than on political and power sharing. Contrary the fragmentations of armed movement prolonged the conflict in the region, caused to transnational crimes such as looting vehicles from Sudan to Chad and supporting the late President of Libya (Ghadafi) in his endeavor to suppress the military uprising in his country. Until recently in 2012, Rezeigat militias supported the military coup in Central African Republic by backing Silikia movement.

Most of the armed movements seek for political and economic gains rather than solving the problem in Darfur till now there are more than 24 different armed movements. Some of these joined Sudanese Revolutionary Front such as SLM Minni Minnawi's faction as well as Abdul Wahid Nur's faction, SLM wing of Abul gasim Imam and Justice and Equality movement, while armed groups signed local peace agreements to guarantee their survival and existence although most of those who signed peace agreements are not influential to change the situation or even stop the conflict to enable displaced persons and refugees return to their origin villages.

Therefore, this research can conclude that greed and grievance argument is applicable to the current situation in Darfur as some of the armed movements were formed due to economic interests raising the slogan of marginalization and equitable power sharing but in fact they seek to gain more money and wealth from International Community and neighboring countries by continuously fighting the government. It is not logic to find more than twenty five armed movements fighting for one problem and they are not willing to agree on common issues that can lead to peace and stability in the war torn region of Darfur.

4.4. Fragile Ethnic Alliance between Fur, Masaleet and Zaghawa:

Before the current conflict started in Darfur in 2003, the situation was already worse in a sense that there was, spread of armed robbery and deterioration of economic situation due to the organized systematic armed robbery against Fur and Masaleet tribes. This situation had continued for more than twenty years with minimal efforts made by the successive governments to stop the armed banditry and tribal clashes on natural resources competition.

As a result of insecurity and violation of human rights Fur tribe started to organized themselves and they conveyed a conference in Nirititi in Jebel Marra in 2003 claiming that the government to recruit Fur tribe members in popular police and popular defense forces in order to protect themselves since the government police and military failed to protect them against the organized armed robbery led by Arabs. Contrary Arab groups around Jebel Marra and Kass areas organized another conference calling the government not to recruit Fur members in popular police and popular defense forces as Fur tribe will attack Arab nomads a round Jebel Marra area.

The situation in Darfur before 2003 had worsen because mistrust had already developed between Fur tribe and the government police as Fur tribe accused the policemen standing beside Arabs ethnic groups particularly if an incident occurred against Fur tribe such as armed banditry. The accused the popular policemen for not being brave enough to handle such issues by for instance return of the property that was stolen from Fur members. As such the Fur agreed with Zaghawa and Masaleet to launch an insurgency against the Khartoum government because they perceived the Khartoum government was backing and standing beside the Arab ethnic groups. They were trained in Jebel Marra and they formed their rebellion body initially named as Darfur Liberation Army but soon they changed the name

into Sudan Liberation Army, because many Arabs tribes perceived that SLA was intended to evacuate them from Darfur, therefore they decided to stand beside the government of Khartoum to protect their identity.

The rebels formed their movement by assigning Abdul Wahid as Head of the movement and Abdallah Abaker af Zaghawa young man as a military commander but after his death SLA assigned Minni Minnawi was assigned as a military commander and the deputy of Head of the movement was given to a man from Masaleet tribe.

The alliance among the three ethnic groups could not continue although they had one enemy. This was mainly due to the fact that, Zaghawa ethnic group has an inspiration to govern Darfur because they regarded themselves as economic and military power in addition to that, Zaghawa ethnic group was willing to take over the achievements of Abuja peace talks since Abdul wahid Nur was refused any attempts to negotiate with the government of Khartoum., The alliance ended when Mini Minnawi organized a conference in Hasakanita in 2005 where Abdul wahid Nur was excluded as a head of SLA movement, that attempt later led to the fragmentation of SLA into more than ten groups based on ethnic lines and issue of Darfur was weakened in Abuja when the rebels came to negotiate with the government of Khartoum in order to bring peace to Darfur.

The negotiation in Abuja was ended in 2006 when Minni Minnawi signed a Peace Agreement with the government and due to mistrust among the conflicting parties on the implementation of Abuja Peace Agreement, Minni Minnawi left his position in 2010 as a Senior Presidency Consultant to Juba declaring his opposition to Khartoum government as Khartoum government failed to fulfill its responsibility towards Abuja Peace Agreement.

On the other hand the remaining SLA factions composed of Fur tribe such as SLA Mother wing under the leadership of Abul gasim Imam who signed a peace agreement in Tripoli in 2006 and he was appointed by the government as Wali Governor of West Darfur State in 2007.

In general this study finds that, internal and external ethnic factors played an essential role in the Darfurian conflict by aggravating and deteriorating, poverty, economic and social situation in which it requires a lot of efforts to restore and maintain the social fabric which was torn out.

4.5. The Economic Situation of Women in West Darfur State prior and after the Conflict:

Conflicts are inherited in human societies as long as people living together with incompatible goals, different views and aspirations, as such conflicts have positive and negative effects on men and women, youth and girls¹⁷⁷.

The current conflict in Darfur has both negative and positive effects on the economic situation of women. Prior to conflict, women in Darfur region played a significant and essential role in economic activities depending on labor work always conducted by themselves on the following fields:

1. Traditional agricultural cultivation. Women in Darfur not like other women in the rest part of Sudan in terms of their contribution to the national economy as well as in raising income to their households. Women during the rainy season make most of the preparations for farming such as cleaning lands, watering the gardens and planting the crops¹⁷⁸. In addition during harvesting time women also bearded a lot from double work hours, working at the farm and at the same taking care of

¹⁷⁷ Ahamed, Mohiddin, “*Democracy and the Management of conflicts and development in Africa,*” a paper presented in a workshop 15 July 2002, [www.dpmf.org], accessed on 2007.OSSREA .

¹⁷⁸ Al-Zubier, Khamis, Omada of Fur tribe in Zalingei locality, Central Darfur State, interview by Yassir Satti, Zalingei, June, 2013.

their kids and provide food for their families. The most famous crops planted by women during the rainy season is millet, groundnuts, sesame, karkadi, and sorghum whereas during the summer season most women in Darfur plant onions, potatoes and water melon by using traditional means of watering the gardens through fetching water from under the ground to the surface. This process is known as shadoof¹⁷⁹.

2. Border Trading. This type of trading is being practiced by women of West, South and North Darfur who live near the Chadian and Central African borders mainly women from Arab nomads as well as women from Zaghawa, Bargo and Gura'an ethnic groups, this type of economic activity although it looked hard and tough to women to travel from one country to another despite the customary regulations in the borders it seemed to be profitable in gaining money because women from Darfur export food items such as sugar, tea, soft drinks, biscuit, oil and non-food items to Chad and Central African. In return, they import cotton, Cosmetics, honey, snake leather and clothes from Chad. Through this economic activity, women gain economic power and turn to be more independent and are able to be decision makers on their own.

3. Petty Trading between the urban centers and rural areas. This type of trade is famous and familiar in Darfur, the people in Darfur call it in local language “*um dawarwar*” i.e. patrolling trade. In Darfur there are particular days in the week set as market days for each market place. Transactions for instance in Zalingei locality, there are more than ten local free markets open to the traders from different ethnic groups like suq terij a famous market south east Zalingei, in which women take their products including animal products or agricultural products for the exchange with other commodities. This in itself brings a lot of money to

¹⁷⁹ A local water container used for lifting water from boreholes.

women and in doing so women contribute positively to the income earning of their households and hence reducing poverty rates and vulnerability.

4. Women also used to work hard in stressed environment such as brick making, tea makers and firewood sellers. All these activities in one way or another empower women economically.

After the current conflict erupted in 2003, women's situation has changed dramatically; most of the villages in the rural markets were closed or destroyed by the armed forces. Therefore women who fled from rural areas to the peripheries of big cities have little income to generate and it is difficult or almost impossible to travel outside the camps to trade or cultivate crops. This is mainly due to the sex harassment that is feared to be committed by the outlaws and tribal militias against women and it is been reported by some women from the camps that they exposed to sex harassment, rape and torture while they were going out site the camp for firewood collection. Experts are extremely reluctant to provide estimates of the number of women and girls raped during the conflict and that was mainly due to under reported as women in Darfur learned the hard way to speak out. In addition, the local culture played an essential role to avoid reporting such cases, because those who have been raped will not be integrated easily in the community as raped women were regarded as undesirable socially.¹⁸⁰

Camp life alters women's and men's role and responsibilities creating abnormal situation by providing relief assistance in terms of food and shelter and medical care. Prior to the current conflict women were regarded as crop producers, petty traders and house servants but due to changing condition by the conflict women

¹⁸⁰ UNICEF and UNFPA, 2006 the Effect of Conflict on Health and Well-being of Women and Girls in Darfur, Situational Analysis Report Conversations with the Community, http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/files/sitan_unfpaunicef.pdf, accessed on September, 2009.

became less productive since some of them abandon their land and businesses due to insecurity situation.

The traditions and customs in the rural areas prior to the conflict were conservative and were characterized by men domination. Whereas after the conflict women's situation was changed, they have an opportunity to live free from subservient traditions. This freedom will lead to transformation of customs and norms in favor of women and they will never be regarded as war victims only but also as agents of change towards peace and conflict resolution.¹⁸¹

In addition it has been observed that Arab ethnic groups are more oppressive to conservative regarding women rights in the sense that they believed that women were born to stay at their fathers' and husbands' houses, and they are not allowed even to be enrolled into schools, they regarded women as representing their identity and dignity, any sexual attack to them or insult or degrading their dignity is regarded as launching a war against them. On the other hand this view faced some challenges by the Arabs youth who are educated in Khartoum and regional Universities as they saw such kinds of views as back warded and not represented the modern view of the Arabs elites who regarded women's education as a priority and essential to carry out a change in their communities since women's voice to claim for their rights are suppressed by the elders of their communities. Arabs women were regarded as less educated compared to Zaghawa and Fur ethnic groups who are well educated and open minded in political and social mobilization, this situation of patriarchal discouraged Arabs women to be political leaders and hence they are always excluded from participating in reconciliation and peace conferences as their view and ideas are not welcomed. Arabs leaders thought that women's rights to participate in the peace and reconciliation conferences is not

¹⁸¹ Shella, Meintjes, Anu Pillay and Meredith Turshen, *The Aftermath- Women in Post- Conflict Transformation* (London and New York: Zed Books, 2002), p.68.

required because women are not able to be successful mediators of conflicts since the responsibility of the mediators are to go to war zones and meet with the conflicting parties and this may require to stay more than one week outside their houses and they may be exposed to sexual harassment or rape in which Arabs culture does not allow such kinds of thing. It should be noted that, there are many incidents of sexual violence often committed by some Arab men against their Arab women and girls.

On the other hand women from non- Arab ethnic groups managed to organize themselves in social organizations and they managed to travel t outside Sudan to attend trainings in capacity building with UN agencies and international organizations. In addition to this they were women from non-Arab ethnic groups who are members of the armed movements such as Rawda El Niemeri a fur strong woman a member of Sudan Liberation Army wing Ahmed Abdel Shaafi, and Mariom Omer famous as Um El jaish i.e mother of the military she is a member of SLA faction of Abdel Wahi Nur and they are many of them fighting with the armed movements in the bush, they have taken the experience of SLPA of South Sudan.

The peace agreements that were signed between the government of West Darfur State and Justice and Equality Movement wing of peace and development in El geneina 2011, and the peace agreement between the government of West Darfur State and the Movement for Democratic Rights in El geneina in 2008 although it has been shown in some statements the rights of women in political participation but in fact none of the signatory movements appointed women in high political ranks in the government of national unity, this is mainly due to fact that most of the women who belonged to the armed movements lacked of political experience and lacked of knowledge and cultural factors that favor men encouraged them to exclude women from high rank political positions.

The interconnection between gender and ethnic factors in deepening conflict and poverty in Darfur is obvious as the conflict in Darfur caused a destruction to the livelihoods of the people, destroyed the environment and torn the social network. The consequences of the conflict is differed from one ethnic group to another, for example Fur and Masaleed ethnic groups were badly and severely affected by conflict and hence they exposed to absolute poverty as most of the people of Fur and Masaleed tribe fled to the camps living in the peripheries of the towns. Gender roles changed due to the conflict, men unable to go out of the camps to work, women burden the difficulty of bringing up their children and generate additional income resources.

Poverty rates is increasing although there was no accurate evidence about the number of poor people in figures but according to the observation and poor living conditions faced by the displaced persons, it shown that poverty is a consequence of the conflict.

Chapter Five

Tribal Reconciliation Conferences and Peace- Building in West Darfur State: Addressing Ethnic, Gender and Poverty Dimensions.

This chapter addresses the role of tribal reconciliation conferences in promoting peace building processes in Darfur by providing a critical view on the tribal reconciliation conferences in achieving sustainable peace and stability in Darfur. In addition the chapter attempts to explore the interplay of ethnic and gender factors in deepening poverty in conflict r in West Darfur State prior and after the current conflict.

5.0. Tribal Reconciliation Conferences:

Tribal reconciliation conferences that were held after tribal clashes in Darfur aimed to resolve the conflicts between the existing ethnic groups based on norms, values and traditions of the society, in some cases some conflicts were settled and violence was reduced but in other cases after immediate end of the conferences, conflicts erupted again in more brutal and aggressive manner. Few scholars and researchers did little to study the way and approaches used to solve the problems between the conflicting parties and why conflicts resumed again although peace agreements were signed.

Before the 1970s of the last century the ethnic groups of Darfur used to live in peaceful co-existence, respecting the norms and customary laws that govern the relations between the existing ethnic groups in land usages for agriculture and grazing. There were few tribal clashes mainly due to the power given to native administration leaders and there was less government intervention in politicizing the native administration leaders. In addition there was a strong rule of law and

order and the existing government institutions were functioning in a proper manner¹⁸².

Whereas in the 1980s, after former President Nimeri dissolved the native administration system in the beginning of the 1970s, the tribal reconciliation conferences lost its prestige due to lack of follow up the decrees and recommendations of the peace conferences which in turn led to recurrence of the conflicts in addition to this customary laws, norms and traditions that governed the relations between the ethnic groups were weaken and few people used to respect them. Thus the dynamics of the conflicts were changed soon and new cultures and behaviors emerged such as diffusion of a culture of violence, armed robberies, exaggerating blood money, kidnapping, raping, and launching insurgency against the government in 2002¹⁸³.

The tribal peace agreements are regarded as one of the mechanisms and approaches of resolving conflicts between the different ethnic groups and individuals. In the previous time before the 1970s those conferences were supported by the government and the community played a vital role in maintaining the order among different ethnic groups and in addition there was a balance of power between the tribes and the government stood in a neutral position between the conflicting tribes. But by late 1990s after National Salvation Government came into power things changed drastically, no body or ethnic group used to respect the customary laws particularly land laws, the balance of power among the tribes changed in favor of the nomads hence the tribal peace agreements became less longer effective and unable to stop hostilities, atrocities and crimes committed against humanity.

¹⁸² Ali, Dawood Hussein, *Chief of Pastoralists Union, Elgeneina West Darfur State*, Interview by Yassir Satti, Zalingei 29/ June, 2009.

¹⁸³ Al-Zubier, Khamis, Omada of Fur tribe in Zalingei locality, Central Darfur State, interview by Yassir Satti, Zalingei, June, 2013.

The conflicts between the ethnic components of the region got renewed and endless, conflicts started between Arabs versus African ethnic groups and recently the conflict dynamics turned over between the same ethnic groups i.e. conflict between Arabs tribes and conflicts between African tribes.

Another example is the case between the government of Sudan and Sudanese Liberation Army wing of Commander Minni Minnawi. When the two conflicting parties signed a peace agreement in Abuja –Nigeria in 2006 to end the conflict in Darfur, however the parties in conflict managed to sign a peace agreement but they did not consider the importance of developing a common moral basis for creating sustainable peace. This was because during the implementation era SLA accused the government of breaching the obligations of the peace agreement and there was no clear policy towards disseminating peace values among the community. Furthermore, there was no foreign guarantee to sponsor the implementation of the peace agreement on the ground.

5.1. The Tribal Reconciliation Conference between Hutiya and Nawaiba (Maharia and Awlad Junoob) in 2005.

The conflict between Hutiya and Nawaiba (Maharia, Awalad Janoob)erupted in 2005 and it was due to immoral behavior as one person from Hutiya tribe raped a woman from Nawabia tribe in Jangha Dulu north of Zalingei town in West Darfur State. A tribal reconciliation meeting was held and the perpetrator was asked to pay money for the family of the victim, but the offender committed the same crime with another woman from the same tribe. During the reconciliation process, he was asked to pay a higher amount to settle the victim.

But the offender provoked the feelings of Nawaiba tribe by saying that “if this time I pay the fines women of Niawaba will walk without wearing inner cloths” this

statement meant that women of Naiwabia tribe will be exposed to sexual harassment and sexual abuse. As a result of this kind of statement, a conflict erupted between the Hutiya and Nawabi(Maharia and Alwad Janoob) in more brutal and bloody manner, hundreds of people were killed and hundreds were injured and thousands fled to Zalingei IDPs living in Al salam and Tayeba camps receiving relief assistance from international organizations and UN agencies.¹⁸⁴

A tribal reconciliation conference was organized in Zalingei between the conflicting tribes and in the first two pages of the inauguration or initiation of the peace agreement, the document of peace and reconciliation talked about achieving the national unity, the necessity of unifying the internal front in so as to not to allow enemies of Sudan to conspire against the country. In addition the document also mentioned that, in order to save the human efforts from waste and loss of properties and destruction of social fabric, the State should concentrate on education, providing services among the pastoralists and raise religious awareness. The below table elaborates the number of death and in juried people during the conflict between Hutiya and Nawabia(Maharia and Awlad janoob) in 2005.

Table (8): Number of death and injured persons of Hutiya and Nawabia Conflict.

Tribe	Hutiya		Nawaiba	
	Number	Money blood	Number	Money blood
The deaths	136	136,000,000 SD	64	64,000,000SD
Wounded impairments sustainable	9	45.000.000 SD	10	500,000SD
Injuries	79	158,000,000 SD	76	152,000,000SD
Total	224	1,56300,000 SD	141	797,000,000SD

Source: Peace Agreement Record, 2005¹⁸⁵.

¹⁸⁴ Zain, Mohammed, Militia Leader of Beisheyshat tribe, interview by Yassir Satti, Zalingei , August, 2012.

¹⁸⁵ Tribal Reconciliation Agreement between Hutiya and Nawabia, 2005.

From the above table we can observe the following key highlights:

First, the numbers of deaths from Hutiya were more than the numbers of deaths from Nawaiba tribe that was mainly because of the startling in the process of killing by Nawaiba who were angry by the insulting words from the Hutiya offender in doing so Nawaiba claimed that they were defending their honor and display.

Second, the amount of blood money for a person was 100,000SD, compared with the official blood money in government courts that is 40,000 SD. This in turn showed the economics of war that is emerging in Darfur region; people are concern with money blood more than reconciliation ends and objectives.

Ethnic polarization in Darfur region is still functioning in a way that those who belonged to camel herders are grouped together under the umbrella of Rezeigat and those cattle herders are grouped together under the umbrella of Baggara ethnic groups. This ethnic polarization changed the dynamics of the conflict in Darfur region as in some cases both camel and cattle herders were grouped together to fight Fur, Zaghawa and Masaleet ethnic groups in mid 1980s and 1990s of the last century, and recently conflicts erupted within the same ethnic groups due to economic, political or social factors.

According to the findings of the interviews with native administration leaders and political leaders in Darfur, ethnic dominator in Darfur region is fabricated and not true, ethnic groups can unit and group themselves together to fight one or two different ethnic groups due to economic or political gains while in some conflicts the same ethnic group fought for economic, political, land rights usages or social factors as the case of Salamat and Misiriya in 2013, Beni Hussein and Rezeigat in 2013, Trajem and Aballa in 2004, and Maalia and Rezeigat in 2013.

The big amounts of money paid for the deaths during the conflict as money blood and for the injured persons can be traced to the emergence of war economies in Darfur as a poverty stricken the region due to the devastation of livelihoods that based on agricultural production and animal rearing in which most people lacked sources of income to support their livelihoods. It was the only way to accept paying money blood for those who were killed.

Those who signed the peace agreement between the two conflicting parties did not mentioned in the introduction page of the peace agreement the main cause of the conflict instead they talked about foreign conspiracy, unity of the people that was escape from reality showed the shallow mind for those peace makers who blamed third parties (outside the country) for fueling the conflict which in reality did not exist.

The mediators have no authority to put any body in a prison or punish him or her, because the above behavior should be done by the government who suffered from lack of control of power and weak of it 's judicial and police institutions. This in turn encouraged the tribal militias to deviant the government authorities and disrespect the customs and traditions that governed the ethnic groups of Darfur for hundreds of years.

Till now the displaced persons from Hutiya tribe have not returned to Yanga dulu, they still in the camps of Tiaba which composed of 3500 person and Al salam camp which is composed of 1500 persons. The government has not been able to stop drug, small arms and bullets trade in these camps and this threatens and it's causing destruction of lives of the people in Zalingei locality.

5.2 The Tribal Reconciliation Conference between Misiriya and Salamat, July 2013.

The ethnic clashes in Darfur region is regarded as an old phenomenon with renewable motives and unjustifiable reasons, which destroyed the social fabric of the community and threatened the peaceful co-existence that characterized Darfur region in the mid 1950s and 1970s of the last century. One of confusing elements in tribal conflicts in Darfur is that the eruption of war between the alliance from the same ethnic group due to either economic, political, land or social factors.

The conflict between Misiriya and Salamat in Central Darfur State erupted in April 2013, proved the evidence that ethnic factor is false it is merely used to achieve economic or political gains when it is necessary and required¹⁸⁶.

The root causes of the conflict between Salamat and Misiriya according to the report of inquiry and investigation of Central Darfur Government (2013)¹⁸⁷ and according to investigations and interviews carried out by the researcher with the tribal leaders of the two tribes separately can be categorized into the following reasons:

First, the exclusion of political participation by Salamat tribe in the administration of Um Dukhun locality to the rest of existing tribes that used to live in Um Dukhun for long time besides Salamat tribe led to greed and grievance and created hatred towards Salamat tribe. Additionally, Misiriya claimed that when the government of West Darfur State, appointed the former commissioner Abdella Mohammed Hussein as a commissioner of Um Dukhun in 2010, the former commissioner appointed more than 15 persons from Salamat ethnic group in national congress

¹⁸⁶ Omer, A. Zarooq, *Sheritay of Dar Kobera Central Darfur State*, interview by Yassir Satti, Mujkar, April, 2013.

¹⁸⁷ Report of Inquiry and Investigation, Central Darfur State, Sudan, 2013.

party high rank positions as well as in administrative positions in the locality excluding the existing 30 tribes members who lived in Um Dukhun besides Salamat and have the rights of citizenship to be appointed in political and administrative positions in the locality.

Second, during inauguration of Salamat Prince Celebration in May 2012 in Um Dukhun Locality, Salamat tribe exaggerated the celebration. They mobilized their counterparts from Chad and Central African Republic showing military parade in various kinds of weapons in the context of force showing. In that inauguration the media person from Salamat tribe announced that, “today is the day of inauguration of Nazir of Salamat and he did not mention Amir of Salamat” in a sense, this statement was perceived as a way Salamat wanted to send a message to the rest of the existing ethnic groups in Um Dukhun that now we are the owners of this land, we are majority, we are powerful in military and economic position.

The existing 30 ethnic groups who lived in Um Dukhun boycotted the inauguration celebration of Salamat Amir and they requested the State Security Committee to meet them, the Wali of Central Darfur State, Yousif Tibin, met them and they explored their suspects from Salamat behavior as Salamat preparing themselves to claim Um Dukhun as their land. In fact the suspects of the existing ethnic groups were to some extent true, because when they heard the word “Nazir” meaning “owner” of the land and control of people while Amir meant only control of people without owning land as a “Hakura”.

On the other hand Salamat accused Misiriya by implementing a proxy war against them by making alliance with Taashia in South Darfur to evacuate Salamat from Um Dukhun areas by destroying their economies in favor of Taashia. Contrary Misiriya refused that accusation and they claimed that Salamat started the war

against their existence in Um Dukhun and they just defend themselves from Salamat's military attacks and invasion.

Third, land ownership problems in Darfur can be dated back to colonial periods when the Condominium government redistributed land ownership due to Hakura system that was adopted by Fur Sultanates rulers, many historians regarded Salamat tribe as the newest tribe settled in Darfur, they migrated from Chad and Central African Republic in mid 1960s of the last century and they seek to occupy other's land to show their identity as a Sudanese tribe.

The current conflict between Salamat and Misiriya as both belonged to Arabs alliance known as Arab gathering who aligned together to fight the armed movements that formed from Fur, Zaghawa and Masaleet non-Arabs ethnic groups in 2003, but due to economic, land ownership and political motives and interests the two alliance fought together brutally for more than six months causing damage to their villages and hundreds of people from both sides were killed and thousands of Salamat fled to Central Darfur state as displaced persons and to Chad and Central African Republic as refugees.

In reality the current conflict between Salamat and Misiriya is based on land ownership and political participation, one of Misiriya leaders acknowledged that Salamat wanted to change the demographic features of Um Dukhun locality by occupying other's land and they behave provocatively disrespecting human rights non-Salamat.

Misiriya and the existing ethnic groups living in Um Dukhun have alliance to live in peace and they form a committee of peaceful co-existence aligned not to cause insecurity, respect the rights of people in agriculture, trade and pasture usage. In fact according to Land Ownership in Central Darfur State, Um Dukhun belong to

Fur tribe due to Hakura system, the land belonged to Dar Kobora under shartawiya of Omer Ahmed Zarooq who granted land to Salamat in 1970s when Samalat fought with Taaisha tribe on Rehad El-Bredi in South Darfur. The root causes of that conflict was land ownership. Salamat claimed that Rehad El bredi belonged to them, and Taaisha also claimed that the land was part of their Hakura system and Salamat had no land ownership, instead they allowed Salamat to benefit from the land usage in pasture and agriculture but not to claim any ownership of land.¹⁸⁸

The problem of land in Darfur is regarded as the main factor fueling conflicts and disputes between the existing ethnic groups since the 1969 when Rezeigat and Maalia fought claiming for Abu Karenka area. In 1970 a conflict erupted between Salamat and Taaisha claiming for Rehad el bredi; in 1996/98 a conflict erupted between Masaleet and Arabs when the government of West Darfur divided the Native Administration of Masaleet granted Arabs 13 Emra and in 2013 Gimer and Beni Helba fought in Katela in South Darfur etc.

Therefore land issue is still regarded as the main cause of ethnic conflicts in Darfur since there is no solution to land issue, Abuja Peace Accord and Doha Peace Document addressed this issue but still the government is not willing to give a clear cut about the prevailing of Hakura system in accordance with land laws of republic of Sudan. This in turn will lead to more conflicts between the tribes because each tribe will seek to impose its control of land as land represents identity of a tribe.

According to the evidence on the ground the conflict between Salamat and Misiriya will not stop because Salamat still felt that they were defeated and displaced from their origin villages by Misiriya and they will not return to Um

¹⁸⁸ Omer A. Zarooq, *Sharty of Dar Kobera Central Darfur State*, Interview by Yassir Satti, Mukjar, March, 2011.

Dukhun until they attained a military victory to restore their dignity and honor. One of the developments in conflict dynamics between Salamat and Misiria was the involvement of militants outside the country particularly from Chad and Central African Republic to fight beside Salamat as there are many Salamat ethnic groups living a long side the border between Sudan, Chad and Central African Republic.

It has been reported that the security forces of Um Dukhun has proven the participation of fighters from Chad and Central African Republic alongside with Salamat ethnic counterparts in Central Darfur, this is an important shift in the dynamics of the conflict if the advocacy and support continue to fuel the conflict, the conflict will be internationalized and both Chad and Central African Republic will be involved deeply and negatively into mire or swamp of civil war which will accelerate the collapse of one of the regimes either in Chad and Central African Republic or Sudan or International Community will intervene by deploying troops under the seven charter of UN security council.

In doing so the international community again will issue UN resolution to capture those war lords both in Sudan, Chad and Central African Republic who will commit war crimes and crimes against humanity which will stand as a barrier towards any real democratization processes in those countries because the leaders of those countries will leave power as ICC will accuse them as war criminals.

The most important decrees of the tribal reconciliation agreement between Salamat and Misiriya are:

1. Both two tribes must reconcile, tolerate and live together immediately after the signing of the reconciliation document.

2. Cancel or dissolve all ethnic alliance, divisions and illegal gathering particularly that concern with Jinaidyan and Abaseiin and the government should empower and strengthen the native administration system.
3. The conference strongly condemns the kidnapping of the innocent persons and requested the two conflicting parties to return the kidnapped persons with their properties without any pre- conditions.
4. All the tribes of the State should disassociate its self from the criminals, looters and agitators as an individual and a group.
5. Native Administration should control their militia commanders according to the norms and local customs that based on human values.
6. The land issue is the responsibility of the state, all ethnic groups are equal in land usages and they can utilize its fruits according to the laws, legislations, regulations and norms that govern it¹⁸⁹.

The decrees of the reconciliation conferences are far from touching the root causes of the conflict between Salamat and Misiriya because the core issue that led to the eruption of the conflict which is land ownership problem and political participation in which the decree six addressed shallowly without taking the implications and consequences of land ownership to Salamat tribes who are seeking to own the land as their Hakura which is against the norms and traditions of the land ownership that originally belonged to Fur ethnic group.

Furthermore, the recommendations of the conference did not address the issue of political participation which is regarded as one of main factors that fueled the conflicts because there is some evidence showing that Salamat tribes excluded the

¹⁸⁹ Tribal Reconciliation Agreement between Salamat and Misiriya, July, 2013.

existing ethnic groups from having high ranks of the political positions in locality administration and national congress party.

Native Administration leaders are unable to control their militia commanders because in many instances militia commanders are more powerful than native administration leaders, they are responsible for launching wars without consulting their native administration leaders and in some cases they threatened the native administration leaders if they do not obey their orders. The militia commanders became war lords, their economic interests and social position is m higher and respectful than the status of native administration leaders. Therefore the recommendations of reconciliation conference between Salamat and Misiriya will not work and function properly due to un-realistic situation that is on the ground and conflict will resume again in more brutal manner as there are still some grievances and prejudices not addressed and solved by the government.

5.3 The Tribal Reconciliation Conference between Beni Hussein and Rezeigat September 2013.

The continuation of conflicts of the same ethnic group is regarded as the major features characterized the recent tribal conflicts in Darfur region since the conflict between the armed movements and the government deescalated or become less intensified as the armed movements that fought the government aligned with Sudan Liberation Army, North Sector and shift their military operations to South Kordofan and Blue Nile.

The conflict between Beni Hussein and Rezeigat in North Darfur State, in Jebel Aamir a place recently discovered with huge amounts of gold. The area of Jebel Aamir belongs to Beni Hussein native administration, there are some ethnic groups living with Beni Hussein such as Rezeigat, Salamat, Misiriya, Fur, Zaghawa and

Berti. According to the reports of UN agencies and International Organizations working in North Darfur the root causes of the conflict can be traced back to economic competition for extracting gold. Beni Hussein native administration leader, Nazir El Jedi put some local regulations alongside with locality authorities to organize the mining process, those regulations composed of imposing taxes for those who extract gold from the mines and taxes on a plot of land after the committee of the wells granted the miners a plot of land for mining.¹⁹⁰

The administrative structure of Jebel Aamir composed of many committees such as wells committee that is responsible for granting wells for the miners and the fees for each well that yield the gold is fluctuated from 500-1000 Sudanese pounds depends on the amount of productivity, and it was estimated that there were about 5000 wells. There was another committee called mills committee which was responsible for collecting taxes from each mill and it's estimated that there were 3000 mills. Another committee was the market committee which is responsible for collecting money as a tax from each shop and restaurant and it was estimated that there were 2000 shop and restaurant. All these committees were run by Beni Hussein ethnic group without involving other ethnic groups because they believe that the place of Jebel Aamir is administratively belonged to them and them and any other outsider is not allowed to participate in those committees.

Beni Hussein leaders are not rationale in excluding other ethnic group from the administration of the mines, this exclusion created unfairness and prejudice among those who were extracting gold and it was verbally reported that Beni Hussein youth are so much aggressive to the extractors of gold particularly if a mine yields more gold and if the owner of the well does not belonged to Beni Hussein. Such

¹⁹⁰ El Nur, Haidar, *Head of Logistics and Administration Affairs, Sudan Liberation Army, wing of Abdel wahid El Nur*, interview by Yassir Satti. Kampala, Uganda, 9 August 2014.

people are usually provoked by Beni Hussein youth and he will be asked to pay more money so as not to lose his gold. . In some cases, if an outsider owns a well with huge amounts of gold, such wells can be taken by the wells committee and the person is instead allocated to another less productive well¹⁹¹.

The people who mine in Jebel Aamir are composed of different ethnic groups from all over Darfur region, other parts of Sudan, Chad, some West African Countries and Central African Republic. In the first year of mining in 2011, the mining bodes good quantity of gold but after the field visit of Federal Minister of Mineral and Mine Mr. Kamal Abdelatif and the Governor of North Darfur State Osman Kiber in late December 2012, a brutal conflict erupted between the miners who belonged to Rezeigat and Beni Hussein the conflict started between two persons and soon converted into a group conflict in which Rezeigat ethnic group gathered together and fought Beni Hussein. , According to victims of the conflict Rezeigat ethnic group who are part of Border Guards and Reserve Police Army invaded Jebel Aamir and killed more than 800 persons and more than 1600 person fled to north and central Darfur¹⁹².

Some scholars argue that the core problem between Rezeigat and Beni Hussein was due to monopolization of mine administration and revenues by Beni Hussein ethnic group and the provoking manner by Beni Hussein youth towards the miners, disrespecting their rights of citizenship and dehumanizing their dignity and honor. Whereas to some scholars the core problem was the involvement of the state government in coordination with Federal Ministry of Mineral and Mining in their endeavor to control the mining process by importing new advance technology for

¹⁹¹ Ibid., 2014.

¹⁹² ليسنج, أولف. "الذهب يغير طبيعة الصراع في دارفور ويغذيه". صحيفة ميدل إيست اون لاين, 2013م-<http://www.middle-east-online.com/?id=163712>

extraction gold and other valuable minerals that may be discovered in the area since the federal budget of the government suffered from deficit after the loss of oil revenues due to South Sudan Separation from the mother country in July 2011.

To do so the State government and Federal Ministry of Mineral and Mining should apply a tactic to move away the traditional miners and replaced them with modern companies belonging to the government of Sudan and opportunistic capitalism in Khartoum. In order to achieve this task the state government should has to use one of its alliances to change the balance of power in the area instead border guards from Rezeigat ethnic group was badly used to occupy the area by committing mass killings and displaced all the miners and the stakeholders from Jebel Aamir. In addition they caused a huge damaged and destruction to the economy of the locality and they looted the property of Beni Hussein and other ethnic groups living in those areas¹⁹³.

In contrast to the above arguments there are some community leaders and displaced persons who witnessed the conflict between Beni Hussein and Rezeigat. They argue that the conflict was due to economic competition between the Beni Hussein and Rezeigat who thought that there should be no regulations and barriers by Beni Hussein in granting plots of land for mining and because Rezeigat is regarded as the biggest ethnic group in population and well equipped by military machines and weapons and they compose 90% of border guards in Darfur region chaired by Sheikh Musa Hilal a famous Janjaweed Commander recruited by the government in an attempt to suppress the rebellion insurgency that was launched against the government in 2003 by non-Arab ethnic groups.

¹⁹³ Ibid., 2013, p.5.

The economic factor was the main cause of the conflict between Beni Hussein and Rezeigat because Rezeigat ethnic group preparing themselves to govern Darfur region as they are scattered all over Darfur region and the privilege they gained from fighting the rebellion movements of Sudanese Liberation Army and Justice and Equality Movement in Darfur was that they have more than 10,000 persons recruited in border guards or Central Reserve Police. They are well equipped with modern weapons and arms, and land cruisers which their rivals from Baggara cattle herders do not have. Moreover they saw themselves as striking force that is protecting the National Salvation Government from those who can conspire against the Islamic State with its Arabization orientation, the most recent example exploring this fact is the depletion of three thousands soldiers from Janjaweed militias recently converted its name into Rapid Support Troops around Khartoum chaired by Mohamed Hamadan Dalgo famous by (Heimiti).

In relation to the above conflict, two tribal conferences were launched one in Al-flasher sponsored by the State Governor Osman Kiber in September 2013 and the second conference was launched by Kiber's rival sheikh Musa Hilal in October 2013 in Kabkabiya, however the two tribal conferences claimed for peaceful coexistence between the Beni Hussein and Rezeigat but the objectives of each conference has its own hidden agenda as the state governor Osman Kebbir claimed that the tribal conference that was held by Musa Hilal was not aimed to attain peaceful coexistence as Hilal has his own agenda to over throw Kiber from state government and to do that task Hilal is mobilizing his ethnic group not to obey Kiber's orders and Hilal used to declare his antagonism against Kiber's policies using media such as internet, and national newspapers.

The tribal conferences that were launched in North Darfur State were less effective in mitigating the conflicts between Beni Hussein and Rezeigat since until now

there are no clear steps taken by the state and federal government to impose or restore the prestige of the state in controlling power in the area. The research suspects that the conflict will resume again in the future since the government is not able to disarm the militias equipped by her, the proliferation of arms without control of the government will lead to tribal competition over mining and land usages to be social protracted conflict that will need long time to be settled down which will affect two or three generations economically, socially and politically.

The study here discusses the decrees and recommendations of the tribal conference that was held in Al- Fasher by the government of North Darfur State. The important decrees and recommendations included¹⁹⁴:

1. Commitment to the immediate cessation of all forms of hostilities between the conflicting parties.
2. Open roads and ensure the safety of movement of citizens, commodities and vehicles.
3. Restore all land that has been taken by the aggressors back to the owners even if it has been cultivated.
4. Open the animal routes and tracks by the regular forces and Hikemdarat¹⁹⁵ in coordination with the locality authorities.
5. Delivery management and insurance of Jebel Aamir mine to the official government authorities administratively, oversight and protection by relying on regular forces and border guards equally.
6. Establishment of compensation fund for those who lost their properties and souls by depending on taxes from the on gold revenues from Jebel Aamir

¹⁹⁴ Tribal Reconciliation Agreement between Beni Hussein and Reizyagat, 2013.

¹⁹⁵ Military rank named to Arab Militia Commanders when they absorbed in Border Guards.

after the State Legislative Council legislate ruled for regulating the mining revenues that should be distributed according to the following items:

- a) Allocate 25% from the total revenues to Serf Omera locality and other destroyed areas for the sake of the reconstruction of government institutions.
- b) Allocate 65% from the total revenues for the contribution of paying money blood and damages to all affected people from the conflict.
- c) Allocate 5% for administrative expenditures and government reserve to confront any emergencies and providing of services.

According to recommendation two, it was clear that land issue is one of the core issues that led to outbreak the conflict between Beni Hussein and Rezeigat because some persons from Rezeigat ethnic group claimed that they have the right to mine without tribal restrictions from Beni Hussein who claimed that mining land belonged to them. According to the Hakura system that governs land usage in Darfur and Rezeigat; other ethnic groups have only the right to benefit from land usage.

On the other hand recommendation two did not mention directly who the aggressors are but mentioned them indirectly. This seemed like a way of escaping from reality by not mentioning Rezeigat ethnic group who are responsible for occupying the land of Jebel Aamir, because when the government of North Darfur State formed a mediation committee to stop hostilities and aggression between the conflicting parties, Rezeigat ethnic group refused to list them as the parts of the conflicts they argued that Rezeigat is a big ethnic group and it composed of more than ten ethnic groups therefore it's not justice and fair to name Rezeigat as one of the conflicting parties, there are other tribes that have been involved in the conflict. That was a canny way of hiding from the fact that, all evidence and reports accused

Rezeigat for the destruction and killing of Beni Hussein by doing so Rezeigat ethnic group was willing to escape from paying money blood and money for property damaged because Beni Hussein brought to the table of negotiation high amounts of pounds showing money blood for their dead persons and property damaged.

Rezeigat ethnic group felt that they are powerful economically and militarily and are not easy for small tribe like Beni Hussein to impose them to pay a huge amounts of money, if they pay that money in the future if Rezeigat entered into a conflict with any ethnic group they are going to pay the money as the customs and norms will obligate them to pay without discrimination. Rezeigat ethnic group sometimes used their ethnical extension to gather under the umbrella of Rezeigat to fight their enemies whether from Baggara Arabs or non-Arabs and in some cases there were some conflicts between the same Rezeigat ethnic group that formed Rezeigat such as the conflict between Awlad Janoob and Awlad Zeid in Ababata north of Zalingei Locality in June 2012.

For recommendation five one of the most important of all the recommendations. It lay the responsibility of delivery management, insurance, oversight and protection of the mine to be equally shared between regular forces of the government and border guards who are mainly formed from Rezeigat ethnic group. This explored inability of the government alone to impose security control in Darfur because of the existence of ethnic militias that were backed and equipped by the government and whom are ready to deviant the government if any solution is not going a alongside with their economic and ethnic agendas.

Lastly recommendation six stated that; the state government should form a compensation fund from revenues of the gold extracted by the miners to be paid as

money for reconstruction of Beni Serif locality that suffered from the destruction, and 65% of the revenues should be paid as blood money and compensation for property looting. This showed that the state government is not willing to pay any money from its budget which is an indirect way of not putting a burden on the deficit budget of the government particularly the estimated money for blood money and property looting that was worth 10 million Dollars.

5.4 The Role of Tribal Reconciliation Conferences in Promoting Peace building Process in Darfur Region:

The transition from violent conflict to peace building opens a unique window of opportunity to address the root causes of the conflict and transform the social structures, change or dismantle the existing government and social institutions and build new relationships that may support the sustainability of peace which required implementation of a series of activities, programmes and design strategies to mitigate the violent conflict by involving not only the conflicting parties but also the affected community¹⁹⁶.

Peace building activities differ from one community to another depending on the nature of the conflict and its consequences. Therefore peace building process can take short term, medium term or long term in order to restore the torn relations and address the root causes of the conflict. In the case of Darfur conflict which has been classified as a complex problem in which national, local, regional and international factors triggered and fueled the escalating of violent conflict, to some experts of conflict and peace studies, such kind of conflict need a package of solutions to address the root causes of the conflict since the root causes of the conflict were traced back to environmental factors, identity, competition over natural resources and water sources, lack of development and marginalization,

¹⁹⁶Yassir, Satti, Women Building Peace (Khartoum: Open University of Sudan Press, 2011), p.12.

armed robberies, land tenure problem, political participation, poverty and social exclusion.¹⁹⁷

On the other hand tribal reconciliation conferences that were held in Darfur aimed to settle down the conflicts between the ethnic groups of the community but those tribal conferences contributed less to the peace building processes in Darfur due to following reasons:

1. The peace makers and mediators (Ajaweed) between the conflicting parties lack of knowledge and wisdom to elaborate on the truth root causes of the conflict. For instance the conflict between Hutiya and Nawaiba in 2005; conflict between Salamat and Misiriya in 2013 and conflict between Rezeigat and Beni Hussein in 2013 in the inauguration pages and in the peace document that was signed by the conflicting parties. The peace makers did not mention the root causes of the conflict rather they talked about foreign conspiracy and unity of the people and cursed the devil who they thought was responsible for fueling the conflicts.
2. The retribution law was not effective for those who committed mass killing, raping and atrocities against innocent people. If the penalty of killing is being activated for example if a person killed a person and it was proven that he or she is guilty there should be no room for releasing him or her unless there was permission from the relative of the person who was killed. In doing so no person will try to kill any person because she or he will be taken directly to court without intervention of the relatives of his or her ethnic group. Currently in Darfur region the phenomenon of killing people has

¹⁹⁷ Yassir, Satti, "Pastoralism, Land rights and migration routes in Darfur: The case of West Darfur State," in *Environment and Conflict in Africa: Reflections on Darfur*, edited by Marcel Leroy (Addis Ababa, United Nations University for Peace, Africa Programme, 2009), p.259

become as a habit and it is easy for any person to kill any one since your ethnic group will pay the blood money and make a settlement for the conflict¹⁹⁸.

3. Due to economic crisis and inflation that affected the country after the separation of South Sudan and due to deficit in the federal budget, most of the ethnic groups in Darfur region used to favor paying money for blood and property damage as each ethnic group will bring to the table of negotiation huge amounts of money blood money and damaged property money as the case of the conflict between Salamat and Misiriya in 2013. while the two conflicting parties were negotiating in Zalingei Salamat brought a long list of property damaged and money for blood as diayat which Misiriya tribe refused to acknowledge and it said that Salamat are exaggerating their property loss which was estimated at 26 billion Sudanese pounds, the same case happened between Rezeigat and Beni Hussein, when Beni Hussein brought billions of money to be paid by Rezeigat but because Rezeigat ethnic group is powerful in military and economy they refused to pay any amount of money and they declared that if Beni Hussein really wanted peace, they can open a new door for the relation between the two tribes and hence they can tolerate and forgive each other without paying.
4. There is impunity to those who committed war crimes and crimes against humanity such as killing, sexual violence and rape. No guilty person has been incriminated in the above three tribal conferences. This instead opens the door for more crimes to be committed in the future since penalty of killing in the Sudanese law is not been convicted due to weak status of the state in Darfur. Because there are counterparts militias who can hamper any process of achieving justice and equality between the victims and culprits.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., 2009, p.270.

This is the main reason that the federal and state governments in Sudan till now fail to achieve justice against those who committed war crimes and crimes against the humanity in Darfur since 2003 when the conflict erupted between Sudanese Liberation Army and Justice and Equality Movement in which in 2005 International Criminal Court prosecuted Ali Kosheb, Ahmed Haroun and then President Al basher for committing war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur region.

5. Peace building requires strong lawful institutions to maintain rule of law such as strong police, prosecution, and judiciary system to record cases and follow those who committed crimes against humanity not to get impunity towards achieving justice. Darfur lacks such kind of system because of fragility of the state and due to the existence of tribal militias that hinder any processes of achieving justice.
6. Weakness of civil society organizations to carry out activities that may mitigate the consequences of violent conflict and this is mainly due to lack of financial sources, security restrictions, lack of skilled persons to carry out peace building projects and lack of neutralism most of the existing civil society organizations are ethnical based organizations.
7. There is no guarantor for the implementation of the tribal reconciliation recommendations and decrees, the government disclaims from its moral obligations towards the implementation of the conventions or peace agreements between the conflicting parties, as the case in Fur versus Arab conflict in 1987/1990. One of the recommendations called for evacuation of some Arab leaders to their original places in Chad but nothing happened and those leaders instead of evacuating their sons after the conflict between the government and the armed movements in 2003, they were appointed in high military ranks and while others were appointed as locality commissioners

and state ministers as a reward to them in their endeavor to support the government in quelling the armed movements in Darfur region.

After the above criticism of the tribal reconciliation conferences that were held in Darfur region the study suggests a new approach for the mediators and peace makers for achieving sustainable peace and stability in Darfur as follows:

1. Formation of peace and reconciliation commission at the federal, state and locality levels with the mandate to resolve conflicts and disputes that will emerge between the ethnic groups, and individuals.
2. The peace and reconciliation commission will be responsible for launching and organizing tribal reconciliation conferences in coordination with federal, state and local authorities, police, security, judiciary, prosecution, native administration leaders, community leaders, civil society organizations, women groups and religious leaders.
3. The peace and reconciliation commission should be responsible for putting plans and projects to transform the violent conflict into peaceful coexistence and international organizations government should pay the money to achieve that goal.
4. Popular courts should be established at the rural levels by supporting them with police and vehicles.
5. The peace and reconciliation commission should be independent from government intervention; its role should be to achieve justice and equality with all means of law.
6. The peace and reconciliation commission should review the customs and norms that exaggerate money blood, impunity from committing war crimes and crimes against humanity.
7. The peace and reconciliation commission should put a certain standard of money blood for all tribes in case of deliberate killing.

5.5 Addressing Ethnic, Gender and Poverty Dimensions of the Conflict.

5.5.1 Ethnic and Gender factors in deepening Poverty in Conflict prior to 2003.


During the mid-1980^s of the last century, Sudan was ruled by Umma Party led by Elsadig El Mahadi, as a Primer Minister and Mohammed Osman El marghani as the Head of the State, the government of Elmahadi faced tremendous problems in governing the country among them is the continuation of the civil war in the South Sudan, the failure of the state to provide basic needs such as food items and water, adequate health care, and lack of infrastructure particularly paved roads in the peripheries of the country such as Darfur Region, Kordofan, South Sudan, North Sudan and Blue Nile to link the peripheries with the Capital of the Sudan.

The situation was aggravated when Garang guerrilla forces recurrently defeated the Sudanese national forces fighting in the south and Juba was surrounded. On the other hand Darfur region was neglected by the government to put an end to the armed robberies and banditries that diffused in the region, many scholars and researchers attempted to explain the deteriorating situation in Darfur as a combination of factors, such as environmental degradation, the spill over of armed robberies, economic and political factors and in addition to the regional factors particularly the Chadian- Chadian war which contributed to the diffusion and spread of small arms and heavy weapons in the region.

West Darfur State witnessed a brutal, destructive tribal conflict between Fur tribe and alliance of twenty five Arab ethnic groups in 1987-89. The conflict was interpreted by many scholars as the conflict over competition over natural resources when the recurrence drought and famine stricken the African Sahel and Darfur in late 1970s and 1980s of the last century.

As a result of the recurrent drought, famine and desertification in Darfur region, Arab nomads from Rezeigat in the northern part of the region migrated to the central and southern parts of the region in search of pasture, grazing lands and water in areas mainly a round Jebel Marra and Wadi Salih that was occupied by Fur ethnic groups. The economic situation of the state at that time was not much promising rather it is a traditional agriculture, mixed with cattle raring and petty trade between the urban centres and rural areas. There is no statistical data or studies to show Poverty rates in the state. In interpreting the conflict between Fur and Arab ethnic groups the thesis lays on testing the theories of ethnicity particularly the Instrumentalist approach which states that ethnicity is the result of actions of community leaders who used their cultural groups as sites of mass mobilization and as constituencies in their competition for power and resources.

The below triangle shows the relation between poverty, ethnicity and gender in the Fur and Arab conflict.



The ethnicization of the tribal conflicts in Darfur is recently emerged particularly during the mid-1980s of the last century when more than twenty five Arab ethnic

groups aligned to fight Fur tribe. It was characterized by ethnic conflict due to the alliance of the Arabs ethnic group in one body named as Arab gathering or Arab congregation. But some scholars pointed out that Arab supremacy in Darfur was growing due to internal and external factors that gave momentum to its evolution among the internal factors are the growing economic power in favor of Arab ethnic groups as they monopolize animal resources markets particularly camels, cattle and sheep. The rapid growing number of the Arab population was another ethnic factor that combined and unified Arabs to fight Fur tribe because Arabs thought that they should rule Darfur in the coming future because since independence of Sudan Arabs did not find a chance to rule Darfur and that was obvious in their claiming letter to the prime Minister El sadiq el Mahadi in 1987.

Qoreish one submitted to the Prime Minister El sadiq El Mahadi in 1987 stated that; Arabs of Darfur region represent 70% of the population of the region and our contribution to the national budget amounts to no less than 15% and our contribution to the Darfur region exceeds 90% and we contribute a lion share to the army and in sacrifice to the nation. The letter further indicated that the worried of Arabs that the neglect of representation of the Arabs race prevails, things may go out control and matters may pass the hands of the wise to the ignorant¹⁹⁹.

Whether the above letter was correct or not it was clear that due to the development of the events in Darfur region Arabs gathering became a reality although the Arab had problems among themselves but they united to fight the Fur tribe for the sake of governing Darfur as the letter explored. Therefore the study identifies that ethnic factor here was used in order to create coalition and alliance in bridging the existing educational, economic and social gap that was in favor of

¹⁹⁹ Abdullahi, Al tom, "The Arab Congregation and the Ideology of Genocide in Darfur, Sudan," 2007, www.aletomadmin.com, accessed March 2007

Fur tribe. Although Fur and Arabs lived together for centuries with intermarriage relations and cooperation in economic and social fields but a conflict erupted between them in more brutal manner characterized by ethnic conflict competing over power and natural resource.

When the conflict erupted in 1987-89 many Fur villages were damaged, farms were burnt down, and cattle of Fur were looted, and the state failed to provide security and restore peace in the region as a consequence of the conflict, Fur tribe became totally poor and vulnerable to economic and climatic shocks this in turn led both women and men to be affected differently by the conflict, men on one hand were killed, handicapped, lost their properties, and women on the other hand some of them were killed, exposed to sexual violence and raped. The gender dimension in Fur versus Arabs conflict was not so much manifested like the current conflict this is mainly due to the fact that no migration took place during the conflict although many villages and fariqs²⁰⁰ were burnt down. In addition to this no statistical data was provided by the government or civil society organizations as it is provided in the current conflict.

The conflict exposed Fur tribe to poverty and vulnerability; this is because Fur lost their cattle and farming land. Poverty here can be traced not only to economic material but rather to social welfare and human rights abuse. Lack of freedom and lack of free movement from the rural areas to the urban centers for the sake of marketing and having better medical care was regarded as the basic elements in identifying poverty and its dimensions. Therefore the thesis concludes that poverty is both a cause and consequence of conflict and ethnicity is a denominator factor in fueling conflicts and disputes. The interplay of the three factors i.e. poverty, gender and ethnicity is clear in the case of Fur versus Arab conflict as it is been mentioned

²⁰⁰ Fariqs, means Nomads gathering settlement in rural areas.

in the above analysis. Poverty induces conflict and conflict in some cases took the shape of ethnic alliance or alienation and ethnic conflict has destructive impacts on both men and women economically, socially and politically and vice versa.

The continuation of the conflict situation between Fur and Arabs ethnic group with the absence of government to protect Fur tribe from the organized armed robbery, grievance and prejudice grew among Fur tribe blaming the government police and security forces of not being able to provide security and protection to their farms and people. Hence Fur tribe organized themselves in militia lines and decided to purchase arms to protect their life in doing so a conducive environment was been created for launching a rebellion movement against the government which in turn found a common consensus among the youth of Fur tribe and elites.

On the other hand the study argues that the same ethnic alliance that aligned against fur tribe was repeated in the conflict between Arabs and Masaleet tribe in 1996 when the West Darfur State Governor Mohammed Ahmed Alfadul divided Masaleet native administrative into 13 Emira granting Arabs 11 Emira as a result of that decision conflict between Masaleet and Arabs erupted in Mesitiri, Habila and a round El geneina, more than 10 Arabs ethnic groups gathered together and fought Masaleet, some of Arabs of Kordofan and Chad also participated in that conflict. The State of West Darfur when he divided Masaleet native administrative system did not consult Sultan Bahr eldeen Sultan of Dar Masaleet and he did not send him the decision under which he divided the Masaleet native administrative system, the same scenario happened before to Fur tribe when the Provincor of Zalingei locality Mohamed Ahmed in 1992 divided the native administration of Fur tribe by separating Arabs native administration from Fur tribe.

The gender dimensions of the conflict was not so different from the case of Fur versus Arabs, few people migrated from their original villages to El geneina and

both men and women were killed, tortured and few women were raped. As there were few reports of conflicts due to the lack of researchers and absence of active civil society organizations and international organizations as the reverse in the current conflict when international organizations reported every crime that has been committed against the civilians either by the government militias or armed movements or outlaws.

5.5.2 Ethnic and Gender factors in deepening Poverty in Conflict after 2003.

The current conflict in Darfur dates back to 2003 when two rebellion movements namely Sudan Liberation Army/ Movement (SLA/M) and Justice and equality Movement (JEM) launched an insurgent against the government claiming for equal power and wealth sharing in the region. The two rebellion movements divided themselves along ethnic lines formed from Fur, Zaghawa, Berti and Masaleet ethnic groups who are non-Arab ethnic group.

The government of Sudan responded with a sustained counter- insurgency offensive to crash and quells the rebellion. As a result of counter- attacks between the government and the rebellions about two million of people were displaced from their villages and 500,000 were killed, the villagers who are regarded as crop producers prior to the current conflict were forced to live in camps near big cities depending on food and shelter provided to them by the international organizations and UN agencies. The conflict was in reality a manifestation of crisis of governance that affect the whole Sudan not only Darfur²⁰¹.

In analyzing the current conflict in Darfur region by using Capability approach of poverty and Instrumentalist approach of ethnic conflict which states that ethnicity and race are viewed as instrumental identities, organized as means to particular ends. The scholars of this school argue that ethnic difference is not sufficient to

²⁰¹ Thabo, Mebki, 2009 Darfur- the Quest for Peace, Justice and Reconciliation, African Union- High Level Panel on Darfur. Abuja. Nigeria, p.55.

explain conflict. Some scholars and researchers explained the current conflict in Darfur as an ethnic conflict between Black African and Arabs competing over power control and economic resources. However number of reasons and manifestations cast serious doubt on the validity of this view.

Firstly, historically the Darfurian community composed of different ethnic groups who lived in peace, tolerance with intermarriage relations and cooperation in economic and social fields. There is no featured in the current conflict to support this view although the government recruited Arab militias to fight the rebellion in order to show that the conflict hasn't got a political manifestation rather it is a conflict between the farmers and pastoralists in competing over natural resource management as the conflict between the two ethnic groups occurred recurrently in the late 1970s and 1980s.

Secondly, there are some Arab ethnic group that joined the rebellion movement although the black Africans constituted more than 70% of the movements' fighters for example Hussein Madibo the former Umma party member is one of the famous leaders in SLA/M, Ibrahim Ahmed Al Zubaydi, leader of Front Revolutionary Forces in Darfur who killed by the government in a place called Khur Ramela west of Jebel Marra in 2010.

Thirdly, some Arab ethnic groups particularly from Rezeigat and Salamat formed what was called Oppressed Solider Movement in 2006 led by Anawar Ahmed Kahtir which descended from Awlad Eid a branch of Rezeigat ethnic group and formation of Justice and equality Movement Wing of Peace in 2009 led by Abdel Rahman Ibrahim respectively. The two movements claimed that the government exploited them badly during the conflict by promising to grant them land and improve the livelihoods of the Arab nomads but it breached its promise therefore

according to them fighting the government is a legacy to restore their dignity and reputation among the African tribes whom we had good relations for a long passage of time.

Fourthly, there is a strong relation between SLA/M Abdel wahid faction and the outlaws of west Jebel Marra particularly Arab Nawabia and Eriagat camel herders, they exchanged information, goods and fought together in the west part of Jebel Marra as well as in the peak of the mountain and central Jebel Marra where the guerilla forces of SLAM/A are found. For example in 2008 the outlaws of Eriagat and Nawabia in west Jebel Marra kidnapped the Vice Chancellor of Zalingei University Dr. Ishag Jame while he was traveling from Nyala to Zalingei when he was crossing the areas occupied by the Arab militias, after he have been kidnapped he was taken to Abdel wahid's faction in the peak of Jebel Marra and immediately the SLM announced in Sudanese online website that they managed to arrest the Vice chancellor of university of Zalingei after a serious battle between the government forces and SLA guerrilla forces which was not true, but SLA wanted to send a message to the government that it can bring harm to its supporters who belong to NCP.

To some conflict analysts the good relations between the Arab militias in west of Jebel Marra was due to the fact that both of them were in need of the other for example the Arab militias who lived in west Jebel Marra in areas of Thur, Nirtite, Gurni, Jebel Afoon and Galolo in need of pasture and water for their camels during the summer season and this is not available in the west part of Jebel Marra where grazing land is poor to keep their cattle and camels in a better condition. Instead the Arab militias in west of Jebel Marra created mutual agreement of exchanging benefits with SLA because on the other hand the SLA required fuel, food and logistic support and this cannot easily be provided unless they aliened and

organized their movement with those who occupy the west part of Jebel Marra in which the government forces are spread along with the pavement road of Nyala, Kass, Zalingei and who may carry out military operation against them. The collaboration between the two paradoxes groups in ethnic feature and interests ensured that the ongoing conflict hasn't to do with ethnic ties rather it manifested in economic interests. The study draws a linkage between the three factors; poverty, gender and ethnicity in analyzing the current conflict in Darfur region by using the previous triangle.

The current conflict has a wide range of effects on the division of labor, of economic responsibility and access and control over resources between men and women. The livelihoods of the farmers were destroyed by forcing them off and making untenable, this is obvious when more than one million flee from their original villages to live in slums and peripheries of big towns in IDPs camps depending on the humanitarian relief from the international organizations and UN agencies in the region.

The rebel groups were different in their economic base, the SLM/A for example financing its military operations depended on the contributions of the Darfurian elites in Saudi Arabia, Europe and inside Sudan whereas for JEM it depended on contributions of Darfurian elites outside and inside Sudan in addition to the investments run by Popular Congress Party as almost time accused by the government that JEM is the military wing of popular congress party. JEM is more empowered economically this is mainly due to the fact that most members of the movement are from Zagahwa ethnic group who are famous in money making through investment.

The destruction of the farmers' economy and livelihood contributed to the change in gender roles and responsibilities particularly in the IDPs and Refugee camps in Chad and Central African Republic. Men became idle and few of them found better job with international organizations and UN agencies. On the other hand most women worked in houses as servants, wood collectors, and tea and food sellers and bore more economic burden. This in itself led the conflict to have a gender sensitive approach because men and women were affected differently by the conflict in the sense that poverty rates increases among both sexes in terms of lack of adequate health care, low income earnings and lack of healthy environment for settling in the camps in addition to the lack of freedom to return to their home villages voluntarily because in many instances some villagers tried to return to their home lands but they were faced with armed threats, sexual harassment and looting properties by the tribal militias of Arab ethnic group.

This intention was due to the fact that some Arabs were been promised by the government officials if they managed to crack down the rebellion they will give them land to stay as many of the Arabs militias that fought in 2003 were migrants from the Chad, Niger and Mali. This sort of behaviors have an ethnic manner because the migrant Arabs were regarded as homeless people in Darfur and they had been taught that the land usage is for those who cultivated not for those who owned and the ownership of land is belonged to the government to the native administrative.

Therefore the current conflict in Darfur region has no ethnic dimension in fueling the conflict rather it has ethnic consequences when the farms of Fur, Zaghawa and Masaleed ethnic groups were destroyed and burnt down by the Arab militias this in turn impoverished the African tribes when their livelihoods were completely destroyed, instead they turn to be food demanders rather than food supplier as they

flee from their lands to stay in camps near the big cities depending on relief given by INGs and UN agencies.

Table (9): Shows Percentage Distribution of House Holds by Improved and not Improved Main Source of Drinking Water (%) in three Darfur States compared with the total percentage of the rest of Sudan states.

Main Source of Drinking Water			
	Improved	Not Improved	Total
Sudan	59	41	100
West Darfur	46	54	100
North Darfur	65	35	100
South Darfur	55	45	100

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, 2009²⁰².

From the above table we can notice that the percentage of improved drinking water in West Darfur State is below the total percentage of other Sudan's states this is mainly due to the lack of modern machines for water treatment during pumped from artesian wells. Whereas the percentage of water not improved in West Darfur State is higher than the total percentage of Sudan and this also refers to the increase number of poverty among the rural and urban communities who used to drink water from valleys, boreholes and pools.

²⁰² Central Bureau of Statics, Poverty in North, West and South Darfur States, Estimate from National Baseline Household Survey, 2009.

Table (10): Table shows the un-employment rate for labor force 10 and 15 years and above in the week prior to the survey (%).

	Un-employment rate for labor force 10 and above			Un-employment rate for labor force 15 and above		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
Sudan	13	10	24	13	9	23
West Darfur	18	15	23	18	15	23
North Darfur	20	19	21	19	19	21
South Darfur	17	12	24	15	11	22

Source: Bureau of Statistics, 2009.

In the above table the un-employment rate for labor force 10 and above in West Darfur State shows that child labor is widely used in the informal sector of the economy where as un-employment rate for labor force 15 and above shows that women are considered as the most economic productive unit compared with the total percentage of Sudan and the other two Darfur states.

Poverty rates was increased differently among Fur, Masaleet and Zaghawa ethnic groups which has a manifestation of ethnicization of poverty, because Arab ethnic groups regarded themselves as the winners of the conflict situation when the government pool them with money, land cruisers and arms to fight the rebellion, after the conflict cool down between the conflicting parties particularly in West

Darfur State, former combatants from Arab ethnic group used the land cruiser for local transportation marked as Sh (س ح) which means looting is halal (سرقة حلال) .

Table (11): Shows poverty rate by urban and rural areas in north, west and south Darfur states compared with the total rate of other states in Sudan

	Incidence	Poverty gap	Severity
Sudan	46.5	16.2	7.8
Urban	26.5	7.1	2.7
Rural	57.6	21.3	10.6
North Darfur	69.4	27.4	14.2
Urban	46.7	13.7	16.7
Rural	75.7	31.3	16.7
South Darfur	61.2	24.5	12.7
Urban	31.6	9.5	3.8
Rural	71.9	30.0	16.0
West Darfur	55.6	19.8	8.9
Urban	1.2	0.2	0.0
Rural	67.8	24.2	-

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, 2009.

From the above table we can notice that poverty rate and severity in West Darfur State was bigger than the average rate of Sudan due to multiple reasons such as;

lack of developmental projects to absorb the un employed youth, low income at the informal sector where most of the population rely on, lack of skills and capacity to create new opportunities for better work and impact of the current conflict which led to the destruction of the livelihoods of non Arab ethnic groups.

Some of the land cruisers were been stolen from the INGOs and UN agencies working in the region. The Arab who owned the land cruiser became richer as they tend to use the cars in local transportation between the rural areas and cities carrying passengers as well as commodities, in addition they the use same vehicles during the tribal synergy.

On the other hand Fur and Masaleet ethnic groups who launched the insurgent pay the cost of their insurgency by exposing to poverty when they have been forced to live in camps living their fertile land as a source of income and dignity to be cultivated by Arabs. Moreover they lack of basic human needs such as food, best health care and freedom of return to their home land to restart their livelihood patterns which was completely destroyed during the conflict.

Finally gender and ethnic factors in conflict and poverty are obvious and interrelated in exploring the facts and reality of the root causes of the current conflict. The conflict affected Fur, Masaleet and Zagahwa ethnic groups differently which was characterized by many scholars as ethnicization of poverty when the three ethnic groups' livelihoods were completely destroyed and burn down as a result of that many people from the Fur, Zaghawa and Masaleet fled from their home land to live in places surrounding the big cities. As the consequence of the conflict gender roles and responsibilities between men and women changed, more responsibilities were put on the women's shoulders some women's husbands were killed and became disabled during the conflict time. The conflict hasn't got ethnic

character in fueling the counter insurgent between the government and the rebels rather it has an ethnic consequence in changing gender roles and responsibilities and increasing poverty rates.

Building a sustainable peace and reconciliation between the conflicting parties requires social, economic, and political programmes to address the root causes of the conflict. To achieve Peace and Reconciliation in Darfur regions is not an easy task to both government of Khartoum and the signatory armed movements this is mainly because of the complexity of the situation in which Darfur region plunged into; on one hand the ethnic polarization between the existing ethnic groups and between the same ethnic groups which deepening the situation of fragmentation; on the other hand the proliferation of small arms and weapons among the government alliances i.e. Arabs militias was regarded as a fuel of barrel full of bullets waiting for somebody to shot it.

Without serious strategy of disarming controlling the weapons and arms in the hands of the tribes, peace and reconciliation will not be achieved and development projects may not continue. This therefore may lead to the region to plunge again into protracted social conflicts and may in the future face emergency of new armed movements claiming for separation of the region or some states in Darfur will announce independence as Somaliland in Somalia.

Tribal reconciliation conferences played an important role in calming down conflicts and disputes between the individuals and a group of people. In the early 1960^s until 1980^s of the last century before the dissolution of native administration system by Niimeri regime, people used to solve their disputes and conflicts through the leaders of native administration who used to organize tribal reconciliation conferences to reconcile parties at dispute. But after Ingaz took

power in 1989^s and due to politicization of ethnic groups and diffusion of arms in the hands of people in Darfur, tribal reconciliation conferences become less effective and unable to put sustainable solutions to the conflicts.

The following chapter will explore the role of tribal reconciliation conferences in conflict resolution and peace building in Darfur and criticizes the mechanisms of peace making by taking three cases of conflicts in west Darfur state.

Conclusion

Summary:

Darfur conflict was an extension of what had been happening in South Sudan since the start of the insurgency chaired by John Garang in 1983, in which the government of Nimeri, Al sadiq El mahadi and Al basher recruited the tribal militias of Misiriya and Rezeigat who live in the intermingling tribal areas with south Sudan and north Sudan. The tribal militias were named as *Murahaleen* which meant that people moved with their cattle from one place to another. The role of those militias were to monitor the boundaries between the South and the North and worked as an intelligence or scouting forces by providing the government information about the movements of SPLA forces. But these militias in order to work in the frame designed to them by the government they used to loot the properties of Dinka and Neur ethnic groups and in some cases they destroyed the villages and burnt them and in addition to that they took women of South Sudan as slaves and servants.

The same behavior and habit has been used in the current Darfur conflict as the Janjaweed militias who were backed by the government to quell and crash the rebellion, they instead burnt the villages and destroyed the livelihoods of Fur, Masaleet, Midoob, Zaghawa, and Berti ethnic groups causing a humanitarian crisis in Darfur in which the international community condemned the atrocities and killings committed against the civilians. As a result UN council issued a decree No.1769 on 31July/2007 to deploy Hyper forces peace keeping forces to monitor the peace agreement and protecting the civilians in Darfur.

Many causes were addressed in interpreting the root the causes of the current conflict in Darfur among those; environmental factors such as drought and

desertification that struck the African Sahel and Darfur since 1970^s and 1980^s of the last century, continuous migration from Chad to Darfur aggravated the situation by changing the population demography in Darfur and further led the migrants to claim for land ownership in the Hakura system which governs the usage of and granting land to both individuals and groups of people.

On the other hand ethnicity played an essential role in fueling and escalating conflicts in Darfur. In the absence of identifying Sudan's identity whether Sudan belong to Arabs or African or both was regarded as one of the major factors that triggered the current conflict in Darfur particularly when some Arab groups in Darfur constituted what is called Arab gathering in the early 1980^s claiming for more inclusion in the political process at the regional and national levels.

National and regional factors also played an essential role in deepening the issue of identity in Darfur particularly when late President Gaddafi of Libya supported Umma Party in the 1980^s in which Darfur was used as the logistical area for the troops of Islamic legion that was initiated by late Gaddafi to invade Chad.

Additionally, the proliferation of small arms and armed robberies aggravated the situation. Arab militias practiced systematic and organized armed robbery against Fur, Zaghawa and Masaleet ethnic groups since the 1980^s. This in itself led Fur, Zaghawa and Masaleet tribes to be impoverished and hence they found themselves living in stress environment in which the government force (police and army) failed to protect them against the organized armed robbery. This in turn led the three above mentioned ethnic groups to create alliance by organizing themselves in Para military forces to protect their farms and properties. The grievance among Fur, Masaleet and Zaghawa ethnic groups grew rapidly after they had common consensus that the government police and army would not protect them and fight the Arab militias.

Fur versus Arab conflict in 1987-89 and conflict of Arab versus Masaleet in 1996-98 were been identified by many scholars that they embodied ethnic factors as more than twenty five Arab tribes gathered together to fight Fur and Masaleet. Ethnicity here was used as a mobilizing factor to capture power, land ownership and get economic gains. On the other hand the study found that there are some conflicts happened between the Arab ethnic groups such as the conflict between Maalia and Rezeigat in 1964, conflict between Salamat and Taaisha in 1970 , conflict between Tarjem and Rezeigat in 2004, conflict between Beni Hussein and Rezeigat 2013, conflict between Salamat and Misiriya 2013 as the conflicting parties are all belonged to Arab ethnic group and the reasons of their struggle were differing from land ownership to administrative boundaries, mining revenues and political leadership.

Furthermore, the lack of real political participation and marginalization of the peripheries by the successive governments of Sudan led to the emergence of regional peaceful movements in 1964 claiming for equal developmental opportunities such as Darfur Renaissance Front. But the main government had short vision and strategic plan to view the peripheries through a national plan that can integrate the peripheries by creating a democratic system that could acknowledge the diversity of the country. Nonetheless, the ruling elites only concentrated on Arab ethnic culture in education, media and public life and inferior the cultures of non-Arabs ethnic groups. As the result of that exclusion, a new rebellion movement emerged in South Sudan calling for new Sudan, Sudan with equitable distribution of wealth and power. The vision of new Sudan was soon extended to the peripheries of Sudan and particularly Darfur region.

Some of the Darfuri elites were influenced by the ideas of John Garang of new Sudan and instead a rebellion movement was launched against the government in

2003 chaired by Abdel Wahid Nur and Menni Minnawi and named their movement as Sudan Liberation Army similar in its manifesto to some extent to the Sudan's People Liberation Army of John Garang.

The ethnic and gender factors in conflict and poverty in Fur versus Arab conflict was clear in the sense that the poverty situation that affected Fur members when their farms were burnt and their cattle stolen by the Arabs deepened their demand for basic needs such as food, adequate water and sanitation and hence poverty tend to have ethnic factors when an organized armed banditry was used to loot Fur's properties after the end of the tribal conflict in 1989. The continuation of the armed robbery on the Fur tribe for more than twenty years without successful government intervention to stop the atrocities and human rights abuses committed against Fur, grievance and prejudice arise rapidly among Fur youth and they decided to organize themselves to launch an insurgent against the government as they accused the government backing the Arabs.

Gender roles were not so much changed during Fur versus Arab conflict because there was no forced migration from rural areas to urban centers like it happened in the current conflict. Therefore we can conclude that conflict of 1987 led to poverty among Fur tribe and hence poverty was characterized as ethnic factor as the properties of Fur tribe were totally being robbed by Arab which later forced Fur tribe to launch an insurgency against the government.

The root causes of the current conflict in Darfur region was categorized by some scholars as the conflict between Arabs and African in competing for power control. The argument lacked a validity to justify the historical events in which the community of Darfur region lived in peace having mutual intermarriage relations among the existing ethnic groups. Secondly the formation of some Arabs elites to arm forces to fight the government dismantles the fact that the conflict has ethnic

roots. The good relation between the SLM faction of Nur and some outlaws from Arab ethnic group living west of Jebel Marra is also cut doubt that the conflict embedded ethnic factors.

The current conflict in Darfur deepened poverty rates among Fur, Zaghawa and Masaleet ethnic groups differently when their farms were destroyed and burnt by the Arabs and that was been seen as ethnicization of poverty because Arab ethnic group destroyed deliberately the livelihoods and modes of production of Fur, Zaghawa and Masaleet and forcing them to migrate to big cities staying in the camps depending on food provided to them by UN agencies and International organizations. Changing in the livelihood patterns of African ethnic groups due to the conflict contributed to the change in the economic balance of power as Arab ethnic group who backed by the government benefited from the current situation as they become the only suppliers of cattle in the market beside owning land cruisers that can be used dually in local transportation and fighting.

Gender responsibilities and duties also changed in favor of men. More burdens were put on women's shoulders. Women took care of their children and worked in informal sector to provide money to their children who enrolled in IDPs schools and in need of medical care, men on the other hand did marginal work which is not enough to pay for the living cost which turned to be high expensive. Women's livelihoods were affected badly by the conflict women in Darfur are productive entities they work on farms cultivating millet, dura, ground nuts, vegetables and water melon as well as they involve in petty trades and border trades. Women of the African ethnic group after the eruption of the conflict found them without production means and without money to reestablish new income generating activities that would have help them not only to survive but to resist.

Poverty on the other hand played as essential role in triggering the conflict as the main indigenous ethnic groups of Fur, Masaleet, Zaghawa and Berti found themselves poor as a result of marginalization of the region and the destruction of their economic base due to the continuation of conflicts between Arabs and non-Arabs thus this situation induced them to launch an insurgent against the government as they perceived the government the main supporter to Arab ethnic groups.

Ethnicity alone is not a factor of fueling conflict, because there were conflicts occurred between the same Arab ethnic groups competing over the natural resources and water supply induced the conflict between Nawaiba and Hutiya tribe in Zalingei in 2005, and conflict between Misiriya and Rezeigat in 2010, Rezeigat and Beni Hussein in 2013 and conflict between Rezeigat and Maalia in 2013.

Changing in the balance of power in Darfur as a result of the current conflict also contributed to the increase of poverty rates among the displaced persons as their economy and livelihood being destroyed during the conflict, and they are unable to cultivate their land if they decided to return voluntarily to their original villages because some of them who decided to return home exposed to sexual harassment and killing by Arab militia.

Peace and reconciliation are regarded as the main elements for sustainable development and peace, but till now the political process in Darfur was seemingly not promising lasting peace as there are some armed groups outside the negotiation table such as JEM, SLA Abdel wahid wing and SLA Minni faction.

Sustainable reconciliation and peace in Darfur required packages of developmental projects. Leadership/political will and new vision to solve the current conflict is so excited and required bringing or making peace required a wide political vision accompanied with maintaining rule of law and state dignity.

The tribal reconciliation conferences that were held in Darfur since 1980s of the last century failed to bring sustainable peace and stability in Darfur that was due to many factors:

First, the mechanism in which conflicts were resolved was not based on scientific methods as after signing the peace agreements between the conflicting tribes conflicts erupted again in more brutal and destructive manner, lack of appropriate mechanism to follow up the recommendations and decrees of the conferences also contributed negatively to the recurrence of the conflicts, and it had been found that all tribal reconciliation conferences since the 1970s of the last century till now lacked of involving women in peace making process as many of the native administrative leaders and the mediators strongly believe that women are not effective to mediate between the conflicting parties and due to cultural restrictions that hamper involvement of women in any peace making mechanism.

In addition, the emergence of *Hikimdarat* i.e. militia commanders as a fighting force who used to impose their views of solutions to the peace making committees and in many cases if they are not agreed with the peace agenda; lasting peace will not be achieved, they will resume the conflict in more brutal manner.

Furthermore, peace building projects required the involvement of both men and women in transforming the torn relations into cooperation and tolerance and this can't be achieve unless women should be involved equally with men as the dimensions of conflict affected the two sexes. Involving women in peace building process and reconciliation is essential in transforming negative impacts of conflict to cooperation and tolerance.

Arab ethnic groups are more sensitive and aggressive in involving women in peace building activities although Arabs women singers Hakamats are used to fuel and triggered conflicts when they sing for the youth to enter into fighting with their

rivalry tribe it is an opposite picture which needs new vision to integrate women in peace building process so as to ensure the sustainability of peace and stability in the torn region of Darfur.

It has been recognized that the migrations patterns that occurred in the early 1970s and 1980s of the last century particularly those migrations from Central African Republic and Chad to West Darfur contributed to the eruption of the ethnic conflicts as the new migrants tended to claim land ownership and calling for changing the customs and norms that govern the usage of land according to Hakura system land in Darfur reflects a symbol of dignity, power and identity. Disputes on land issues are not new in the modern history of Darfur there are many conflicts erupted between the existing ethnic groups since the 1964s when Maalia tribe fought with Rezeigat tribe in Abu karinka place in east Darfur state, then followed by Arab versus Fur conflict in and around Jebel Marra in 1987-89; conflict between Arab and Masaleet in 1996-98 in Dar Masaleet; conflict between Rezeigat and Beni Hussein in 2013 in Jebel Amir in North Darfur; conflict between Beni Helba and Gimer in Katila in South Darfur 2013 etc.

The Findings:

Darfur region is considered as one of the most volatile regions in Sudan after South Sudan in which many tribal conflicts occurred from time to another among the existing ethnic groups in addition the region witnessed events of armed robberies during the 1980s of the last century and proliferation of small arms and weapons due to the Chadian- Chadian Conflict, the Islamic Legion and the War between Libya and Chad on Azo strip.

The ongoing conflict in Darfur that erupted in 2003 has economic, social, gender, environmental and political dimensions, the region was destroyed, and most of the

farmers fled from their origin villages to the towns as internal displaced persons and refugees in the neighboring countries seeking for security and peace.

This study, the “interplay of ethnic and gender factors in deepening poverty in conflict in West Darfur State”, explores how poverty and conflict deepened the situation in the region and how gender and ethnic factors are characterized the dimensions of the conflict. The research after analyzing the data gathered from the field and secondary sources come out with the following findings:

First, it was hypothesized that the destruction of the economic base of non- Arab descendants by the Arab militias led to the impoverishment and changing livelihoods of Fur, Masaleet, Zaghawa and Erenga tribes as they becoming less productive and exposed to severe poverty which later urged them to launch the conflict to protect their dignity and properties.

According to the findings of the research; there is a direct relationship between the systematic destruction of economic base and livelihoods of Fur, Zaghawa, Erenga and Masaleet ethnic groups by the Arab militias since 1989s. Though the tribal reconciliation conference between Fur and Arabs was held in Al fasher to end the clashes between Fur and Arabs and instead of building the social ties and networks that were torn by the conflict with the absence of government authorities to follow up the recommendations of the peace agreement, armed banditry continued to rob and loot Fur, Masaleet, Erenga and Zaghawa properties systematically for twenty years and hence they were been impoverished totally as they lost most of their cattle, properties and their crops which later urged them to launch an insurgency against the government of Khartoum as they perceived that the government is backing Arabs against them.

Accompanied with weak government institutions that cannot achieve social justice, an organized armed banditry grew up faster in Fur, Masaleet, Erenga and

Zaghawa areas causing damage to the farms, looting, beating, killing and raping women without religious and manner scruples exposing Fur, Zaghawa, Erenga and Masaleet tribes to fall into extreme poverty. That miserable situation motivated the impoverished tribes to defend their land from appropriating by forming armed militias to protect themselves and their properties.

Moreover the distinction between Arabs and Africans can be linked to a process of societal marginalization than to racial perceptions. The ethnicity perceptions in Darfur seem to be more the result of a constructive process than primordial feelings. However it's important to recognize that ethnicity did a vital role in the emergence of the conflict between Fur versus Arabs in 1987-89 and between Arabs versus Masaleet 1996-98. But in the current conflict ethnicity plays a minor role as a sole root of the conflict though the conflict was organized and launched by African ethnic groups there were some Arabs fighters joining SLA/M and JEM.

Second, it was hypothesized that lack of real political participation and marginalization of the peripheries by the successive governments of Sudan led to the emergence of regional armed movement's insurgency demanding for equal power and wealth sharing. According to the findings of the study it's approved that Sudan since independence of the country in 1956 did not create a national permanent constitution to explore how power and wealth can be divided between the regions instead the country fluctuated between democratic and non-democratic regimes in which non democratic regimes are extended for more than four decades.

With the absence of good governance and lack of projects for nation building in addition to blurry or fog in the identification of identity whether Sudan belong to Arabs or Africans. The successive governments that ruled Sudan since independence of the country failed to achieve equal development and manage the

diversity between the regions in addition to the lack of real political participation to the elites of marginalized regions, all those grievance combined led to the emergence of peaceful and armed movements struggling for power and wealth sharing. In 1964 regional movements of demands were formed in Darfur, Nuba Mountain and East Sudan in early 1958, demanding for equal development and equal political participation in the federal and regional government.

Unfortunately the successive governments did not pay attention to those demands instead they neglected the demands of the peripheries as a result of that deniable South Sudan witnessed two rebellion movements in 1964 under the chair of Colonial Josef Lago who named his movement South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) with a military wing named as Anyaya one and a second rebellion movement chaired by Dr. John Garang in 1983 named as Sudanese People Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) claiming for ending marginalization and calling for equal power and wealth sharing in a new perspective, Garang named it new Sudan project.

The ideas of Dr. Garang of New Sudan found a solid ground for elites of the margin in the lack of national projects to unite Sudan in new bases as a result of that new armed movements emerged in Darfur claiming for ending marginalization and equal participation of power and wealth sharing with the center those movements are Sudanese Liberation Army and Justice and Equality Movement who they launched a brutal attacks and counter attacks with the government forces and its militias since 2003 till now although some armed movements signed peace agreements in Abuja in 2006 and Doha in 2011, but still fighting is going on between the government of Sudan and non –signatory armed movements.

Third, it was hypothesized that famine, migration and recurrent drought that stricken the African Sahel and Darfur since early 1970s and 1980s of the last century contributed negatively to the emergence of ethnic clashes between the indigenous African and Arab ethnic groups on seizing lands.

According to the findings of the study, it is found that famine that stricken the African Sahel and Darfur in the 1970s and 1980s of the previous century had led to waves of migrations from Chad, Central African Republic and Niger to Darfur and waves of migration inside Darfur region from northward to southward. As the consequence of those waves of migrations from the neighboring countries migrated to Darfur, the major ethnic groups migrated from Chad to Darfur were; Tama, Awald Zeid, Shajerat, Bargo, Mahameed, Awlad Tako, Maharia and Salamat. They settled in Darfur in different places particularly in areas of Fur, Masaleet and Gemir. As the same time there was internal migration from north Darfur to southwards as the northern parts of Darfur lacked from water sources and pasture due to famine and drought where as the major tribes who migrated to central and south Darfur were Zaghawa, Maharia and Abul Jalool.

Before the dissolution of native administration system in Sudan in early 1970s by Neimeri regime those who migrated from one place to another they bring letters from their native administration leaders to their counterparts of the land owners expressing the time of their staying in those lands, the number of people who accompanied them, then the native administration leaders of the host areas grant them a place to settle, to graze and a piece of land for cultivating.

But after the abolition of the native administration system in early 1970s things were not in favor of the indigenous people because the migrants from the neighboring countries tended to disrespect the norms and customs that govern land usages and ownership tend to use violence to acquire land and graze in arable land

used by the farmers. As drought and famine continued hitting the region with the absence of government project to combat desertification and drought, cattle and camel herders migrated southwards seeking for water and pasture and instead they entered into conflicts with Fur and Masaleet ethnic groups because the lands of Fur and Masaleet are rich arable lands with water sources.

Fourth, it was hypothesized that the exclusion of women from conflict resolution mechanisms and reconciliation processes contributed to the lack of sustainable peace and social stability in Darfur. To examine this hypothesis it is found that women in Darfur played a greater role in fueling conflicts and disputes between individual and groups of people and those women are known as *Hakamas* i.e. war singers who fueled and triggered conflicts between the existing tribes. Darfurian culture is based on paternal authoritarian in whom man decided everything; women are subjected to men's thoughts and ideas; women suffered more to decide their own future under this system.

Furthermore the hypothesis approved positively that most of the tribal conflicts in Darfur whether characterized by ethnic or not are used to be solved by the native administration leaders and community and religious leaders peacefully and the perpetrators were offended and punished and no person deliberate to disrespect those sentences against him or his tribe that situation was continued for many years without interruption as most of the people respected the norms and customs that govern the relations between the tribes. Tribal peace agreements were purely man made women were excluded in the peace making and peace building process, although women may be affected by the conflict but men only who decided the shape and agenda for peace which later contributed negatively to the sustainability of peace and social stability in the torn region.

Fifth, it was hypothesized that the more inter- ethnic relations move from harmony to tensions and conflict the more women were victimized and exposed to poverty. Conflict in Darfur has gendered dimensions; women and men were differently exposed to crimes against humanity. Women were raped, exposed to sexual violence and sexual assaults whereas men exposed to torture, kidnapping and killing. Many UN agencies that worked in Darfur reported that women of Fur, Masaleet, Erenga and Zaghawa were exposed to rape and sexual violence. Women in Darfur are regarded as greater contributors to the local economy they practice farming, petty trading and employee in the government sector. After the examination of the hypothesis, it is positively approved that the current conflict in Darfur caused huge damage and destruction to the women's economic practice as prior to the conflict women gained a lot of money from farming and trading whereas after the conflict women lost everything they abandoned their land, lost their properties and exposed to severe economic shocks and hence they become unable to support their families with income as before the conflict.

The interplay of ethnic and gender factors in deepening poverty and conflict in Darfur was obvious as feminization of poverty attached to the women of non Arabs ethnic groups who affected by the conflict more than their counterparts from Arabs ethnic groups.

Recommendations:

The research recommended the following:

1. Promoting and creating sustainable peace and reconciliation required reforming the existing institutions to absorb the notion of managing diversity in a manner that will lead to social peace and tolerance. Moreover sustainable reconciliation has to address the root causes of the conflict; handling the consequences of the

conflict on both men and women is a vital process in healing the hatred between the victims and the perpetrators.

2. Poverty as a social, economic and political phenomenon should be treated in a comprehensive manner that will look for gender sensitive approach and gender equality as a way of achieving justice and equality between men and women who experienced poverty differently.

3. International humanitarian law and International human rights law are important areas in exploring the human rights abuses before, during and after the conflict which will impose the political, military and militias leaders to respect human rights and hence will mitigate committing gender based violence.

4. Setting up of democratic institutions accompanied along side with the establishment of strong civil society organizations in order to achieve sustainable peace and social stability that cannot be achieved in a divided society without effective involvement of civil society organizations, along with government-related institutions, during and after the conflict situation to address the root causes of the conflict.

5. Achieving equal social and development will mitigate the possibility of emerging new conflicts to erupt. Moreover the reconstruction of Darfur regions requires providing income generating activities to both farmers and pastoralists who lost their prosperities during the conflict.

6. New education system should be developed by the government ministry lines to develop a new curriculum to integrate peace, identity, development, justice, and equality and conflict studies into education system so as to create new generation having new ideas on how to live together and respect each other.

7. Controlling the borders between Chad and Sudan will help in controlling the migration patterns and thus conflicts will be reduced as a result of competing over natural resources.

8. New mechanisms should be created to involve women in peace building process and follow up of recommendations of the tribal conferences as well as strengthening the role of native administrative leaders in conflict resolution and peace building processes.

Suggestions for further Studies:

1. More studies and researches should be done on fighting corruption and ethnic diversity will pave the way for national unity and sustainable reconciliation.

2. Gender dimensions to poverty, ethnicity and conflict also needed to have more studies and researches since the existing institutions and civil organizations lack data on gender disaggregated.

3. More studies and researches in gender, conflict and poverty are required to explore the root causes of the current conflict and tribal based conflicts in a gender perspective.

4. Carrying out common researches on issues concerning cultural diversity, rule of law, land ownership, economic cooperation and security control mechanisms between Chad and Sudan.

5. Further studies in measuring poverty and its dimensions should be taken by the government related institutions and international organizations working in the field in Darfur to provide aggregated data for those who living under poverty line.

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Appendixes:

1. Appendix (1): Tribal Reconciliation Peace Agreement between Hutiya and Nawabia 2005.
2. Appendix (2): Tribal Reconciliation Peace Agreement between Salamat and Misiriya in 2013.
3. Appendix (3): Tribal Reconciliation Peace Agreement between Beni Hussein and Reizyagat Al fasher 2013.
4. Appendix (4): Report of Committee of Inquiry to the conflict between Salamat and Misiriya Central Darfur State, 2013.